

GR 934

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM MOSCOW 141535Z JANUARY

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 57 OF 14 JANUARY

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, PARIS, BONN, UKDIS GENEVA
AND MODUK (FOR DS17).

INFO SAVING TOKYO AND HELSINKI

GROMYKO INTERVIEW ON GENEVA RESULTS. MT

SUMMARY.

1. IN A TELEVISION INTERVIEW ON 13 JANUARY GROMYKO GAVE THE MOST DETAILED SOVIET ACCOUNT TO DATE OF THE GENEVA TALKS AND OF SOVIET POSITIONS ON THEM. CONTINUING THE ATTACK ON US PLANS TO PURSUE SDI RESEARCH HE STRESSED THAT NO PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE MADE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHOUT AGREEMENT ON SPACE. SOME NEW EMPHASIS BUT NOTHING SUBSTANTIALLY NEW.

DETAIL.

2. GROMYKO'S QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION WITH ZHUKOV(PRAVDA), MATVEYEV (IZVESTIA), BOGACHYOV(TASS) AND ZORIN (TELEVISION AND RADIO COMMENTATOR) TOOK UP ONE HOUR AND FIFTY MINUTES OF PRIME TIME EVENING VIEWING. HE SPOKE ALMOST ENTIRELY ON THE GENEVA TALKS OUTCOME. HIS MAIN POINTS WERE :

GENEVA.

- A. THE GENEVA TALKS WERE 'DIFFICULT' BUT 'BUSINESSLIKE, SERIOUS, AND FRANK' : THE RESULTS WERE 'ON THE WHOLE, POSITIVE'.
- B. THE US ADMINISTRATION HAD TRIED TO PREVENT DISCUSSION OF SPACE - THIS WAS 'ABSOLUTELY UNACCEPTABLE'. BUT IT WAS AGREED THAT NEITHER STRATEGIC NOR INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COULD BE DISCUSSED WITHOUT SPACE WEAPONS. SHULTZ HAD SINCE WRITTEN TO SAY THAT THE US WOULD STICK TO THE AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS OF GENEVA. THIS WAS A 'POSITIVE SIGN' BUT, GROMYKO ADDED, 'WE WILL WAIT AND SEE'.

STRUCTURE.

- C. ALTHOUGH 'THEORETICALLY' IT WAS POSSIBLE TO ENVISAGE SUCCESS ON STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE QUESTIONS AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE WOULD UNDO IT. THE SOVIET UNION HAD THEREFORE ARGUED 'SHARPLY' THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO EXAMINE THOSE QUESTIONS PRODUCTIVELY WITHOUT CONSIDERING SPACE. THERE SHOULD NOT BE AGREEMENT IN ONE WORKING GROUP REGARDLESS OF ANOTHER. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO SEPARATE TALKS ON STRATEGIC FROM INTERMEDIATE SYSTEMS (SINCE, FOR THE SOVIET UNION, ALL MISSILES COULD REACH THEIR TERRITORY), NOR THOSE FROM SPACE SYSTEMS (SINCE BOMBS COULD COME FROM SPACE) . BUT SOLUTIONS TO THE WHOLE COMPLEX WERE POSSIBLE GIVEN THE WILL.

/PROSPECTS.

PROSPECTS.

- E. THE SOVIET UNION WANTED BUSINESSLIKE AND SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS AND TO SEE THE GENEVA GOALS ADHERED TO. IF THE US INTENTION SPACE WEAPONS WAS ONLY TO GLORIFY THEIR IMPORTANCE IN STRENGTHENING PEACE THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE SENSELESS, FUTILE UNDERTAKING. IF THEY RENEGED ON THE NEED IDENTIFIED TO PREVENT AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE THE TALKS WOULD BE TORPEDOED.
- F. PROSPECTS FOR STRATEGIC WEAPONS REDUCTIONS, IF AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THE PREVENTION OF MILITARISATION OF SPACE, WOULD BE 'MORE FAVOURABLE THAN SO FAR' AND PROGRESS SHOULD BE POSSIBLE. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE PREPARED FOR A 'SHARP REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS'. BUT IF THERE WERE NO PROGRESS ON SPACE IT WOULD BE 'SUPERFLUOUS TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS'.
- G. THE AMERICANS HAD STATED CLEARLY IN GENEVA THAT SDI TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT COULD BE PROHIBITED, BUT RESEARCH SHOULD BE CONTINUED SINCE A BAN COULD NOT BE VERIFIED. BUT WHY SHOULD THERE BE RESEARCH, WHEN A TOTAL BAN WAS THE GOAL? 'RESEARCH, WITH A VIEW TO DEVELOPING A LARGE-SCALE MISSILE DEFENCE MUST BE REJECTED'.
- H. TO DESCRIBE SDI AS DEFENSIVE WAS 'CUNNING AND PERFIIDIOUS'. THE SYSTEM WAS OFFENSIVE SINCE THE PLAN AGGRESSIVE EVEN IF A NUCLEAR STRIKE WERE NOT LAUNCHED FROM BEHIND THE SHIELD. THE US WOULD USE IT FOR PRESSURE AND BLACKMAIL. BUT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NEVER LET ITSELF BE PUT IN A SUBORDINATE POSITION.

INF.

- I. CONTINUED AMERICAN DEPLOYMENT (AS STILL CONFIRMED BY THE US) WOULD MAKE THE SITUATION 'MUCH MORE COMPLICATED'. AT GENEVA THE RUSSIANS WARNED THAT THIS WOULD CALL THE NEGOTIATIONS INTO QUESTION. GROMYKO HOPED THAT THE US WOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF THIS.
- J. ON INCLUSION OF CARRIER AIRCRAFT IN INF TOTALS (COUNTING 40 NUCLEAR CAPABLE PLANES PER SHIP, WITH TWO OR THREE MISSILES EACH) NOT ONLY THE SIX US CARRIERS AROUND EUROPE, BUT 'AT SOME STAGE OF THE TALKS' ALL 15, COULD BE RAISED.

BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS.

- K. THE US HAD NOT ALTERED ITS STANCE: THE SOVIET REPLY CONTINUED TO BE THAT THEY SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. IT WOULD BE TOTALLY UNJUSTIFIED FOR NATO TO RECEIVE A KIND OF ALLOWANCE OR BONUS. INCLUSION, NOT ELIMINATION, WAS THE DEMAND: US SYSTEMS MUST BE REDUCED CORRESPONDINGLY.

PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS.

- L. SALT II REMAINED "IN FORCE" BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT SINCE SALT II COMMITMENTS WERE NOT LEGALLY VALID (DUE TO US NON-RATIFICATION) BUT THE SIDES "PROCEED FROM THE PREMISE THAT WHAT IS OF POSITIVE IMPORTANCE SHOULD REMAIN IN FORCE ... AND THIS IS GOOD ". THE SOVIET UNION WAS FOR "UNIVERSAL DISARMAMENT AND UNIVERSAL VERIFICATION " AND WAS NOT IN THE HABIT OF VIOLATING ITS COMMITMENTS .
- M. THE US ADMINISTRATION HAD COME TO REALISE THAT THE HISTORY OF US AND SOVIET STRATEGIC WEAPONS HAD DEVELOPED DIFFERENTLY. ELIMINATING THE STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCE ("HEAVY" ICBMS AS OPPOSED TO BOMBERS, NUCLEAR AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND SUBMARINES) WAS NOT, THEREFORE, A "SERIOUS MATTER " SINCE THE US HAD AT LEAST UNDERSTOOD THAT THEIR DEMAND FOR A SHARP CUT IN ICBMS WAS "EXCESSIVE AND INAPPROPRIATE ". EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY REMAINED THE "HOLY OF HOLIES" IN ARMS TALKS.
- N. INDEPENDENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS , PROGRESS ON NUCLEAR ISSUES COULD BE MADE BY : TEST BAN AGREEMENT, NUCLEAR FREEZE, RATIFICATION OF AGREEMENTS ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS AND TEST THRESHOLDS , AND NOFUN.

CENTRAL AMERICA.

- O. THE RUSSIANS HAD RAISED THIS AT GENEVA. THEY DEPLORED US ACTIONS AND THEIR POLICY OF GROSS INTERVENTION AND UNDISGUISED TERRORISM, PARTICULARLY IN NICARAGUA , AND THE ECONOMIC BLOCKADE OF CUBA.

PEACE MOVEMENTS.

- P. GROMYKO REJECTED THE ARGUMENT THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD RELIED ON ANTI-WAR MOVEMENTS BUT FAILED TO PREVENT INF DEPLOYMENT. SUCH MOVEMENTS WERE FAR FROM EXHAUSTED.

US/SOVIET BILATERAL RELATIONS.

Q. THE SITUATION WAS UNSATISFACTORY. AGREEMENTS OVER THE LAST 10 YEARS WERE NOW FROZEN OR VOID AND DESPITE US STATEMENTS OF GOOD INTENT, REMAINED SO. A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME FROM THE ARMS NEGOTIATIONS WOULD MEAN A GREAT ADVANCE IN US/SOVIET RELATIONS.

3. COMMENT FOLLOWS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TOKYO AND HELSINKI.

SUTHERLAND

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EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

LIMITED

SOVIET D	PS/MR LUCE
DEFENCE D	PS/PUS
RESEARCH D	MR DEREK THOMAS
PLANNING STAFF	SIR W HARDING
EED	MR FERGUSSON
NAD	MR GOODALL
WED	MR JENKINS
ACDD	MR WESTON
FED	MR DAVID THOMAS
PS	
PS/LADY YOUNG	
PS/MR RIFKIND	

GR 281

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FROM MOSCOW 141500Z JANUARY

TO PRIORITY FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 58 OF 14 JANUARY

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON

INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO

INFO SAVING PARIS AND BONN

WASHINGTON TELNO 101 PARAS 2 AND 3 : THE GENEVA MEETING.

1. MY U S COLLEAGUE, WHO WAS A MEMBER OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION, MADE EXACTLY THE SAME POINTS ABOUT SHULTZ'S POSITION AND THE PRESIDENT'S ENGAGEMENT IN THE ISSUES DISCUSSED AT GENEVA WHEN I SAW HIM ON 12 JANUARY. UNTIL THE VERY EVE OF THE MEETING, HARTMAN HAD BEEN CONCERNED AT THE CONTINUING DIVISIONS IN WASHINGTON AND LACK OF A CLEAR LINE AND WAS FULL OF ADMIRATION FOR THE MANNER IN WHICH SHULTZ, SUPPORTED BY NITZE, HAD SUCCEEDED IN CREATING A UNIFIED DELEGATION. HE SEES IS AS MOST UNFORTUNATE THAT NITZE MUST NOW STAND DOWN. KAMPELMAN IS, IN HIS VIEW, FIRST RUNNER AS COORDINATOR IN THE FORTHCOMING NEGOTIATIONS.
2. ON THE PRESIDENT'S DEGREE OF COMMITMENT, HARTMAN TOLD ME THAT, IN HIS AND OTHERS' VIEW, THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON HAD BEEN MOST INFLUENTIAL AND SALUTORY. IT HAD ALSO BEEN USEFUL IN STIMULATING REAGAN TO DEFINE PUBLICLY IN ADVANCE OF GENEVA THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SDI RESEARCH AND DEPLOYMENT.
3. GROMYKO'S PERFORMANCE AT GENEVA HAD HOWEVER BEEN MIXED. AT TIMES, PARTICULARLY IN THE EXCHANGES ON THE COMMUNIQUE, HE HAD, TO DOBRYNIN'S OBVIOUS EMBARRASMENT, DISPLAYED THAT LACK OF GRASP WHICH HARTMAN HAD FOUND AT MORE THAN ONE MEETING WITH HIM LAST YEAR IN MOSCOW. HE WAS SHOWING HIS AGE. HOWEVER HE WAS IN VERY GOOD FORM AT THE TELEVISED QUESTION-AND-ANSWER SESSION WITH SOVIET JOURNALISTS ON 13 JANUARY REPORTED IN MY TELNO 57.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO PARIS AND BONN.

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LIMITED

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MR DEREK THOMAS
SIR W HARDING
MR FERGUSSON
MR GOODALL
MR JENKINS
MR WESTON
MR DAVID THOMAS

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