



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 June, 1985.

MEETING WITH UNIONIST LEADERS

Thank you for your letter of 21 June enclosing records of the Northern Ireland Secretary's meeting with leaders of the two main Unionist parties.

The Prime Minister has read these. She has commented that work should be put in hand straight away on our reply to the sort of statement or speech which the Reverend Ian Paisley is threatening to deliver; and that a careful watch must be kept on his statements and those of other Northern Ireland politicians for evidence of incitement.

I am copying this letter to Len Appleyard (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

(C.D. Powell)

SMH

J.A. Daniell, Esq.,
Northern Ireland Office.

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From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

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NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE

WHITEHALL

LONDON SW1A 2AZ

Prime Minister

I suggest that you read these records, or at least the passages which I have underlined. Dr. Paisley at his 21 June 1985

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

worst.

CDP 21/6

We must prepare our reply to such a speech, and watch for any windfall.

Dea Clark

MEETINGS WITH UNIONIST LEADERS

I enclose records of three meetings which took place yesterday between the Secretary of State and the leaders of the two main Unionist parties. The Secretary of State saw Mr Molyneaux and Dr Paisley separately to discuss political development within Northern Ireland and, at their request, he met them together in a discussion about security.

I am copying this letter to Len Appleyard (FCO) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

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Jim

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J A DANIELL

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MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND MR MOLYNEAUX HELD ON
20 JUNE TO DISCUSS POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT - 5.30PM

Present: Secretary of State Mr Molyneux
PUS
Mr Daniell

The Secretary of State said that he wished to examine ways of making political progress within Northern Ireland, irrespective of what happened on the external track. Partial devolution was one possibility but another option might be for some form of elected provincial body with administrative responsibilities. Timing was difficult, especially as the SDLP were not at this stage keen to embark upon serious discussions.

2. Mr Molyneux said that he was attracted to giving more powers to district councils, but accepted that in present circumstances that could not be on the agenda. One option might be to improve legislative procedures at Westminster, although that need not preclude progress on other fronts. The Secretary of State said that this might be an area for discussion in the future.

3. Mr Molyneux said that he had been making enquiries about the work of the Report Committee in the Assembly. It appeared that they were taking evidence from a variety of people not directly involved in politics and allowing themselves to be diverted from their task. If the Assembly could be transformed into something useful, Mr Molyneux would support it in the long term. However as it seemed unlikely to develop into a worthwhile body in the foreseeable future, there were strong arguments for looking at possible improvements in the way in which Northern Ireland business was dealt with.

4. The Secretary of State said that he did not need to decide on the future of the Assembly for some months. One option for consideration might be some form of administrative devolution and if that were adopted, then clearly legislative procedures for Northern Ireland at Westminster would merit re-examination. However the time for detailed discussion of such points had not yet been reached. Mr Molyneux suggested that the Secretary of State might have to implement measures without consulting the party leaders on the detail.

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5. On the Anglo-Irish talks, the Secretary of State said that the outcome was still uncertain. However it should become clear within a matter of weeks whether agreement would be reached. The Secretary of State took Mr Molyneaux's point that the presentation of any agreement in Dublin could fuel fears in the North that it was a step on the road to Irish unity. For that reason it was essential that Mr Molyneaux understood HMG's position on the Anglo-Irish dimension even though he might not endorse it. Two important considerations were the need to bring about improved security co-operation; and to unfreeze nationalist attitudes in Northern Ireland in that they would realise that the Dublin Government did not contemplate a united Ireland in the foreseeable future.

Mr Molyneaux recognised that it was impossible to engage in public discussion of what was happening while negotiations were in progress; but this did give rise to suspicions on the part of Unionists, particularly when Dublin engaged in kite-flying. While the Prime Minister might convince Unionists of the Government's good faith, there would remain a worry about what might happen should there be a change of Government at Westminster.

6. In a brief discussion about the position on district councils, the Secretary of State said that he remained of the view that it would be a mistake to use proscription as a means of preventing people from voting for Sinn Fein. However one possibility might be legislation requiring elected representatives to make a declaration renouncing violence before they took their seats. It was always possible that Sinn Fein members might make the declaration and then ignore it; nevertheless it was an idea worth considering. Mr Molyneaux agreed to mull it over.

J A Daniell

J A DANIELL
Private Secretary

21 June 1985

cc PS/S of S (L&B)-m Mr Chesterton
PS/Mr Patten (L&B)-m Mr Buxton-m
PS/Mr Scott (L&B)-m Mr Merifield-m
PS/PUS (L&B)-m Mr Gilliland-m
Mr Bloomfield-m Miss Elliott
Mr Brennan Mr Lyon
Mr A W Stephens-m Mr Reeve-m
Mr Ferneyhough-m Mr Bickham
Mr Wood

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MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND DR PAISLEY HELD ON
20 JUNE TO DISCUSS POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT - 3.15 PM

Present: Secretary of State Dr Paisley
 PUS
 Mr Daniell

The Secretary of State opened the discussion by broaching the issue of political development within Northern Ireland. He noted that Mr Patten had carried out a ground clearing exercise with the main constitutional political parties in the Province; but that Dr Paisley had not felt able to see him. While the Secretary of State had no specific model to put to Dr Paisley, he said that he would welcome views on the timing of movement on this front. Consideration of a version of partial devolution was one possibility, but it would be a mistake to embark upon a political initiative without the Northern Ireland parties being genuinely interested in reaching agreement.

2. Dr Paisley said that his thinking was coloured by serious doubts about the Anglo-Irish talks. He and his people resented their future being the subject of discussions between London and Dublin in which they had no say. While the SDLP were briefed on the state and content of the talks by the Government in Dublin, Unionists were dependent upon leaks from both sides of the Irish Sea and from Irish MEPs. It was sometimes difficult to gauge whether the leaks were genuine or some kind of kite-flying exercise aimed at assessing reactions to particular proposals. This was contributing to an increasingly unstable situation in Northern Ireland - so much so that in the wake of security incidents bereaved families were no longer just complaining bitterly about the murder of loved ones but were also in the same breath discussing being sold down the river by the British Government. There could be a fearful backlash and it was necessary to bear in mind that these views were being expressed not by hot-heads but by responsible members of the community.

3. On the internal front, Dr Paisley said that he could hardly be expected to have any truck with the SDLP, given that they were now working in tandem with Provisional Sinn Fein. Also John Hume

had said that Northern Ireland was a failed entity; he could not therefore be expected to seek to make internal political structures work. Dr Paisley was not the man to help Mr Hume; he wanted to see Republicanism thrashed.

4. Replying to the points about Anglo-Irish talks, the Secretary of State said that these were confidential between Governments but that the parameters within which they were taking place had been repeatedly made clear. They were being conducted within the framework set out in the Chequers Summit and during the ensuing press conference. There would be no derogation from United Kingdom sovereignty in Northern Ireland and no executive role for the Republic in the affairs of the North; there was no question of a breach of the constitutional guarantee, of selling Northern Ireland down the river or of the talks producing a back-door route to Irish unity. The talks were about seeking a methodical way of exchanging views which might help unfreeze SDLP attitudes on institutions in Northern Ireland. Also, and very importantly, a successful agreement would have implications for security. Progress had been made in the fight against terrorism, but it was inadequate. The most promising means of securing further substantial improvement was through enhancing cross-border co-operation with the Republic; and this meant being prepared to listen to their views on other matters. It was unrealistic to suggest that the Republic should be more amenable on security matters while at the same time HMG should not be prepared to talk to Dublin about other matters relating to Northern Ireland. This was the strongest reason for reaching agreement.

5. Dr Paisley rejected this approach. If HMG wished to continue to do business with Dublin, it should do so on the basis that it was dealing with an unfriendly government which was seeking by one means or another to destroy Northern Ireland as a part of the United Kingdom. The Secretary of State's argument was that there was a price for security co-operation; in fact the real price was long-term absorption of Northern Ireland into the Republic. There should be no price for co-operation in the defeat of terrorism; in particular it was no business of Dublin to tinker with Northern Ireland's courts or security forces. It was outrageous for Mr Barry to suggest that he could speak for United Kingdom citizens (ie the nationalist minority)

in Northern Ireland) when they had their own elected representatives. If agreement was reached there would be no chance of internal progress and, with Protestant resistance, the situation would be too fearful to contemplate. The answer to the security problem was to seal the border, which could be achieved by the security forces if they were given the right orders. Protestants would not recognise special community police forces or joint courts and if a member of the Garda were to cross the border on an operation, he would be killed. In response to a direct question from Dr Paisley about whether there had been any discussion with the Irish about judges and joint courts, the Secretary of State said that Dr FitzGerald was interested in the concept; but although the details of the talks on this point, as on others, were confidential, Dr Paisley could take it that HMG was fully seized of all the difficulties. Dr Paisley remarked that HMG should bear in mind that Dr FitzGerald did not keep confidences.

6. Dr Paisley said that a sound relationship with the Republic could be achieved only when there was a devolved administration in Belfast to deal with cross-border co-operation. But there was no prospect of agreement on that front while the SDLP were dealing with Sinn Fein. The Secretary of State noted that on several councils Unionist pacts were operating to exclude the SDLP from positions on committees and appointments to consultative boards; this played into the hands of Sinn Fein. Dr Paisley replied that election victors could not be expected to hand over the fruits of their victory to opponents. The DUP wanted to defeat the SDLP as much as Sinn Fein as both parties were out to destroy Northern Ireland. It was worth noting that in Fermanagh the Official Unionists had agreed to work with the SDLP to keep Sinn Fein at bay; however the Executive Committee of the SDLP issued an instruction that at the local level SDLP members were not to allow themselves to be voted into positions by Unionists. The result was to push the SDLP in Fermanagh into the hands of Sinn Fein. Omagh and Cookstown were similar examples showing the SDLP in their true colours. Local government in Northern Ireland had effectively broken down.


7. The Secretary of State said that a careful watch was being kept on local councillors to ensure that statements which they made did not contravene the law. There were no present plans to change

local government law in the light of the difficulties on Councils but it would be kept under review. In dealings with elected representatives HMG and Northern Ireland Departments would use the maximum discretion available to them under the law to distinguish between those who favoured constitutional methods and those who did not. In this context, the Secretary of State noted that George Graham and Ivan Foster, both DUP representatives, had the previous day made monstrous speeches in the Assembly, speaking out in favour of retaliatory killings outside the law: Mr Graham had subsequently spoken of standing beside the UVF to fight. The Secretary of State said that in the light of this he would not be prepared to receive Mr Graham or the Reverend Foster as part of a DUP deputation to discuss security on 24 June. There would be no purpose in including these two in such a meeting as there could be no basis for discussion. Dr Paisley objected strongly to the Secretary of State's remarks. He said that while Sinn Fein supported the killing of members of the security forces, Mr Graham and the Reverend Foster had spoken of dealing with terrorists; it was quite unreasonable to treat them in the same way as members of Sinn Fein and if the Secretary of State persisted with this view, Dr Paisley would refuse to attend any further meetings with him on security. He asked the Secretary of State whether he would refuse to see the Reverend Foster at his forthcoming meeting with the Assembly Security Committee (of which the Reverend Foster was a member). The Secretary of State replied that the only basis on which he would discuss security matters was one of respect for the rule of law; he could not therefore meet these two people in the aftermath of a debate in which such deplorable comments had been made. He would give separate consideration to the Assembly Security Committee.

8. As for the present mood in the loyalist community, Dr Paisley said that the Chief Constable's attempts to interfere with traditional parades could be the straw to break the camel's back. It was intolerable that at Castlewellan a parade should have been banned because a Roman Catholic Church, on the traditional route, had decided to open for Saturday mass. The argument that this was to save on police resources which could be better deployed in dealing with terrorism could not be sustained; more policemen were present to enforce the ban than would have been required to police the

parade. It was intolerable that the Chief Constable should have issued a directive announcing the establishment of additional Divisional Mobile Support Units in order to deal with parades and provide cover in case of a loyalist backlash against the Anglo-Irish agreement. It was disgraceful that such documents should be issued to senior police officers and naive to imagine that they would not be leaked.

9. The Secretary of State made it clear that there was no intention to abolish parades. It was partly a question of seeking the co-operation of organisers to minimise the pressure on police resources; but it was also necessary to bear in mind that parades constituted provocation, especially where people wanted to be provoked. The RUC were discussing routes with the organisers and coming to decisions on a case by case basis. At this difficult time of the year it was up to responsible people to help the Chief Constable.


J A DANIELL
Private Secretary

21 June 1985

cc PS/S of S (L&B) -m
PS/Mr Patten (L&B) -m
PS/Mr Scott (L&B) -m
PS/PUS (L&B) -m
Mr Bloomfield -m
Mr Brennan
Mr A W Stephens -m
Mr Ferneyhough -m
Mr Chesterton
Mr Buxton -m
Mr Merifield -m
Mr Gilliland -m
Miss Elliott
Mr Lyon
Mr Reeve -m
Mr Bickham
Mr Wood

MEETING BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND UNIONIST LEADERS HELD
ON 20 JUNE TO DISCUSS SECURITY 4.15 PM

Present: Secretary of State Mr Molyneux
 Mr Scott Dr Paisley
 PUS
 Mr Buxton
 Mr Daniell

This joint meeting was called at the request of the two Unionist leaders.

2. Mr Molyneux said that he and Dr Paisley had decided to seek the meeting in view of the dangerous situation in Northern Ireland arising out of:

- (i) the Government's ambiguity in dealing with Sinn Fein councillors;
- (ii) the stepping up of the terrorist campaign on the part of associates of these councillors;
- (iii) speculation about the Anglo-Irish talks.

On top of these factors was the new policy on banning traditional parades which was seen as the last straw by many loyalists. If this policy were pushed too far, there would be a major eruption of violence with confrontation between loyalists and the RUC and there would be no point in Unionist leaders advising people to stay calm. While Mr Molyneux could see the reasoning behind some of what the Secretary of State's security advisers were trying to do, it was essential that they should act with more sensitivity.

3. Dr Paisley said that the policy on banning and rerouting marches would be the detonator that unleashed loyalist violence. It was incomprehensible that action should be taken against traditional loyalist marches that had followed the same route for decades or more, especially given that Hibernian marches had been allowed through loyalist and mixed areas, such as Rasharkin and Portglenone. The proposal to reroute a Craigavon/Portadown march away from the "Tunnel" was particularly serious. Dr Paisley despaired of the

decision to operate extra Divisional Mobile Support Units to deal with a possible loyalist backlash against the Anglo-Irish talks; this was explosive. It appeared that the Government wanted to see loyalists on the wrong end of RUC batons in order to prove to the Irish that the security forces were impartial. The stage was being reached where there was no point in talking to the Secretary of State about security; Unionists would have to concentrate on using Parliament and the media to communicate. Indeed, was there any point in Loyalist politicians carrying on in public life?

3. The Secretary of State said that constitutional politicians would always be welcome to meet him to discuss security matters. He agreed with much of Mr Molyneaux' analysis of the situation but could not accept his conclusions. The Anglo-Irish talks were closely geared to the needs of the security situation, vitally important given that the Secretary of State had taken on the Unionists' point that security would not further improve substantially until something was done about the border. As for Sinn Fein's presence on District Councils, it would have been a mistake to proscribe them before the elections; if we had done so it would have been impossible to demonstrate that they constituted only a minority within the minority community. In its dealings with councillors and other elected representatives, the Government's policy was clear; it would distinguish to the maximum extent possible allowed by the law between those who believed in constitutionalism and those who connived in violence. On the level of violence, it was not the case that there had been some sudden upsurge. Since the beginning of the year 39 people had been killed, exactly the same number as in the same period last year; there had been 234 injuries compared to 284; fewer shooting incidents; and less use made of explosives. The pattern of killings had changed however in that more policemen had died, but fewer soldiers. The Secretary of State said that he would listen carefully to views on parades; the policy was to reduce the opportunity for mutual provocation and reduce the amount of RUC resources being diverted away from counter-terrorist activities to deal with marches. It was not possible to generalise on marches; each decision on rerouting would be taken on its merits by the RUC in the light of local conditions. Banning parades was a matter for the Secretary of State who took RUC advice.

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4. Mr Molyneaux said that in their dealings with Sinn Fein, Ministers and departments were acting in accordance with legal advice. Councils, however, were having to establish the position by means of test cases in the courts. For example, it was not clear in some cases whether Sinn Fein councillors could legally be excluded from nominations to certain Boards. There was a duty on Government to advise councillors, rather than expect them to risk putting themselves on the wrong side of the law. Perhaps DOE-NI could work more closely with Councils to give them support on this. Also, would the Government consider changing local government law in the light of the Sinn Fein threat? The Secretary of State said that it would be a mistake to rush into any changes in the law, rather it was his intention to keep the situation under review for a period to allow Councils the opportunity to settle down to their work. On the question of legal help for Councils, Mr Scott said that if Chief Executives spoke to DOE-NI they would no doubt receive advice where the law was clear cut; but where there was doubt the matter would have to be tested in the courts.

(Mr Barry to note and to advise please on whether anything further should be said to Mr Molyneaux about this.)

5. Mr Molyneaux cast doubt on whether the Anglo-Irish talks would contribute to better security. If the Irish were acting in good faith they would have done more to stop the flow of explosives while the talks were in progress. The Taoiseach ought now to be taking effective action to show his determination to deliver on his side of the agreement. Loyalists feared that a good deal would be conceded to the Irish with nothing being given in return in terms of enhanced security in border areas. The Secretary of State replied that there were many ways in which the Irish could help on the security front, in the field of explosives for example. They were already working with the UK on examining ways of producing fertilizer that was less easily converted to Home Made Explosives. There could be enormous benefit in devising a methodical arrangement for consultation with Dublin in which such matters could be pursued.

6. Dr Paisley said that if the cost of better security was to allow the South to get a toe in the door leading to Irish unity, then

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Unionists would not pay such a price. If they needed concessions in order to behave decently, that was not good enough. Successive British Governments had betrayed Northern Ireland and, with the Dublin element thrown in as well, an explosive situation was being created. It had in the past been stated by British Governments that the affairs of Northern Ireland were for the UK Parliament and the people of Northern Ireland to decide. Now it was being said that the government in the Republic had the right to represent the nationalist community in Northern Ireland; that was the toe in the door. Moreover the constitutional guarantee would be severely undermined if Dublin was to be involved in law-making in the North and if Judges from the Republic were to be involved in applying Northern Ireland's law. The Secretary of State said that there was no question of the Government in Dublin being given joint authority over Northern Ireland. If agreement was reached, then this would become clear. Mr Molyneaux doubted whether the Irish would agree to enhanced security co-operation unless HMG conceded more than was allowed for under the terms of the Chequers summit. Dr Paisley noted that the SDLP believed Northern Ireland to be a failed entity and could not be expected to help make the Province workable.

7. Mr Molyneaux disputed the argument that the policy on parades was designed to release RUC resources to deal with terrorism. Where parades were banned or rerouted, the police commitment had been shown to be greater than when they were allowed to proceed along traditional routes. It was monstrous that traditional parades should be rerouted because the character of the neighbourhood had changed (usually the result of unionist acceptance that land should be used for better housing for Catholics). The position in Craigavon/Portadown was a nonsense. The parade was being rerouted away from the "Tunnel" where there was a small Catholic presence to take it through much larger Catholic housing estates. This would be seen as a victory for Sinn Fein, one of whose councillors lived in the "Tunnel". Dr Paisley reported on an unsatisfactory meeting in RUC HQ where a senior police officer repeatedly lost his temper over discussion on an Apprentice Boys parade in Belfast and had to be restrained by a junior officer. Banning traditional parades would constitute an intolerable provocation of the Loyalist people and would result in serious confrontation. Mr Molyneaux said that he and

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Dr Paisley did not support new "coat trailing" parades clearly aimed at provocation; but the authorities should rethink their stance on traditional parades.

8. The Secretary of State re-iterated the point that decisions would be made on a case by case basis in the light of local circumstances; the way through all of this was for parade organisers to enter into constructive discussions with the local police. Mr Scott accepted that for the first time that a march was re-routed extra police resources might on some occasions be needed; but in subsequent years the policing requirement should be considerable reduced.

9. Dr Paisley referred to the Secretary of State's decision not to meet Mr Graham and the Reverend Foster as a part of a DUP deputation to discuss security. It was intolerable that they should be treated in the same way as members of Sinn Fein, who supported the killing of members of the security forces. The Secretary of State said that he had read very carefully the report of the Assembly debate on 19 June. Graham and Foster were clearly speaking in support of retaliatory killings outside the law; this was so alien to anything that the Secretary of State could contemplate that in the aftermath of such statements he could see no point in meeting them to discuss security. The Secretary of State accepted Dr Paisley's point that these people lived under enormous pressures, but pointed out that as leaders in the community they had a duty to behave responsibly. Mr Molyneaux said that all of this was an inevitable consequence of setting up an Assembly with no powers and no control over security. It was inevitable that in their frustration, members of such a body would give vent to their feelings in an extreme manner. As for whether he would meet the Reverend Foster later, as a member of the Assembly Security Committee, the Secretary of State said that he would consider the matter carefully.

10. As the meeting came to an end, Dr Paisley said that he had met successive Secretaries of State. The position was getting progressively worse. He would no longer talk to the Government about security; his next public statement would be stronger than anything said by Messrs Graham and Foster. It was irrelevant that

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security statistics showed an improvement; the real point was the increasing bitterness of the man in the street. Ulster's constitutional position would be protected by the people of Ulster, not by any meaningless constitutional guarantee. Ulster was close to getting out of hand and Dr Paisley would not be surprised to see prominent Sinn Fein councillors being shot.

11. The Secretary of State said that he understood the words of anxiety and emotion which swept through the majority community from time to time, producing extreme statements. However during his period in Northern Ireland, he had been greatly encouraged by the number of ordinary people who continued to speak in constructive moderate tones. We have taken careful note of all that Mr Molyneux and Dr Paisley had said.

Spail

J A DANIELL
Private Secretary

21 June 1985

cc PS/S of S (L&B) -m
 PS/Ministers (L&B) -m
 PS/PUS (L&B) -m
 Mr Bloomfield -m
 Mr Brennan
 Mr Stephens -m
 Mr Barry (DOE-NI) -m
 Mr Chesterton
 Mr Merifield -m
 Mr Gilliland -m
 Mr Ferneyhough -m
 Mr Buxton -m
 Mr G Hewitt -m
 Mr Coulson -m
 Mr Lyon
 Mr Reeve -m
 Miss Elliott
 Mr Bickham
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