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TO PRIORITY FCO
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1605 OF 17 MAY
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO.

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VIENNA TELNO 94: SHULTZ' MEETING WITH GROMYKO

1. WE HAVE PICKED UP SOME FURTHER DETAILS OF THE MEETING.
2. AT THE PUS'S MEETING WITH ARMACOST ON 16 MAY, BURT CONFIRMED THAT THE OVERALL US ANALYSIS WAS THAT GROMYKO SEEMED PREPARED TO CONTEMPLATE MOVES ON RELATIVELY MINOR ASPECTS OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, BUT HAD NO NEW INSTRUCTIONS ON THE CENTRAL ISSUES, INCLUDING ARMS CONTROL. SHULTZ HAD STRESSED TO GROMYKO THAT THE US WANTED TO SEE PROGRESS IN THE SECOND ROUND STARTING IN GENEVA ON 30 MAY, AND HOPED THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD COME FORWARD WITH NEW PROPOSALS. BUT THE US GENEVA NEGOTIATORS IN FACT EXPECTED NOTHING TO HAPPEN THERE BEFORE THE AUTUMN.
3. ON REGIONAL ISSUES, BURT SAID THAT GROMYKO'S PRESENTATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST HAD BEEN PRECISELY THE MIXTURE AS BEFORE, WITH MUCH DWELLING ON THE LEGITIMATE GRIEVANCES OF THE PALESTINIANS, AND THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. ON SOUTHERN AFRICA, NOTHING NEW HAD BEEN SAID, THOUGH EXPERTS WOULD MEET ON 30 MAY IN PARIS. ON AFGHANISTAN, EXPERTS WOULD MEET IN JUNE IN WASHINGTON. (WE UNDERSTAND TALKS ON ASIAN ISSUES ARE A POSSIBILITY LATER IN THE YEAR). WHAT WAS NEW WAS THAT GROMYKO HAD RAISED CENTRAL AMERICA AND HAD TAKEN A TOUGHER LINE THAN IN THE PAST. HE HAD BEEN SHARPLY CRITICAL OF THE US FOR QUOTE INTERFERENCE UNQUOTE IN NICARAGUA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND HAD CALLED FOR A HANDS OFF POLICY. ARMACOST ADDED THAT THE RUSSIANS WANTED TO HAVE TALKS WITH THE US ON CENTRAL AMERICA, BUT THE US WERE REFUSING, BECAUSE THEY FELT THAT THE SUBJECT WAS BEST TACKLED AT GROMYKO/SHULTZ LEVEL.
4. ON THE POSSIBILITIES FOR A SUMMIT, WE GATHER FROM THE SOVIET DESK IN STATE THAT SOVIET OFFICIALS HERE HAVE, IN RECENT INFORMAL CONTACTS, BEEN TAKING THE LINE THAT AFANASIEV'S PREDICTION OF A MEETING IN THE MARGINS OF THE UN MEETING IN NEW YORK WAS WRONG, AND HINTING THAT THE TIMING MAY SLIP. THE STATE DEPARTMENT BELIEVE THAT THIS, IF CONFIRMED, IS MORE LIKELY TO BE FOR REASONS OF INTERNAL RATHER THAN FOREIGN POLICY.

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5. ON THE POSSIBILITIES FOR MFN TREATMENT (PARA 11 OF TUR) STATE SAY THAT SHULTZ HAD NOT DRAWN AN EXPLICIT LINK BETWEEN THE POSSIBILITY OF MFN TREATMENT FOR SOVIET TRADE AND IMPROVEMENT IN SOVIET EMIGRATION POLICY . THE ADMINISTRATION HAD NO INTENTION OF TAKING A LEAD IN DOING SUCH A DEAL. HOWEVER THERE WAS SOME DEBATE IN CONGRESS AND IN THE JEWISH COMMUNITY AT LARGE ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE JACKSON/VANIK AMENDMENT, AND SHULTZ' PURPOSE HAD BEEN SIMPLY TO IMPLY THAT, IF SOVIET PRACTICE IMPROVED SUFFICIENTLY, THIS MIGHT BENEFIT SOVIET TRADE.

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