

PRIME MINISTER

Meeting with President Kyprianou

You are seeing him on Monday
afternoon. He will be accompanied by his
Foreign Minister (Mr. Iacovu) and High
Commissioner.

The Foreign Secretary will also attend.
The FCO would like to send an official:
you have previously tried to keep your
meetings with Kyprianou very small and
this has worked well. Agree to limit it
to Ministers and note-takers?

I attach a card.

Yes not

C.D.P.

C. D. POWELL

11 January, 1985

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU

1. Encouraged by progress since last meeting. Recognise your statesmanship. Turks and Denktash also seem ready for concessions. Time to clinch.
2. ? Prospects for high-level meeting.
3. Suggest you focus on the really indispensable points: veto powers and quality of territory to be restored. Leave troop withdrawals till later.
4. Confident that Secretary-General will handle fairly. We support him.
5. See risks in reopening question of guarantees. No doubt that Turks will insist on remaining a Guarantor Power.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

11 January 1985

CM

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's Meeting with President Kyprianou: 14 January

I enclose briefing for the Prime Minister's meeting with President Kyprianou at 4.30 pm on 14 January.

The brief is rather fuller than usual. We believe that this is unavoidable on this occasion given the important stage the Cyprus question has reached, its complexity, and the fact that Kyprianou may go into detail.

I enclose a copy of the recent JIC assessment for ease of reference.

*Yours ever,
Peter Ricketts*

(P F Ricketts)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU:
14 JANUARY

STEERING BRIEF

Introduction

1. The meeting is at President Kyprianou's request. He is stopping over on his way to New York for the high level meeting with Denktash on 17 January. We are not aware that he is seeing any other European or American leaders.
2. Last year the Prime Minister met President Kyprianou in January, June, September and on 19 November. A record of the November meeting is at Annex A.
3. The United Nations Secretary General announced the agreement to a high level meeting on 12 December. The Greek Cypriots maintain that there are a number of important issues to be discussed before the draft high level agreement [redacted] is signed. Denktash and the Turks insist that the purpose of the meeting is merely to fill in certain blanks left for dates in the agreement and that there can be no further negotiation on the text.
4. Just as Ozal in his message to the Prime Minister sought understanding for Denktash's position President Kyprianou will want to seek support and understanding for his. His purpose in so doing will be partly that in the event of breakdown less blame will attach to him. He may also want us to intercede with the Secretary General and to put pressure on the Turks to ensure that he is not forced into signing an unsatisfactory document on 17 January. He has told the High Commissioner in Nicosia he wants to discuss Turkish troop withdrawals and guarantees for a settlement.

*Passage deleted and retained
under Section 3(4)*

British/

*Wayland
15 July 2014*



British Objectives

5. a) To show our concern about the problem in order to protect our interests in Cyprus and to avoid Greek Cypriot blame in the event of breakdown.

b) To encourage Kyprianou to show the courage, realism and statesmanship necessary to seize what may be a unique opportunity.

c) To re-emphasise our support for the United Nations Secretary General, reminding Kyprianou of our efforts up to now and resisting attempts to cast us as mediator.

Cypriot Objectives

6. a) To present and justify Kyprianou's position.

b) Possibly to urge us to press the Secretary General and/or the Turks to bring about the scenario Kyprianou wants.

c) To discuss troop withdrawals and guarantees for a settlement.

Background

7. The attached JIC assessment, "Cyprus: High level meeting to be a turning point?" approved on 10 January, provides much of the background.

8. We understand that Kyprianou greatly values his meetings with the Prime Minister. Her suggestions for flexibility and moderation appear to have been heeded in the past.

9. The opportunities for a settlement now seem better than at any time since the Turkish invasion of 1974. This is because:

a) following 'UDI', the Greek Cypriots seem at last to have understood that the passage of time works to Turkish Cypriot advantage: failure to reach a settlement would probably swiftly be followed by consolidation of the 'TRNC' and permanent partition.

b) Denktash has responded to Turkish pressure and wants to avoid blame for a breakdown.

Passages deleted and retained
under Section 3(4). C. Wayland
15 July 2014

c) the Turks and, even more unusually, the Greeks are acting positively on Cyprus at present. - Papandreou has gone as far as to recognise publically the significance of Denktash's concessions during the proximity talks.

d) The Secretary-General holds over the heads of both parties the threat of making public where he believe blame lies in the event of a breakdown.

10. While we believe that we have a good understanding of the current situation, we are not certain of all the details, some of which appear to have been conveyed orally and some of which may be tactically crucial. The UN Secretary General is keeping his own counsel: even his closest UN advisers have not been fully briefed on his plans. He may have more than one round of high level talks in mind. And we believe there is at least one document put forward by each side (there may be others) / _____ which will be considered at the meeting.

11. In these circumstances, _____ we should not give specific advice to Kyprianou. We should not, for instance, urge him to sign the draft agreement as it stands. This would risk cutting across what we believe to be a deliberate policy by the Secretary-General to blur the issues to ensure a meeting takes place.

12. We could nonetheless suggest how he might pursue some of his concerns. The Secretary-General has told Sir J Thomson that he hopes the Greek Cypriots will concentrate at the meeting on matters that are 'really indispensable' for them, for example, the extent of the Turkish Cypriot veto and the quality of territory to be restored to them. He feels he might be able to obtain concessions from the Turkish Cypriots on these points.

13. The Greeks have recently stressed the prime importance of early Turkish troop withdrawals. The Secretary General believes that immediate pressure for this would cause the talks to collapse.



14. The Greek Cypriots attach importance to establishing new guarantees for a settlement in addition to or instead of the present Treaty (Annex B), bringing in other Western countries (rather than Eastern bloc or non-aligned). The Turks want to retain the present guarantee arrangements.

15. A preliminary FCO study of this concludes our interests also lie in preserving the status quo. Change would open up the possibility, inter alia, of a Soviet toe-hold in Cyprus. See also Essential Facts.

16. President Kyprianou has just completed a government reshuffle in which he replaced ministers regarded as close to the Communist Party (AKEL). The only surprise was the departure of Veniamin, a heavyweight who ran the defence and interior ministeries and who had made extensive contingency plans for arms purchases. Kyprianou's political position at home remains secure with all-party support for his position on the negotiations.

Tactics and the likely course of the meeting

17. The Prime Minister might congratulate Kyprianou on progress so far and invite his views on the prospects for the high level meeting.

18. Kyprianou will probably explain his views on how the meeting should be conducted, stressing the need for further Turkish Cypriot movement and clarifications. He may ask for the Prime Minister's support and intervention with the Secretary-General (whom he may criticise) or with the Turks.

19. We should avoid any commitment to intervene. We should express support for the Secretary General and confidence in his intention to work for a balanced outcome.

20. If appropriate, we should explain that we are not aware of all the details of the negotiations nor do we know how the Secretary General plans to run the meeting.



21. But we should say that Turkish Cypriot feeling on Turkish troop withdrawals appears to be very strong. As Kyprianou wants to see substantive negotiations on a number of subjects, it might be prudent to leave this question to the latest stage of the meeting or to a subsequent occasion. We should suggest that Kyprianou would do best to concentrate on issues where there may still be Turkish Cypriot flexibility eg on the extent of a Turkish Cypriot veto power and quality of territory to be returned.
22. We should emphasise that the high level meeting is a unique opportunity to lay the basis for a permanent settlement to the Cyprus problem. Realistically the status quo ante Turkish Cypriot "UDI" is no longer an option. We know it will require courage and statemanship and that difficult negotiations lie ahead. But it is very important for the people of Cyprus and for stability in southern Europe that a breakdown is avoided.
23. When Kyprianou raises the question of guarantees for a settlement we should avoid making commitments, but remind him of Turkish insistence on remaining a Guarantor Power.
24. Kyprianou may probe our reaction to a breakdown and suggest a British initiative. The best hope remains with the Secretary General. A breakdown must be avoided.
25. Detailed briefing is attached.



POINTS TO MAKE

1. Encouraged by progress made in third round of proximity talks. Recognise statesmanship you have shown. Also that many difficult questions still to be resolved. Important both sides approach high level meeting in positive spirit. Risk of leaving tactical advantage with Denktash. Need to maintain the international support you currently enjoy.
2. Understand Denktash may have made some important concessions. You have too. Appears both Denktash and Turks are more prepared than ever before to achieve a settlement. Must not miss this unique opportunity.
3. How do you see prospect of successful high level meeting?
4. (When Kyprianou has described his concerns) Troop withdrawals likely to be most difficult for Denktash. Would need careful handling and might best be dealt with last or postponed. Suggest concentrating initially on other issues, say, clarification of the extent of Turkish Cypriot veto powers and quality of territory to be restored.
5. (If necessary) Breakdown could mean lost opportunity to regain significant territory. Turkish Cypriots would be tempted to move fast to consolidate "TRNC".

Pressure on Secretary General and/or Turks (if raised)

6. Do not have details of negotiations. Confident that the Secretary General will handle the meeting fairly. We have been in touch with all the parties and have strongly urged the Turks at all stages to be positive.

Guarantees

7. Realise how important this matter is to both sides. Believe that Turks could insist on remaining a Guarantor Power. Would want to work closely with Secretary General on any ideas.



British initiative in the event of breakdown (if raised)

8. Still firmly convinced that United Nations Secretary General's initiative remains best way forward. Would not want to do anything which could cut across his efforts. Hope you remain committed to support him.

TREATY OF GUARANTEE

The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the other part,

- I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and regulated by the Basic Articles of its Constitution, are in their common interest,
- II. Desiring to co-operate to ensure respect for the state of affairs created by that Constitution,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution.

It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island.

ARTICLE II

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.

ARTICLE III

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to it by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus⁽¹⁾ signed at Nicosia on to-day's date.

ARTICLE IV

In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.

In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.

ARTICLE V

The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The original texts of the present Treaty shall be deposited at Nicosia.

The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible to the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.