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OF 021500Z SEPTEMBER 85

INFO PRIORITY : WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO, UKDIS GENEVA.

INFO SAVING : TOKYO, HELSINKI.

MIPT

GORBACHEV'S INTERVIEW WITH TIME MAGAZINE: COMMENT

## SUMMARY

1. A MESSAGE TO THREE AUDIENCES. TO U S AND WEST EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION THE APPEARANCE OF POWERFUL LOGIC COMBINED WITH AN APPEAL FOR COMMON SENSE TO PREVAIL. TO THE U S ADMINISTRATION: A TOUGH NEGOTIATING POSITION ON BOTH THE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA AND FOR THE NOVEMBER SUMMIT. TO THE SOVIET PUBLIC: AN ACTIVE BUT MODERATE EXTERNAL POLICY DESIGNED TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR GREATER DOMESTIC WELL-BEING.

## DETAIL

2. THIS IS A SKILFUL PERFORMANCE BY GORBACHEV WHICH IS BOUND TO MAKE SOME IMPACT ON WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION. BOTH IN THE SCRIPTED AND, MORE SIGNIFICANTLY, THE UNSCRIPTED PARTS OF THE INTERVIEW HE SHOWS A TALENT FOR CLEAR AND REASONABLE EXPOSITION COMBINED (E.G. IN THE UNSCRIPTED PASSAGE ON SDI RESEARCH) WITH A COMMAND OF DETAIL. APART FROM SOME DEFENSIVE BLUSTER ON THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CAPACITY, AND SOME UNSUBTLE (BUT NOT NECESSARILY INEFFECTIVE) WEDGE-DRIVING AIMED AT WESTERN EUROPE, GORBACHEV'S ANSWERS ARE PITCHED AT A RELATIVELY SOPHISTICATED LEVEL AND ARE REMARKABLY FREE FROM COMMUNIST JARGON.

3. ON US/SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE NOVEMBER SUMMIT, GORBACHEV, WITH TWO SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSALS (NUCLEAR TEST MORATORIUM AND NON-MILITARISATION OF SPACE) ALREADY ON THE TABLE IN HIS NAME, TAKES ADVANTAGE OF THE APPARENT U S PREFERENCE FOR A "GETTING TO KNOW YOU" MEETING TO ARGUE FOR AN OCCASION AT WHICH SUBSTANTIVE BUSINESS SHOULD AND CAN BE DONE. ON THE NATURE OF THAT BUSINESS, HOWEVER, THE LINE IS VERY HARD: THE AMERICANS MUST AGREE TO DISCUSS A BAN ON SDI-RELATED MILITARY RESEARCH BEYOND THE LABORATORY PHASE, THUS UNBLOCKING THE ROAD TO PROGRESS ON LIMITING AND REDUCING BOTH CATEGORIES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND TO AN OVERALL IMPROVEMENT IN THE EAST/WEST CLIMATE. GORBACHEV GIVES, IN HIS REPLY TO GRUNWALD'S SECOND QUESTION, THE MOST DETAILED STATEMENT SO FAR, AT THIS LEVEL OF AUTHORITY, ON THE SOVIET DEFINITION OF THE LINE TO BE DRAWN BETWEEN UNVERIFIABLE SDI RESEARCH ("FUNDAMENTAL SCIENCE") AND VERIFIABLE R AND D (ANYTHING OUTSIDE THE LABORATORY.) HE

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MAKES EFFECTIVE USE OF THE PROPAGANDA BONUS OFFERED BY THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A NEW U S ASAT TEST. HE DODGES THE AWKWARD QUESTIONS (SOVIET SD-I-RELATED RESEARCH) AND DISTASTEFUL ONES (CHEMICAL TRACING AGENTS); BUT FIELDS A TRICKY ONE (WHAT DO YOU THINK OF PRESIDENT REAGAN ?) VERY COMPETENTLY. ALL IN ALL, THE FOREIGN POLICY SECTION OF THE INTERVIEW APPEARS, SEEN FROM HERE, TO INCREASE THE SOVIET LEAD ON POINTS IN THE PROPAGANDA RUN-UP TO GENEVA.

4. ON THE SOVIET ECONOMY GORBACHEV'S REPLIES ARE FOR OBVIOUS REASONS LESS IMPRESSIVE: BUT CONTAIN A SUCCINCT EXPRESSION OF HIS 'CARROT AND STICK' STRATEGY - STRUCTURAL REFORM PLUS MATERIAL INCENTIVES BUT COMBINED WITH STRICTER DISCIPLINE AND HARDER WORK. THE GENERAL TONE IS DEFENSIVE BUT THE PRIMACY HE GIVES TO THE MATERIAL BETTERMENT OF THE SOVIET CITIZEN WILL GO DOWN WELL WITH HIS DOMESTIC AUDIENCE. HE INDICATES AN IMPLICIT BUT CLEAR LINK BETWEEN THE PROSPECTS FOR RAISING LIVING STANDARDS AND THE ECONOMY'S ABILITY TO CATER FOR THE NEEDS OF THE DEFENCE SECTOR.

5. GORBACHEV'S READINESS TO REPLY CANDIDLY TO QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS PERSONAL STYLE AND HIS NEW-BROOM APPROACH TO CADRE POLICY IS NOVEL AND ANOTHER DEMONSTRATION OF HIS TALENT FOR PUBLIC RELATIONS. THE PASSAGES TOO ARE LIKELY TO ENHANCE HIS SOVIET READERSHIP'S REGARD FOR HIM.

6. ONE COULD WISH THAT A SOVIET JOURNAL AS WIDELY READ AS TIME MAGAZINE MIGHT OFFER A SIMILAR UNCENSORED OPPORTUNITY TO A WESTERN STATESMAN.

CARTLEDGE

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EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

LIMITED

SOVIET D

DEFENCE D

RESEARCH D

PLANNING STAFF

EED

NAD

WED

ACDD

FED

NED

PUSD

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/MR LUCE

PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

SIR W HARDING

MR FERGUSSON

MR GOODALL

MR JENKINS

MR DAUNT

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INFO SAVING : HELSINKI, TOKYO.

GORBACHEV'S INTERVIEW WITH TIME MAGAZINE: EXTERNAL

1. GORBACHEV'S INTERVIEW WAS REPRODUCED, APPARENTLY IN FULL, IN PRAVDA ON 2 SEPTEMBER. ON FOREIGN POLICY, HE SPOKE ON PROSPECTS FOR THE SUMMIT, ARMS CONTROL AND US/SOVIET RELATIONS: THE MAIN POINTS OF INTEREST ARE SUMMARISED BELOW. MIPT SUMMARISES HIS REMARKS ON INTERNAL MATTERS AND THE ECONOMY. COMMENT FOLLOWS.

SUMMIT PROSPECTS  
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2. (A) 'I REGARD THE PROSPECTS FOR THE GENEVA MEETING MORE CAUTIOUSLY THAN WHEN WE GAVE OUR AGREEMENT TO THAT MEETING'. GORBACHEV SAID THAT HE WAS 'DISAPPOINTED AND CONCERNED' BY BOTH THE POLICIES AND STATEMENTS WHICH WERE EMANATING FROM WASHINGTON. HE WAS NEVERTHELESS READY TO HAVE A SUBSTANTIVE AND BUSINESSLIKE DISCUSSION. INVECTIVE WAS NO AID TO A GOOD OUTCOME.

(B) THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT WITHOUT HOPE THAT, NEVERTHELESS, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO FIND POINTS IN COMMON AND AREAS OF COMMON OR PARALLEL INTEREST - FOR EXAMPLE, THAT A NUCLEAR WAR MUST NOT BE WAGED AND COULD NOT BE WON. THE US, HOWEVER, SEEMED TO BE PREPARING FOR A TUSSELE BETWEEN POLITICAL 'SUPER GLADIATORS': IT SEEMED AS IF EVEN THE SLIGHTEST PROGRESS WOULD DEPEND ONLY ON CONCESSIONS BY THE SOVIET UNION ON ALL QUESTIONS - EVEN CONCERNING ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

(C) THE SOVIET SIDE WAS PREPARING SERIOUSLY FOR GENEVA, ATTACHED ENORMOUS SIGNIFICANCE TO THE MEETING AND HAD SERIOUS HOPES OF IT. BUT IT LOOKED AS IF WASHINGTON ATTACHED MORE MODEST SIGNIFICANCE TO THE OCCASION, CHARACTERISING IT ONLY AS ONE FOR MAKING ACQUAINTANCE AND WORKING OUT AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. 'BUT CLEARLY IT WOULD BE TOO GREAT A LUXURY FOR THE LEADERS OF TWO STATES SUCH AS THE SOVIET UNION AND THE USA TO GO TO GENEVA ONLY TO GET TO KNOW ONE AND OTHER AND THEN TO ADMIRE THE LAKE OF GENEVA AND THE SWISS ALPS. WHEN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IS SO VERY TENSE, THIS WOULD BE AN IMPERMISSIBLE LUXURY'.

SDI AND ARMS CONTROL  
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3. (A) THE BELIEF THAT THE SDI COULD ASSURE INVULNERABILITY AGAINST NUCLEAR ATTACK AND THUS LEAD TO THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS, IN THE SOVIET VIEW AND IN THAT OF MANY US EXPERTS, AN UNREALISABLE FANTASY, 'AN EMPTY DREAM'. BUT EVEN IF IT WAS REGARDED MORE MODESTLY, AS AN ABM SYSTEM, IT WAS STILL VERY DANGEROUS IN THAT IT WOULD EXACERBATE THE ARMS RACE AND INCREASE THE THREAT OF WAR. THE SO-CALLED RESEARCH PROGRAMME OF THE SDI WAS, IN FACT, A PROJECT FOR THE CREATION OF A NEW ABM SYSTEM, FORBIDDEN BY THE RELEVANT 1972 TREATY.

(B) IF THE SDI PROGRAMME WERE NOT TO LEAD TO A DETERIORATION IN SOVIET/US RELATIONS, IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF THE ARMS RACE IN SPACE: SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE VERIFIABLE. BUT 'IF THERE IS TO BE NO SUCH AGREEMENT, THEN IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO REACH AGREEMENTS ON THE LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE DEPENDENCE BETWEEN DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IS SO OBVIOUS THAT IT NEEDS NO PROOF. THUS IF THE PRESENT POSITION OF THE USA WITH REGARD TO WEAPONS IN SPACE REPRESENTS THEIR FINAL WORD, THEN THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA - AND THIS MUST BE SAID DIRECTLY - LOSE ANY MEANING'.....'IF THERE IS NO BAN ON THE MILITARISATION OF OUTER SPACE AND IF THERE IS NO PREVENTION OF THE ARMS RACE IN SPACE - THEN THERE WILL BE NOTHING AT ALL. THAT IS OUR FIRM POSITION'.

(C) 'WITH REGARD TO ACTIVITY IN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND THE NECESSITY FOR PREVENTING IT, WE CERTAINLY DO NOT HAVE IN VIEW THE FUNDAMENTAL SCIENCES. RESEARCH OF THIS KIND GOES ON AND OBVIOUSLY WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO'. BUT WHAT WAS INVOLVED WAS WORK LEADING TO CONTRACTS WHICH WOULD NECESSITATE MODELS, EXPERIMENTAL PROTOTYPES, FIELD EXPERIMENTS OUTSIDE THE LABORATORY AND TESTS. CONTRARY TO WHAT THE AMERICANS SAID, IT WAS POSSIBLE TO VERIFY A BAN ON SUCH ACTIVITY BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. 'IF WE CAN NOW DISTINGUISH, FROM SPACE, THE NUMBER ON AUTOMOBILES, THEN OF COURSE WE CAN TRACE EXTRA-LABORATORY FIELD TESTS'. IF TENS OF BILLIONS OF DOLLARS WERE TO BE SPENT ON RESEARCH WORK, THEN CLEARLY NOBODY WOULD WISH TO STOP IT HALFWAY: ONCE WEAPONS WERE DEPLOYED IN SPACE, THE PROCESS WOULD BECOME UNCONTROLLABLE. 'CLEARLY, SOMEBODY IN THE USA THINKS THAT AN OPPORTUNITY HAS TURNED UP TO OUTSTRIP US, TO PUT THE SCREW ON THE SOVIET UNION. BUT THIS IS AN ILLUSION. IT HAS NOT SUCCEEDED IN THE PAST AND WILL NOT SUCCEED NOW. WE SHALL FIND AN ANSWER AND A WHOLLY ADEQUATE ONE. BUT THEN ALL THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE BURIED AND I DO NOT KNOW WHEN IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO RETURN TO THEM'.

(D) THE FACT THAT THE USA WAS NOW PLANNING TO TEST ALREADY A SECOND GENERATION OF ABM SYSTEMS WAS FRAUGHT WITH SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES. 'WE SHALL BE COMPELLED TO REACT TO THIS IN AN EQUIVALENT MANNER'. IT AMOUNTED TO THE TESTING OF CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF A SPACE-BASED ABM SYSTEM.

(E) THE SOVIET UNION WOULD CONTINUE TO CALL UPON THE US GOVERNMENT TO ADOPT A DIFFERENT COURSE: "THEN THERE WOULD OPEN UP GREAT POSSIBILITIES BOTH IN THE AREA OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND IN THAT OF INTERMEDIATE RANGE WEAPONS, A WAY WOULD BECOME OPEN FOR A SERIOUS PROCESS OF IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES AND FOR THE RESOLUTION OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS".

4. SEE MIFT. (NOT TO ALL)

CARTLEDGE

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EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

LIMITED

SOVIET D  
DEFENCE D  
RESEARCH D  
PLANNING STAFF  
EED  
NAD  
WED  
ACDD  
FED - ESSD.  
NED  
PUSD  
ES  
PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RIFKIND  
PS/MR LUCE  
PS/PUS  
MR DEREK THOMAS  
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MIPT : GORBACHEV'S INTERVIEW WITH TIME MAGAZINE : INTERNAL

1. THE MAIN POINTS OF INTEREST ON ECONOMIC AND INTERNAL ISSUES IN GORBACHEV'S INTERVIEW WITH 'TIME' MAGAZINE ARE THE FOLLOWING:

ECONOMIC

2. CONTRARY TO WESTERN PREDICTIONS, THE SOVIET UNION HAD SWIFTLY REBUILT ITS ECONOMY AFTER WORLD WAR II. NONETHELESS, SINCE THE REVOLUTION, THE EFFECTS OF WAR HAD DELAYED DEVELOPMENT BY 20 YEARS. THE SOVIET UNION WAS FRANK ABOUT ITS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WHOSE SOLUTION WAS OF THE HIGHEST PRIORITY. INVESTMENT POLICIES WERE TO BE IMPROVED AND THE MACHINE-BUILDING, ELECTRONICS, ENERGY, TRANSPORT AND AGRICULTURAL SECTORS TO BE DEVELOPED. 'WHAT COUNTRY DOES NOT HAVE ITS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS?'

3. CENTRALISED MANAGEMENT OF STRATEGIC AIMS (TO WHICH SECTORAL AND REGIONAL INTERESTS SHOULD BE MORE STRICTLY SUBORDINATED) WOULD BE CONSOLIDATED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE EXTENSION OF AUTONOMY TO ENTERPRISES AND FARMS. CURRENT EXPERIMENTATION INVOLVED THE USE OF SUCH METHODS AS INCENTIVES, PROFIT, PRICES, CREDIT AND ECONOMIC ACCOUNTING. BUT THERE WERE RESERVES TO BE EXPLOITED THROUGH ESTABLISHING DISCIPLINE AT ALL LEVELS AND CULTIVATING 'THE WORK ETHIC'.

4. GORBACHEV'S TRAVELS IN THE COUNTRY HAD DEMONSTRATED THAT THE NECESSITY FOR CHANGE NOT ONLY ENJOYED POPULAR SUPPORT BUT WAS DICTATED BY THE TIMES. THE ATTENTION RECENTLY PAID TO THE ECONOMY WAS MOTIVATED BY THE NEED TO RAISE LIVING STANDARDS AND NOT BY ANY AMBITION TO ACHIEVE PRODUCTION RECORDS. FOR EXAMPLE, CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF WORKERS HAD RECEIVED WAGE INCREASES, AND A MILLION PLOTS OF LAND WERE TO BE GRANTED ANNUALLY FOR PRIVATE CULTIVATION. FURTHER SUCH MEASURES WERE PLANNED, BUT THEIR SCALE WOULD DEPEND ON THE ECONOMY'S PERFORMANCE. 'WE SHOULD PREFER TO SPEND ON CIVILIAN, PEACEFUL REQUIREMENTS EACH ROUBLE WHICH NOW GOES ON DEFENCE'.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

5. IN THE WORLD ECONOMY THE MOST IMPORTANT AIM SHOULD BE STABILISATION OF THE ECONOMIC AND CURRENCY-FINANCIAL SITUATION, A JUST SOLUTION OF THE INDEBTEDNESS PROBLEM, THE REMOVAL OF DISCRIMINATORY RESTRICTIONS AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF WORLD TRADE IN WHICH THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES INTENDED TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE PART

PART. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION ON THE SOVIET INTEREST IN ACQUIRING U S TECHNOLOGY, GORBACHEV SAID THAT EVEN THE U S SOUGHT TECHNOLOGY, BOTH LEGALLY BY THE PURCHASE OF LICENSES AND ILLEGALLY THROUGH INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE, NOT TO MENTION THE "BRAIN DRAIN" FROM WESTERN EUROPE AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. THE ACTIVITIES OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS ALSO ENABLED THE U S TO ACQUIRE FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY. THE U S WAS USING THE STAR WARS RESEARCH PROGRAMME FOR THE SAME PURPOSE.

6. THE SOVIET UNION WAS A MAJOR SCIENTIFIC POWER, AS HAD BEEN PROVED BY ITS VICTORY IN WORLD WAR II AND ITS SPACE PROGRAMME. U S ARGUMENTS WERE FULL OF CONTRADICTIONS. WHEN THEY WANTED TO JUSTIFY INCREASED DEFENCE SPENDING THEY REFERRED TO FANTASTIC SOVIET ACHIEVEMENTS IN TECHNOLOGY BUT WHEN THEY WANTED TO IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS THEY PRESENTED THE SOVIET UNION AS A SLEEPY, BACKWARD VILLAGE, COOPERATION WITH WHICH WOULD ENDANGER U S NATIONAL SECURITY. WHAT WAS THE TRUTH HERE ? SOVIET LEADERS WISHED TO SPEED UP SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS BY TRANSFERRING PROGRESSIVE IDEAS, FROM SOVIET SCIENCE INTO INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE. BUT IN DOING SO THEY WOULD NOT WISH TO REJECT THE ADDITIONAL BENEFIT OF MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES INCLUDING THE USA. THIS COOPERATION HAD PROGRESSED IN THE 1970S - IN ENERGY, INCLUDING NUCLEAR POWER, THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY, SPACE RESEARCH, CARDIOLOGY AND ONCOLOGY. THE BENEFIT WAS MUTUAL. AMERICAN SCIENTISTS KNEW THIS. NOW COOPERATION HAD CEASED. THE SOVIET UNION REGRETTED THIS BUT WOULD SURVIVE IT BECAUSE IT HAD FIRST-CLASS SCIENCE OF ITS OWN.

7. THE U S WAS APPLYING INCREASING PRESSURE ON ITS ALLIES TO STOP THEM SELLING MODERN PRODUCTS TO THE USSR, FORBODE THE EXPORT OF CERTAIN ITEMS FROM THE U S TO WESTERN EUROPE IN THE INTERESTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY, AND INCREASINGLY OFTEN REFUSED WEST EUROPEAN REPRESENTATIVES ACCESS TO U S LABORATORIES AND SCIENTIFIC SYMPOSIA. BY THIS MEANS THE U S HOPED NOT ONLY TO DAMAGE THE USSR BUT ALSO TO SLOW DOWN TECHNICAL PROGRESS AMONG ITS ALLIES SO AS TO BECOME ITSELF MORE COMPETITIVE ON THE WORLD MARKET. BUT THE OTHER COUNTRIES CONCERNED COULD SEE WHAT WAS HAPPENING AND IT WAS A FUTILE POLICY.

#### INTERNAL POLITICAL

8. ASKED WHETHER HE ENJOYED HIS STYLE OF LEADERSHIP AND MEETINGS WITH ORDINARY PEOPLE GORBACHEV SAID THIS WAS LENIN'S STYLE. HE HAD ADOPTED IT HIMSELF WHEN HE WORKED IN STAVROPOL AND IN MOSCOW BEFORE BECOMING PARTY LEADER. MANY OTHERS ADOPTED THIS STYLE. IT WAS WHAT WAS NEEDED. WHEN GRUNWALD ASKED WHETHER GORBACHEV'S TENDENCY TO REPLACE OFFICIALS IN SENIOR POSITIONS MEANT THAT PEOPLE WERE AFRAID OF HIM, GORBACHEV SAID HE THOUGHT NOT. THE WHOLE LEADERSHIP, RATHER THAN HE ALONE, WAS BEHIND CURRENT POLICIES. THEY WERE SURE THEY WERE DOING THE RIGHT THING. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BE BOLD, DECISIVE, BUT AT THE SAME TIME, CIRCUMSPECT. PEOPLE WANTED /FIRM

FIRM POLICIES. THE NEW APPROACH WAS MORE OPEN AND DEMOCRATIC AND PEOPLE WELCOMED IT. THE REPLACEMENT OF CADRES DID NOT MEAN AN EXCEPTIONAL SITUATION EXISTED. IT WAS A NATURAL PROCESS, AND THINGS ONLY WENT WRONG WHEN IT STOPPED. REORGANISATION MUST GO ON EVERYWHERE - IN THE CENTRE, THE REPUBLICS, OBLASTS AND AMONG WORK COLLECTIVES.

CARTLEDGE

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