

cc OPS, MASTER

SECRET

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PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T206/85

10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

2 November 1985

Dear Ron,

I was most grateful for your message of 31 October on the negotiations at Geneva. This advance notice was most valuable and a further example of the splendid way you have kept your allies in touch.

Your further proposal is a most positive step, exactly on the lines we discussed last week. It puts you in a very strong position diplomatically and will have a favourable impact on public opinion in the West. It will have my full support.

You would not expect me to comment in detail at this stage. But it may be helpful to give you a few initial impressions. On offensive weapons, your determination to bring the Russians back to the strategic and INF definitions which they had previously accepted is absolutely right. It is only on this basis that you can work towards significant reductions that provide for equal limits on both sides. In the INF context, your proposals have implications for the deployment programme in Europe. These will need to be looked at in the appropriate NATO body. On the strategic defence side, I hope that the suggestions I left with you in New York last week on the line of approach you might follow with Gorbachev will prove helpful.

SECRET

I've just had a talk about these issues with Kadar, the Hungarian Communist Party leader, who is here on a visit. He made three points:

- Gorbachev is sincere in wanting major reductions in nuclear weapons and is ready for substantive talks with you on this;
- what matters most to the Russians is broad equality with the US in nuclear strength;
- the Soviet Union will go ahead with developing its own SDI, whatever the burden on the Soviet economy, if you and Gorbachev are unable to agree on permissible limits on such work.

On balance, he was optimistic about the prospects for success at your meeting in Geneva. He is in no doubt that the Alliance is fully behind your approach and will I hope pass this message on to Gorbachev.

With my warm best wishes for success in your historic task.

Yours ever
Ronald

The President of the United States of America



PA

has an

copy.

10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

You could tell

Cabinet:

① That you have just had a letter from the President giving details of the new arms control proposals which he will shortly make.

② They build on the Soviet proposals & accept the concept of a 50% in ballistic missile warheads & throw-weight.

③ an interim step on INF

④ dialogue on Strategic
defense, plus an
"open laboratories"
proposal.

⑤ This is a good
return for the constant
pressure you have
put on the President to
come forward with
further proposals.

C.D.P.

SECRET



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cpc

10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary


4 November 1985

GENEVA ARMS CONTROL: NEW US PROPOSALS

Thank you for your letter of 31 October enclosing a draft reply from the Prime Minister to President Reagan's recent message about his new arms control proposals.

I enclose a revised version which the Prime Minister has signed and which was despatched on the direct line to the White House during the weekend.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to Richard Mottram (MOD) and Michael Stark (Cabinet Office).


(Charles Powell)

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

(copy sent via co to Reagan) 34



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Prime Minister

London SW1A 2AH

I have rather amended the message. Agree to sign attached message?

31 October 1985

Dear Charles,

C.D.P. 'x. Yes no

Geneva Arms Control: New US Proposals

The Prime Minister will no doubt wish to send an early acknowledgement of President Reagan's message of 30 October about his new arms control proposals. I enclose a draft which has been approved by the Foreign Secretary.

And for gen.

The Administration's decision to table an early counter-proposal is very welcome and represents a victory for those in the State Department and NSC who had advocated doing this before the Summit on 19 November. We have been told that "skilfully applied pressures from Britain had been extremely helpful in getting the right result". But the inter-agency debate in Washington appears to have left unresolved the question of how to move forward the problem of defining the limits on permissible space research. The President has not therefore, at least at this stage, taken up the ideas which the Prime Minister suggested last week. The draft reply makes a reference to this.

US and Soviet spokesmen have already confirmed that the round is to be extended after 1 November. The White House spokesman has today announced that the President will write to Mr Gorbachev expanding on new proposals before they meet on 19-20 November, and indicated that the President had approved a new move at Geneva. Details of the US proposals will probably be published over the next few days. If so, the Foreign Secretary proposes that his spokesman should warmly welcome the tabling of further US proposals; confirm that we were consulted in advance; and say that we hope the Soviet Union will now seriously begin the process of give-and-take which will be necessary if agreement is to be reached: the US move is exactly what we had been advocating and makes US commitment and sincerity in the Geneva negotiations admirably clear in the run-up to the summit. The Prime Minister may herself wish to make an on the record comment along these lines (possibly in next Wednesday's speech in the House) in view of her discussion with the President last week.

FCO and MOD officials are preparing a detailed analysis and assessment of the US and Soviet proposals on the table in Geneva. I will let you have this in due course.

I am copying this letter to Richard Mottram and Michael Stark.

Yours ever,
Her Appleyard
(L V Appleyard)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street

T206/85 Draft



S E C R E T

Please type
for PM's signature

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

I was most grateful for your message of 31 October on the negotiations at Geneva. This advance notice was most valuable and a further example of the splendid way you have kept your allies in touch.

This is a most positive step, exactly on the lines we discussed last week. ~~I am sure~~ ^{very strong} it puts you in a ~~much better~~ position diplomatically and will have a favourable impact on public opinion in the West. It will have my full support and I ~~will~~ ^{shall} urge the Russians to follow it up. // You would not expect me to comment in detail on the proposals at this stage. But it may be helpful to give you a few initial impressions.

On offensive weapons, your determination to bring the Russians back to the strategic and INF definitions which they had previously accepted is absolutely right. ^{URS only on this basis} ~~This should enable the US~~ ^{but you can work} negotiations to work towards significant reductions that provide for equal limits on both sides.

In the INF context, your proposals ~~will~~ have implications for ~~management~~ of the deployment programme in Europe ^{these} which will need to be looked at in the appropriate NATO body.

On the space and defence side, ~~you have produced imaginative ideas which I hope may help to engage the Russians' attention.~~ ^(I hope these will) The ideas I left with you in New York last week might then find their place in following up this issue in your discussion with Mr Gorbachev.

^[insert new para. from over]
I ~~too~~ ^{very much} look forward to seeing you in Brussels on 21 November.

S E C R E T



// I've just had a talk about these issues with Kadar, the Hungarian Communist Party leader, who is here on a visit. He made three points:

- Gorbachev is sincere in wanting major reductions in nuclear weapons & is ready for substantive talks with you on this;
- what matters most to the Russians is broad equality with the US in nuclear strength;

- The Soviet Union will/keeps its own DDI, whatever the burden on the Soviet economy, if ~~there is no~~ ^{you and} permissible limits Gorbachev are unable to agree on limits on such work.

On balance, he was optimistic about the prospects for success. He understands that the Alliance is ~~is~~ fully behind your approach.