

D. R.

CONFIDENTIAL

C.D.P.

PRIME MINISTER

US/SOVIET SUMMIT

As you requested, I have had a go at producing a message from you to President Reagan about the Summit and I attach the result. Percy Cradock has seen it and approves.

C.D.P.

Charles - brilliant -
only 2 comments -
on my memo -
P.1 the other on
should report on
or P.3 where we
have the
propaganda
advantage
nd

C D POWELL

11 September 1985

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MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

I promised to let you have my thoughts on your forthcoming meeting with Gorbachev. Since you will be having a first round with Shevardnadze later this month, it may be best to give you my views now. From what I hear, they may not coincide with all the advice you are getting from your own people. But I think you would expect me to ^{give} ~~spea~~k my ^{own} ~~mind~~ *views* nonetheless!

As we both expected, Gorbachev is showing himself to be a deft operator. He is playing western public opinion skilfully and for all it's worth. The "Time" interview is just one example. And his performance is spoiled only by the arrogance which he cannot always conceal.

His purpose is, of course, to set opinion in Europe against the United States, to give the impression that the Soviet Union is full of initiatives and original ideas while the United States is flat-footed and unimaginative. After years of deadbeat performances by the Soviet Union on the public relations front, we must not under-estimate the vulnerability of our own public opinion to Gorbachev's more skilful tactics. But it is essential that we should not let him make all the running. Otherwise public attitudes to and expectations from the meeting itself will be irreversibly tilted against you: and this in turn will affect the way in which its results are interpreted. We must - and this is something for all western governments - counter Gorbachev's campaign.

But that is only part of what is needed. It is even more important that the United States should show that it has appealing proposals of its own on which you will be prepared to begin the process of negotiation when you and Gorbachev meet. This point goes right to the heart of my perception of your meeting and I should like to spend some time on it.

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Clearly we must not build up your first meeting with Gorbachev as a climactic event which will at a stroke cut through the main East/West problems. That way lies certain disappointment. The differences are too profound. But it would be no less a mistake, in my view, to approach it with ambitions that are too modest. I am troubled, in particular, by the notion which is gaining ground that you see the meeting as little more than a "getting to know you" session, whose only other task will be to set an agenda for future work.

It is important that you should take the measure of Gorbachev and his style. It is even more important that he should get the full flavour of your sincerity and seriousness of purpose, the West's greatest single asset. But a meeting limited to this will not satisfy public opinion in Europe that the United States has made a really serious effort to achieve forward movement in East/West relations. If the meeting is to be judged a success, it must give a specific and measurable impetus to negotiations on a wide range of issues, above all arms control. This will mean getting into the substance of the issues. This is not just as a matter of presentation. I believe that the pressures, particularly those of resource allocation, on Gorbachev to advance negotiations on arms control are a good deal stronger than he would have us believe. There may be genuine prospects of useful progress provided that we maintain Western cohesion and, at the same time, show that we are serious in seeking balanced agreements. It remains to be seen whether he wants to, or could, deliver against the entrenched interests in the Soviet Union. We should put him to the test.

I very much hope therefore that you will feel able to put forward concrete and specific proposals in Geneva. On arms control, you will certainly want to explain to him personally the rationale behind your Strategic Defence Initiative. I would hope that you would also, basing yourself on the four points which we agreed at Camp David, be prepared to put to him proposals on the place of strategic defence in relation to offensive forces and arms control. The key

D. R.

element would of course be deep cuts in offensive weapons. The proposals might also cover the clarification of activities which are permitted and prohibited under the ABM Treaty, commitments not to enter particular phases of defensive programmes before certain specific dates, and a dialogue on the relationship between offensive and defensive forces in the longer term. You might hold out too the prospect of a reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty, incorporating a longer period of notice of termination, as part of a package embracing deep cuts in offensive weapons. Thus in the immediate future both sides would agree to an interim framework of restraint on strategic offensive forces as you have suggested; we would maintain and strengthen the existing arms control regime while building a better one for the future. An approach of this kind would not constrain your longer term freedom of manoeuvre on defensive systems, when the way forward on the SDI will be clearer in the light of the research programme.

I believe that agreement in principle on proposals on these lines would enable your talks with Gorbachev to unlock the door to progress in the detailed arms control talks. But I also believe that progress will be maintained only if there is direction from the top by you and Gorbachev and that, for this purpose, you should be thinking in terms of a further meeting at your level within a reasonable time.

I hope that you would also be able to review prospects in other arms control negotiations, above all chemical weapons about which you know I am particularly concerned. Even if it is not realistic to expect a breakthrough in these areas, it will be a change for you to bring home to Gorbachev the importance we attach to serious negotiations leading to results. *And to bring home to the public that it is the Soviet Union which is reluctant to ^{control} these weapons.*

I am sure you will want to raise human rights. Gorbachev showed in London that when confronted with particular human rights issues (including individual cases) he could get tough. We found he reacted most often by hitting back with allegedly

bad features of life in the West. This can too easily lead to an argument about the fundamentals of our two systems, or the trading of particular accusations, neither of which in my own experience is likely to get us anywhere in terms of better Soviet behaviour. I found the best tactic was to concentrate instead on putting across to Gorbachev two parallel convictions.

- that we in the West are not in the business of undermining the Soviet state. As I put it to him, we do not see his system through rose-tinted spectacles, but we know we have to live with it in a single world;

- nevertheless, human rights in the Soviet Union are our business: not just because both East and West have committed themselves to them at Helsinki: but also because justice at home is more likely to produce stability and responsible behaviour abroad. Our people, on whose beliefs our democratic foreign policy is founded, will continue to demand progress on these matters and the Soviet leadership have to reckon with the force of public opinion in free democratic societies.

I welcome your intention to discuss regional issues. I am sure you will stress in particular how strongly we all feel about Afghanistan. It is high time the Russians did their part now to unblock progress towards a settlement: and a timetable for withdrawing their forces is the key. A gesture here would be highly significant for the whole of East-West relations.

This has become a longer message than I intended. And I certainly don't want you to feel that I am lecturing (perish the thought)! These matters are immensely important and difficult to judge. But I am convinced that we must stop Gorbachev's propaganda bandwagon from gaining too much speed before your meeting by making clear now that the US is utterly serious about making the maximum progress at Geneva; and that we must set clear goals for the meeting itself with which our

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people on both sides of the Atlantic can identify, and by which they can measure the meeting's success.

I should be very ready to discuss these points more fully with Bud McFarlane if you were able to spare him for a day or so to come over as my guest. In the meantime I send you warmest best wishes and my fullest support in the very demanding tasks which you face. We could not have a better or braver champion.

VC3AGZ

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(83)



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

10 September 1985

US/SOVIET SUMMIT

Len Appleyard's letter of 6 September enclosed a draft message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan about the forthcoming US/Soviet Summit.

The Prime Minister was very far from content with this draft, which she has decided not to send. At her request, I have tried my hand at an alternative version. I do not know whether it will appeal to her any more than the FCO draft. But on a personal basis it would be helpful to have any comments particularly on the arms control aspects by 3.00 pm tomorrow, before I put the draft to her.

BP

I am copying this letter and enclosure on the same personal basis to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence).

C D POWELL

Peter Ricketts, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

I promised to let you have my thoughts on your forthcoming meeting with Gorbachev. Since you will be having a first round with Shevardnadze later this month, it may be best to give you my views now. From what I hear, they may not coincide with all the advice you are getting from your own people. But I think you would expect me to speak my mind nonetheless!

As we both expected, Gorbachev is showing himself to be a deft operator. He is playing western public opinion skilfully and for all it's worth. The "Time" interview is just one example. His performance is spoiled only by the arrogance which occasionally breaks through. I gather that he treated some of your senior senators rather disdainfully.

His purpose is, of course, to set opinion in Europe against the United States, to give the impression that the Soviet Union is full of initiatives and original ideas while the United States is flat-footed and unimaginative. After years of deadbeat performances by the Soviet Union on the public relations front, we must not under-estimate the vulnerability of our own public opinion to his more skilful tactics. But it is essential that we should not let him succeed in his ploy. Otherwise public attitudes to and expectations from the meeting itself will be irreversibly tilted against you: and this in turn will affect the way in which its results are interpreted. We must - and this is something for all western governments - counter Gorbachev's campaign. We must warn our people what to expect and expose his proposals and initiatives for the sham they are. I feel that not enough is yet being done to get this over, though I had a go in my own speech to the International Democratic Union in Washington in July.

But that is only part of what is needed. It is even more important that the United States should show that it has fresh and appealing proposals of its own on which you will be

prepared to negotiate when you and Gorbachev meet. This point goes right to the heart of my perception of your meeting and I should like to spend some time on it.

Clearly we must not build up your encounter with Gorbachev as a climactic event which will at a stroke cut through the main East/West problems. That way lies certain disappointment. The differences are too profound. But it would be no less a mistake, in my view, to approach it with ambitions that are too modest. I am troubled, in particular, by the notion which is gaining ground that you see the meeting as little more than a "getting to know you" session, whose only other task will be to set an agenda for future work.

It is important that you should take the measure of Gorbachev and his style. It is even more important that he should get the full flavour of your sincerity and seriousness of purpose, the West's greatest single asset. But a meeting limited to this will not satisfy public opinion in Europe that the United States has made a really serious effort to achieve forward movement in East/West relations. In the climate which Gorbachev has created it will be essential that, if the meeting is to be judged a success, it should give a specific and measurable impetus to negotiations on a wide range of issues, above all arms control. This will mean getting into the substance of the issues. This is not just as a matter of presentation. I believe that the pressures, particularly those of resource allocation, on Gorbachev to advance negotiations on arms control are a good deal stronger than he would have us believe. There are genuine prospects of useful progress.

I very much hope therefore that you will feel able to put forward concrete and specific proposals in Vienna. On arms control, you will certainly want to explain to him personally the rationale behind your Strategic Defence Initiative. I would hope that you would also, basing yourself on the four points which we agreed at Camp David, be prepared to put to him proposals in the area of strategic defence.

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These might cover for instance agreement on permitted research, a dialogue on the relationship between offensive and defensive forces, and commitments not to enter particular phases of defensive programmes before certain specific dates. This would be part of a wider approach designed to govern both offensive and defensive developments over a significant period of time. It would be combined with proposals for deep cuts in offensive weapons and a reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty. The aim would be to achieve predictability in terms of the possible deployment of defensive systems against which offensive force deployments and programme decisions over the next decade could be matched. I believe that proposals on these lines would enable your talks with Gorbachev to unlock the door to progress in Geneva.

I hope that you would also be able to review prospects in other arms control negotiations - MBFR, the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe and above all chemical weapons about which you know I am particularly concerned. Even if it is not realistic to expect a breakthrough in these areas, it will be a change for you to bring home to Gorbachev the importance we attach to serious negotiations leading to results.

I am sure you will want to raise human rights. Gorbachev showed in London that when confronted with particular human rights issues (including individual cases) he could get tough. We found he reacted most often by hitting back with allegedly bad features of life in the West. This can too easily lead to an argument about the fundamentals of our two systems, or the trading of particular accusations, neither of which in my own experience is likely to get us anywhere in terms of better Soviet behaviour. I found the best tactic was to concentrate instead on putting across to Gorbachev two parallel convictions.

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know we have to live with in in a single world;

- nevertheless, human rights in the Soviet Union are our business. Not just because these rights are universal, and both East and West were committed to them at Helsinki: but also because justice at home is linked with stability, prosperity and responsible behaviour abroad. Our people, on whose beliefs our democratic foreign policy is founded, will continue to demand progress on these matters and the Soviet leadership have to reckon with the force of public opinion in a free democratic society.

I welcome your intention to discuss regional issues. I am sure you will stress in particular how strongly we all feel about Afghanistan. It is high time the Russians did their part now to unblock progress towards a settlement: and a timetable for withdrawing their forces is the key. A gesture here would be highly significant for the whole of East-West relations.

This has become a longer message than I intended. And I certainly don't want you to feel that I am lecturing (perish the thought)! These matters are immensely important and difficult to judge. But I am convinced that we must stop Gorbachev's propaganda bandwagon from gaining too much speed before your meeting by making clear that the US will be ready to make new and far-reaching proposals; and that we must set clear goals for the meeting itself with which our people on both sides of the Atlantic can identify, and by which they can measure the meeting's success.

I should be very ready to discuss these points more fully with Bud McFarlane if you were able to spare him for a day or so to come over as my guest. In the meantime I send you warmest best wishes and my fullest support in the very demanding tasks which you face. We could not have a better or braver champion.

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PRIME MINISTER

*See summary
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US/SOVIET SUMMIT

The Foreign Secretary advised you last week that your message to President Reagan about the summit ought to go fairly soon if it was to be properly taken into account in American preparations. He has now provided the attached draft. It comes in two parts: a message and an annex.

It would be helpful to have your reaction. I find it bland, uninteresting and too inclined to accept - indeed encourage - the view of those in the US Administration who take a minimalist view of the Summit. If you are to send a message, you should set what we think the West's aims should be and then suggest what progress can feasibly be made at the summit towards them. The aims should include precise ideas on arms control. The message should also propose a number of criteria by which the success of the summit could be judged. I don't think much of the idea of splitting the message into two parts, especially since the more interesting bits on arms control are in the Annex. It simply doesn't make sense to divide the substance from the style. When set against the vast amount of briefing material which the President will be getting, this simply won't make an impact. It's a pity the Foreign and Commonwealth Office didn't pay more attention to the guidance you gave them in advance (attached).

If you agree that the draft is substandard, what next?

(a) We can try to assemble some outside experts. But you had the Sovietologists pre-Gorbachev and didn't get much out of them: and it's you not they who have had the direct experience of him. Anyway, your diary hardly allows it.

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(b) We can have a meeting of Ministers and senior officials to commission a fresh draft.

(c) Or Percy Cradock and I can have a go at producing a version.

Another possibility would be to invite Bud McFarlane over here, so that you can put your views directly to him. I think you should do this, but after you've sent a message and rather nearer the time of the summit.

Agree (b) or (c)?

The next draft is worse than unless. I should dream of writing it. Try (C). Above - let's into account the judgement we have to take

P.O.

C.D.P.

Port- divide into 2 papers not

(C.D. POWELL)

6 September 1985

M.B.

The talks must unblock the door to progress at Geneva. A general 'letting to know you' is not enough.

SRWAID

see PC.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 September 1985

*see PM's comments**CDP
11/9.**Dear Charles,*US/Soviet Summit

In your letter of 31 July you asked us to draft a substantial message from the Prime Minister to President Reagan, following up the undertaking she made in her letter of 9 July to the President (and repeated with Vice-President Bush) to offer some thoughts on the handling of the November Summit. I am sending you the enclosed material now, earlier than you suggested, because as you know we think it important (and have been strongly advised by the Embassy at Washington) that the Prime Minister's message should reach the President before he receives Shevardnadze on 26 September.

This timing should give our input a chance to influence the briefing, not just for the Summit itself, but also for the crucial preparatory meetings. It should also ensure that the Prime Minister's thoughts reach the President before any exchange between him and President Mitterrand over Mr Gorbachev's visit to Paris. We expect, however, that there may be grounds and opportunity for the Prime Minister to send the President some further thoughts nearer the actual time of the Summit: and the last paragraph of the present letter is drafted to provide a peg for this.

The Foreign Secretary would like to explain something of the thinking behind the drafts. Our first concern was not to make the message to President Reagan too long. We know from NSC contacts that policy submissions are normally made to him in abbreviated style, focusing on the essentials. To accommodate his preferences while getting all the important points across, we suggest that the Prime Minister's message should take the form of a reasonably brief covering letter on questions of strategy and style, with a short enclosure about the substance of the President's discussions. Both elements have been so drafted as to come clearly from the Prime Minister herself. They take account among other things of the latest indications of Gorbachev's approach ("Time" article, meetings with US Senators) and of the US public response.

Most of the drafts should be self-explanatory. The covering letter stresses our appreciation for the way the President himself is approaching the Summit but injects some

/ important ...



important nuances, especially on the handling of Gorbachev. HM Ambassador Washington, whom we have consulted, confirms that this style should serve us better than the offer of more categorical advice. (The actual word "Summit" has been avoided because US spokesmen themselves prefer not to use it, for fear of inflating the occasion.)

On substance we have covered everything in your letter, though in a rather different order. In dealing with the Geneva arms control negotiations (and MBFR, CDE, CW etc) we have suggested a rather less direct and specific approach than you originally proposed. We share the concern not to lose the opportunity the Summit offers for giving a fresh impetus to the talks. There are those in Washington who will be seeking to put as much substance as possible into the arms control discussion. But we believe it would be going too far to give the Americans the clear impression that we were proposing a comprehensive game-plan for the future of arms control. None of the current arms control negotiations will have reached the point by November where detailed agreements satisfactory to both sides can be signed. The Russians have so far shown little sign of genuine flexibility and their public offers seem designed mainly to unnerve the US into offering unwarranted concessions. Trying to manoeuvre the Americans into too forward a posture, even if it only produced an eventual agreement at a later stage, could lead to undue concessions on their part and consequent damage to Alliance interests, not to mention increased problems of Western consultation and coordination. (We have not mentioned ASATs on the rather different ground that this issue is unlikely to figure seriously in the Summit discussions, given the overall limits on time - indeed CW, CDE and MBFR may not be reached either - and we have not included nuclear test issues because there is no particular UK point to make on these at present.)

So we have preferred in our drafts to go for a more indirect approach, flagging the ideas to which you referred. This would complement other elements of the Summit designed to improve personal relations between the two leaders. Together with the conclusion of a number of bilateral agreements, some with direct relevance to security, the sum total should contribute to building the stable, interdependent framework of relations which will be necessary to open the way for real progress in arms control. If a firmer structure for further negotiations can also be agreed, so much the better. Nonetheless, we must recognise that even this indirect approach on arms control may not achieve all we wish, and may go beyond the advice being currently prepared for the President by his own officials.

/ We note ...

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We note the Prime Minister's comment that it might be useful to arrange a meeting with outside experts; timing apart, you will doubtless bear in mind the publicity which might result from any such meeting.

I am copying this letter, like yours, to Richard Mottram (Ministry of Defence) and Richard Hatfield (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever,

L V Appleyard

(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing St

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DRAFT LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

When I wrote on 9 July I said I would be taking up your kind invitation to offer some thoughts on your meeting with Mr Gorbachev in November. You of all people know how to handle this, and what we have heard of your plans so far makes great sense. But it might be worth underlining a few points from my own experience of the man: and my sense of how people in Europe are approaching this historic meeting.

Like your own people they look to it with hope, as the first such event for many years. But because of that very lack of recent parallels, they cannot be certain what exactly to expect. We must persuade them to look neither too high or too low: above all by stressing, as you have rightly stressed already, that this is the start of a creative process and not the end. One encounter cannot magic away the differences between systems, or solve complex security problems at a stroke. But it can and should have a clear productive purpose: laying the groundwork - as your spokesmen have put it - to address the great issues facing your two nations. It can put in place the first elements of a more stable, workmanlike relationship between the two major powers on this planet.

Any bilateral agreements that can be presented as an indication of progress will obviously help. But a more general aim should be to start building the climate of greater understanding and confidence we shall need, if Mr Gorbachev is ever to help open the way for true progress on arms control. The first essential step is for you to get across to him your own deep commitment to peace and a stable and safer world. If you can then draw him into a searching debate on the key issues; reaffirm such basic aims as the two sides share; explore the way ahead, and perhaps produce a structured approach to further negotiations - this kind of outcome? should in my belief be not

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only worthwhile in substance but deeply reassuring to opinion in the West. !?

Mr Gorbachev himself seems to see your meeting at the moment mainly as a licence for public diplomacy, a chance to probe US nerve and the strength of Western positions. We can expect more propaganda ploys both before and during Geneva, aimed at the most sensitive links in the Allied chain. The essential will be to meet these with firmness and keep Western opinion solid - a task we all share - while ensuring the event is not driven off its proper course. The hardest response for Mr Gorbachev to evade is the calm, measured one which points out that the Soviets have not addressed - and should not waste the chance your meeting offers to address - the real core of the issue.

For he also struck me as a man who knows, deep down, he cannot tackle his formidable economic problems without a durable peace and stable relationship with the US. In my long talk with him last December, his personal commitment to raising Soviet living standards - and his conviction that the task is possible - came across clearly. He knows and has once spoken publicly of the "immense" commitment military spending means for his people. Of course he will always give priority to what he sees as "adequate" security. His skill in manipulating opinion in the West is matched by a personal vision of the world still fixed in naively orthodox Communist terms. But in his meeting with you he will be exploring too - looking as always for concessions, but looking also at the possibility (and costs) of greater cooperation.

Even last December, before his elevation, Mr Gorbachev was speaking as a man who intends to be around for a good while and whose authority will grow with experience. Now is the time for efforts to convince him of Western good faith, to show him that with application and patience deals can be done to the benefit of



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all. And now is the time to press him, as a statesman, to devote his talents constructively to the crucial East-West issues. This long-term strategy needs great maturity, firmness and patience on the Western side. I cannot imagine any Western leader better qualified than you to carry it through.

You will be speaking to Mr Gorbachev for the whole of the West, as leader of a free alliance. He has nothing like that behind him and he knows it. The more this strength can be reflected in the handling of all aspects of the event, the better. Sharing your general aims with the Allies in advance will help them to speak and act supportively. And I welcome the excellent practice you have established for briefing NATO quickly through qualified emissaries.

I may seek a chance to return to some of these issues between now and November and would be glad to take further any particular points you want to pursue. For the moment, I am / enclosing some further thoughts of mine on the subject-matter of your meeting.

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[ENCLOSURE]

THOUGHTS ON SPECIFIC ISSUES

Who?
1. Given the current Soviet approach to Arms Control, one meeting is unlikely to sweep away the obstacles. But your discussions do have an all-important task to perform in laying the foundation for serious negotiations on the Geneva issues and giving them a fresh impetus. The first step is to make Mr Gorbachev accept our seriousness of purpose in seeking agreements, and your readiness to define with him the shared interests which such agreements should serve.

2. On the central Geneva topics, the four points which we agreed at Camp David remain an excellent starting point: the emphasis your people have put on them in recent presentations is much appreciated here, and healthy for Western solidarity. Against that background, I wonder if the way ahead may lie in beginning to explore with Mr Gorbachev a combination of measures which would not preclude potential options for a later stage. They would be designed to provide greater security over the medium-term, while at the same time improving chances of securing the radical reductions in offensive arms which you and I wish to see.

3. The sort of ideas I have in mind, on which we have already touched in our previous talks, might include eventual agreements

- to cut nuclear forces significantly;
- to halt the erosion of the ABM Treaty by reaffirming the commitment to observe the Treaty in its present form, with subsequent clarification of the ambiguous areas in it and especially those that bear on the distinction between research and development;

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- to discuss the maintenance of those elements of the SALT agreements which would continue to be relevant, within an interim framework of agreed restraint;
- to establish a new commitment to compliance with existing agreements, and to cooperation in resolving points of outstanding difficulty;
- and to engage in a serious and sustained dialogue on the relationship between offensive and defensive forces, as this continues to evolve in the light of your SDI research programme.

- to stand firm on SDI.

An agreement on a structured approach to further negotiations would be a bonus.

? But limited ground?

4. The Soviets claim an interest in all these aspects, though their actions so far have not done much to reflect it. November could be the right time to put them to the test at the highest level. The details of any such agreements would of course have to be worked out later in negotiation. But I feel even a tentative accord on these lines would be a major success for you and the Western Alliance. Much will of course depend on Mr Gorbachev's preparedness for detailed discussion: and your agenda will already be very full. But I hope you will be able to do more than skim the surface with him on these key issues. It would also be worth reflecting in a public statement any common ground you were able to reach.

5. Time permitting, the meeting could also offer you a chance to review prospects in other arms control negotiations - Chemical Weapons, the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe, and MBFR. I doubt if an immediate breakthrough - which means major Soviet concessions - will be possible in these areas. But I do hope you can stress to Mr Gorbachev the importance we all attach to concrete results. These would enhance US-Soviet relations and global stability: but they can only be gained by negotiating seriously, without sticking to plainly unacceptable positions.

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6. I am sure you will want to ^{raise} ~~focus~~ on Human rights. In ^{doing} ~~raising~~ them I know you will carry with you the thought, which we share, that despite changes in the presentation of Soviet policies there has been no change in their practice. Mr Gorbachev showed in London that when confronted with particular human rights issues (including individual cases) he could get tough. We found he reacted most often by hitting back with allegedly bad features of life in the West. This can too easily lead to an argument about the fundamentals of our two systems, or the trading of particular accusations - neither of which in my own experience is likely to get us anywhere in terms of better Soviet behaviour. I found the best tactic was to concentrate instead on putting across to Gorbachev two parallel convictions:

- that we in the West are not in the business of undermining the Soviet state. As I put it to him, we do not see his system through rose-tinted spectacles, but we know we have to live with it in a single world;
- nevertheless, human rights in the Soviet Union are our business. Not just because these rights are universal, and both East and West were committed to them at Helsinki: but also because justice at home is linked with stability, prosperity and responsible behaviour abroad. Our people, on whose beliefs our democratic foreign policy is founded, will continue to demand progress on these matters and the Soviet leadership have to reckon with the force of public opinion in a free democratic society.

7. I welcome your intention to discuss regional issues. I am sure you will stress in particular how strongly we all feel about Afghanistan. It is high time the Russians did their part now to unblock progress towards a settlement: and a timetable for withdrawing their forces is the key. A gesture here would be highly significant for the whole of East-West relations.

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East/West Relations:

Foreign Pol. PLS



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PRIME MINISTER

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The next draft is worse than unless. I should dream of writing it. Try (C). Above - let's into account the judgement we have to take

P.O.

C.D.P.

Post- divide into 2 papers not

(C.D. POWELL)

6 September 1985

M.B.

The talks must unblock the door to progress at Geneva. A general 'letting to know you' is not enough.

SRWAID