

Ref. A085/2289

MR POWELL

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HETMAN

At my meeting this morning we went through the texts enclosed with Len Appleyard's letter of 6 September to you, together with the amendments made by the Prime Minister and recorded in your latest letter (undated).

2. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had no comments on the text. The Home Secretary proposed one amendment to the first paragraph of the "on the record" press statement, to make clear HETMAN's position in the Soviet Embassy (as in Note 2 of the Notes for Supplementaries).

3. The Prime Minister's and Home Secretary's amendments have been carried through to the revised text of the press statement. We have agreed a number of other minor amendments, notably in the last three paragraphs of the Speaking Note and in Aide Memoire Number 2. There are also minor additions and changes in the Notes for Supplementaries.

--- 4. I attach a set of the revised documents. These are now regarded as agreed texts.

5. The plan is that at 9.00 am on Thursday 12 September Mr Parshin will be summoned to see Mr Goodall at 11.00 am that day. Mr Goodall will read the Speaking Note, and hand over copies both of that and of the two Aide Memoires. Sir Bryan Cartledge will seek an appointment with Mr Suslov in Moscow an hour later (3.00 pm Moscow time), and give him copies of all three documents.

6. The proposed statement will be issued at the Foreign Office news conference at 12,30 pm (3.30 pm Moscow time) that day.

7. Subject to the Prime Minister's agreement it is proposed that the messages to President Reagan and President Mitterrand should be sent at 9.00 am on the morning of Thursday 12 September. The message to President Reagan will thus reach the White House by about 5.00 am Washington time. I propose, if the Prime Minister agrees, to send a note in parallel to Mr MacFarlane, to tell him that the news is to be given to a press conference at 12.30 pm (7.30 am Washington time), and to express the hope that it may be possible for the President to receive the Prime Minister's message at if not shortly before that time, so that he does not hear the news for the first time on the radio or television.

8. We have agreed contingency arrangements to take action before Thursday if it should prove necessary to do so.

9. The most likely contingency is a summons to Sir Bryan Cartledge from Mr Gorbachev. Such a summons could give fairly short notice - only an hour or two. But it is unlikely to be sent outside working hours. On the other hand there are possible contingencies - an apparently well-informed leak here or in Copenhagen for instance - which might themselves lead the Russians to issue the summons to Sir Bryan Cartledge from Mr Gorbachev and might for this or some other reason require us to take immediate action. Such a contingency would not necessarily surface in working hours.

10. Sir Bryan Cartledge is being asked to let the Foreign and Commonwealth Office know immediately, by telephone or by flash telegram, if and as soon as he is summoned to see Mr Gorbachev. In that event, or in the event of some other contingency which Mr Goodall and I agreed made it necessary to act immediately:

- if the contingency occurred in working hours, Mr Parshin would be summoned immediately to come round as soon as possible - say, an hour later - and messages would be sent immediately to President Reagan and President Mitterrand.

If the contingency occurred early in the day, the news could be announced at the normal Foreign and Commonwealth Office press conference at 12.30 pm. If it occurred too late for that, a special news conference would be convened to take place shortly after Mr Parshin's call.

- if the contingency occurred during "silent" hours Mr Parshin would be summoned at the opening of business the following day. The sequence of events would then be as in the main plan, though some of the time intervals might have to be shortened.

11. Copies of the agreed texts of the Speaking Note and the two Aide Memoires are being sent by secure channels to Sir Bryan Cartledge in working hours tomorrow (in working hours so that the volume of traffic does not appear to the Russians to be abnormal). At the same time Sir Bryan Cartledge will be told of the main plan and of the contingency plan. He will be asked to let the Foreign and Commonwealth Office know immediately, if he receives a summons from Mr Gorbachev. He will be told to take no action until receiving a further telegram of final instructions: that would be the telegram included in the attached texts, and on the main plan it would be despatched on Wednesday afternoon, to reach Sir Bryan Cartledge before close of business that day.

12. Arrangements are being made to brief the three Secretaries of State with a close interest - the Secretaries of State for Trade and Industry, Defence and Scotland - in the latter part of Thursday morning, shortly before the Foreign and Commonwealth Office press conference. On the contingency plan this briefing is likely to have to fall by the wayside.

13. I am sending copies of this minute and the agreed texts to Mr Appleyard, Mr Taylor, Sir Antony Duff and 'C'.

RIA

ROBERT ARMSTRONG

9 September 1985

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SPEAKING NOTE

1. The British Government attach great importance to Anglo-Soviet relations. As has been stressed repeatedly in meetings at the highest level, we see the development of a more constructive relationship between our two countries as serving our mutual political and commercial interests, and contributing to the building of confidence between East and West. The Prime Minister herself is firmly committed to this view.
2. One matter, however, has recurrently caused friction in our bilateral relations: the extent and scope of inadmissible intelligence activities by Soviet officials in the United Kingdom. Too often we have had to make clear that such activities will not be tolerated, and to take the necessary action to protect our national security.
3. I have to tell you that Mr Oleg GORDIEVSKY, previously Counsellor at your Embassy, has applied for and been granted asylum in the UK. Mr GORDIEVSKY was a senior official in the KGB. He has provided us with a detailed picture of the extent and nature of Soviet intelligence activities in this country. It is quite clear from his account that despite action as recently as April, these activities have continued on a deplorably large scale.
4. I therefore have with regret to draw your attention to the cases of 25 members of the Soviet community in London, all of whom hold functions and have been concerned in activities incompatible with their positions in the UK. Six of these are diplomatic staff of the Soviet Embassy, three are non-diplomatic staff, seven are members of the Soviet Trade Delegation and nine are Soviet officials working for other organisations.
5. I must therefore ask you to arrange that the 25 persons listed in the Aide Memoire which I shall give you leave the United Kingdom within three weeks, that is not later than *Thursday 3 October*. Those who are present not in this country will not be permitted to return.

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6. The permitted overall number of staff of the Soviet Embassy, Soviet Trade Delegation and ancillary organisations will be correspondingly reduced by 23, since 23 out of these 25 fall under the ceilings arrangements for Soviet officials in Britain.

7. Some of the 25 persons I have referred to have no immunity from jurisdiction. The British authorities are nevertheless prepared to give them the opportunity to make their own arrangements to leave the country. But I must ask you to inform them that if any of them is still in this country in three weeks' time, that is on *Friday 4 October*, deportation proceedings will be instituted against him.

8. The press will be informed today of the action we have taken.

9. I would draw your attention to the fact that Mr GORDIEVSKY's wife and children remain in the Soviet Union. Naturally he is anxious that they should join him here in the UK. We hope that, on humanitarian grounds, the Soviet authorities will accede to this request.

10. I am instructed to hand you this Aide Memoire which is self-explanatory. When you have read it I have some additional points to make.

11. The action which we are obliged to take has been made unavoidable by the persistence of Soviet intelligence activities in this country. As in the past, so in the future we shall remain vigilant to detect such activities and determined to combat them. But the British Government have no desire for this action to obstruct the development of a productive dialogue between our two countries. I am instructed personally to convey this to you as the firm view of both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. Both continue to desire the further constructive development of Anglo/Soviet relations.

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12. Guided by this desire the Government have given very careful consideration to the approach made by your Ambassador to Sir Geoffrey Howe on 4 June. They have decided to introduce new arrangements for the ceilings on numbers of Soviet officials in the UK. As I have said, following the departure of the 25 persons I have named to you, the overall permitted number of all categories of Soviet representatives in London will now be 211. This total will remain subject to the British Government's long-standing policy whereby the overall number will be reduced as appropriate in the event of expulsions for unacceptable activities. However, to meet the concerns expressed by your Ambassador on 4 June, it has been decided that within the overall total of 211 the number of Soviet diplomatic staff at the Soviet Embassy will be permitted to rise to 46.

13. Furthermore, there will henceforth be no separate ceilings on the numbers of Soviet non-diplomatic staff at the Embassy, officials at the Soviet Trade Delegation, and staff of ancillary Soviet organisations. These new arrangements are set out in a second Aide Memoire which I shall now ask you to read.

14. The constructive arrangement I have outlined whereby the ceiling on the number of diplomatic staff will be permitted to rise is designed to enable the Soviet Embassy to perform its proper functions, contributing to the positive development of Anglo/Soviet relations which, as I have emphasised, the British Government wishes to see.

15. We shall remain fully alert to any evidence of further abuse by Soviet officials of their position here whether diplomatic or otherwise. In such a case we should respond with firmness. These new and more flexible arrangements would have to be reconsidered and the permitted ceilings would be liable to be reduced as appropriate.

16. I wish also to make absolutely clear that any retaliatory action by the Soviet authorities against British personnel or interests in the Soviet Union will be totally unjustified and will meet with a commensurate response.

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17. The Soviet side should bear in mind that the new arrangements I have outlined are not immutable. It would be open to us to take further measures. Moreover we have information about other Soviet officials, in addition to the 25 persons I have named, whose activities are inconsistent with their declared functions.

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AIDE-MEMOIRE

The Soviet Embassy will be aware that intelligence activities by Soviet citizens in the United Kingdom are totally unacceptable to Her Majesty's Government. As has repeatedly been made clear to the Soviet authorities, the necessary action will be taken against Soviet citizens who engage in such activities.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office regrets to inform the Soviet Embassy that 25 members of the Soviet community in the UK have been identified as being concerned in unacceptable intelligence activities in this country. Their names are as follows:

1. Yuriy Vasilyevich YEZHOV  
First Secretary, Soviet Embassy
2. Vyacheslav Ivanovich KALITIN  
First Secretary, Soviet Embassy
3. Boris Aleksandrovich KORCHAGIN  
First Secretary, Soviet Embassy
4. Valeriy Grigoryevich TOKAR  
Second Secretary, Soviet Embassy
5. Anatoly Nikolayevich MERETIKOV  
Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy
6. Dmitriy Mikhaylovich VASILYEV  
Attache, Soviet Embassy
7. Aleksandr Timofeyevich GORELOV  
Soviet Embassy
8. Vyacheslav Dmitriyevich MISHUSTIN  
Soviet Embassy
9. Igor Fedorovich KHOMUTOV  
Soviet Embassy

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10. Yuriy Pavlovich KOMOV  
Soviet Trade Delegation
11. Oleg Pavlovich KRASAKOV  
Soviet Trade Delegation
12. Viktor Orestovich LOGUSH  
Soviet Trade Delegation
13. Vladimir Ivanovich LYUBENKO  
Soviet Trade Delegation
14. Viktor Viktorovich TIMOFEYEV  
Soviet Trade Delegation
15. Eduard Viktorovich PEREPELKIN  
Soviet Trade Delegation
16. Valeriy Vasilyevich PROKOPCHIK  
Soviet Trade Delegation
17. Valeriy Pavlovich IPATOV  
Moscow Narodny Bank
18. Valeriy Aleksandrovich KOTOV  
Razno
19. Mikhail Yuryevich BOGDANOV  
Correspondent, Socialist Industry
20. Aleksandr Anatolyevich KODINTSEV  
Correspondent, Novosti
21. Yuriy Aleksandrovich KUDIMOV  
Correspondent, Komsomolskaya Pravda
22. Viktor Ivanovich MUZALEV  
Correspondent, TASS

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23. Sergey Ivanovich SAYENKO  
Correspondent, Radio Moscow
24. Yuriy Pavlovich ROZHKOV  
International Cocoa Organisation
25. Mikhail Dmitriyevich SAVVATEYEV  
International Wheat Council

The Soviet Embassy is requested to arrange for these 25 Soviet citizens to leave the UK within three weeks from the date of this Aide-Memoire, that is not later than                    October. Those of the above who are at present out of the country will not be permitted to return.

Of those named, the following have no immunity from jurisdiction:

1. Yuriy Pavlovich KOMOV  
Soviet Trade Delegation
2. Oleg Pavlovich KRASAKOV  
Soviet Trade Delegation
3. Viktor Orestovich LOGUSH  
Soviet Trade Delegation
4. Vladimir Ivanovich LYUBENKO  
Soviet Trade Delegation
5. Andrey Vladimirovich NOVIKOV  
Soviet Trade Delegation
6. Eduard Viktorovich PEREPALKIN  
Soviet Trade Delegation
7. Valeriy Vasilyevich PROKOPCHIK  
Soviet Trade Delegation

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8. Valeriy Pavlovich IPATOV  
Moscow Narodny Bank
9. Valeriy Aleksandrovich KOTOV  
Razno
10. Mikhail Yuryevich BOGDANOV  
Correspondent, Socialist Industry
11. Aleksandr Anatolyevich KODINTSEV  
Correspondent, Novosti
12. Yuriy Aleksandrovich KUDIMOV  
Correspondent, Komsomolskaya Pravda
13. Viktor Ivanovich MUZALEV  
Correspondent, TASS
14. Sergey Ivanovich SAYENKO  
Correspondent, Radio Moscow

The Soviet Embassy is requested to inform these 14 persons that if any of them is still in this country in three weeks' time, that is on                    October deportation proceedings will be instituted against him.

Mr ROZHKOV of the International Cocoa Organisation and Mr SAVVATEYEV of the International Wheat Council do not have immunity from jurisdiction in respect of activities outside the scope of their official duties, as staff members of these international organisations. Nevertheless, we are prepared to give them the opportunity to make their own arrangements to leave this country. If either of them is still in this country on                    October, deportation proceedings will be instituted against him.

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The permitted overall level of staff of the Soviet Embassy, Soviet Trade Delegation and ancillary organisations will henceforth be reduced by 23 to 211.

The activities in which those named were concerned are an obstacle to the development of fruitful and constructive relations between our two countries. Both sides have stated that they desire such relations. For its part, the British Government, while determined to take the measures necessary for the protection of national security, will continue to work for a more constructive relationship with the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

September 1985

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AIDE MEMOIRE

CEILINGS ON THE NUMBER OF SOVIET OFFICIALS IN LONDON

1. Most careful consideration has been given to the Soviet Ambassador's approach of 4 June 1985.
2. We shall as hitherto continue to refuse visas to officials nominated to Soviet establishments in the UK when the record of their previous activities indicates that they would not be acceptable. Second, Soviet officials working in this country at the Soviet Embassy, the Soviet Trade Delegation, or Soviet ancillary organisations here, who engage in unacceptable activities, will be required to leave.
3. In the light of the Soviet Ambassador's approach and our sincere desire for more constructive relations with the Soviet Union, it has been decided to modify the existing arrangements.
4. From a date three weeks from the date of this Aide Memoire that is *Friday 4 October*, the permitted overall number of Soviet officials and representatives in London will be 211. Within this overall total, the number of Soviet diplomats in London will now be permitted to rise to 46.
5. There will henceforth be no separate ceilings on the numbers of Soviet non-diplomatic staff at the Embassy, officials at the Soviet Trade Delegation, and staff of other ancillary Soviet organisations.
6. Any evidence of abuse by Soviet representatives of their position here, whether diplomatic or otherwise, would be liable to lead to further expulsions and could cause these new and more flexible arrangements to be reconsidered.

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DRAFT FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

Dear Ron,

I want to let you know of action we shall be taking later today as a result of a defection of a senior official of the KGB.

The official in question, Oleg GORDIEVSKY, who has applied for and been granted asylum here, was the Head of the KGB Residency at the Soviet Embassy in London.

He has been serving in London since 1982. Though we are holding the details very close, GORDIEVSKY had been working for us for some time. He has been the source of a great deal of invaluable information about the extent and nature of the Soviet intelligence effort in the UK and elsewhere; as well as significant political information on the Soviet Union. Much of this material has already been passed to your people on the usual channels, and there will of course now be more to come.

As a result of GORDIEVSKY's information, we shall be telling the Russians today, and announcing publicly, that we are expelling 25 Soviet diplomatic and other officials from London. All have been actively involved in intelligence activities. Their expulsion will inflict a very heavy blow to the Soviet intelligence capability in this country.

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We are making clear to the Russians, on my personal authority, that while we cannot tolerate the sort of intelligence actions which GORDIEVSKY has revealed, we continue to desire a constructive relationship with them.

At this critical time in East/West relations, with your meeting with Gorbachev and that of President Mitterrand approaching, there are crucial choices to be made by Gorbachev in Geneva and elsewhere which will influence the direction of East/West relations for the coming decade. It is vital that we should all speak with the same voice of our willingness to work patiently but firmly for dialogue and soundly based agreements between East and West. I shall be sending you separately some thoughts on your own meeting with Gorbachev, in which so many hopes are invested. In the meantime, I think it is no bad thing that he should have presented to him so starkly, early in his leadership, the price to be paid for the scale and nature of KGB activities in Western countries. I would hope that action of this kind by a country such as ourselves, coupled with repeated assurances of our sincere desire to build a productive dialogue with the Russians, will help to instil a greater sense of responsibility and realism in the Soviet leadership over their relations with the West.

With best wishes to you as ever

Margaret

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CURRICULUM VITAE [to be released to the press]

OLEG ANTONOVICH GORDIEVSKY

Date of birth: 10 October 1938

Joined KGB in 1962 and, after a year at their training school in Moscow, spent much of the next 10 years dealing, both in Moscow and abroad, with Soviet "illegals". Subsequently engaged in KGB activities concerning Scandinavia and, later, the UK.

Posted as Counsellor in Soviet Embassy in London in 1982. At the time of his defection had just been appointed Head of the KGB Residency in London.

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DEYOU

FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

TELNO

OF

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR

HETMAN: ACTION FOR EXPULSIONS

My 3 IFTs contain the final texts of a speaking note which David Goodall will use with the Soviet Charge, together with the two accompanying Aides Memoire which he will hand over. Parshin will be summoned at 120800Z and 121000Z. On the morning of 12 September you should put in for a call on Suslov, to take place at 121100Z, or as soon after as possible. However, you should not (not) leave for the MFA until we confirm by a telephone call and/or flash telegram with reference to these telegrams that the interview with Parshin is in progress, and that you should proceed.

2. You should take Suslov through these texts and leave copies of all three with him, explaining that you are acting in parallel because I wish the MFA to have the fullest and most immediate information about the action we are taking in London. Your main message should be that, though we have regrettably been obliged, as always, to act in defence of our security interests, you speak with the personal authority of the Prime Minister and myself in saying that we nonetheless wish the recent improvement in Anglo/Soviet relations to be maintained and indeed developed further. In this context you should draw particular attention

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to our favourable response to Popov's demarche about the Soviet diplomatic ceiling.

3. The FCO spokesman will make a statement (text in my 4th IFT) to the press at 121130Z. If asked, you may confirm to the press that you have made a parallel demarche, but should refer all other questions to the FCO.

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DRAFT FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE  
FRENCH REPUBLIC

Dear Mr President

In April 1983 you very kindly sent a personal emissary to inform me of the magnificent French operation which had produced extremely important information concerning the acquisition by the Russians of advanced Western technology.

In a similar spirit, I would like to tell you that we now have in the United Kingdom an important KGB defector, Mr Oleg GORDIEVSKY, latterly the Head of the KGB Residency in London, who has provided us over a period of time with significant political and counter intelligence information.

As a result of GORDIEVSKY's information, we shall be telling the Russians today, and announcing publicly, that we are expelling 25 Soviet diplomatic and other officials from London. All have been actively involved in intelligence activities. Their expulsion will inflict a very heavy blow to the Soviet intelligence capability in this country.

We are making clear to the Russians, on my personal authority, that while we cannot tolerate the sort of intelligence actions which GORDIEVSKY has revealed we continue to desire a constructive relationship with them.

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At this critical time in East/West relations, with your meeting with Gorbachev and that of President Reagan approaching, there are crucial choices to be made by Gorbachev in Geneva and elsewhere which will influence the direction of East/West relations for the coming decade. It is vital that we should all speak with the same voice of our willingness to work patiently but firmly for dialogue and soundly based agreements between East and West. At the same time, I think it is no bad thing that he should have presented to him so starkly, early in his leadership, the price to be paid for the scale and nature of KGB activities in Western countries. I would hope that action of this kind by a country such as ourselves, coupled with repeated assurances of our sincere desire to build a productive dialogue with the Russians, will help to instil a greater sense of responsibility and realism in the Soviet leadership.

I believe that some of GORDIEVSKY's information will be of particular interest to you, and I have therefore asked that the appropriate officer in our Embassy should brief your Directeur de Cabinet and remain at his disposal for any questions which you may wish to put.

Yours sincerely  
Margaret Thatcher

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25 copies

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Public from  
12-30 on 12 September.

ON THE RECORD STATEMENT

The Soviet Charge d'Affaires ad interim, Mr Parshin, was asked to call at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office earlier today. He was informed that a senior member of the Soviet Embassy, Mr Oleg GORDIEVSKY, had sought and been granted asylum in this country. Mr GORDIEVSKY was a Counsellor at the Soviet Embassy from June 1982. He was a senior official in the KGB, and had recently become Head of the KGB Residency in London. Mr GORDIEVSKY was in a position to know full details of Soviet intelligence activities and personnel in this country.

2. Mr Parshin was told that a significant number of Soviet representatives in London have been engaging in intelligence activities which are of course totally incompatible with their status and declared tasks. The nature and scale of the activities are completely unacceptable.

3. The Soviet Charge d'Affaires was therefore informed that 25 Soviet officials, of whom 6 belong to the diplomatic staff of the Soviet Embassy, must leave the country within three weeks.

4. The Government attach great importance to the development of a realistic dialogue with the Soviet Union which can contribute to mutual confidence between East and West. It was accordingly made clear to Mr Parshin that, although our action was necessary in the interests of national security, it remained our policy to work for an improvement in bilateral relations with the Soviet Union.

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NOTE FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES (ON THE RECORD)

Who saw the Soviet Charge d'Affaires?

1. The senior available Deputy Under Secretary at the FCO, Mr David Goodall.

Great coup for intelligence/security services?

2. Yes, and the intelligence gained is of very great value to our security operations.

When and where did he defect? Was he in touch with the British authorities before he sought asylum? Has he worked as an agent for British intelligence?

3. No comment.

Where is he now?

4. In this country. I cannot give further details.

Have the Soviet Embassy requested access to him?

5. No. [or Yes, if by then they have]

Is he under protection?

6. I cannot comment on that.

Is he being held under duress?

7. No. His decision to seek asylum was entirely his own.

Why did he defect? Can we be sure he will stay?

8. He has told us that he wishes to become a citizen of a democratic country and live in a free society.

Will he see/speak to the media?

9. No present plans for him to do so.

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Where is his family?

10. No comment.

When did he start giving information?

11. No comment.

How was this achieved?

12. No comment.

Are any more diplomats implicated by his information?

13. No comment.

Has his information been relevant to any other recent counter-espionage activity - Bettaney etc?

14. No comment.

Was there any prior knowledge of the unacceptable activities of any of the 25 persons now being expelled?

15. No comment.

Will there be prosecutions?

16. Any information that might be relevant to a prosecution would, as in the past, be made available to the prosecuting authorities.

How long have the Russians known about his defection?

17. No comment.

Why if he was KGB officer was he admitted to this country?

18. No comment.

Wrong signal at sensitive time for East/West relations?

19. The activities of these people were a serious threat to national security and a source of friction. They could not be tolerated. We have made it quite clear that we remain committed

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to developing a more constructive relationship, but that this cannot be at the expense of national security.

Has Mrs Thatcher been in touch with Gorbachev about this?

(or Sir Geoffrey Howe with Shevardnadze?)

20. No.

Any further expulsions planned?

21. Our policy is that if Soviet officials engage in inadmissible activities, appropriate action will be taken.

Any relaxation on control of entry?

22. Our policy remains not to admit to the UK known intelligence officers. In this we will have the valuable help of information provided by Mr Gordievsky.

Effect on ceilings?

23. The permitted level of Soviet officials in London (ie diplomatic staff, Embassy non-diplomatic staff, Soviet Trade Delegation, and ancillary organisations) will be reduced by 23 to 211.

Why not the full 25?

24. Because two of those expelled have been working for international organisations in London and therefore do not count under the ceilings on the Soviet community.

What about the diplomatic ceiling?

25. Under modified arrangements now in force, the permitted number of Soviet diplomatic staff will be set at 46.

But why raise it from 39 to 46?

26. The major consideration is the overall ceiling, now reduced by 23 to 211. But within that ceiling it is very important

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that each side should be able to maintain a viable Embassy in the other's capital. Our judgment is that 46 is the right figure.

Link between British Embassy Moscow and new Soviet diplomatic ceiling in London?

27. (Unattributable) Not directly. But we obviously had our needs in Moscow in mind when fixing the new ceiling in London for the Russians.

Will the ceilings be reduced in future in the event of expulsions?

28. The ceilings on Soviet representatives in London will be reduced as appropriate in the event of expulsions for unacceptable activities.

Why are those who are not diplomats not being subjected to the normal process of law?

29. The Government must decide how to deal with these cases bearing in mind the needs of our own security and all other relevant factors. In this instance it was decided that our objectives were best served by requiring the withdrawal of these persons.

What measures will be taken if they do not leave within three weeks?

30. We have no reason to expect that they will not leave before then.

Do you expect retaliation?

31. Any such action by the Soviet authorities would be entirely without justification. The Soviet authorities know that HM Government would take an extremely serious view of any retaliation.

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What exactly did those expelled do?

32. Regret cannot give further details.

What damage have they done to national security?

33. Cannot comment.

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