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 TELEGRAM NUMBER 1543 OF 10 MAY
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 ROUTINE VIENNA, UKMIS NEW YORK
 INFO SAVING TOKYO

SHULTZ'S MEETING WITH GROMYKO IN VIENNA

1. AMBASSADOR PLATT (SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY AND THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT) TOLD MINISTER ON 10 MAY THAT, WHILE THE TONE OF US/SOVIET CONTACTS WAS MARGINALLY LESS FROSTY THAN IT HAD BEEN A COUPLE OF WEEKS AGO, NEVERTHELESS THE US SIDE HAD NO EXAGLERATED EXPECTATIONS OF THE SHULTZ/GROMYKO MEETING NEXT WEEK. THERE WAS IN ANY CASE A TENDENCY FOR BOTH SIDES TO KEEP ANY INTERESTING CARDS IN THEIR HAND FOR A REAGAN/GORBACHEV MEETING LATER IN THE YEAR.
2. PLATT SAID THAT THE HANDLING OF THE NICHOLSON AFFAIR WAS GOING TO BE PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT. A QUOTE SENSE OF CONGRESS UNQUOTE RESOLUTION, PASSED BY A LARGE MAJORITY ON 9 MAY, DEMANDED THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY APOLOGY FROM THE SOVIET SIDE, DOBRYNIN SHOULD BE EXPELLED. THE RESOLUTION HAD NO OPERATIVE EFFECT BUT THE PRESSURE ON SHULTZ TO TAKE A TOUGH LINE WITH GROMYKO WAS CLEAR. IT WAS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT GROMYKO WOULD NOT GIVE GROUND ON THE SUBJECT. SO THE RISKS OF A CLASH SIMILAR TO THE POST-KAL ONE IN MADRID IN 1983 WAS VERY REAL.
3. PLATT SAID THAT SHULTZ WOULD GIVE GROMYKO A RESPONSE IN VIENNA TO THE RECENT FORTHCOMING SOVIET COMMUNICATION ON US/SOVIET DISCUSSION OF REGIONAL ISSUES (HANNAY'S TELELETTER TO JENKINS OF 29 APRIL). HE WAS LIKELY TO WELCOME THE IDEA OF TALKS ON AFGHANISTAN AND ON AFRICA, BUT TO SUGGEST THAT SOUTH EAST ASIA WAS RATHER TOO SENSITIVE TO PROCEED WITH IMMEDIATELY, AND THAT THE AMERICANS DID NOT BELIEVE THAT TALKS ON CENTRAL AMERICA WERE APPROPRIATE. HANNAY ASKED WHETHER THE AMERICANS PICKING OUT THE PLUMS IN THIS WAY MIGHT NOT RESULT IN A COMPLETE ABSENCE OF PROGRESS. WHILE WE SHARED THE US OBJECTIVE OF KEEPING TO THE MINIMUM SOVIET AND CUBAN INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA, IT WAS NOT EVIDENT TO US THAT THE SORT OF TALKS ENVISAGED IN THIS SERIES CUT ACROSS THAT. PLATT MADE IT CLEAR THAT THERE WAS NO GIVE IN THE AMERICAN POSITION ON DISCUSSING CENTRAL AMERICA, IF ONLY FOR THE REASON THAT THEY WOULD FIND IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO AGREE AMONGST THEMSELVES WHAT TO SAY TO THE RUSSIANS ABOUT THEIR OBJECTIVES AND POLICY IN THE REGION.

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4. ON ARMS CONTROL, PLATT SAID THAT SHULTZ WOULD HAVE NO NEW PROPOSALS TO MAKE IN VIENNA. HE WOULD DO HIS BEST TO ENCOURAGE GROMYKO TO ENSURE THAT THE NEXT ROUND OF TALKS WAS MORE BUSINESSLIKE AND LESS DOMINATED BY PROPAGANDA. BUT, REALISTICALLY, THE AMERICANS EXPECTED NO SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS THIS SIDE OF A REAGAN/GORBACHEV MEETING. PLATT ADDED HOWEVER THAT THE AMERICANS WERE VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED NOT TO LET THE RUSSIANS HOLD THE PROPAGANDA STAGE DURING THIS PERIOD. THAT EXPLAINED THE PRESIDENT'S RE-STATEMENT AT STRASBOURG OF HIS EARLIER IDEAS ON NO FIRST USE OF FORCE AND ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES. THERE MIGHT WELL BE FURTHER PUBLIC RE-FORMULATIONS OF EXISTING WESTERN POSITIONS IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. BUT THE AMERICANS SAW NO CASE FOR PUTTING FORWARD GENUINELY NEW PROPOSALS WHILE THE RUSSIANS WERE STILL TROTTING OUT THEIR OLD POSITIONS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TOKYO.

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