

RESTRICTED



PS

From: J S Wall

Date: 12 March 1985

cc: PS/Mr Rifkind

Mr Braithwaite

Mr Renwick

Mr Adam Fergusson

ECD(E)

WED

VISIT OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE TO MOSCOW:  
COMMUNITY ISSUES

1. I submit speaking notes on European Community issues for use by the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister in Moscow.
2. I also attach Mr Renwick's draft telegrams reporting on the outcome of the Anglo/German Economic talks which provide an update on the latest situation.
3. Sir Julian Bullard has recommended that the Prime Minister should try and have a word with Chancellor Kohl in Moscow if possible. We agree that this would be particularly helpful given the German blockage of own resources.

J S Wall

European Community Dept (Internal)

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VISIT OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
TO MOSCOW: SPEAKING NOTES ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ISSUES

A: Chancellor Kohl/Herr Genscher

Own Resources/UK Abatement

- Nine months after Fontainebleau own resources decision still not adopted. Must try and dispose of issue before European Council. We are no less committed than Germans to enlargement and understand German desire to keep up pressure on others.
  
- Fontainebleau must be implemented. This means writing own resources decision so that even if own resources generally are not made available until 1 January 1986, UK could receive 1000 mecu abatement in December 1985, thereby honouring Fontainebleau.
  
- Others unlikely to agree to German wish to make explicit linkage between availability of new own resources and ratification of Accession Treaties. Are likely, at very least to seek a provision to bring in own resources on 1 January (ie before instruments of accession are deposited) by unanimous decision of the





Council in the light of progress made over ratification of accession Treaties.

#### Enlargement

- Next weeks Foreign Affairs Council last chance to make successful European Council possible.
  
- German ideas for uncontrolled Spanish fishing after 10 years will not do - would prejudice future of painfully negotiated Common Fisheries Policy.
  
- If Five do not stick together, there will be no agreement, and enlargement itself may be at risk.
  
- Commission's proposals for transitional financing faithfully reflect Fontainebleau, and are only basis for solution.

#### Integrated Mediterranean Programmes

- Need to maintain common position on IMPs.
  
- Should be no further tilting of Structural Funds towards Mediterranean.





- Additional figure of 2 billion ecu for IMPs too high.
- Commission proposal not in accordance with Fontainebleau conclusions.
- Duration of IMPs should be five, not seven years. Must constitute definitive response to Greek Memorandum. Greece should have the lion's share of IMPs.
- We must have common position on IMPs at European Council.

#### Vehicle Emissions

- Progress made at Environment Council, on large and small cars.
- Outstanding issue remains emission levels for medium sized vehicles. UK cannot agree to standards for medium range which could only be met by catalytic converters.





- Prospect of Community agreement offers major benefits to environment, as well as preservation of internal market.
  
- Alternative is minimal short term environmental gain for Germany at cost of damage to internal market and less effective environmental approach in Community as a whole over longer term.





## SPEAKING NOTES ON EC ISSUES

B: Prime Minister Craxi/Signor Andreotti

### Own Resources/UK Abatement

- Must try to get this issue settled before European Council if agenda not to be overburdened.
  
- Hope Italian Presidency will make vigorous effort at next week's FAC to get settlement.
  
- Presidency proposal remains best available option since it permits our 1000 mecu to be made available, as agreed at Fontainebleau, before the end of 1985.
  
- Could not accept German amendment effectively making it impossible for us to get our abatement by the end of the year.
  
- If Presidency solution not possible then UK could accept double Inter-Governmental Agreement provided all other Member States could agree.

### Enlargement

- Final phase; must go for maximum progress at 17-20





March Foreign Affairs Council.

- Fisheries the crucial issue; bad deal would wreck the Common Fisheries Policy.
  
- On fisheries, Community must put clear position to Spaniards and impress on them that there is no further flexibility to come.
  
- Disarray in the Community will simply cause delay, and may put enlargement at risk.

Integrated Mediterranean Programmes

- Hope IMPs can be agreed at European Council though Greek domestic politics make this difficult.
  
- If agreement not possible should nonetheless aim for agreement that enlargement negotiation can be completed subject to overall Greek reserve on IMPs.
  
- UK remains ready to implement IMPs as agreed at Fontainebleau.
  
- Could not accept further tilting of Structural Funds





in favour of Mediterranean regions (commitments to Italy under Structural Funds already amount to 7 - 8.5 billion ecu over 5 years).

- Two billion ecu additional figure for IMPs also too high.

#### Vehicle Emissions

- Considerable progress made at 7 March Environment Council. Bottom line for us is that we could not agree to standards for medium range cars which could only be met by catalytic converters..

- If UK, France and Italy stick together, real prospect of agreement being reached.

#### GATT

- Community must put weight firmly behind the principle of new round at next weeks Foreign Affairs Council.

- Otherwise serious risk that US policy will start to move in directions bad for open trading system and dangerous for all of us.





## SPEAKING NOTES ON EC ISSUES

C: President Mitterrand/M Dumas

### Own Resources/UK Abatement

- Must avoid this coming to European Council if possible.
  
- German amendment to Presidency proposal not acceptable since would mean we could not get our abatement in 1985 as per Fontainebleau.
  
- Understand that French and German Governments accept that our abatement should be made in 1985.
  
- Community as a whole could not agree to other German condition, ie no own resources as a whole until Accession Treaties ratified.
  
- But might be possible to consider something on these lines provided provision was made for unanimous decision of Council to bring in own resources ahead of Accession Treaties depending on state of progress on ratification.





### Enlargement

- Very worried by disarray among Five fishing nations on fisheries.
  
- If France, UK and Ireland at least cannot hold firm on basis of jointly worked out position, omens for next weeks Foreign Affairs Council - and so for European Council - bleak.
  
- Time to stick together, not to produce radical new ideas which cannot command consensus and could only lead to protracted negotiations.

### Integrated Mediterranean Programmes

- Must not allow this issue to hold up completion of enlargement negotiations even if Greece maintains reserve.
  
- Commission proposals an improvement but cannot accept:
  - Further weighting of structural funds towards Mediterranean regions.
  - Additional figure of 2 billion ecu.





- Greece must have the lion's share of IMPS and IMPS should constitute definitive response to Green Memorandum.

#### Vehicle Emissions

- Both we and the French negotiated seriously at Environment Council.
- Agreement possible provided we stick together.
- Bottom line for us is that we could not accept standards for the medium range which could only be met by catalytic converters.

#### GATT

- Community must put weight firmly behind the principle of new round at next weeks Foreign Affairs Council.
- Otherwise serious risk that US policy will start to move in directions bad for open trading system and dangerous for all of us.



File No. ....

Department .....

Drafted by  
(Block Capitals) R W RENWICK .....

Tel. Extn. ....

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification	
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Precedence	
IMMEDIATE	
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FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched	(Date) .....	POSTBY .....	Z
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[TEXT]

COMMUNITY BUDGET

1. During the meeting of the Anglo-German Economic Committee yesterday, Ungerer went through the four elements of the German position. He was told that we could agree that

- (a) new own resources generally should come into effect from 1. January 1986;
- (ii) the 1985 deficit should be covered by an inter-governmental agreement. This should not repeat not be reimbursable, as this would be an unnecessary additional charge on the 1986 budget.

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(2) our 1,000 mecu should be received immediately following ratification of the new own resources decision. The decision must be written in such a way as to permit this to happen, as agreed at Fontainebleau<sup>u</sup>, before the end of 1985.

2. Our difficulty arose with the fourth German point, namely that the own resources decision should enter into force only after ratification also of the Treaty of Accession. This would not be agreed by others in the Council and would make it practically impossible for us to receive our 1,000 mecu before the end of the year.

3. Ungerer acknowledged that at present German Ministers were linking our 1,000 mecu also to ratification of the Accession Treaty. He appeared to think, however, that ~~this position might be modified and that~~ the Germans might agree that our 1,000 mecu should be received immediately following ratification of the own resources decision, while own resources generally should only be made available following ratification of the Accession Treaty.





## PRIME MINISTER'S BRIEFING

I GORBACHEV SPEECHES  
OF 20 FEB. AND  
11 MARCH

II PERSONALITY NOTES  
+ LIST OF THOSE ATTENDING

III BRIEFS FOR POSSIBLE BILATERALS

- Vice President Bush
  - Chancellor Kohl
  - Nakasone
  - Gonzales
  - General Zia
  - Rajiv Gandhi
  - Mitterrand
  - Craxi
  - Mulroney
- Nyerere
  - Nigerian
  - Botswana  
(for return trip)



## B. INTERNAL AFFAIRS

### Gorbachev's RSFSR Supreme Soviet Election Speech in Moscow

'Pravda' 21 Feb 85

Text of "Tass report" on 20th February meeting between M.S. Gorbachev, member of Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and voters of Kiev constituency in Moscow, "Following the course of unity and cohesion":

The election campaign in our country is taking place in an atmosphere of great work and political activity. It graphically demonstrates the unbreakable unity of the Party and people and the firm determination of Soviet people to strengthen the country's economic and defence power through selfless work. This was discussed at a meeting between the voters of the Kiev constituency in Moscow and RSFSR Supreme Soviet Candidate deputy Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, member of the Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on 20th February.

The Presidium included Comrades M.S. Gorbachev, V.V. Grishin, Ye.K. Ligachev, and N.I. Ryzhkov, leading production workers, Party and local government officials, scientists, and representatives of the public.

The meeting was opened by A.V. Korovitsyn, First Secretary of Kiev Rayon CPSU Committee.

An honorary presidium comprising the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee headed by Comrade K.U. Chernenko was elected with enthusiasm.

The candidate deputy's agent, I.N. Losev, adjuster at Moscow No. 1 tool-making works described M.S. Gorbachev's life and urged the voters unanimously to cast their votes on election day for the unbreakable bloc of communists and non-party people.

The meeting was addressed by V.N. Kudryavtsev, Director of the Institute of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences; L.A. Fedorova, teacher at No 5 school; and S.M. Bedin, Secretary of the Party Committee of the USSR Ministry of the Food Industry. They gave assurances that the rayon's working people would devote all their efforts, knowledge, and experience to a successful completion of the Five-Year Plan and giving a worthy welcome to the 27th CPSU Congress and the 40th anniversary of the great victory.

M.S. Gorbachev, who was warmly greeted by those present, delivered a speech. More than 60 years ago in his famous speech, "What is Soviet power", Vladimir Ilyich Lenin spoke words whose importance is still great even today: "Soviet power is the road to socialism which has been found by the working masses and is therefore correct and invincible."

By following this road, the speaker continued, our country has scaled tremendous heights in its economic, social and cultural development. And today Soviet power - the power of working people and for working people - is revealing its creative potential increasingly fully and successfully resolving the tasks of improving socialist society.

Precisely this determines the significance of the elections to the Soviets. In preparing for them the CPSU again and again checks its political course against the very rich experience of the people, which is a vital necessity and a law of activity for the ruling party in a socialist country. Service of the people is the summit of all the work of the CPSU, its Central Committee and the Soviet government.



The unity of the Party and people and working people's ardent support for the CPSU's internal and external policy have been displayed with renewed force in the course of the election campaign. It is the Party which elaborates the political line of our society's development and ensures its cohesion, the strength of the Soviet multinational state, and purposefulness in the work of state and public organisations. The basis of all our successes is the living creativity of the people, the unity of the Party's ranks, and the high responsibility and collectiveness of the work of the Central Committee and its Politburo, whose soul is Comrade K.U. Chernenko.

The nomination of Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, as candidate deputy to the supreme soviets of the union republics at numerous meetings is a vivid expression of this unbreakable link between the Party and people.

Soviet people rate highly Comrade K.U. Chernenko's multifaceted and fruitful activity in the highest posts in the Party and Soviet state and his great contribution to the elaboration of Marxist-Leninist theory and topical problems of building communism. Devotion to the cause of peace and communism, farsightedness and realism, a demanding attitude and sensitivity are distinctive features inherent in Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko as a leader of the Leninist type.

Work collectives in the capital, also in Kiev rayon, are among the collectives which nominated Comrade K.U. Chernenko as candidate deputy to the supreme body of state power in the RSFSR. Konstantin Ustinovich has asked that gratitude should be expressed to you for this confidence and that cordial greetings and best wishes should be conveyed to the communists and all working people of the rayon.

The election campaign is nearing its end. The best representatives of the working class, the collective farm peasantry, and the intelligentsia, people of different nationalities, ages, and vocations, have been nominated as candidate deputies. Their meetings with voters demonstrate working people's extremely profound interest in the affairs of their state and their readiness to continue to work selflessly for the good of their great homeland. Soviet man's characteristic sense of being the master of the country, a sense born of building socialism, is expressed in the vigorous and business-like nature of the election campaign.

It is both a great honour and a very great responsibility to be a people's deputy. I am well aware that I owe my nomination as candidate deputy to the prestige of the CPSU Central Committee and to the people's trust in the Party's policy. I am deeply grateful for the trust, the warm reception, and the business-like exhortations which have been heard in this auditorium today.

The entire heroic road of the Land of the Soviets is linked with the Party of communists. The CPSU's ability to approach social matters creatively and realistically from the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism, to lead the masses confidently towards the achievement of new heights of social development, and to assume responsibility for the historical destiny of the country - all this makes the Communist Party the guarantee of socialist progress.

This ability has again been displayed with the utmost force during the present stage, during the implementation of the Party's political course formulated by the 26th Congress and the subsequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee. The time since the congress has been a time of extremely crucial decisions, of major economic developments, and of the implementation of important measures to further develop socialist democracy and improve the style and methods of organisational, ideological and economic work.

On the Party's initiative, large-scale programmes such as the Food Programme and the Energy Programme have been formulated and are being implemented; the preparation of a comprehensive programme for the development of consumer goods production and the services sphere is being completed. Economic experiments are expanding, and collective forms of organising and providing incentives for work are being



developed. The school reform, which is a long-term social programme in the sphere of training and education, is being implemented. A number of important measures to improve the activity of the press, the films, and television and to strengthen the material base of culture have been taken.

Today it is possible to conclude with complete justification, M.S. Gorbachev emphasised, that the policy formulated by the Party is yielding fruitful results. In implementing the resolutions of the 26th Congress, the country has taken a significant step in economic, social and cultural development. In the light of the exacerbation of the international situation, the Soviet state's defence power has been maintained at the proper level.

The last two years have brought a marked acceleration of the country's socio-economic development. Thanks to the people's selfless work and the vigorous measures which have been taken, it has been possible to improve the situation in the national economy. Average annual production growth rates in industry have increased by one-third. Changes for the better have emerged in the economy's qualitative characteristics.

The working people of the RSFSR are making a weighty contribution to the country's achievements. National income increased by 19% in the period between elections. Last year the entire increase in national income, and also the increase in industrial output and in the volume of construction and installation work and railway transport were obtained by means of improved labour productivity. This shows that Russia's economy is on the right road - the road of intensification and efficiency.

The initial results of implementation of the Food Programme are encouraging. The average annual gross agricultural production increased by 9% in 1983-84, as compared with the preceding two years, and an upsurge of stock farming and certain other sectors of the agroindustrial complex has emerged.

The economic progress has had a beneficial effect on Soviet people's living standards. Real incomes have increased and the supply of many types of industrial and food products to the population has improved. The Five-Year Plan targets for the construction of housing and schools are being successfully implemented.

The development of the socio-economic sphere is inseparable from the improvement of the political system and the deepening of our society's democratic principles. In order to make fuller use of the soviets' tremendous potential, their powers have been expanded and the Leninist principle of the unity of legislation, management and monitoring is being implemented more consistently.

A characteristic feature of the past years is the greater attention paid to ideological and political education work and the further development of science and culture. These vital issues were discussed at the June (1983) plenum, of the Central Committee which demanded that Party committees should seek to ensure the unity of ideological, economic and organisational efforts and the organic combination of our ideology's transforming power with the solution of economic and social tasks.

In short, much has been accomplished, the speaker noted. Our successes are based on intense and selfless work by communists, our heroic working class, the glorious collective farm peasantry and the people's intelligentsia. But it is not part of the Party's traditions to flatter itself and rest on its laurels. Many unsolved problems remain.

The country has reached most responsible heights of socio-economic development. As K.U. Chernenko emphasised. "We can and must MOVE FORWARD, GUIDED BY THE SUPREME AND MOST DEMANDING IDEAS OF SOCIALISM ELABORATED BY SCIENTIFIC THEORY. This is the essence of the profound qualitative changes that are urgently needed in all spheres of our society's life."

This is the strategic aim which forms the basis of all the Party's work to prepare for the 27th Congress. It will be a congress of tremendous theoretical and political



importance. It has to adopt the new revised edition of the CPSU Programme and determine the main line of our long-term development.

Painstaking work is currently under way on the draft basic guidelines for the economic and social development of the USSR in 1986-1990 and in the period up to the year 2000. It is these studies which are laying the foundations for our country's future and outlining the scientific, technical, economic and social shape with which the country will enter the 21st century.

A special place in the plans is occupied by matters connected with further improving the people's well-being and their material and spiritual living conditions. In this connection we are faced with the task of dynamically boosting production forces, renewing the material and technical base, intensifying the economy and enhancing its efficiency.

[Note: The Soviet television version of Gorbachev's speech (1800 gmt 20 Feb 85) included the following passage at this point: It is a matter of bringing the national economy up to a foremost world level, in terms of equipment and technology, in a short space of time. Above all, it is necessary to give greater priority to the development of machine-building, which is the prime basis for the technological renewal of all sectors of the national economy, and to pay increased attention to the re-equipping of existing enterprises and capacities. Greater emphasis must be put on an economic use of raw materials and fuel, and a situation must be achieved whereby economies in them become a key factor for ensuring increased production.]

This is not a simple matter. It demands the maximum effort, the mobilisation of the people's creative potential, the utilisation of all social, ideological, and moral resources and the enhancement of the responsibility of cadres at all levels.

The improvement of the economic apparatus and the entire system of economic management and the implementation of a number of structural shifts in production are on the agenda. The solution of these tasks necessitates the faster development of science and technology and the introduction of their achievements into practice. To increase the pace of scientific and technical progress is an imperative command of the times. Something else is equally important - to make efficient and thrifty use of everything that already exists.

Life shows that right now, using the same machine tools, the same equipment and the same land it is possible to produce larger quantities of better quality goods with less expenditure. Even though this conclusion is not new, it has not lost its topicality. It is important to study carefully time and again all the factors and all the components which ensure highly productive work and to better think out the machinery for spreading advanced experience. The causes of poor work by lagging enterprises and building sites, state farms and collective farms, and planning and design organisations must be investigated with the utmost principledness. Tremendous reserves for our economy's development are contained here, and they must be brought into operation.

The main thing now, the candidate deputy stressed, is to be able to transfer the Party's aims into the channel of practical solutions and real actions and persistently ensure their implementation. People judge the results of economic, organisational and educational activity by the way major and minor problems are resolved and shortcomings are eliminated. This requires considerably greater organisation, competence and purposefulness.

It is a matter of all cadres profoundly mastering the work style which has gone down in our Party's history as Bolshevik professionalism - the antithesis of paper-pushing and sessionmania, waffle and formalism. Professionalism means initiative, responsibility and the ability to carry out one's duties conscientiously. But often these qualities are lacking. The present year has shown this particularly graphically.

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
In connection with the frosts the situation in the production and consumer spheres in a number of regions of the country became difficult and a number of telegrams



asking for help arrived at the centre. But a severe winter cannot be considered a surprise in our country. We prepare for it in good time. However, here and there people have become used to saying "maybe we shall manage" in order to get by. And if they do not manage, some superior will set things to rights. This dependence and negligence are intolerable.

The Party Central Committee recently examined in detail the work of passenger transport. Measures which must be implemented by central organisations were defined. At the same time many issues emerged which were the result of insufficient attention being given to matters locally and the inability to organise affairs, to ensure precision in bus, tram and trolleybus traffic, and to be concerned about cadres and strengthening the repair base. Yet this falls within the competence of local soviets, which are called on to carry out the duties entrusted to them and in a demanding way monitor and hold people responsible for the assigned task.

It is also apposite to return to the question of work discipline and order. A great deal has been done in this direction recently and the results are obvious. But discipline and order are not needed for one day alone. They constitute an indispensable condition for steady work and the precise organisation of production and leisure, which means the well being of all society.

Our laws, our morality and our ideology stand guard over this well-being. And if we encounter squandering of worktime and dereliction of professional and public duty all measures of moral, legal and economic influence must be used against this. Work collectives are called on to do a great deal here. There is no place better than the work collective to see who takes what attitude to the job and who needs to be called to account and in what way.

At the same time, leaders of enterprises, economic organisations and local soviets must be concerned to create the conditions for highly productive work and eliminate hold-ups and distractions from work. In particular, it is necessary to put a stop to the attempts by certain service establishments to return to the old practice whereby working people had to take time off work to deal with everyday matters.

In increasing the prestige of honest work it is important to conduct all management and education so that life itself is severe on those who would like to live better and work less, and sometimes even do nothing at all. Is this vital severity justified? Undoubtedly. It corresponds to the interests of all honest working people.

Describing the international situation, the candidate deputy noted that the past four decades without a world war are the result of major positive shifts in favour of socialism, freedom democracy and peace in the world arena and are to the historic credit of Soviet foreign policy and all peace-loving forces on Earth.

The Soviet Union, the socialist community and the international communist and workers' movement are making a decisive contribution to the cause of maintaining peace. All the large-scale initiatives aimed at removing the threat of war, expanding international co-operation and ending the arms race have proceeded and continue to proceed from them.

The Washington policy of confrontation clearly reveals the source of the war threat. It is being rejected increasingly actively by the peace-loving peoples as an alien and dangerous phenomenon. As Comrade K.U. Chernenko has stressed, "People are not just aware of the drama of our time, they realise more and more clearly where the watershed lies between the two main political courses - the policy of peace and the line of preparing for war." This inspires a sense of confidence and strengthens the conviction that mankind will succeed in curbing militarism.

Today the world's peoples are showing tremendous interest in the forthcoming Geneva talks on the entire range of space and nuclear arms. The Soviet Union is going into the talks with a sincere desire to achieve specific results.



Unfortunately, this cannot be said of the Washington administration's approach. On the eve of the talks the USA has embarked on activity which sows doubts as to the American side's true intentions in agreeing to hold the Geneva talks. What can we say about this? One thing only: calculations of this kind are mistaken, indeed its very approach is unacceptable if there is seriously to be any question of reaching agreements. The world public expects Washington to take a constructive attitude to the talks, based on unswerving observance of the principle of equality and equal security.

While attaching great importance to the normalisation of relations with the USA and to honest talks with it on all the topical issues of international life, we never forget for a minute that the world is not limited to that country alone but is a much bigger place. The Soviet Union has devoted and does devote great and constant attention to its relations with all states which desire peace and equal, mutually advantageous co-operation.

Discussing the matters of European detente, the speaker stressed that Soviet people believe in the good sense of West Europeans and in their interest in preventing Europe - our common home - from being turned into a theatre of military action and a firing range for testing Pentagon doctrines of "limited" nuclear war. We are pleased to note the desire of many West European states for political dialogue. For its part the USSR has been and remains attached to the policy of good-neighbourly relations among all European states.

The speaker went on to dwell on some issues concerning the work of work collectives in Moscow and in the capital's Kiev Rayon. Moscow is the cradle of many revolutionary, combat and work traditions. It was here in 1905, as Lenin observed, that the Moscow workers' never-to-be-forgotten heroism set an example of struggle for all Russia's working people. It was here, at the walls of the capital, that the dawn of our victory broke over the snow-covered fields of the Moscow region in the Great Fatherland.

The victory which we won was not just a victory for our arms. It was a victory for the socialist system, for our economic and political structure, for our ideology and morality. The war brought countless misfortunes, but it revealed with staggering strength the unparalleled tenacity of the Soviet people's revolutionary spirit and their patriotism, courage and mass heroism. The war showed what people defending a righteous cause, their homeland, and their socialist gains are capable of.

In the most difficult year - 1941 - when the capital was under siege, several large units of people's volunteer militia were formed on the territory of Kiev Rayon alone. Together with Soviet servicemen they barred the enemy's way at the point of his main strike and fought to the death in the most critical situations of the great battle for Moscow.

Some of those who took part in those memorable battles are present in this auditorium - Boris Mikhaylovich Vishnyakov and Sergey Vasilyevich Vasilyev. They have told me that they travelled the road of war from Moscow to Berlin and the Elbe in the ranks of the Kiev Rayon people's volunteer militia division, which later became a Guards division. In warmly welcoming them here, we honour the accomplishment of all Moscow veterans, front-line heroes and selfless workers in the rear - the accomplishment of all who held nothing back to help the country in that dreadful hour: neither energy nor life itself, overcoming everything and winning victory!

Today too Muscovites are the initiators of many glorious deeds. Preparing for the coming congress, the capital's working people are marching in the vanguard of competition to complete the 11th Five-Year Plan in a worthy fashion. They successfully



fulfilled the plan targets and socialist pledges for last year and for the first four years of the Five-Year Plan as a whole.

A lot of good and interesting things are being done in Kiev Rayon's industrial and transport enterprises, construction organisations, scientific institutes and cultural and educational establishments. Last year they successfully fulfilled the production targets, and industry achieved above-plan growth in labour productivity and reductions in production costs.

The militant vanguard of the capital's working people is its Party organisation. The Moscow Bolsheviks have written many glorious pages in the revolutionary biography of Lenin's Party. In wartime trials and peaceful socialist building they have always been and remain a reliable support for the Central Committee. Now the Party organisations of Moscow, including the 60,000 communists of Kiev Rayon, are rallying and mobilising the working people to resolve new tasks in the capital's economic, social and cultural development.

In conclusion, M.S. Gorbachev wished Muscovites new successes in their affairs, good health and great personal happiness.

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MIKHAIL GORBACHYOV'S SPEECH

SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 1 (ONE) FIFTEEN TAKES

MOSCOW MARCH 11 TASS - FOLLOWING IS THE FULL TEXT OF THE  
SPEECH BY GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE  
MIKHAIL GORBACHYOV AT THE PLENARY MEETING OF THE CPSU CENTRAL  
COMMITTEE:

DEAR COMRADES,

ALL OF US, ALL OUR PARTY AND COUNTRY ARE IN DEEP GRIEF.  
KONSTANTIN USTINOVICH CHERNENKO, A TRUE LENINIST, AN OUTSTANDING  
FIGURE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOVIET  
STATE, OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, A PERSON WITH A  
RESPONSIVE HEART AND OF A BIG ORGANIZATIONAL TALENT, HAS PASSED  
AWAY.

KONSTANTIN USTINOVICH TRAVERSED A LONG AND GLORIOUS ROAD.  
EVERY POST, ASSIGNED TO HIM BY THE PARTY, EVER FULLER REVEALED  
HIS TALENT, ABILITY TO WORK WITH PEOPLE. AT THE POST OF THE  
GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND THE  
PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET,  
KONSTANTIN USTINOVICH CHERNENKO DEVOTED ALL HIS EFFORTS AND  
KNOWLEDGE TO DEVELOPING THE ECONOMY OF THE COUNTRY, RAISING THE  
WELL-BEING AND CULTURAL LEVEL OF THE PEOPLE, ENSURING THE  
SECURITY OF MOTHERLAND, PRESERVING AND CONSOLIDATING PEACE ON  
EARTH.

/MORE/

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SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 2 (TWO)

KONSTANTIN USTINOVICH CHERNENKO GUARDED AS THE APPLE OF HIS EYE THE UNITY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THE COLLECTIVE CHARACTER OF THE ACTIVITY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND ITS POLITICAL BUREAU. HE ALWAYS SOUGHT TO ACHIEVE THAT THE PARTY ACT AT ALL LEVELS AS A CLOSE-KNIT, WELL-ADJUSTED AND SPIRITED ORGANISM. HE REGARDED THE UNITY OF IDEAS AND DEEDS OF THE COMMUNISTS AS AN EARNEST OF SUCCESSES, OF OVERCOMING SHORTCOMINGS, AS AN EARNEST OF STEADY ADVANCE.

THE STRATEGIC LINE, WORKED OUT AT THE 26TH CONGRESS, AT THE SUBSEQUENT PLENARY MEETINGS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WITH VIGOROUS PARTICIPATION OF YURI VLADIMIROVICH ANDROPOV AND KONSTANTIN USTINOVICH CHERNENKO, HAS BEEN AND REMAINS UNCHANGED. THIS IS THE LINE TOWARDS SPEEDING UP THE COUNTRY'S SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, TOWARDS PERFECTING ALL ASPECTS OF THE LIFE OF SOCIETY. THE POINT AT ISSUE IS RESTRUCTURING THE MATERIAL AND TECHNICAL BASE OF PRODUCTION.

/MORE/

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SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 3 (THREE)

THE POINT AT ISSUE IS THE PERFECTION OF THE SYSTEM OF SOCIAL RELATIONS, ABOVE ALL ECONOMIC ONES. THE POINT AT ISSUE IS ALSO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIVIDUAL, QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT OF THE MATERIAL CONDITIONS OF HIS LIFE AND WORK, OF HIS SPIRITUAL MAKEUP.

WE ARE TO ACHIEVE A DECISIVE TURN IN TRANSFERRING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY TO THE TRACKS OF INTENSIVE DEVELOPMENT. WE SHOULD, WE ARE BOUND TO ATTAIN WITHIN THE BRIEFEST PERIOD THE MOST ADVANCED SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL POSITIONS, THE HIGHEST WORLD LEVEL IN THE PRODUCTIVITY OF SOCIAL LABOUR.

IN ORDER TO RESOLVE THE TASK WITH GREATER SUCCESS AND SPEED, IT IS NECESSARY TO CONTINUE TO PERFECT PERSISTENTLY THE ECONOMIC MECHANISM AND THE ENTIRE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. BY TREADING THIS PATH, SELECTING OPTIMAL DECISIONS, IT IS IMPORTANT TO APPLY IN A CREATIVE WAY THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF SOCIALIST ECONOMY. THIS MEANS INVARIABLY CARRYING OUT A PLANNED DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMY, STRENGTHENING SOCIALIST OWNERSHIP, EXPANDING THE RIGHTS, ENHANCING THE INDEPENDENCE OF ENTERPRISES, RAISING THEIR INTEREST IN THE END PRODUCT OF THEIR WORK. THIS MEANS SUBORDINATING ULTIMATELY ALL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TO THE INTERESTS OF SOVIET PEOPLE.

/MORE/

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SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 4 (FOUR)

THE PARTY WILL INVARIABLY FOLLOW ITS SOCIAL POLICY.  
EVERYTHING IN THE NAME OF MAN, FOR THE BENEFIT OF MAN -- THE  
PROGRAMME PROVISION SHOULD BE FILLED WITH EVER DEEPER AND  
CONCRETE CONTENT. NATURALLY, THE IMPROVEMENT OF LIVING  
CONDITIONS OF PEOPLE SHOULD BE BASED ON THEIR GROWING  
CONTRIBUTION TO THE COMMON CAUSE. WHEREVER DEVIATIONS FROM THIS  
PRINCIPLE OCCUR, SOCIAL JUSTICE, WHICH IS A MAJOR FACTOR OF THE  
UNITY AND STABILITY OF SOCIALIST SOCIETY, IS INVARIABLY  
DISRUPTED.

THE PARTY REGARDS FURTHER PERFECTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF  
DEMOCRACY, OF THE ENTIRE SYSTEM OF SOCIALIST SELF-GOVERNMENT OF  
THE PEOPLE AS ONE OF THE VITAL TASKS OF DOMESTIC POLICY.

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SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 5 (FIVE)

TASKS HERE ARE MULTIFACETED. A GREAT DEAL IS BEING DONE IN THIS RESPECT. THE POINT AT ISSUE IS ENHANCING THE ROLE OF SOVIETS; ACTIVISATION OF TRADE UNIONS; KOMBOMOL; PEOPLE'S CONTROL; WORKERS' COLLECTIVES. LYING AHEAD IS PERSISTENT WORK ALONG THE OUTLINED; AND NEW DIRECTIONS.

DEEPENING SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY IS INSEPARABLY LINKED WITH ENHANCING SOCIAL AWARENESS. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EDUCATIONAL WORK IS MANIFESTED IN HOW WORKERS, COLLECTIVE FARMERS AND INTELLECTUALS PARTICIPATE IN THE SOLUTION OF BIG AND SMALL PROBLEMS; HOW THEY WORK; HOW THEY COMBAT SHORTCOMINGS. RAISING LABOUR AND SOCIAL ACTIVITY OF SOVIET PEOPLE; STRENGTHENING DISCIPLINE; INCULCATING PATRIOTISM AND INTERNATIONALISM ARE BY WHAT THE RESULTS OF ALL OUR IDEOLOGICAL ACTIVITY ARE MEASURED.

/MORE/

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11/3 TASS V-5-24

SPEECH--GORBACHYOV & (SIX)

TASS ENGLISH

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IN DOING SO RESOLUTE MEASURES WILL BE CONTINUED FURTHER TO  
SET THINGS IN GOOD ORDER; TO REMOVE FROM OUR LIFE ALL ALIEN  
PHENOMENA; ALL ENCROACHMENTS ON THE INTERESTS OF SOCIETY AND ITS  
CITIZENS; TO STRENGTHEN SOCIALIST LEGALITY.

WE MUST STILL FURTHER DEVELOP PUBLICITY IN THE WORK OF  
PARTY, STATE, GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS. V.I. LENIN  
USED TO SAY THAT THE STATE IS STRONG BY THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE  
MASSES. OUR PRACTICE HAS FULLY CORROBORATED THAT CONCLUSION. THE  
BETTER INFORMED THE PEOPLE, THE MORE CONSCIOUSLY THEY ACT, THE  
MORE ACTIVELY THEY SUPPORT THE PARTY, ITS PLANS AND PROGRAMMATIC  
OBJECTIVES.

IN THE FOREIGN POLICY SPHERE OUR COURSE IS CLEAR AND  
CONSISTENT. THIS IS THE COURSE OF PEACE AND PROGRESS.

MORE



# **SPECIAL NOTE**

**ITEM SCANNED AS SUPPLIED  
PAGINATION IS AS SEEN**



TASS ENGLISH

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SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 7 (SEVEN)

THE FIRST PRECEPT OF THE PARTY AND THE STATE IS TO PRESERVE AND STRENGTHEN IN EVERY WAY THE FRATERNAL FRIENDSHIP WITH OUR CLOSEST FRIENDS AND ALLIES -- THE COUNTRIES OF THE GREAT SOCIALIST COMMUNITY. WE WILL DO EVERYTHING THAT DEPENDS ON US TO EXPAND COOPERATION WITH SOCIALIST STATES; TO ENHANCE THE ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF SOCIALISM IN WORLD AFFAIRS. WE WOULD LIKE A SERIOUS IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC AND BELIEVE THAT, GIVEN RECIPROCITY, THIS IS QUITE POSSIBLE.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALWAYS SUPPORTED THE STRUGGLE OF PEOPLES FOR LIBERATION FROM COLONIAL OPPRESSION. AND TODAY OUR SYMPATHIES GO OUT TO THE COUNTRIES OF ASIA, AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA WHICH ARE FOLLOWING THE ROAD OF CONSOLIDATING INDEPENDENCE AND SOCIAL RENOVATION. FOR US THEY ARE FRIENDS AND PARTNERS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR A DURABLE PEACE; FOR BETTER AND JUST RELATIONS BETWEEN PEOPLES.

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SPEECH--GORBACHYOV & (EIGHT)

AS TO RELATIONS WITH CAPITALIST STATES, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY  
THE FOLLOWING. WE WILL FIRMLY FOLLOW THE LENINIST COURSE OF  
PEACE AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE. TO GOODWILL THE SOVIET UNION  
WILL ALWAYS RESPOND WITH GOODWILL, AS IT WILL RESPOND WITH  
TRUST TO TRUST. BUT EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW THAT WE SHALL NEVER  
WAIVE THE INTERESTS OF OUR MOTHERLAND AND THOSE OF ITS ALLIES.

WE VALUE THE SUCCESSES OF THE RELAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL  
TENSIONS ACHIEVED IN THE 1970S AND ARE READY TO TAKE PART IN  
CARRYING ON WITH THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING PEACEFUL MUTUALLY  
BENEFICIAL COOPERATION BETWEEN STATES ON THE BASIS OF PRINCIPLES  
OF EQUALITY, MUTUAL RESPECT AND NON-INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNAL  
AFFAIRS. NEW STEPS ALONG THESE LINES COULD DULY MARK THE 40TH  
ANNIVERSARY OF THE GREAT VICTORY OVER HITLER FASCISM AND  
JAPANESE MILITARISM.

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SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 9 (NINE)

NEVER BEFORE HAS SO TERRIBLE A THREAT LOOMED SO LARGE AND  
DARK OVER MANKIND. AS THESE DAYS, THE ONLY REASONABLE WAY OUT OF  
THE EXISTING SITUATION IS AGREEMENT OF THE CONFRONTING FORCES  
ON AN IMMEDIATE TERMINATION OF THE RACE IN ARMS; ABOVE ALL,  
NUCLEAR ARMS; ON EARTH AND ITS PREVENTION IN SPACE. AN AGREEMENT  
ON AN HONEST AND EQUITABLE BASIS WITHOUT ATTEMPTS AT  
+OUTPLAYING+ THE OTHER SIDE AND DICTATING TERMS TO IT. AN  
AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD HELP ALL TO ADVANCE TOWARD THE CHERISHED  
GOAL -- THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION AND PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR  
WEAPONS FOR GOOD; TOWARD THE COMPLETE REMOVAL OF THE THREAT OF  
NUCLEAR WAR. THIS IS OUR FIRM CONVICTION.

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SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 10 (TEN)

NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WILL OPEN IN GENEVA TOMORROW. THE APPROACH OF THE U.S.S.R. TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS IS WELL KNOWN. I CAN ONLY REAFFIRM THAT: WE DO NOT STRIVE TO ACQUIRE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES OVER THE UNITED STATES; OVER NATO COUNTRIES; FOR MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER THEM (SEMICOLON) WE WANT TERMINATION, AND NOT CONTINUATION OF THE ARMS RACE AND, THEREFORE, OFFER A FREEZE OF NUCLEAR ARSENALS; AN END TO FURTHER DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES (SEMICOLON) WE WANT A REAL AND MAJOR REDUCTION OF THE ARMS STOCKPILES; AND NOT THE DEVELOPMENT OF EVER NEW WEAPON SYSTEMS, BE IT IN SPACE OR ON EARTH.

WE WOULD LIKE OUR PARTNERS IN THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS TO UNDERSTAND THE SOVIET UNION'S POSITION AND RESPOND IN KIND. THEN AGREEMENT WILL BE POSSIBLE. THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD WOULD SIGH WITH RELIEF.

MORE

*Balance*



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SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 11 (ELEVEN)

THE CPSU IS AN INTERNATIONALIST PARTY IN ITS NATURE. PEOPLE ABROAD WHO HOLD THE SAME VIEWS AS WE MAY REST ASSURED: IN THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS THE PARTY OF LENIN WILL, AS ALWAYS, CLOSELY COOPERATE WITH FRATERNAL COMMUNIST, WORKERS' AND REVOLUTIONARY-DEMOCRATIC PARTIES, AND WILL CHAMPION THE UNITY

AND ACTIVE COOPERATION OF ALL REVOLUTIONARY FORCES.

COMRADES, THE SOLUTION OF THE COMPLEX TASKS WE ARE FACED WITH PRESUPPOSES A FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF THE PARTY AND A RISE IN ITS ORGANIZING AND GUIDING ROLE. THE CPSU HAS ALWAYS PROCEEDED AND PROCEEDS FROM LENIN'S IDEA THAT THE PRINCIPLED POLICY IS THE ONLY CORRECT ONE. SUCH A POLICY WHICH IS WORKED OUT COLLECTIVELY WILL BE IMPLEMENTED CONSISTENTLY AND UNDEVIATINGLY. THE PARTY IS PRECISELY THE FORCE WHICH WILL TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE INTERESTS OF ALL CLASSES AND SOCIAL GROUPS, ALL NATIONS AND NATIONALITIES OF THE COUNTRY, RALLY THEM CLOSE TOGETHER AND MOBILISE THE PEOPLE'S ENERGIES FOR THE COMMON CAUSE OF COMMUNIST CONSTRUCTION.

/MORE/



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SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 12 (TWELVE)

THE PARTY'S POLICY HAS BEEN AND WILL BE DIRECTED TOWARDS STRENGTHENING THE ALLIANCE OF THE WORKING CLASS, COLLECTIVE-FARM PEASANTRY AND INTELLIGENTSIA, AND TOWARDS STEADY STRENGTHENING OF FRIENDSHIP OF THE PEOPLES OF OUR GREAT MULTINATIONAL COUNTRY.

THE CPSU WILL IN EVERY WAY DEVELOP THE CREATIVE INITIATIVE OF THE YOUTH; SHOW CONCERN FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE WORKING AND LIVING CONDITIONS OF WOMEN; AND FOR THE NEEDS AND REQUIREMENTS OF WAR VETERANS AND VETERAN WORKERS.

IN THE COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, IT IS OF IMPORTANCE AS NEVER BEFORE TO MAINTAIN THE DEFENSE CAPACITY OF OUR MOTHERLAND AT SUCH A LEVEL THAT POTENTIAL AGGRESSORS WOULD KNOW WELL: AN ENCROACHMENT UPON THE SECURITY OF THE LAND OF THE SOVIETS AND ITS ALLIES, UPON THE PEACEFUL LIFE OF SOVIET PEOPLE WILL MEET WITH A CRUSHING RETALIATORY STRIKE. OUR GLORIOUS ARMED FORCES WILL HAVE, IN FUTURE AS WELL, EVERYTHING NECESSARY FOR THAT.

/MORE/



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SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 13 (THIRTEEN)

PREPARATIONS FOR THE 27TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU HAVE NOW  
BEGUN ON A LARGE SCALE. A NEW EDITION OF THE PARTY'S PROGRAMME  
IS TO BE CONSIDERED AT THE CONGRESS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE  
COUNTRY'S DEVELOPMENT FOR THE NEXT FIVE-YEAR-PLAN PERIOD AND FOR  
THE PERIOD ENDING IN THE YEAR 2000 ARE TO BE DETERMINED.

TIME CALLS FOR INTENSE, CREATIVE WORK OF ALL PARTY  
ORGANIZATIONS FROM TOP TO BOTTOM. IN ALL SECTORS EVERYWHERE THE  
COMMUNISTS SHOULD BE AN EXAMPLE OF THE DISCHARGE OF CIVIC DUTY,  
OF CONSCIENTIOUS WORK FOR THE GOOD OF SOCIETY, AND OF STRICT  
OBSERVANCE OF THE LENINIST STYLE OF WORK. THIS APPLIES FIRST OF  
ALL TO THE PARTY CADRES, TO PARTY AND STATE LEADERS. THE CPSU  
WILL UNDEVIATINGLY PURSUE THE LINE TOWARDS INCREASING INSISTENCE  
ON HIGH STANDARDS, AND TOWARDS RAISING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE  
ENTRUSTED WORK.

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SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 14 (FOURTEEN)

AFTER THE END OF THE PLENARY MEETING, THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, THE FIRST SECRETARIES OF REGIONAL COMMITTEES, AND ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE PLENARY MEETING WILL GO TO THEIR AREAS IN ORDER TO GET DOWN TO WORK WITH FRESH VIGOUR. A GOOD DEAL IS TO BE DONE. FIRST OF ALL, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETE WORK FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS OF THIS YEAR AND THEREBY TO ENSURE A CONFIDENT START OF THE NEXT FIVE-YEAR-PLAN PERIOD. THE SEVERE WINTER HAS SOMEWHAT SLOWED DOWN THE ATTAINMENT OF PLANNED TARGETS IN A NUMBER OF SECTORS. IT MEANS THAT ONE SHOULD MUSTER ONE'S ENERGIES, TAP RESERVES AND MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO MAKE UP FOR WHAT HAS NOT YET BEEN DONE AND TO ATTAIN THE PLANNED TARGETS BY THE END OF THE YEAR.

COMRADES, THESE DAYS WE FEEL STILL MORE KEENLY HOW MIGHTY AND MONOLITHIC THE RANKS OF THE COMMUNISTS ARE AND HOW UNITED OUR SOVIET PEOPLE IS. AT THE RECENT ELECTIONS SOVIET PEOPLE AGAIN EXPRESSED UNANIMOUS SUPPORT FOR THE COURSE OF OUR PARTY AND THE STATE. THIS SUPPORT IS BOTH INSPIRING AND BINDING.

/MORE/



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TASS ENGLISH

11 MAR 1985

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SPEECH--GORBACHYOV 15 (FIFTEEN)

TODAY THE PLENARY MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLACED UPON ME THE COMPLEX AND BIG DUTIES OF GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE. I AM WELL AWARE OF THE GREAT TRUST PUT IN ME AND OF THE GREAT RESPONSIBILITY CONNECTED WITH THIS. IN THE FORTHCOMING WORK I COUNT ON THE SUPPORT AND ACTIVE ASSISTANCE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU, ALTERNATE MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU AND SECRETARIES OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, AND THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE AS A WHOLE. YOUR VERSATILE EXPERIENCE IS THE GIST OF THE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE OF OUR PEOPLE. I PROMISE YOU, COMRADES, TO DO MY UTMOST TO FAITHFULLY SERVE OUR PARTY, OUR PEOPLE, AND THE GREAT LENINIST CAUSE.

ALLOW ME TO EXPRESS CONFIDENCE THAT, LOOKING AHEAD TO THE 27TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU, THE PEOPLE AND THE PARTY, RALLIED ROUND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, WILL DO EVERYTHING FOR OUR SOVIET MOTHERLAND TO BECOME STILL MORE RICH AND POWERFUL AND FOR THE CREATIVE FORCES OF SOCIALISM TO REVEAL THEMSELVES STILL MORE FULLY.

ITEM ENDS+++

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MOSCOW 120921Z MAR 85

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TO FLASH FCO

TELEGRAM NUMBER 329 OF 12TH MAR 85

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO

ADVANCE COPY

DEATH OF CHERNENKO: ATTENDANCE

1. THE FOLLOWING IS INTERIM LIST OF THOSE ATTENDING THE FUNERAL:

UNITED STATES VICE PRESIDENT BUSH AND SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ

FRANCE: PRESIDENT MITTERRAND AND FOREIGN MINISTER DUMAS

FRG: PRIME MINISTER KOHL AND MINISTER OF CHANCELLERY SHAUBLE

ITALY: PRESIDENT PERTINI AND FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREOTTI

SPAIN: PRIME MINISTER FELIPE GONZALEZ (AND POSSIBLY FOREIGN MINISTER MORAN)

TURKEY: PRIME MINISTER OZAL AND FOREIGN MINISTER

JAPAN: PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE AND FOREIGN MINISTER ABE

INDIA: PRIME MINISTER RAJIV GANDHI

PAKISTAN: PRESIDENT ZIA UL HAQ AND FOREIGN MINISTER KHAN

JORDAN: PRIME MINISTER AHMED OBAIDAT AND FOREIGN MINISTER AL MASRI

CANADA: PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY

FINLAND: PRESIDENT KOIVISTO AND PRIME MINISTER SORSA

IRELAND: PRESIDENT HILLERY AND MINISTER OF FISHERIES O'TOOLE

SWEDEN: PRIME MINISTER AND CROWN PRINCE BERTHOLD

AUSTRALIA: MINISTER OF INDUSTRY, SENATOR BUTTON

NEW ZEALAND: HIGH COMMISSIONER IN LONDON

PORTUGAL: ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT AMARAL

NETHERLANDS: FOREIGN MINISTER VAN DEN BORK

AUSTRIA: PRESIDENT KIRSCHLAGER

BELGIUM: FOREIGN MINISTER TINDEMANS AND POSSIBLY PRIME MINISTER MARTENS

GREECE: FOREIGN MINISTER HARALAMBOPOULOS

CHINA: VICE PREMIER LI PENG AND DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN QICHEN

EGYPT: PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT MENDOSSA (TO BE CONFIRMED)

UN SECRETARY GENERAL PEREZ DE CUELLAR

WE HAVE TWO REQUESTS FOR BILATERALS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER  
ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT ZIA AND SPANISH PRIME MINISTER GONZALEZ.

RATFORD



DEATH OF CHERNENKO: ATTENDANCE: FCO TELNO 251.

1. WE NOW HAVE THE FOLLOWING FURTHER DELEGATION DETAILS:

TANZANIA: SECRETARY - GENERAL OF PARTY, RASHED M KAWAWA  
(PROVISIONAL HEAD OF DELEGATION)

NIGERIA: MINISTER OF DEFENCE:

LEBANON: PRESIDENT GEMAYEL

NORWAY: CROWN PRINCE HARALD AND PRIME MINISTER

LUXEMBOURG: MINISTER OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY

DENMARK: PRINCE GEORG AND FOREIGN MINISTER

EGYPT: DR SOPHI ABDEL HAKIM, SPEAKER OF CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL AND  
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF RULING PARTY (NOT PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT,  
AS STATED IN OUR TELNO 329)

ALGERIA: POLITBURO MEMBER AND LEADER OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE  
SECRETARIAT, MOHAMMED CHERIF NESSADIA

YAR: ABDUL AZIZ, PRIME MINISTER

LIBYA: PRIME MINISTER

MOROCCO: PRIME MINISTER AL-KARIM LANRANI

PDRY: PRESIDENT ALI NASSER MOHAMMED

TUNISIA: REPRESENTATIVE OF PRESIDENT, AL-MUNJIB AL-KAAL

SYRIA: ABDULLAH EL-AHMAR, ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAATH  
PARTY. FAROUK SHARA, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

IRAQ: ABDUL AZIZ ALDOURI, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE REVOLUTIONARY  
COUNCIL. TARIZ AZIZ, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

KUWAIT: ABDUL RACHMAN SALEM AL ATIQUI, ADVISER OF THE AMIR

PLO: YASSER ARAFAT, FAROUK ABDOUMI, MAHMOUD ABBAS

SUDAN: SECOND VICE-PRESIDENT JOSEPH LAGU.

2. CANADIANS HAVE ALSO ASKED FOR PRIME MINISTER BILATERAL WHICH  
THEY SAY THEY HAVE FED ON IN LONDON.

SUTHERLAND

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CONFIDENTIAL

M S GORBACHEV - A BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Summary

I. Early years; 1931-1949

Gorbachev was born in 1931 into a peasant family in the agricultural area of Stavropol (North Caucasus), which was occupied by the Germans between August 1942 and January 1943. After working as an assistant to a combine harvester operator (probably part-time while he did his secondary education), Gorbachev entered Moscow University (paragraphs 1 to 4).

II. Moscow University, 1950-1955

Gorbachev studied law, but Moscow University was of decisive importance in his political career. He joined the Party in 1952 and was probably secretary of the University's Komsomol (the Party's youth wing) organisation (paragraphs 5 to 6).

III. Komsomol Work in Stavropol, 1956-1962

Immediately after university Gorbachev started his career as a Komsomol and Party official in his home region (paragraph 7).

IV. Party Work in Stavropol, 1962-1970

Gorbachev's first years as a Party official coincided with Khrushchev's last. He benefited from Khrushchev's numerous reorganisations of the Party apparatus, but also took a hand in returning the local Party organisation to its traditional form under Brezhnev (paragraph 8). He got an agricultural degree by correspondence (paragraph 9). He rose steadily in the Stavropol Party organisation, probably helped by the promotion to the centre of his former boss, Kulakov, and by the decline under Brezhnev of his immediate superior in the Stavropol regional party organisation (paragraphs 10 to 12).

V. First Secretary of Stavropol Kraikom, 1970-1978

On election as First Secretary of the Stavropol Kraikom in 1970, Gorbachev became one of the regional Party Secretaries who are the backbone of the Party's control over the country as a whole (paragraph 13). Locally he supported schemes to improve incentives for farm workers and greater mechanisation of the harvesting process. Nationally, he became a Deputy to the Supreme Soviet and a



member of the Party's Central Committee. As such he began to lead Party delegations abroad (paragraphs 14 to 15).

#### VI. To Moscow as Central Committee Secretary, 1978

Gorbachev's crucial promotion to Party Secretary for Agriculture in 1978 probably came about through a mixture of luck (the sudden death of Kulakov), connections with the leadership (Suslov's interest in the region, and its resorts, frequented by the leadership) and ability (noted by Brezhnev). (Paragraphs 16 to 18.)

#### VII. Rise in the leadership under Brezhnev and Andropov, 1978-1984

At 47, Gorbachev was not exceptionally young to be made a Party Secretary, but his rise to full membership of the Politburo by 1980 was exceptionally rapid and was probably due in particular to Brezhnev's approval (paragraphs 19 to 20). Gorbachev's personal contribution to agricultural policies is hard to discern: this is probably to his advantage (paragraph 21). He rose steadily up the ranks of the Party Secretaries until he stood third after Andropov and Chernenko. With both sick in 1983, much of the burden of running Party affairs must have fallen on Gorbachev (paragraphs 22 to 23). In May 1983 he visited the West for the first time as a representative of the Soviet State (paragraph 24).

#### VIII. Under Chernenko as General Secretary, 1984

Gorbachev is unlikely to have challenged Chernenko for the leadership when Andropov died in February 1984. He retains the confidence of the rest of the leadership, as shown by the exceptional breadth of his current responsibilities as a Party Secretary: he supervises ideology and foreign policy, agriculture and general economic questions, and Party organisation. He is the natural choice as General Secretary when Chernenko dies, if his age (53) is not held against him (paragraphs 25 to 27).

#### IX. Personality, Family

Gorbachev is intelligent and urbane; nor is his wife a Soviet stereotype (paragraph 28).

#### X Conclusions

Gorbachev has had a successful Party career, a prerequisite for the highest political office, and one that is less narrow than it appears at first sight (paragraph 29). As the first Politburo member not old enough to have fought in the War or to have held political office under Stalin, and the first in recent history to have had a university education, Gorbachev belongs to a new generation. The generational gap should not be exaggerated:



Gorbachev has made his entire career in the Party apparatus, whose discipline and suspicion of individualism have not been relaxed. But he reached political maturity under Brezhnev, when the Party came to recognise the complexity of the issues it was dealing with, sought specialist advice and strove for solutions that satisfied all interests. Gorbachev has thrived in this atmosphere (paragraph 30). Gorbachev himself probably holds progressive views on economic management, but would have no interest in a radical dilution of Party control. If he were to become the Soviet leader he would be subject to the same constraints as his predecessors, though his youth would of itself affect the style of leadership. On external affairs he has so far reflected the Party line (paragraph 31).



## M S GORBACHEV - A BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

I Early years; 1931-1949

1. Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev was born into a peasant family on 2 March 1931 in the village of Privolnoe in the Krasnogvardeisky district of Stavropol region. This is an important grain growing and sheep rearing area of the Russian Republic (RSFSR) in the North Caucasus. Gorbachev's birth place is in the north west of the region, bordering the neighbouring Rostov region.
2. Gorbachev was born after the forcible collectivisation of the peasants had largely been achieved, but just before one of its immediate consequences, the great famine of 1932-1934, which affected the north Caucasus as well as the Ukraine and Kazakhstan.
3. Gorbachev presumably went to school in his home village, but there is no record of what happened to him when the region was occupied by the Germans between August 1942 and January 1943.
4. Gorbachev's official biography maintains that he started work in 1946 (at the age of 15) as an assistant to a combine harvester operator in a Motor-tractor Station (these were state run enterprises which from 1930-1958 served as agricultural machinery pools for collective farms and also as centres of political control). But a local biography which was seen by a Western scholar indicates that he did this work only during the summer while he was going to secondary school. This seems more likely, both because work with the combine harvester would be largely confined to the summer months, and because it is difficult to see how without secondary education Gorbachev could have gained even the minimum qualifications to enter Moscow University.

II Moscow University, 1950-1955

5. Gorbachev entered the Law Faculty of Moscow University in 1950 (aged 19) and studied till 1955, the standard length of that course at the time. His elevation from the provinces to the most prestigious seat of learning in the Soviet Union was clearly of decisive importance for his later career, but there is no information about how it was achieved. Gorbachev may have benefited from the reconstitution and expansion of the Soviet higher education system after the war. Stalin's campaign against the Jews from 1949 to his death may also be relevant. A high proportion of Soviet lawyers were Jewish and there may have been a requirement to replace Jewish law students with Russians.
6. Gorbachev was evidently exempted from military service through being at university, though he will probably have done a reserve officer's course concurrently. Moscow University was the starting point of Gorbachev's political career. In 1952, at the age of 21, he joined the Communist Party. According to one Western scholar, Gorbachev was secretary of the Moscow University Komsomol (the Party's youth wing) from 1954 to 1955 (it is normal for leading Komsomol officials to be Party members).



III Komsomol Work in Stavropol, 1956-1962

7. It was evidently Gorbachev's Komsomol and Party credentials, rather than his degree in law, which determined his next steps, and indeed his whole subsequent career. From 1956 to 1962 he was a Komsomol official in his home region of Stavropol. He was First Secretary of the Stavropol Town Committee (Gorkom) from 1956 to 1958. He then moved upwards into the Regional Committee (Kraikom) of the Komsomol, where between 1958 and 1962 he was successively: Deputy Head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department, Second and then First Secretary of the Kraikom Komsomol organisation. In 1961, as a Komsomol representative, he was a voting delegate to the 22nd Party Congress, a historic occasion, when it was decided to remove Stalin's body from the Mausoleum, following a further demunciation of the former dictator by Khrushchev.

IV. Party Work in Stavropol, 1962-1970

8. The start of Gorbachev's career as a Party official coincided with the last 2½ years of Khrushchev's regime, with its constant administrative reorganisations, which seem to have worked in Gorbachev's favour. In the spring of 1962 Khrushchev reorganised the administration of agriculture with the creation of "Territorial-Production Administrations", bodies which covered several districts and administered collective and state farms. This reorganisation gave Gorbachev his first Party post as Party Organiser of the Stavropol Territorial-Production Kolkhoz/Sovkhoz Administration. The end of that same year saw another reorganisation: the splitting of the Party into separate industrial and agricultural structures. This meant that there were now 2 Stavropol regional party organisations, one for industry and one for agriculture. As a result of the reorganisation, in December 1962, Gorbachev was advanced to the politically sensitive post of Head of the Department of Party Organs of the Stavropol Regional Party Committee (Kraikom). (This was presumably the agricultural Kraikom, which in Stavropol was the more important.) In this post, under the supervision of the second secretary of Stavropol Kraikom, Gorbachev will have been in charge of all the relevant party organisational matters and appointments throughout the region. Gorbachev's nomination for such a sensitive post could only have been made with the full approval, if not at the instigation of the then first secretary of the Kraikom, F D Kulakov (see paragraph 10 below). He remained in this job until September 1966 and thus will have been in charge of implementing in the Stavropol region the post-Khrushchev leadership's decision in November 1964 to restore a unitary party structure.

9. During these years Gorbachev was doing a correspondence course at the Stavropol Agricultural Institute, from which he graduated in 1967. The Party has always encouraged its officials to further their education. The purpose of Gorbachev's further qualification - in academic terms worth much less than his degree from Moscow University - will have been to enhance his authority as a Party official in a largely agricultural region.



10. Between 1966 and 1978 Gorbachev rose steadily as a local party official, mirroring his rise a decade earlier as a Komsomol official. From 1966 to 1968 he was First Secretary of Stavropol Town Party Committee (Gorkom), from August 1968 to April 1970 he was Second Secretary of the Stavropol Regional Party Committee (Kraikom) and from 1970 to 1978 First Secretary of the Stavropol Kraikom. While it is impossible to say whether his connections played a greater part in this rise than his talent, it is undoubtedly relevant that his former superior, Kulakov (see paragraph 8 above), was transferred to Moscow and promoted in late 1964 after the fall of Khrushchev first to Head of the Agricultural Department of the Central Committee and then to Central Committee Secretary for Agriculture, from which position he could undoubtedly influence appointments in his former region.

11. It is also relevant that Kulakov's replacement as First Secretary of Stavropol Kraikom was L N Efremov, a politician on a downward trend. He had been a Candidate Member of the Politburo under Khrushchev, but was shunted aside to Stavropol by the new leadership and lost his Politburo status in 1966. Thus Gorbachev as Second Secretary from 1968 was serving under someone who was politically doomed and whom he may already have been earmarked to succeed.

12. The timing of Gorbachev's promotion to First Secretary of Stavropol Kraikom in April 1970, after less than 2 years as Second Secretary and at the early age of 39, may have been dictated by the approach of the elections to the Supreme Soviet in June 1970 and the 24th Party Congress in April 1971 and the leadership's wish to deprive Efremov of his status as a Deputy to the Supreme Soviet and full member of the Central Committee, to which he had the unspoken right as Party leader of an important region. At all events, it was Gorbachev who acquired this status (see paragraph 15 below).

#### V First Secretary of Stavropol Kraikom, 1970-1978

13. Gorbachev thus became a significant political figure at local and national level. He was now one of the regional Party secretaries who are the backbone of the Party's control over the country as a whole. His own region of Stavropol ranks high in importance because of its agricultural potential. As a Krai it also ranks in status above most other regions (oblasts) because it includes within its borders one of the regions set aside for national minorities within the Russian Republic - the Karachaevo-Cherkesskaya Autonomous Oblast.

14. As the Party boss of a major agricultural area Gorbachev was in a position to put his weight behind various agricultural schemes which had proved successful in his own region. In 1976 he advocated the "link" system of farming (whereby small teams are allocated specific areas of farmland to cultivate round the year and paid by results), which has now won Politburo approval (see paragraph 21 below). He also supported the "Ipatovo method" of harvesting by highly mechanised harvesting columns complete with their own



transport, spare parts, canteens etc, which toured the farms completing the full harvesting and reploughing process in a single operation. Gorbachev acknowledged in a Pravda article in 1978 that this Ipatovo method (named after the district where it was evolved, which is also Gorbachev's Supreme Soviet constituency) cut across the link system and was not everywhere greeted with enthusiasm. It nonetheless met the Party's requirement for more intensive and mechanised cultivation and was recommended by a Central Committee decree and by a personal message from Brezhnev for wider application. As with so many similar initiatives, whatever its intrinsic local merits, its wider and frequently thoughtless application has led to the Ipatovo method being somewhat discredited.

15. Gorbachev's debut as a national figure came with his election in June 1970 as a Deputy to the Council of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet. In 1970 he was also elected a member of its Environmental Protection Commission and in 1974 of its Youth Affairs Commission. More importantly, he was elected to full membership of the Central Committee of the CPSU at the 24th Party Congress in April 1971. This did not in itself confer any significant central decision making role on Gorbachev (there were 240 other full Central Committee members), but gave him status in the Party. It also gave him the opportunity to travel abroad as a leading Party representative. His first recorded trip abroad had been as a member of a Party delegation to Czechoslovakia in November 1969 to discuss youth work (a difficult assignment in the atmosphere following the Soviet invasion). As a member of the Central Committee he began to lead Party delegations: to Brussels in 1972, the FRG in 1975 and France in 1976.

#### VI To Moscow as Central Committee Secretary, 1978

16. In July 1978 Kulakov, by then a Full Member of the Politburo, died suddenly, aged 60. Gorbachev was one of the speakers at his funeral. At the next routine Party Plenum on 28 November 1978 Gorbachev (then 47) was elected a Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. (Though, as is customary, his responsibilities were not disclosed, it was clear that he was to supervise agriculture in place of Kulakov.)

17. There was a large element of luck for Gorbachev in this crucial promotion. Had Kulakov lived, Gorbachev might well have stayed on in Stavropol until at least Brezhnev's death, since movement of Party officials was becoming more and more sluggish. The choice of Gorbachev was probably dictated partly by his connections with the top leadership and partly by his ability. Gorbachev's connections will have been enhanced by having his former chief, Kulakov, in the centre, but the latter could obviously not have contributed directly to his promotion to Secretary. Gorbachev also had an unusual advantage in that his region includes the famous spas of Kislovodsk and Pyatigorsk to which members of the leadership (Andropov regularly) repaired. Gorbachev will undoubtedly have seen to their comforts and visited them there. Gorbachev may also have had the backing of Suslov, who had been first secretary of the Stavropol



Kraikom during the war and whose continuing interest in Stavropol was signalled by his representing the Politburo at the 100th anniversary celebrations of the town of Stavropol in May 1978. Finally, Gorbachev seems to have enjoyed Brezhnev's confidence, and this confidence was probably based to a large extent on Brezhnev's assessment of Gorbachev's ability, since it was not in Brezhnev's interest to choose anyone less than competent for the difficult post of agricultural Secretary. There were other regional Party Secretaries closer to Brezhnev who could have been chosen. Brezhnev showed particular warmth when presenting Gorbachev with an award in December 1978 for "working in one of the main granaries in the country, Stavropol". Brezhnev hoped that "in his new, responsible post of Central Committee Secretary, Mikhail Sergeevich will display his characteristic qualities of initiative and selflessness".

18. Gorbachev inherited Kulakov's personal aide, A P Lushchikov (born 1917) a former Deputy Head of the Agriculture Department of the Central Committee, who remains with him to this day.

#### VII Rise in the leadership under Brezhnev and Andropov, 1978-1984

19. At 47, Gorbachev was not exceptionally young to be elected a Central Committee Secretary. Katushev had been made a Secretary in 1968 at the age of 41, Dolgikh in 1972 aged 48 and Ryabov in 1976 aged 44. But Katushev lost his place on the Secretariat after 9 years and Ryabov after 3, while Dolgikh spent 10 years as a junior Secretary before being promoted to candidate membership of the Politburo in 1982, where he remains. Gorbachev, by contrast, rose exceptionally quickly in the Party hierarchy. He was made a Candidate Member of the Politburo in November 1979, one year after becoming a Secretary, and a full member a year later in October 1980. He thus became one of the select group of Party Secretaries who are also members of the Party's top decision making body, the Politburo, and thus at the apex of the power structure of the Soviet Union.

20. Gorbachev's initial rise was not accompanied by any broadening of his responsibilities and must be attributed to his general acceptability to the rest of the Politburo and in particular to Brezhnev's desire to fill the gap in the Politburo left by Kulakov's death with a competent lieutenant overseeing the ever difficult agricultural sphere. This much can be deduced from Brezhnev's commendation of Gorbachev when presenting him in March 1981 with the Order of Lenin which he had (routinely) been awarded on his 50th birthday:

"This is an energetic and go-ahead man, who knows the economy. But the sector of the Party's management entrusted to him by the Politburo does indeed demand great energy, initiative and the search for effective solutions. I am talking about agriculture, the agro-industrial complex as a whole."

21. The nature and effect of Gorbachev's contribution to Soviet agricultural policy (and to other political matters) is hard to



discern. Under Brezhnev and since, all initiatives have been ascribed to the General Secretary and little room has been left for the public display of the political talents of other leaders. Gorbachev will undoubtedly have played a large part in formulating the major agricultural policy document of Brezhnev's latter years, the Food Programme, adopted in May 1982, but he is unlikely to have been equally involved in all aspects of this wide-ranging programme. In publicising the programme, he said little about the reorganisation of agriculture at the local level into agro-industrial associations (RAPO's), the organisation of which may have been left to Chernenko, then Brezhnev's Party Secretary in charge of Party and government administration. Gorbachev does seem to be an advocate of the "link", or "collective contract" system, as it is now called, which has always met with some reservation in Party circles because of the spectre of peasant private enterprise which it raises. It may be significant that the system was not endorsed at the May 1982 Plenum, but only by the Politburo after Brezhnev's death, and that it was Gorbachev who explained its advantages authoritatively and cogently at a provincial conference in March 1983. The fact that Gorbachev cannot be firmly identified with any particular agricultural (or other policy) is probably to his advantage, however. He will still be among the best known of the Party Secretaries in the country at large through his fairly frequent travels round the country's agricultural areas.

22. As Gorbachev has risen in the Party, so he has accumulated status in the Supreme Soviet. Having served as a member of 2 Commissions (Environmental Protection and Youth), he was made Chairman of the Legislative Proposals Commission in 1979 (the only formal use that has been made of his legal training) and of the Foreign Affairs Commission in 1984 (see paragraph 26 below for the political significance of this move). In 1980, in common with the other Politburo members, he was also elected a Deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR for another, but less successful agricultural region, the Altai Krai in Southern Siberia.

23. Thanks to the death and retirement of his seniors, Gorbachev has risen steadily up the ranks of the Party Secretaries. From the beginning of 1982, with the successive departure of Suslov and Brezhnev through death, and Kirilenko through retirement, Gorbachev's position improved, although in May 1982 Andropov was brought in from the KGB and placed ahead of the other senior Secretaries (probably because of his having served in the Secretariat earlier). When Andropov took over as General Secretary in November 1982 Gorbachev was third in line after Chernenko. The latter was absent for much of the Summer of 1983, and though a new secretary (Romanov) was brought in in June, Gorbachev's status and the breadth of his responsibilities increased correspondingly. There were indications that he had taken on broader economic responsibilities and had some role in supervising Party organisation. Thus, whether or not stories that he enjoyed the particular confidence of the ailing Andropov are true, much of the burden of running the Party's affairs must have fallen on Gorbachev in the summer of 1983.



24. As a Senior Party Secretary, Gorbachev represented the CPSU at the Mongolian and Vietnamese Party Congresses in 1981 and 1982, at the Portuguese Communist Party Congress in 1983 and at the Italian Communist leader Berlinguer's funeral in 1984 (after which Gorbachev was received by President Pertini). More importantly, in May 1983 he visited Canada at the head of a Supreme Soviet delegation, his first visit to the West as a representative of the Soviet State, rather than Party. He had talks with Prime Minister Trudeau and toured Canadian agricultural enterprises, impressing his hosts with his detailed knowledge of the subject. He also appeared before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence of the Canadian House of Commons, at which he replied to questions, some hostile, while a verbatim record was taken. For a Soviet politician this is an unusual ordeal, and for Gorbachev to have agreed to submit to it reflects not only his own self-confidence but his knowledge of having the confidence of his Politburo colleagues.

#### VIII Under Chernenko as General Secretary, 1984

25. Andropov died in February in 1984, and Chernenko, the next in line of the Party Secretaries, succeeded him as General Secretary. This was a safe and, in terms of precedence and protocol, an uncontroversial choice. Nonetheless, it looked very much like the "old guard" choosing one of their own generation, an impression strengthened by the fact that Chernenko was proposed for the office by Prime Minister Tikhonov and not, as had been the case in the previous succession, by the next most senior Party Secretary, who on this occasion would have been Gorbachev. There were rumours of a disputed succession and indications of some dismay in Party circles that another elderly General Secretary had been chosen in preference to Gorbachev. The Plenum proceedings published in booklet form a few days later contained Gorbachev's previously unpublished speech closing the Plenum, in which he had duly supported the choice of Chernenko; this was presumably done to dispel such rumours within the Party.

26. It is in fact unlikely that Gorbachev would have squandered his accumulated political capital by mounting a premature challenge to Chernenko, and his subsequent rise indicates that he retains the confidence of the rest of the leadership. When Chernenko was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in April 1984 and thus relinquished his chairmanship of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Council of the Union of the Supreme Soviet, Gorbachev was elected in his place. This post, which of itself accords Gorbachev status, not power, indicates that he has taken over the responsibility in the Party Secretariat for the broad area of ideology and foreign policy, particularly towards with the "Socialist" countries, exercised by Chernenko, Andropov and Suslov before him. (The fact that in the 2 previous successions this position has been the stepping stone to the General Secretaryship does not of itself provide any guarantee for the next succession.) In addition, Gorbachev has maintained his supervision of agriculture; of general economic questions (he is said to be Chairman of the Politburo Commission tasked with working out a plan for the improvement of the whole economic mechanism); and of Party



organisation. This is an exceptionally broad range of responsibilities, which is partly dictated by there being only 2 senior Party Secretaries, Gorbachev and Romanov, apart from the General Secretary himself.

27. In the Party Secretariat Gorbachev ranks immediately below Chernenko and is therefore the natural choice as successor when Chernenko dies, if his age (at 53 he is still the youngest member of the Politburo) is not held against him. In the hierarchy of the Politburo as a whole he still ranks below the "old guard" of Prime Minister Tikhonov, Foreign Minister Gromyko and Defence Minister Ustinov. But none of these is a likely successor to Chernenko.

#### IX Personality, Family

28. Gorbachev is stocky and bald, with a prominent birthmark on his head, which is airbrushed out of his official photographs. He is not known to speak any foreign language. He has impressed his Western interlocutors with his intelligence and his urbanity. As with all the Soviet leadership, little has been revealed about Gorbachev's private life. His wife, however, was well to the fore at the Women's Day reception in March 1984, where she emerged as well dressed to the point of elegance, bejewelled and altogether unlike the Soviet stereotype. She is just under a year younger than her husband. They are thought to have a daughter and granddaughter.

#### X. Conclusions

29. In the Soviet Union a successful Party career is the prerequisite for the highest political office. Gorbachev has so far travelled this road extremely successfully. He has spent all his working life as a Komsomol and Party official. He rose steadily through the ranks as a local official to become an important regional First Party Secretary. He was transferred to Moscow as a Central Committee Secretary and he achieved early elevation to the Politburo. The relative narrowness of his experience is probably not a handicap. Since the upheavals of the Stalin and Khrushchev eras, and the war, Party officials have been moved around less energetically, and in future there will be few aspiring leaders who have had the varied experience of earlier generations. Nor is Gorbachev's close association with agriculture necessarily to his disadvantage, despite its continuing problems. In Party terms it is more important that Gorbachev has had broad experience as a Party manager at various levels. He has, however, no direct experience of military affairs, and his role as overlord of sector which absorbs a significant slice of capital investment would not seem to make him a natural ally of the military.

30. Much has been made of Gorbachev as a leader of the new generation. He became the first Politburo member who was not old enough to fight in the war and had not held political office under Stalin, and the first in recent history to have had a university degree rather than a technical education. This generational gap should not be exaggerated. If too young to fight in the war,



Gorbachev was certainly directly affected by it. If he did not hold political office under Stalin, his first political steps were taken in the last and most obscurantist years of Stalin. Most significantly, Gorbachev has made his entire career in the Party apparatus, whose tradition of strict discipline and suspicion of "individualism" has not been relaxed with the years. This said, Gorbachev does represent a new type among Soviet politicians. He reached political maturity in the Brezhnev years when, in contrast to the Stalin and Khrushchev years, the Party leadership recognized the complexity of the domestic and foreign issues it was dealing with, sought and listened to specialist advice and attempted to come up with solutions that as nearly as possible satisfied all the interests involved. Gorbachev has thrived in this atmosphere, where his intellectual capacity seems to have stood him in good stead. Moreover, after Brezhnev's death, the requirement for a Soviet leader to surround himself with his own coterie seems to have declined somewhat, again to the benefit of Gorbachev, who seems to have won broad respect in the Party for his ability. It may be a combination of these factors that has allowed Gorbachev to dispense with the hectoring manner characteristic of Soviet Party officials, particularly in the regions (and typified by his rival, Romanov).

31. It remains hard to discern whether Gorbachev has any far reaching political ideas which he would like to put into practice if he became Party leader. There is little doubt that in Western terms his views on the economy and agriculture tend towards the "progressive", ie more stress on economic stimuli and less on exhortation and campaigning. But this does not make him a radical. He would have no interest in a dilution of Party control over all spheres of Soviet life, and it seems almost inconceivable that he could be brought to concede, for example, that the forcible collectivisation of the peasants, which most Western observers consider still to be at the root of Soviet agricultural problems, was a mistake. If he were to become the Soviet leader he would be subject to the same constraints as his predecessors, at least for a number of years. But his youth and energy would be bound to affect his style of leadership and might do something to revivify the Party apparatus at all levels. As regards the Soviet Union's external policy, there is little evidence of his doing other than reflect the general Party line. Despite his newly acquired status as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Council of the Union he has not hitherto been any more accessible to Western interlocutors in Moscow or particularly forthcoming when approached.

Soviet Section  
Research Department  
November 1984



## GORBACHEV'S UK VISIT

Biography

1. The following points were added to the generally known details of Gorbachev's biography:
  - a) His father fought in the war, was wounded at Kosice and treated in Cracow. His wounds eventually killed him. Gorbachev's mother is still alive.
  - b) As a child Gorbachev lived in his paternal grandparent's home. His grandfather was a communist and had been a pioneer in the organisation of the first collective farms. His grandmother, however, was an ardent believer and had Gorbachev baptised.
  - c) Gorbachev's leap from the provinces to Moscow University had been achieved, he claimed, simply by filling in the application and taking the exams (though he had partial exemption through gaining a silver medal on completing his secondary education). He had chosen law because there was some official interest in it at the time and because his grandfather had recommended it.

Wife's Biography and Personality

2. Raisa Maksimovna Gorbacheva is a year younger than her husband. Her father (a Ukrainian) was a railway official, and although she was born in the Altai Krai she had a very mobile childhood. Her mother is from Siberia. She gained a 'gold star' at secondary school and met her husband at Moscow University, where she was studying philosophy. She is now a Doctor of Philosophy and has lectured at higher educational institutes. She is proud of her wide reading, but her interest in much of what she saw and heard in the UK was genuine and not borne of a desire to please or impress. She is clearly accustomed to being in a position where she is offered the best and where her wishes and changes of mind are catered for without question. She had learnt some English at school and was keen to read it and try out a few phrases, but basically she is not an English speaker.

Family Life

3. The Gorbachev's are an extended family: the household includes a daughter (the only child, aged 27), who is a doctor, her husband (a cardio vascular surgeon) and their grand-daughter (4 years old), and also her parents for much of the time and his mother for some of the time.

.../Gorbachev's



Gorbachev's Responsibilities and Relations with the Rest of the Politico

4. All that Gorbachev could be induced to say about his responsibilities was to acknowledge that they went wider than agricultural and economic affairs. Zamyatin vouchsafed that in addition to agriculture, Gorbachev had a wide range of other responsibilities and an important coordinating role within the Party Secretariat. Apart from his constant references to Chernenko, Gorbachev scarcely mentioned his Politbureau colleagues. He spoke warmly of Ustinov when revealing the latter's death, but did not appear to be emotionally affected by it himself.

His Views

5. On agriculture Gorbachev acknowledged that this year's harvest was 'not good' and that a 'big drop' had been registered. Nonetheless, he asserted that they would solve the grain problem in just a few years. He said that while the USSR had pressed ahead vigorously with fertilizer production it was still behind requirements in pesticides.

6. On the economy in general, Gorbachev spoke in standard terms, though with evident conviction. His broad theme was that what could safely be decentralised would be decentralised, but that key decisions, such as price fixing, would be even more firmly centralised. There would be more elements of self-management introduced throughout the Soviet economy, but no mechanical borrowing of eg. Hungarian experience.

7. Gorbachev took pleasure in airing his knowledge not only of agricultural techniques but also (at the Cowley Motorworks) of the technical and economic problems of vehicle production. He spoke as a man at ease with the capabilities of robotics, computer technology and new management techniques. He was confident that modernisation - the application of advanced technology and better methods of organisation and management - would solve the Soviet Union's social and economic problems. In this context he mentioned current economic experiments. He said the process would be lengthy, and above all, progress had to proceed evenly. His confidence in the power of technology harnessed to sound organisation was several times expressed in terms of evident pride in Soviet power.

8. On international affairs, Gorbachev was less animated than when he spoke on the Soviet economic scene. But he was never lost for a reply, and the discussions had a liveliness normally absent at meetings with Gromyko or Chernenko.

9. Gorbachev revealed a strong strain of Russian/Slav nationalism, as did his wife. He told several people that

.../without



without the firm grip at the centre, the many races in the Soviet Union would have flown apart and produced chaos.

10. Gorbachev was well prepared for the inevitable questions on dissidents and Jewish immigration and was quick to move onto the counter attack. He gave no indication of having any 'liberal' thoughts on these subjects.

General

11. Gorbachev's behaviour was, above all, natural. He seemed unconcerned by the extensive press coverage of his visit and handled the British media well. In the talks, while he was able to use the appropriate dialectical terms, he avoided standard Pravda verbiage and showed facility in debate. His relations with his delegation were good. He not infrequently gave members of his team the floor to speak on subjects on which they were experts. Their attitude to him was one of natural deference and admiration, but not of awe. Throughout the visit Gorbachev gave no indication that he speaks or understands any English.



CONFIDENTIAL

GROMYKO, Andrei Andreevich

Minister of Foreign Affairs USSR 1957; First Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers USSR 1983; Member, CC CPSU 1956 and of its Politburo 1973.

Born 1909, Belorussia; officially described as "Russian".

1931            Joined Party.

1932            Graduated from an Economics Institute.

1936            Completed post-graduate course at All-Union Scientific-Research Institute of Agricultural Economics.

1936-1939      Worked in Institute of Economics, Academy of Sciences, USSR.

1939            Began diplomatic work as Head, Department of American Countries of MFA.

1939-1943      Counsellor, Washington.

1943-1946      Ambassador, Washington and concurrently Envoy to Cuba.

1946-1948      Permanent Soviet Representative in UN Security Council.

1946-1949      Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

1946-1950      Deputy, Supreme Soviet USSR.

1949-1952      First Deputy Foreign Minister.

June 1952-     Ambassador, London.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

April 1953

- 1952-1956      Candidate Member, CC CPSU.
- 1953-1957      First Deputy Foreign Minister.
- 1956-            Member, CC CPSU
- 1957-            Minister of Foreign Affairs USSR
- 1958-            Deputy to Supreme Soviet USSR
- 1973-            Member, Politburo CC CPSU.
- 1983-            First Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers.

Gromyko led the Soviet delegation at Dumbarton Oaks, was present at the Potsdam and Crimea conferences, and has been Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union for over 25 years. In addition to this unrivalled experience, he has very considerable ability; a methodical and accurate mind; a good command of English; and rather more charm than is apparent on his greyer days. He is beginning to look his age, but at present he is in excellent health.

Gromyko is the author of works on international relations and is Chairman of the Commission for Publishing Diplomatic Documents; a book by Gromyko on capitalist economic relations was published in 1983. He has twice been awarded the title "Hero of Socialist Labour" and he has 6 Orders of Lenin.

Mrs Gromyko is friendly and on occasion indiscreet in her conversation. Their son, Anatoly, after a few years in diplomatic work became Director of the Africa Institute of the Academy of Sciences; Anatoly's son, Igor, is a post-graduate student at the Moscow State Institute of Foreign Relations.

CONFIDENTIAL



TIKHONOV, Nikolai Aleksandrovich

Chairman, Council of Ministers USSR 1980; Member of Politburo CC CPSU 1979; Member, CC CPSU 1966.

Born 1905, Kharkov, Ukrainian.

- 1924 graduated from Dnepropetrovsk Railway Technical School.
- 1924-1930 worked as an assistant to an engine driver and as a factory technician.
- 1930 graduated from Kharkov Metallurgical Institute.
- 1930-1940 engineer, section head, chief engineer at metallurgical plant in Dnepropetrovsk.
- 1940 joined the Party.
- 1940-1947 involved in evacuation of the plant in Dnepropetrovsk to Pervouralsk in Sverdlovsk oblast; continued to work in the plant as chief engineer, then deputy director.
- 1947-1950 Director, Southern Pipe Plant in Nikopol.
- 1950-1955 Head, Chief Administration for Pipe-rolling and Casting, Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy USSR.
- 1955-1957 Deputy Minister of Ferrous Metallurgy USSR.
- 1957-1960 Chairman of Dnepropetrovsk CNE.
- 1958- Deputy to Supreme Soviet USSR.
- 1960-1963 Deputy Chairman, State Scientific-Economic Council of USSR Council of Ministers – rank of USSR Minister.
- 1961 Dr Technical Sciences.
- 1961-1966 Candidate Member, CC CPSU.
- 1963-1965 Deputy Chairman of Gosplan – USSR Minister.
- 1965-1976 Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers USSR.
- 1966- Member, CC CPSU.
- 1976-1980 First Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers USSR.
- Nov 1978-  
Nov 1979 Candidate Member of Politburo.



Nov 1979- Member of Politburo.

Oct 1980- Chairman, Council of Ministers USSR.

Tikhonov was awarded State Prizes in 1943 and 1951, on the latter occasion for developing production of large-diameter seamless pipes. He holds the title of Hero of Socialist Labour, 7 Orders of Lenin, 2 Orders of the Red Banner of Labour, the Order of the October Revolution, and the Red Star. He has travelled relatively widely, and accompanied Khrushchev to the USA in 1959 and Podgorny to Iran in 1970; he has also visited Austria (most recently in April 1981), Canada, Japan, and Finland. Before assuming his present post he travelled frequently to Berlin and Bonn as head of the Soviet sides of the Soviet-GDR and Soviet-FRG intergovernmental commissions for economic and scientific-technical cooperation. Speaks some German and some English. He was Chairman of the Soviet Commission for the International Year of the Child in 1979.

Tikhonov has a reputation as a dry and colourless technocrat. His association with Brezhnev dates back at least to the 1930s when both were working in Dnepropetrovsk. Tikhonov became Chairman of the Council of Ministers on Kosygin's retirement on health grounds. He had been under-studying Kosygin since 1976, and his promotion to full Politburo member in 1979 made him the obvious successor.

Tikhonov is said to have chaired the session of the Council of Ministers that authorised the decision to deprive Academician Sakharov of his titles and exile him to Gorky.

His wife died in October 1980.



ROMANOV, Grigory Vasilevich

Secretary, CC CPSU, 1983; Member of Politburo, CC CPSU 1976; Member, CC CPSU 1966.

Born 1923; Russian.

- 1938 student at a technical college.
- 1941-1945 in the Army.
- 1944 joined the Party.
- 1946-1954 designer; head of sector of Central Design Bureau at A A Zhdanov Shipbuilding Works (in Leningrad).
- 1953 graduated from Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute (by correspondence).
- 1954-1957 Secretary of Party Committee, then CC CPSU Party Organiser at the Zhdanov Works.
- 1957-1961 Secretary, then First Secretary, of Kirov raikom (Leningrad).
- 1961-1962 Secretary of Leningrad gorkom.
- 1962-1963 Secretary of Leningrad obkom.
- 1963-1970 Second Secretary, Leningrad obkom.
- 1966-1970-83 Member, CC CPSU.  
First Secretary, Leningrad Obkom
- 1966- Deputy to Supreme Soviet USSR.
- 1971- Member of Presidium, Supreme Soviet USSR.
- April 1973- Candidate Member of Politburo.  
March 1976
- March 1976- Member of Politburo.
- 1983 - Secretary, CC CPSU

Romanov has two Orders of Lenin. His travels include China and Italy (1966), Norway (1967) and Finland, France and Cuba, which he has visited several times. He also led a delegation to Vietnam in 1978.

Romanov is popularly thought of as a hard liner in the arts but relatively adventurous in economic management; he has a high handed manner towards his subordinates, and overrode all opposition to holding his daughter's wedding reception at the Hermitage — an ostentatious affair at which priceless Tsarist porcelain is said to have been smashed. Despite reports that Romanov was sharply reprimanded by Suslov, his standing and authority do not appear to have suffered significant damage.

Western politicians who have met him in Leningrad have found him singularly unimpressive, never going beyond a prepared script even on local questions.

September 1982



CONFIDENTIAL

ALIEV Geidar Ali Rza ogly (Alievich) Major General

First Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers USSR 1982; Member, Central Committee CPSU 1971 and Member of Politburo CC CPSU 1982.

Born 1923 in Nakhichevan, Azerbaidzhani.

Graduated from Faculty of History, Azerbaidzhan State University.

1941-1949 held responsible positions in organs of State Security and internal affairs in Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic.

1945- Member, CPSU.

1949-1950 studying.

1950-1964 administrative work in MGB, MVD and KGB in Azerbaidzhan.

1964-1967 Deputy Chairman of KGB, Azerbaidzhan.

1966-1969 Candidate Member, CC CP Azerbaidzhan.

1967-1969 Chairman, KGB Azerbaidzhan, with rank of Major General.

1969- First Secretary and Member of Buro, Azerbaidzhan Central Committee.

1970- Deputy to Supreme Soviet USSR.

1971- Member, CC CPSU.

1976- Candidate Member of Politburo CC CPSU.

1982- First Deputy Chairman Council of Ministers USSR.

1982- Member of Politburo.

Aliev holds 2 Orders of Lenin, the Order of the Red Star and other awards. In 1971 he accompanied Brezhnev to Berlin and he led CPSU and Supreme Soviet delegations to Syria (1972), Cairo (1973) India (1978) and Mexico (1982). He was a member of Ponomarev's delegation to Rome in 1974, and visited Romania with Kosygin later the same year. He went to Yugoslavia in July 1976 as a guest of the Yugoslav Central Committee. In 1970 he was said to have been the target of an assassination attempt following his sweeping purges in the Azerbaidzhan Party apparatus. Aliev is well known as one of Brezhnev's most sycophantic supporters, but he has impressed Western observers as a tough and self confident natural leader with a sense of humour.

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VOROTNIKOV, Vitali Ivanovich

Chairman, Council of Ministers, RSFSR 1983. Member of Politburo CC CPSU 1983; Member of CC CPSU 1971.

Born 1926, Voronezh, Russian.

1942 Began work as apprentice fitter in a locomotive repair works in Voronezh. Then moved to engineering and aviation works in Kuibyshev.

1947 Joined Party.

1954 Graduated from Kuibyshev Aviation Institute.

1955?1960 Secretary of factory Party Committee.

1960 Head of Industry Department in Kuibyshev obkom.

1961-1962 Secretary, Kuibyshev obkom.

1963-1967 Second Secretary, Kuibyshev obkom.

1967-1971 Chairman, Kuibyshev oblispolkom.

1970- Deputy to Supreme Soviet USSR.

1971-1975 First Secretary, Voronezh obkom.

1971- Member, CC CPSU.

1975-1979 First Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers RSFSR.

1979-1982 Ambassador, Cuba.

1982-1983 First Secretary, Krasnodar kraikom.

June 1983- Candidate Member of Politburo CC CPSU  
Dec 1983

June 1983- Chairman, Council of Ministers RSFSR.

Aug. 1983- Deputy to Supreme Soviet RSFSR.

Dec 1983- Member, Politburo CC CPSU.

In 1976 Vorotnikov was noted as First Vice-President of the Soviet-Cuban Friendship Society, and was elected President of the Soviet-Angolan Friendship Society. He led a Friendship Society delegation to Luanda in 1978; he has also visited the FRG twice (1971, 1977). In 1976 he was awarded the Order of the October Revolution.

Vorotnikov was recalled from Cuba in mid-1982 in order to take over as First Party Secretary for the important Krasnodar kraikom after the previous Secretary (Medunov) had been dismissed for corruption. But he had been there for less than a year when he was further promoted to Chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, taking over from Solomentsev, who had become Chairman of the Committee of Party Control following the death of Pelshe.

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GRISHIN, Viktor Vasilievich

First Secretary, Moscow gorkom 1967; Member, CC CPSU 1952 and of its Politburo 1971; Member, Presidium, Supreme Soviet USSR 1967.

Born 1914

1932 graduated from Moscow Geodesic Institute.

1932-1933 worked as land technician in Moscow oblast.

1937 graduated from Moscow Steam Engine Tekhnikum; worked as Deputy Head of Serpukhov Railway Depot and as the Depot's Komsomol Secretary.

1938-1940 in Army.

1939 joined Party. Studied at some time at Higher Party School attached to CC CPSU, by correspondence.

1940-1941 Party Secretary at Serpukhov Railway Depot.

1942-1950 Secretary, Second Secretary, First Secretary of Serpukhov gorkom.

1950-1952 Head of Machine-building Department of Moscow obkom.

1952- Member, CC CPSU

1952-1956 Second Secretary, Moscow obkom.

1953- Deputy to Supreme Soviet USSR.

1956-1967 Chairman, AUCCTU and Vice-President, WFTU.

1961-1971 Candidate Member, Politburo.

1962-1977 Member, Constitutional Commission.

1967- First Secretary, Moscow gorkom; Member, Presidium of Supreme Soviet USSR.

1971- Member, Politburo.

Grishin travelled widely in his Trade Union days, visiting Britain in 1956 with a Supreme Soviet delegation and again in 1961 for the Scottish Trade Union Congress. His most recent visit to the West was to Milan in 1972 for the Italian CP Congress.

Grishin has the title of Hero of Socialist Labour, three Orders of Lenin and various medals.

In recent public appearances Grishin has appeared relaxed and self-confident. He is thought to be intolerant of the politically unorthodox. His daughter Olga, head of English at Moscow University, was studying recently in London where her husband, V G Aleksandrov, was Counsellor.





PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW FOR PRESIDENT CHERNENKO'S FUNERAL

CHECK LIST OF POINTS TO MAKE FOR MEETING WITH VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH  
(EXCLUDING EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL)

Middle East

- Report on Mubarak's visit to Washington?
- Prospects for US activity in response to Hussein/Arafat initiative. Need to keep up momentum
- Concern about deteriorating cycle of violence in Southern Lebanon. Hope Israelis will proceed with full withdrawal

Falklands/Argentina

- Hope US will urge realism on Argentina during Alfonsin's visit to Washington (begins 17 March)
- They must drop linkage between sovereignty and normalisation of bilateral relations

Laker

- Welcome agreement between BA and Eximbank
- Lot of work still remains to be done

US Economy

- Watching progress on Administration's attempts to reduce budget deficit with interest

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

NORTH AMERICA DEPARTMENT

12 March 1985





PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH: ARMS CONTROL

POINTS TO MAKE


- Grateful for President's message of 10 March on US negotiating position.
- Welcome your readiness to keep in close touch as negotiations unfold.
- Glad to see US negotiators have good degree of flexibility.
- Need to resist Soviet attempts to make progress in one area dependent on progress in another.
- Welcome President's rejection of inclusion of third country systems in US/Soviet negotiations.

- [REDACTED]
- Hard road ahead; you have our full support.



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PRIME MINISTER'S CONTACTS WITH OTHER DELEGATIONS IN MOSCOW : 12/13 MARCH

<u>Country</u>	<u>Points to Make</u>	<u>Relevant Factors</u>
Federal Republic of Germany Chancellor Kohl	Congratulations on CDU Governing Mayor <u>Diepgen's</u> impressive performance with the FDP in holding Berlin in the 10 March Land Elections. Augurs well for further stability in Allied/Berlin relations over next 4 years.	The CDU/FDP coalition in Berlin strengthened their majority in the House of Representatives thanks to a collapse in the SPD vote. Land elections in the <u>Saarland</u> on <u>10 March</u> resulted in victory over the CDU for the SPD left-winger, <u>Oskar Lafontaine</u> .
Italy President Pertini	Impressions of mood in Buenos Aires during your visit last week. Congratulations on grant of honorary degree from Oxford University.	Pertini and Andreotti visited Argentina on 8/9 March.  Degree to be conferred on 26 June.
 Finland President Koivisto	Much enjoyed our useful exchange of views last November. [If raised] Grateful for invitation to visit Finland: will discuss with Prime Minister Sorsa in May	Koivisto visited UK 13-16 November 1984, and had talks with the Prime Minister. He has since invited her to visit Finland.
Mr Kalevi Sorsa, Prime Minister	Look forward to our meeting in May.	Sorsa to visit UK 21-22 May : talks with Prime Minister 21 May.

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Country

Austria  
President Kirschschrager

Points to Make

No points to make

Relevant Factors

Visit to UK by Austrian  
Defence Minister

This proposed visit by  
Frischenschlager is now off:  
The Austrians invited UK  
views - we have told them that  
postponement would be in our  
mutual interest. <sup>probably</sup>  
Kirschschrager will /not raise  
this.



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## PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, 12-13 MARCH 1985

## JAPAN

1. Last met Mr Nakasone at Mrs Gandhi's funeral in November 1984.
2. Domestic political situation in Japan confused by sudden illness of former Prime Minister Tanaka, Mr Nakasone's chief backer. Some uncertainty about Mr Nakasone's survival for full two-year term until November 1986.
3. Mr Tebbit visiting Japan 15-19 April. Foreign Minister Abe due to visit UK during 1985 for regular consultations.
4. First (unofficial) 2000 Group meeting in Japan 4-5 February successfully set pattern for future bilateral conferences. Participants led by Mr James Prior met Mr Nakasone, delivered message from Mrs Thatcher. Next conference probably January 1986 in UK.
5. Prince Hiro leaves Oxford this summer, returns to Japan in September.
6. UK/Japan visible trade imbalance up to £2.87 billion in 1984.
7. Seven-power Economic Summit (Bonn) 2-4 May.



**CHERNENKO'S FUNERAL: POSSIBLE MEETING SPANISH PRIME MINISTER**OUR OBJECTIVES

1. (a) to show our goodwill over enlargement
- (b) to remain non-committal about high level visits.
- (c) to avoid comment on Spanish proposals on sovereignty.
- (d) to press for action on Spanish Prohibited Airspace.

ARGUMENTS TO USEEC

2. 17/20 March Brussels Foreign Affairs Council most important. Wish to see Spain an EC member by 1 January 1986.

Gibraltar

- 3.(a) Welcome outcome of Geneva talks on 5 February
- (b) Want early action on Spanish Prohibited Airspace, as was agreed in Brussels Communiqué last November. Delay already risking accusations of bad faith.

High Level Visits

4. Geneva process and agreement on managing differences over Gibraltar opens the way for high level visit.

Spain/NATO

5. Glad to see Defence Minister (Narcis Serra) in London mid-February. Prospects for referendum? Hope you will leave way open for future integration to NATO's military structure.



THEIR OBJECTIVES

- 6.(a) To press for progress over enlargement negotiations.
- (b) (Possibly) to press for early Prime Ministerial visit to Spain.
- (c) (Possibly) to discuss Gibraltar sovereignty.

YOUR RESPONSE

7.(a) Terms on offer will not improve. Spain will get nothing by delay. On fisheries, UK has been taking lead in seeking solution taking account of Spanish concerns. Must protect balance of Common Fisheries Policy.

(b) Sir Geoffrey Howe due to visit Madrid at end of this year. We shall need to look at other opportunities in light of situation created by Geneva Agreement.

(c) Will study Spanish proposals on sovereignty against background of HMG's commitments to respect wishes of people of Gibraltar as in 1969 Constitution. Cannot consider fixed time-scales. First priority is practical cooperation. Should not try to force the pace.

ADVANCE PRESS LINE

8. Short meeting: discussed a range of issues of mutual interest.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
12 March 1985





PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, 12-13 MARCH:

BILATERAL WITH PRESIDENT ZIA

POINTS TO MAKE

Elections

1. Congratulations on confirmation as President for further 5 years term. Welcome recent elections to new Assembly (to convene 23 March). Plans to lift martial law?

Afghanistan

2. Conscious of need not to expose Pakistan to greater Soviet military pressure. We propose to give £50,000 food aid for refugees inside Afghanistan. Hope you can concur.

UN Initiative

3. No indication of Soviet flexibility over troop withdrawal timetable: dates fixed in May for Geneva IV?

Bilateral

4. Hope sale of 3 frigates can be concluded soon.





PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, 12-13 MARCH:  
BILATERAL WITH MR RAJIV GANDHI

POINTS TO MAKE

Visit to India

1. Looking forward to seeing you in Delhi on 13 April.

Sikh Extremists

2. Share your concern about Sikh extremists in the UK. Have publicly stated our attitude, including support for the unity and territorial integrity of India. But can only act against Chauhan and his associates within the constraints of our law.
3. Welcome the assurances you gave that there is no obstacle to normal commercial relations. The Sikh extremist problem is one we both share. Should not allow it to distort our close relations.

Westlands Helicopters

4. Concerned that contract for supply of Westlands helicopters to Oil and Natural Gas Commission still not concluded, despite our offer of 100% aid. If downpayment not made before end of this financial year, danger of underspending aid this year and problem for management of aid programme in 1985/86.

Sri Lanka

5. Have urged Sri Lankan Government to resume negotiations with Tamils and establish dialogue with you. Will repeat this to President Jayewardene at Easter.



## FRENCH CANTONAL ELECTIONS

- First round of voting on 10 March.  
Good result for UDF (Giscard)/RPR (Chirac) almost 50%.  
National Front (Le Pen) consolidated European election  
breakthrough (8.8%).  
Socialists and Communists: slight improvement on very  
poor European election results.
- Second and final round on 17 March.
- Effect on possible introduction of proportional  
representation: slight PS revival and high NF vote  
could deprive UDF/RPR of overall majority in  
proportional system.





PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW FOR PRESIDENT CHERNENKO'S FUNERAL

CHECK LIST OF POINTS TO MAKE FOR MEETING WITH MR MULRONEY  
(EXCLUDING EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL)

Defence

- Welcome Canada's commitment to NATO, and recent decision to increase level of Canadian forces in Europe
- Also welcome Canada's support for US research on SDI

Anglo-Canadian Relations

- Welcome close contacts and co-operation between our Governments

Foreign Policy

- Hope that Canada will maintain close relations with Britain and with Europe
- Pleased to hear of your continuing commitment to the Caribbean following your meeting with regional leaders in Jamaica. Important that we continue working together in the region

Visits

- Look forward to welcoming you to London

New High Commissioner

- Look forward to welcoming Mr McMurtrey to London