



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 September 1985

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RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT *HETMAN*

I enclose texts for the Prime Minister's approval relating to the action to be taken with the Russians next week:

- ✓ A. Speaking Note to be used with the Soviet Charge d'Affaires by the senior available FCO official.
- ✓ B. Two aide memoires to be handed to the Soviet Charge
- ✓ C. Draft message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan
- ✓ D. Draft message from the Prime Minister to President Mitterrand
- ✓ E. Draft press statement and replies to supplementary questions
- ✓ F. Draft instructions to Sir Bryan Cartledge.

*President - 0
less to move
we on the relevant
drafts
net*

Speaking Note

We have included in this a reference to HETMAN's family in order to be able to say in public that we have asked that they should be allowed to join him. It is envisaged that both the aide memoires, and the less formal speaking note, would be handed to the Soviet Charge.

Messages to President Reagan and President Mitterrand

The Prime Minister asked for a message to President Reagan to be drafted. We have also prepared a draft message to President Mitterrand, which envisages a direct contact on the subject of HETMAN's defection between Mitterrand's Directeur de Cabinet, M. Colliard, [redacted]

Our Friends plan to pass to Colliard in the first instance a digest of HETMAN's most interesting political product.

.../Press



Press Line

We have prepared a composite set of answers to supplementaries for use as appropriate by the Foreign Office and Home Office spokesmen. We propose to add to it factual background notes to be drawn on by the spokesmen on forthcoming high level visits and contacts, and on Anglo/Soviet trade. We will prepare a line to take for Ministers as requested early next week.

Sir Bryan Cartledge has recommended that in the event of Soviet retaliation (eg expulsions of our Embassy staff) he should be authorised to deal with the press handling of this in the first instance with the local correspondents in Moscow. The main purpose of this is to ensure that all our staff who are directly affected have the opportunity to contact their relatives in the UK before any public announcement is made. This can best be done if the Ambassador's finger, rather than News Department's, is on the publicity button. We would agree in advance with Sir Bryan the statement which he would issue. After this initial statement, the ball would be passed back to FCO News Department.

We have given some thought to the briefing of allies on our action (besides the messages to President Reagan and President Mitterrand, which would not be revealed). We shall need to issue guidance to our posts immediately after action is taken with the Soviet Charge. We envisage the main briefing being done by our Permanent Representative to NATO, supplemented as necessary in capitals.

I wrote to you separately about the timing of our action. There are a number of gaps in the enclosed drafts which depend on the final decision on this.

Sir Robert Armstrong is to hold a meeting on Monday at 1030 am to review action in the light of the Prime Minister's comments and those of the Foreign Secretary and the Home Secretary on these papers. Sir Geoffrey Howe has not yet seen them.

I am copying this letter to Hugh Taylor (for the Home Secretary), Sir Robert Armstrong, Sir Antony Duff and 'C'.

Yours ever,

Len Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

SPEAKING NOTE

1. The British Government attach great importance to Anglo-Soviet relations. As has been stressed repeatedly in meetings at the highest level, we see the development of a more constructive relationship between our two countries as serving our mutual political and commercial interests, and contributing to the building of confidence between East and West. The Prime Minister herself is firmly committed to this view.
2. One matter, however, has recurrently caused friction in our bilateral relations: the extent and scope of inadmissible intelligence activities by Soviet officials in the United Kingdom. Too often we have had to make clear that such activities will not be tolerated, and to take the necessary action to protect our national security.
3. I have to tell you that Mr Oleg GORDIEVSKY, previously Counsellor at your Embassy, has applied for and been granted political asylum in the UK. Mr GORDIEVSKY was a senior official in the KGB. He has provided us with a detailed picture of the extent and nature of Soviet intelligence activities in this country. It is quite clear from his account that despite action as recently as April, these activities have continued on a deplorably large scale.
4. I therefore have with regret to draw your attention to the cases of 25 members of the Soviet community in London, all of whom hold functions and have been concerned in activities incompatible with their positions in the UK. Six of these are diplomatic staff of the Soviet Embassy,

.../3 are

3 are non-diplomatic staff, 7 are members of the Soviet Trade Delegation and 9 are Soviet officials working for other organisations.

5. I must therefore ask you to arrange that the 25 persons listed in the Aide Memoire which I shall give you leave the United Kingdom within three weeks, that is not later than

6. The permitted overall number of staff of the Soviet Embassy, Soviet Trade Delegation and ancilliary organisations will be correspondingly reduced by 23, since 23 out of these 25 fall under the ceilings arrangements for Soviet officials in Britain.

7. Some of the 25 persons I have referred to have no immunity from jurisdiction. The British authorities are nevertheless prepared to give them the opportunity to make their own arrangements to leave the country. But I must ask you to inform them that if any of them is still in this country in three weeks time, that is on deportation proceedings will be instituted against him.

8. The press will be informed later today of the action we have taken.

9. I would draw your attention to the fact that Mr GORDIEVSKY's wife and children remain in the Soviet Union. Naturally he is anxious that they should join him here in the UK. We hope that, on humanitarian grounds, the Soviet authorities will accede to this request.

10. I am instructed to hand you this Aide Memoire ⁽¹⁾ which is self-explanatory. When you have read it I have some

.../additional

additional points to make.

11. The action which we are obliged to take has been made unavoidable by the persistence of Soviet intelligence activities in this country. As in the past, so in the future we shall remain vigilant to detect such activities and determined to combat them. But the British Government have no desire for this action to obstruct the development of a productive dialogue between our two countries. I am instructed personally to convey this to you as the firm view of both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. Both continue to desire the further constructive development of Anglo/Soviet relations.

12. Guided by this desire the Government have given very careful consideration to the approach made by your Ambassador to Sir Geoffrey Howe on 4 June. They have decided to introduce new arrangements for the ceilings on numbers of Soviet officials in the UK. As I have said, following the departure of the 25 persons I have named to you, the overall permitted number of all categories of Soviet representatives in London will now be 211. This total will remain subject to the British Government's long-standing policy whereby the overall number will be reduced as appropriate in the event of expulsions for unacceptable activities. However, to meet the concerns expressed by your Ambassador on 4 June, it has been decided that within the overall total of 211 the number of Soviet diplomatic staff at the Soviet Embassy will be permitted to rise to 46.

13. Furthermore, there will henceforth be no separate
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ceilings on the numbers of Soviet non-diplomatic staff at
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the Embassy, officials at the Soviet Trade Delegation, and staff of ancillary Soviet organisations. These new arrangements are set out in a second Aide Memoire ⁽²⁾ which I shall now ask you to read.

14. The constructive arrangement I have outlined whereby the ceiling on the number of diplomatic staff will be permitted to rise is designed to enable the Soviet Embassy to perform its proper functions, contributing to the positive development of Anglo/Soviet relations which, as I have emphasised, the British Government wishes to see.

15. I must make one thing very clear. We shall remain fully alert to any evidence of further abuse by Soviet officials of their position here whether diplomatic or otherwise. In such a case we shall respond with firmness. These new and more flexible arrangements would have to be reconsidered and if appropriate the permitted ceilings ^{would} ~~may~~ have to be reduced.

16. I wish also to make absolutely clear that any retaliatory action by the Soviet authorities against British personnel or interests in the Soviet Union will be totally unjustified and will meet with a commensurate response. The Soviet side should bear in mind that the new arrangements I have outlined are not immutable, and that the information available to us about activities of Soviet officials which are inconsistent with their declared functions does not stop at the 25 persons I have named.

E.R.

●IDE MEMOIRE (1)

1. The Soviet Embassy will be aware that intelligence activities by Soviet citizens in the United Kingdom are totally unacceptable to Her Majesty's Government. As has repeatedly been made clear to the Soviet authorities, the necessary action will be taken against Soviet citizens who engage in such activities.

2. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office regrets to inform the Soviet Embassy that 25 members of the Soviet community in the UK have been identified as being concerned in unacceptable intelligence activities in this country. Their names are as follows:

1. Aleksandr Timofeyevich GORELOV
Soviet Embassy
2. Vyacheslav Ivonovich KALITIN
First Secretary, Soviet Embassy
3. Igor Fedorovich KHOMUTOV
Soviet Embassy
4. Boris Aleksandrovich KORCHAGIN
First Secretary, Soviet Embassy
5. Anatoly Nikolayevich MERETIKOV
Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy
6. Vyacheslav Dmitriyevich MISHUSTIN
Soviet Embassy
7. Valeriy Grigoryevich TOKAR
Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy
8. Dmitriy Mikhaylovich VASILYEV
Attache, Soviet Embassy
9. Yuriy Vasilyevich YEZHOV
First Secretary, Soviet Embassy
10. Yuriy Pavlovich KOMOV
Soviet Trade Delegation

.../11.

E.R.

11. Oleg Pavlovich KRASAKOV
Soviet Trade Delegation
 12. Viktor Orestovich LOGUSH
Soviet Trade Delegation
 13. Vladimir Ivanovich LYUBENKO
Soviet Trade Delegation
 14. Andrey Vladimirovich NOVIKOV
Soviet Trade Delegation
 15. Eduard Viktorovich PEREPELKIN
Soviet Trade Delegation
 16. Valeriy Vasilyevich PROKOPCHIK
Soviet Trade Delegation
 17. Mikhail Yuryevich BOGDANOV
Correspondent, Socialist Industry
 18. Valeriy Pavlovich IPATOV
Moscow Narodny Bank
 19. Alesksandr Anatolyevich KODINTSEV
Correspondent, Novosti
 20. Valeriy Aleksandrovich KOTOV
Razno
 21. Yuriy Aleksandrovich KUDIMOV
Correspondent, Komsomolskaya Pravda
 22. Viktor Ivanovich MUZALEV
Correspondent, TASS
 23. Yuriy Pavlovich ROZHKOV
International Cocoa Organisation
 24. Mikhail Dmitriyevich SAVVATEYEV
International Wheat Council
 25. Sergey Ivanovich SAYENKO
Correspondent, Radio Moscow
3. The Soviet Embassy is requested to arrange for these 25 Soviet citizens to leave the UK within three weeks from the date

.../of

E.R.

of this Aide Memoire, that is not later than
Those of the above who are at present out of the country will not
be permitted to return.

4. Of those named, the following have no immunity from
jurisdiction:

Yuriy Pavlovich KOMOV
Soviet Trade Delegation

Oleg Pavlovich KRASAKOV
Soviet Trade Delegation

Viktor Orestovich LOGUSH
Soviet Trade Delegation

Vladimir Ivanovich LYUBENKO
Soviet Trade Delegation

Andrey Vladimirovich NOVIKOV
Soviet Trade Delegation

Eduard Viktorovich PEREPELKIN
Soviet Trade Delegation

Valeriy Vasilyevich PROKOPCHIK
Soviet Trade Delegation

Mikhail Yuryevich BOGDANOV
Correspondent, Socialist Industry

Valeriy Pavlovich IPATOV
Moscow Narodny Bank

Aleksandr Anatolyevich KODINTSEV
Correspondent, Novosti

.../Valeriy

E.R.

Valeriy Aleksandrovich KOTOV

Ravno

Yuriy Aleksandrovich KUDIMOV

Correspondent Komsomolskaya Pravda

Viktor Ivanovich MUZALEV

Correspondent TASS

Yuriy Pavlovich ROZHKOV

International Cocoa Organisation

Mikhail Dmitriyevich SAVVATEYEV

International Wheat Council

Sergey Ivanovich SAYENKO

Correspondent, Radio Moscow

The Soviet Embassy is requested to inform these 16 persons that if any of them is still in this country in three weeks' time, that is on _____ deportation proceedings will be taken against him.

5. The permitted overall level for staff of the Soviet Embassy, Soviet Trade Delegation and ancillary organisations will henceforth be reduced by 23 to 211.

6. The activities in which those named were concerned are an obstacle to the development of fruitful and constructive relations between our two countries. Both sides have stated that they desire such relations. For its part, the British Government, while determined to take the measures necessary for the protection of national security, will continue to work for a more constructive relationship with the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.

E.R.

AIDE MEMOIRE

CEILINGS ON THE NUMBER OF SOVIET OFFICIALS IN LONDON

1. Most careful consideration has been given to the Soviet Ambassador's approach of 4 June 1985.
2. We shall as hitherto continue to refuse visas to officials nominated to Soviet establishments in the UK when the record of their previous activities indicates that they would not be acceptable. Second, Soviet officials working in this country at the Soviet Embassy, the Soviet Trade Delegation, or Soviet ancillary organisations here, who engage in unacceptable activities, will be required to leave.
3. In the light of the Soviet Ambassador's approach and our sincere desire for more constructive relations with the Soviet Union, it has been decided to modify the existing arrangements.
4. From a date three weeks from the date of this Aide Memoire, that is _____, the permitted overall number of Soviet officials and representatives in London will be 211. This overall number will be reduced as appropriate in the event of any expulsions for unacceptable activities. But within this overall total, the number of Soviet diplomats in London will now be permitted to rise to 46.
5. There will henceforth be no separate ceilings on the numbers of Soviet non-diplomatic staff at the Embassy, officials at the Soviet Trade Delegation, and staff of other ancillary Soviet organisations.
6. Any evidence of abuse by Soviet representatives of their position here, whether diplomatic or otherwise, may cause these new and more flexible arrangements to be reconsidered.

DSR 11 (Revised)

TOP SECRET

C

DRAFT: ~~XXXXX~~/letter/~~XXXXX~~/~~XXXXX~~/~~XXXXX~~/~~XXXXX~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM:
PRIME MINISTER

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:
PRESIDENT REAGAN

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

I want to let you know of action we shall be taking later today as a result of a defection of a senior official of the KGB.

CAVEAT.....

The official in question, Oleg GORDIEVSKY, who has applied for political asylum here, was the Head of the KGB Residency at the Soviet Embassy in London.

He has been serving in London since 1982. Though we are holding the details very close, GORDIEVSKY had been working for us for some time. He has been the source of a great deal of invaluable information about the extent and nature of the Soviet intelligence effort in the UK and elsewhere; as well as significant political information on the Soviet Union. Much of this material has already been passed to your people on the usual channels, and there will of course now be more to come.

Enclosures—flag(s).....

As a result of GORDIEVSKY's information, we shall be telling the Russians today, and announcing publicly, that we are expelling 25 Soviet diplomatic and other officials from London. All have been actively involved

TOP SECRET

in agent-running. Their expulsion will inflict a very heavy blow to the Soviet intelligence capability in this country.

We are making clear to the Russians, on my personal authority, that while we cannot tolerate the sort of intelligence actions which GORDIEVSKY has revealed, we continue to desire a constructive relationship with them.

At this critical time in East/West relations, with your meeting and that of ~~Francis~~ ^{President} Mitterrand with Gorbachev approaching, there are crucial choices to be made by Gorbachev in Geneva and elsewhere which will influence the direction of East/West relations for the coming decade. It is vital that we should all speak with the same voice of our willingness to work patiently but firmly for dialogue and soundly based agreements between East and West. I shall be sending you separately some thoughts on your own meeting with Gorbachev, in which so many hopes are invested. In the meantime, I think it is no bad thing that he should have presented to him so starkly, early in his leadership, the price to be paid for the scale and nature of KGB activities in Western countries. I would hope that action of this kind by a country such as ourselves, coupled with repeated assurances of our sincere desire to build a productive dialogue with the Russians, will help to instil a greater sense of responsibility and realism in the Soviet leadership over their relations with the West.

TOP SECRET

DRAFT: ~~xxxx~~/letter/~~xxxx~~/~~xxxx~~/~~xxxx~~

TYPE: Draft/Final 1+

FROM
Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT: TEL. NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TO:
President Mitterrand

Your Reference

- Top Secret
- Secret
- Confidential
- Restricted
- Unclassified

Copies to:

PRIVACY MARKING

SUBJECT:

.....In Confidence

CAVEAT.....

1. In April 1983 you very kindly sent a personal emissary to inform me of the magnificent French operation which had produced extremely important information concerning the acquisition by the Russians of advanced Western technology.
2. In a similar spirit, I would like to tell you that we now have in the United Kingdom an important KGB defector, Mr Oleg GORDIEVSKY, latterly the Head of the KGB Residency in London, who has provided us over a period of time with significant political and counter intelligence information.
3. As a result of GORDIEVSKY's information, we shall be telling the Russians today, and announcing publicly, that we are expelling 25 Soviet diplomatic and other officials from London. All have been actively involved in agent-running. Their expulsion will inflict a very heavy blow to the Soviet intelligence capability in this country.
4. We are making clear to the Russians, on my personal authority, that while we cannot tolerate the sort of

Enclosures-flag(s).....

intelligence actions which GORDIEVSKY has revealed we continue to desire a constructive relationship with them.

5. At this critical time in East/West relations, with your meeting and that of President Reagan with Gorbachev approaching, there are crucial choices to be made by Gorbachev in Geneva and elsewhere which will influence the direction of East/West relations for the coming decade. It is vital that we should all speak with the same voice of our willingness to work patiently but firmly for dialogue and soundly based agreements between East and West. At the same time, I think it is no bad thing that he should have presented to him so starkly, early in his leadership, the price to be paid for the scale and nature of KGB activities in Western countries. I would hope that action of this kind by a country such as ourselves, coupled with repeated assurances of our sincere desire to build a productive dialogue with the Russians, will help to instil a greater sense of responsibility and realism in the Soviet leadership.

6. I believe that some of GORDIEVSKY's information would be of particular interest to you and I have therefore asked that the appropriate officer in our Embassy should brief your Directeur de Cabinet and remain at his disposal for any questions which you may wish to put.

ON THE RECORD STATEMENT

1. The Soviet Charge d'Affaires ad interim, Mr Parshin, was asked to call at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office earlier today. He was informed of the defection to the UK of a senior member of the Soviet Embassy, Mr Oleg GORDIEVSKY. Mr Parshin was told that the Soviet official had provided information showing that a significant number of Soviet representatives in London have been engaging in ^{intelligence} activities ^{which are of course totally} incompatible with their status and declared ^{tasks.} ~~functions~~. The scale and nature of these activities are completely unacceptable.

→ (must X. (overpru))

2. The Soviet Charge d'Affaires was therefore informed that 25 Soviet officials, of whom 6 belong to the diplomatic staff of the Soviet Embassy, must leave the country within three weeks.

3. The Government attach great importance to the development of a realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union which can contribute to mutual confidence between East and West. It was accordingly made clear to Mr Parshin that although our action was necessary in the interests of national security, it remained our policy to work for an improvement in bilateral relations with the Soviet Union.

NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES (ON THE RECORD)

Who saw the Soviet Charge d'Affaires ?

1. The senior available Deputy Under Secretary at the FCO, Mr David Goodall.

Who is the defector ?

2. Mr Oleg GORDIEVSKY was a Counsellor at the Soviet Embassy from June 1982. He was a senior official in the KGB and had recently become Head of the KGB Residency in London.

Great coup for intelligence/security services

3. Yes, and the intelligence gained is of very great value to our security operations.

Has he requested asylum ?

4. Yes, and it has been granted.

and where
When/did he defect ? Was he in touch with the British authorities before he sought asylum ? Has he worked as an agent for British intelligence ?

5. No comment.

Where is he now ?

6. In this country. I cannot give further details.

Have the Soviet Embassy requested access to him ?

7. No.

Is he under protection ?

8. I cannot comment on that.

Is he being held under duress ?

9. No. His decision to defect was entirely his own.

X must
previous
page.
? Mr G.
was in a
position to
know full
details of
Soviet intelligence
activities &
personnel
in this
country.

Why did he defect ? Can we be sure he will stay ?

10. He has told us that he wishes to become a citizen of a democratic country and live in a free society.

Will he see/speak to the media ?

11. No present plans for him to do so.

Where is his family ?

12. In the Soviet Union.

Will they be allowed to rejoin him here ?

13. That depends on the Soviet authorities.

Have you put a request to them ?

14. Yes.

When did he start giving information ?

15. No comment.

How was this achieved ?

16. No comment.

Are any more diplomats implicated by his information ?

17. No comment.

Has his information been relevant to any other recent counter-espionage activity - Bettaney etc ?

18. No comment.

How long have the Russians known about his defection ?

19. No comment.

Why if he was KGB officer was he admitted to this country ?

20. No comment.

Wrong signal at sensitive time for East/West relations ?

21. The activities of these people were a serious threat to

national security and a source of friction. They could not be tolerated. We have made it quite clear that we remain committed to developing a more constructive relationship, but that this cannot be at the expense of national security.

Has Mrs Thatcher been in touch with Gorbachev about this ?
(or Sir Geoffrey Howe with Shevardnadze ?)

22. No.

Any further expulsions planned ?

23. Our policy is that if Soviet officials engage in inadmissible activities, appropriate action will be taken.

Any relaxation on control of entry ?

24. Our policy remains not to admit to the UK known intelligence officers. In this we will have the valuable help of information provided by Mr Gordievsky.

Effect on ceilings ?

25. The permitted level for Soviet officials in London (ie diplomatic staff, Embassy non-diplomatic staff, Soviet Trade Delegation, and ancillary organisations) will be reduced by 23 to 211.

Why not the full 25 ?

26. Because two of those expelled have been working for international organisations in London and therefore do not count under the ceilings on the Soviet community.

What about the diplomatic ceiling ?

27. Under modified arrangements now in force, the permitted number of Soviet diplomatic staff will be set at 46.

But why raise it from 39 to 46 ?

28. The major consideration is the overall ceiling, now reduced by 23 to 211. But within that ceiling it is very important that each side should be able to maintain a viable Embassy in the other's capital. Our judgement is that 46 is the right figure.

Link between British Embassy Moscow and new Soviet diplomatic ceiling in London ?

29. (Unattributable) Not directly. But we obviously had our needs in Moscow in mind when fixing the new ceiling in London for the Russians.

Will the ceilings be reduced in future in the event of expulsions ?

30. The ceilings on Soviet representatives in London will be reduced as appropriate in the event of expulsions for unacceptable activities.

Why are those who are not diplomats not being subjected to the normal process of law ?

31. The Government must decide how to deal with these cases bearing in mind the needs of our own security and all other relevant factors. In this instance it was decided that our objectives were best served by requiring the withdrawal of these persons.

What measures will be taken if they do not leave within three weeks ?

32. We have no reason to expect that they will not leave before then.

Do you expect retaliation ?

33. Any such action by the Soviet authorities would be entirely without justification. The Soviet authorities

know that HM Government would take an extremely serious view of any retaliation.

What exactly did those expelled do ?

34. Regret cannot give further details.

What damage have they done to national security ?

35. Cannot comment.

CURRICULUM VITAE

OLEG ANTONOVICH GORDIEVSKY

Date of birth: 10 October 1938

Joined KGB in 1962 and, after a year at their training school in Moscow, spent much of the next 10 years dealing, both in Moscow and abroad, with Soviet "illegals". Subsequently engaged in KGB activities concerning Scandinavia and, later, the UK.

Posted as Counsellor in Soviet Embassy in London in 1982. At the time of his defection had just been appointed Head of the KGB Residency in London.

ZCZC

TOP SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL

DEYOU

FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

TELNO

OF

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR

HETMAN: ACTION ON EXPULSIONS

1. My 3 IFTs contain the final texts of a speaking note whichwill use with the Soviet Charge, together with the two accompanying Aides Memoire which he will hand over. Parchine will be summoned at for You should now put in for a call on Suslov, to take place at *or as soon after as possible.*/ However, you should not (not) leave for the MFA until we confirm by a telephone call with reference to these telegrams that the interview with ^{Parchine?} Parchine is in progress, and that you should proceed.

2. You should take Suslov through these texts and leave copies of all three with him, explaining that you are acting in parallel because I wish the MFA to have the fullest and most immediate information about the action we are taking in London. Your main message should be that, though we have regrettably been obliged, as always, to act in defence of our security interests, you speak with the personal authority of the Prime Minister and myself in saying that we nonetheless wish the recent improvement in Anglo/Soviet relations to be maintained

.../and

and indeed developed further. In this context you should draw particular attention to our favourable response to Popov's demarche about the Soviet diplomatic ceiling.

3. The FCO spokesman will make a statement (text in my 4th IFT) to the press at

If asked, you may confirm to the press that you have made a parallel demarche, but should refer all other questions to the FCO.