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TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 731

OF 240003Z SEPTEMBER 85

INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, ATHENS, BONN, BRUSSELS EEC  
BRUSSELS EMBASSY, COPENHAGEN, DUBLIN, LUXEMBOURG, PARIS, ROME  
THE HAGUEINFO PRIORITY BELGRADE, BUCHAREST, BUDAPEST, EAST BERLIN, PRAGUE  
SOFIA, WARSAW, TOKYO, OTTAWA, CANBERRA

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

SECRETARY OF STATES MEETING WITH SHEVARDNAZDE: 23 SEPTEMBER

## SUMMARY

1. CANDID, BRISK AND BUSINESS DISCUSSION, WITH BOTH SIDES AFFIRMING THE WISH TO DRAW A LINE UNDER THE EXPULSIONS ISSUE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE OPENED STRAIGHTAWAY ON EXPULSIONS, SPEAKING FIRMLY BUT INDICATING THAT HE ALSO WANTED TO DISCUSS OTHER QUESTIONS. SHEVARDNAZDE REPLIED IN SIMILAR TERMS. DISCUSSION OF US/SOVIET SUMMIT PROSPECTS AND ARMS CONTROL, WITH SHEVARDNAZDE RECALLING SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED TO COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY. BRIEF DISCUSSION OF MIDDLE EAST. SECRETARY OF STATE REFERRED TO EARLIER INVITATION TO SHEVARDNAZDE.

## DETAIL

2. AT SHEVARDNAZDES INVITATION, THE SECRETARY OF STATE OPENED THE DISCUSSION. HE SAID THAT EVENTS OVER THE PAST TEN DAYS WERE VERY MUCH IN EVERYONES MIND AND HE THOUGHT IT RIGHT TO BEGIN BY DISCUSSING THEM. BUT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO KEEP THESE EVENTS IN PERSPECTIVE SINCE THERE WERE OTHER IMPORTANT MATTERS WHICH HE WISHED TO DISCUSS, AND WHICH HAD BEEN TOUCHED UPON IN HELSINKI.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT NO FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD BE LIKELY TO TAKE ACTION INVOLVING EXPULSIONS ON THIS SCALE UNLESS THERE WERE VERY GOOD REASONS. NO ONE WOULD WANT TO DISTURB THE SEARCH FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS WITHOUT VERY STRONG CAUSE. THE PRIME MINISTER AND HE HAD BOTH DEVOTED A GREAT DEAL OF TIME TO ACHIEVING STABLE LONGTERM RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. HE WISHED TO STRESS THAT THERE WAS NO TRUTH IN THE ALLEGATION IN PRAVDA THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WANTED TO POISON RELATIONS.

4. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SECRETARY OF STATE CONTINUED, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, LIKE THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, ATTACHED THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO NATIONAL SECURITY. IT WAS CLEAR FROM INFORMATION THAT HAD REACHED US THAT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE KGB IN BRITAIN WERE ON A SCALE, AND OF SUCH AN UNACCEPTABLE NATURE, THAT THEY WERE WHOLLY INCOMPATIBLE WITH NATIONAL SECURITY. IT WAS REGRETTABLE THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD RETALIATED IN THE WAY THAT IT DID. NOTHING

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WOULD PREVENT US FROM TAKING ACTION TO DEFEND OUR NATIONAL SECURITY. BUT WE WERE ALSO EQUALLY SERIOUS IN THE IMPORTANCE WHICH WE ATTACHED TO ACHIEVING GREATER UNDERSTANDING. WE LOOKED TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO CONTROL THE ACTION OF THOSE AGENCIES WHICH WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR RECENT EVENTS IN ORDER TO PREVENT THREATS BOTH TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND TO BETTER RELATIONS. THE REASONS WHICH HAD LED THE PRIME MINISTER AND GORBACHEV TO PUT SUCH AN EFFORT INTO IMPROVING RELATIONS REMAINED EQUALLY STRONG TODAY. THIS TASK SHOULD NOT BE INTERRUPTED OR PREVENTED BY RECENT EVENTS.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE THEN MOVED ON TO DISCUSS THE US/SOVIET SUMMIT MEETING. HE UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE WHICH WE, AND OTHER WESTERN GOVERNMENTS, ATTACHED TO THE SUMMIT. HE HAD BEEN STRUCK BY GORBACHEV'S INTERVIEW IN TIME MAGAZINE, WHERE HE SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN SEEN BY SOME AS A POTENTIAL BATTLE BETWEEN SUPER-GLADIATORS. THIS WAS INDEED HOW THE MEDIA TENDED TO PRESENT IT BUT THE PUBLIC RELATIONS ASPECTS MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO DOMINATE THE MEETING. HE WELCOMED WHAT GORBACHEV HAD SAID ABOUT THE NEED TO TACKLE QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE. WE KNEW THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN SHARED THIS DESIRE FOR A SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION. WE HOPED IT WOULD REPRESENT THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS GENUINE AGREEMENTS WHICH WOULD REDUCE TENSION AND MISTRUST.

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT IN OUR VIEW THE ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS WOULD COVER BOTH SPACE AND OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO SECURE A REDUCTION IN THE MASSIVE SCALE OF EXISTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE HOPED THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOW MOVE TO MAKE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS RATHER THAN POSTPONING DISCUSSIONS OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS UNTIL SPACE ISSUES HAD BEEN AGREED. WE WERE CONCERNED BY THE SOVIET ATTEMPT TO MAKE PROGRESS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONDITIONAL ON AGREEMENT ON SDI RESEARCH. GORBACHEV HAD ACKNOWLEDGED BY IMPLICATION THAT SDI RESEARCH WAS LEGITIMATE, AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS PARTICIPATING IN IT. (KORNENKO DISSENTED). THE SECRETARY OF STATE COMMENDED THE CAMP DAVID FOUR POINTS AS THE RIGHT BASIS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS AND STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ADHERING TO EXISTING TREATY OBLIGATIONS. WE WERE CONCERNED THAT THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR INSTALLATION MIGHT BE IN CONFLICT WITH TREATY OBLIGATIONS. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO USE THE APPROPRIATE AGENCIES TO DETERMINE IF BREACHES HAD TAKEN PLACE.

7. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO CONCLUDE WITH A WORD ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST. THERE WAS A COMMON WORLDWIDE INTEREST IN FINDING A WAY FORWARD TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. THE PRIME MINISTERS RECENT VISIT TO EGYPT AND JORDAN HAD ENABLED US TO SEE WHAT PART WE COULD PLAY IN THIS PROCESS. WE HAD AGREED TO MEET A JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN DELEGATION IN LONDON. BUT SYRIA WAS MOST RELUCTANT TO TAKE ANY PART IN THE PEACE PROCESS. IN VIEW OF THE SOVIET UNION'S CLOSE RELATIONS WITH SYRIA, WE HOPED THAT SYRIA COULD BE PERSUADED TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE.

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8. IN REPLY, SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT HE WANTED TO SPEAK CANDIDLY. HE HAD FOUND THE PREVIOUS MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN HELSINKI USEFUL, OPEN AND FRANK. THEY HAD HAD A THOROUGH DISCUSSION OF MAJOR ISSUES AND HE HAD BEEN LOOKING FORWARD TO A SIMILAR DISCUSSION IN NEW YORK. HE HAD PREPARED SERIOUSLY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY TO DISCUSS BILATERAL AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. HE ALSO ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE, AS DID ALL COUNTRIES, TO THE FORTHCOMING SUMMIT IN GENEVA. PEOPLE WHO THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE A RUN-OF-THE-MILL, GETTING-TO-KNOW-YOU MEETING, WERE QUITE MISTAKEN.

9. SHEVARDNADZE WENT ON TO SAY THAT IN THAT CONTEXT IT WAS ESSENTIAL NOT TO POISON THE ATMOSPHERE BEFORE THE SUMMIT OR TO WHIP UP TENSION. AT THE MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN HELSINKI, BOTH HAD AGREED TO COOPERATE TO CREATE A FAVOURABLE CLIMATE. HE HAD TO SAY FRANKLY THAT THE HOSTILE ACTIONS BY THE BRITISH SIDE HAD BEEN HARMFUL TO THE ATMOSPHERE AND HAD WHIPPED UP TENSIONS. THESE ACTIONS HAD BEEN MOTIVATED BY IMMEDIATE SHORT-TERM CONSIDERATIONS ONLY. HE DID NOT INTEND TO REPEAT WHAT THE MFA HAD TOLD OUR AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW. A GREAT DEAL HAD CHANGED FOR THE GOOD IN BILATERAL RELATIONS AFTER GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO LONDON. BUT HE FELT THAT SOME CIRCLES IN BRITAIN (HE DID NOT KNOW WHO) FEARED THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE RELATIONS.

10. SHEVARDNADZE RECALLED THAT EACH SIDE HAD EXPELLED 25 DIPLOMATS, REMARKING THAT WE KNEW WHAT OUR PEOPLE WERE DOING AND WHO THEY WERE. BRITAIN TOOK THE NEXT STEP AND THE SOVIET UNION FOLLOWED SUIT. SOVIET ACTIONS WERE EQUALLY MOTIVATED BY NATIONAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS. HE HAD NOTED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SAID IN EGYPT THAT WE WANTED TO DRAW A LINE UNDER THE INCIDENT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD REPEATED THAT REMARK. THE SOVIET UNION EQUALLY FAVOURED SUCH AN APPROACH. SHEVARDNADZE WAS INTERESTED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF BUSINESS-LIKE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN. THERE WERE GOOD OPPORTUNITIES FOR TRADE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION. HE WAS READY TO CONSIDER WITH THE UTMOST SERIOUSNESS ANY PROPOSALS WHICH MIGHT BE MADE.

11. MOVING ON TO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT HE GREATLY VALUED THE SECRETARY OF STATES ADVICE ON THESE ISSUES, IN WHICH HE WAS A VERY EXPERIENCED WORLD STATESMAN. BUT HE COULD USEFULLY GIVE SIMILAR ADVICE TO BRITAIN'S CHIEF ALLY. THE SOVIET UNION ATTACHED THE UTMOST, PRINCIPLED IMPORTANCE TO AVOIDING THE MILITARISATION OF SPACE. WHETHER YOU CALLED IT SDI OR HARMLESS RESEARCH, A SERIOUS MILITARY PROGRAMME WAS UNDER WAY TO MILITARISE SPACE. IT MUST BE STOPPED TODAY. TOMORROW WOULD BE TOO LATE. THE PROCESS COULD BE UNCONTROLLABLE. ALLEGATIONS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS VIOLATING SALT II OR THE ABM TREATY WERE TOTALLY UNSUBSTANTIATED. THE SOVIET UNION OBSERVED TREATIES METICULOUSLY TO THE LETTER. THE STRATEGIC BALANCE DEPENDED ON IT.

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12. THE SOVIET UNION, SHEVARDNADZE CONTINUED, HAD PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS IN NEW YORK FOR THE PEACEFUL EXPLORATION OF SPACE. IT WAS READY TO ACCEPT DEEP CUTS IN EXISTING NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS. IT HAD TAKEN UNILATERAL ACTION ON EUROPEAN MISSILE DEPLOYMENT, ON THE NUCLEAR TEST MORATORIUM, AND NOFUF. BUT THIS WAS STILL A ONE-WAY STREET. THE DESIGNATION AND TASKS OF THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR STATION HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR MANY TIMES AND HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BY EXPERTS IN THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION. SHEVARDNADZE RECALLED THE PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY AND SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS STILL READY TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS ON A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY.

13. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, SHAVARDNADZE SAID THAT HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO SPEAK ON BEHALF OF SYRIA, WHICH WAS AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY. BUT IF WE HAD INTERESTING AND CONSTRUCTIVE IDEAS ON THE MIDDLE EAST, HE WAS READY TO LISTEN AND COOPERATE, PROCEEDING FROM THE STANDPOINT THAT THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS AND OF ISRAEL SHOULD NOT BE SET ASIDE. THE SOVIET UNION, AS WE KNEW, FAVOURED AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UN TO WORK OUT THE PRINCIPLES OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

14. KORNIENKO INTERVENED TO ARGUE THAT UNDER ARTICLE 5 OF THE ABM TREATY EACH SIDE HAD UNDERTAKEN NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY SPACE WEAPONS, WHICH WAS CONTRARY TO THE PRESENT POLICIES OF THE US GOVERNMENT.

15. THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN CONCLUSION REBUTTED KORNIENKO, BUT STRESSED THE NEED FOR BOTH SIDES TO PURSUE THE SEARCH FOR ARMS CONTROL. ON BILATERAL QUESTIONS HE HAD NOTHING TO ADD TO THE OBSERVATIONS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE BY OUR AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW AND WHAT HE HIMSELF HAD ALREADY SAID EARLIER IN THE DISCUSSION. (SHEVARDNADZE NODDED). HE NOTED AND WOULD REFLECT ON WHAT SHEVARDNADZE HAD SAID ABOUT A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY. HE HOPED THAT OUR EXPERTS COULD GET TOGETHER AGAIN TO DISCUSS THE MIDDLE EAST. HE CLOSED BY RECALLING THE INVITATION WHICH HE HAD ISSUED TO SHEVARDNADZE TO VISIT THE UK.

16. SHEVARDNADZE FINALLY REPEATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WANTED BUSINESSLIKE CONTACTS. ON KRASNOYARSK, HE SAID HE WOULD NOT COMMENT ON WHAT WAS BEING DONE IN THE UK, OTHERWISE THE EXCHANGES WOULD NEVER END. THEY HAD HAD A CANDID DISCUSSION, SHEVARDNADZE COMMENTED, IN WHICH THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD SAID WHAT HE HAD TO SAY, AND HE HAD SAID WHAT HE HAD TO SAY. OF COURSE HE RECALLED THE INVITATION WHICH HAD BEEN ISSUED TO HIM.

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