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US NAC BRIEFING ON SHULTZ'S MOSCOW TALKS

SUMMARY

1. SHULTZ'S MEETINGS IN MOSCOW INDICATE THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARING SERIOUSLY FOR THE GENEVA SUMMIT. CONCRETE AGREEMENTS ARE NOT RULED OUT. BUT THERE IS NO CLEAR SIGN THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE YET READY TO TAKE THE TOUGH DECISIONS NECESSARY TO GIVE SUBSTANCE TO THE SUMMIT.

DETAIL

2. AMBASSADORS NITZE AND MS RIDGEWAY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, BRIEFED THE COUNCIL THIS MORNING ON THE GENEVA ARMS CONTROL TALKS AND ON SHULTZ'S MEETINGS ON 4-5 NOVEMBER IN MOSCOW. THIS LATEST STAGE IN THE SUSTAINED US EFFORT TO KEEP ALLIANCE PARTNERS INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RUN-UP TO THE SUMMIT WAS WARMLY WELCOMED BY ALL PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES WHO SPOKE.

3. FOR NITZE'S OPENING BRIEFING ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL ISSUES SEE NIFT. MS RIDGEWAY FOLLOWED WITH OUR ACCOUNT OF THE NON-NUCLEAR TOPICS COVERED IN MOSCOW AND SUBSEQUENTLY FIELDDED QUESTIONS. THESE COVERED THE SOVIET RESPONSE ON REGIONAL ISSUES (CANADA, DENMARK, SPAIN); SOVIET PERSONALITIES AND ATMOSPHERE (NETHERLANDS, ITALY); HUMAN RIGHTS (DENMARK); CDE (NORWAY); AND THE PROSPECTS FOR THIS AND FUTURE SUMMITS (GERMANY, BELGIUM).

4. MS RIDGEWAY SAID THAT MR. SHULTZ HAD GONE TO MOSCOW AT SOVIET INVITATION. HE HAD SEEN SHEVARDNADZE FOR 8 HOURS ON 4 NOVEMBER, INCLUDING 1.1/2 HOURS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. ON 5 NOVEMBER HE HAD 4 HOURS WITH GORBACHEV IN THE MORNING AND NEARLY 3 HOURS THAT AFTERNOON WITH SHEVARDNADZE, INCLUDING A BRIEF TETE-A-TETE. GROMYO HAD NOT PARTICIPATED. WITH SHEVARDNADZE TALKS HAD BEEN 10 OR 11 A SIDE. APART FROM KWITSINSKY, SHEVARDNADZE HAD BEEN SURROUNDED BY SOVIET MFA EXPERTS ON THE US, INCLUDING DOBRYMIN. THE MEETING WITH GORBACHEV HAD BEEN 3 A SIDE (SHULTZ, MCFARLANE AND AMBASSADOR HARTMAN FOR THE US).

ATMOSPHERE

5. GORBACHEV WAS CLEARLY THE COMMANDING PRESENCE, SPEAKING WITH MORE AUTHORITY THAN SHEVARDNADZE. THERE HAD BEEN LIVELY GIVE AND TAKE WITH BOTH AND AN UNUSUAL DEGREE OF QUOTE CONCRETENESS UNQUOTE. EXCHANGES

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WITH GORBACHEV HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY QUOTE VIGOROUS UNQUOTE, CANDID AND FRANK. BUT SHEVARDNADZE HAD PROVED LESS IMPRESSIVE THAN ANTICIPATED, INDULGING IN SET PIECE STATEMENTS FOLLOWED BY EXCHANGES ON A POINT BY POINT BASIS. THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE QUOTE COLLEGIAL UNQUOTE NATURE OF THE SOVIET APPROACH, ALTHOUGH NEITHER GORBACHEV NOR SHEVARDNADZE APPEARED TO BE FULLY ABREAST OF ALL THE DETAILS: BOTH WERE EVIDENTLY STILL ON A LEARNING CURVE.

6. SHULTZ HAD BEEN INVITED TO OPEN ON 4 NOVEMBER AND HAD COVERED A FULL RANGE OF ISSUES, BEGINNING WITH ARMS CONTROL ON WHICH THE RUSSIANS HAD RESPONDED IN FAMILIAR QUOTE BLACK AND WHITE UNQUOTE TERMS. THE OTHER TOPICS BELOW ARE IN RIDGEWAY'S ORDER OF PRESENTATION.

NON PROLIFERATION

7. SHULTZ HAD NOTED A MEASURE OF US/SOVIET CO-OPERATION AT THE NPTRC. IT WAS AGREED THAT THIS SUBJECT COULD BE ADDRESSED AT THE SUMMIT.

CW

8. ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, SHULTZ HAD STRESSED THE DESIRABILITY OF A GLOBAL BAN AND HAD EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON THE BASIS OF THE US DRAFT TREATY. THE TWO SIDES HAD DISCUSSED THE DESIRABILITY OF PREVENTING CW PROLIFERATION AND WAYS OF ADDRESSING THIS QUESTION FURTHER.

CDE

9. SHULTZ HAD CONFIRMED THAT REAGAN'S DUBLIN SPEECH OFFER ON NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF) STILL STOOD. A FORMULATION ON NUF WAS POSSIBLE IF THE RUSSIANS WERE PREPARED TO AGREE TO CONCRETE SBMS. NEITHER RIDGEWAY NOR MITZE COULD RECALL ANY SPECIFIC SOVIET RESPONSE ON THE SUBSTANCE. HOWEVER, RIDGEWAY COMMENTED THAT THERE WAS SOME INDICATION THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO DISCUSS A CDE CONCLUDING FORMULA.

MBFR

10. SHULTZ HAD STRESSED THE US COMMITMENT TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS: THE US WAS CONTINUING TO STUDY THE EAST'S FEBRUARY 1985 PROPOSALS. HE HAD ALSO INDICATED THAT THE WEST WAS CONSULTING ON WAYS TO MOVE THE TALKS FORWARD.

HUMAN RIGHTS

11. SHULTZ HAD EMPHASISED THE IMPORTANCE OF SOVIET MOVEMENT BEFORE THE SUMMIT AND HAD RAISED SPECIFIC CASES. SHEVARDNADZE HAD RESPONDED IN STANDARD TERMS, OCCASIONALLY WITH CONSIDERABLE FEELING. BUT HE HAD SAID THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD CONSIDER THE CASES RAISED. RIDGEWAY COMMENTED THAT WHILE MRS BONNER'S LIKELY DEPARTURE MIGHT BE SEEN AS A SOVIET GESTURE IT WAS MEAGRE RECOMPENSE FOR YEARS OF WESTERN PRESSURE AND THERE WAS STILL NO INDICATION THAT SHE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO THE SOVIET UNION. IN SUM, NEITHER GORBACHEV NOR SHEVARDNADZE HAD GIVEN ANY HINT OF DRAMATIC SOVIET MOVES BEFORE THE SUMMIT.

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BILATERAL

BILATERAL ISSUES

12. A NUMBER OF BILATERAL ISSUES HAD BEEN DISCUSSED INCLUDING A CULTURAL AGREEMENT, AVIATION QUESTIONS, THE ESTABLISHMENT, NEW CONSULATES AND A VARIETY OF NEW IDEAS ON QUOTE PEOPLE TO PEOPLE UNQUOTE CONTACTS.

REGIONAL ISSUES

13. SHULTZ HAD ASKED IF THE RUSSIANS WANTED TO REGULARISE THE BILATERAL REGIONAL EXPERTS MEETINGS WHICH HAD ALREADY TAKEN PLACE, LISTING THE AREAS ALREADY COVERED AND IMPLYING THAT THEY SHOULD BE REPEATED IN THE SAME ORDER. THE TWO SIDES HAD ALSO DISCUSSED REAGAN'S REGIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROPOSALS (THE UNGA SPEECH). THE SOVIET RESPONSE HAD BEEN QUOTE MINIMAL UNQUOTE ESPECIALLY ON THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS ALTHOUGH THERE HAD BEEN INDICATIONS THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE INTERESTED IN PURSUING THE IDEA OF REGULARISING THE EXPERT TALKS. BUT THEY HAD REFRAINED FROM MENTIONING SPECIFIC REGIONS DESERVING JOINT CONSIDERATION AND THERE WERE CONSEQUENTLY NO QUOTE TEA LEAVES UNQUOTE TO BE READ ON THEIR OVERALL APPROACH, INCLUDING THAT TO THE MIDDLE EAST. THE US WOULD CERTAINLY, HOWEVER, BE RAISING REGIONAL ISSUES AGAIN AT THE SUMMIT AND IT WAS HARD TO IMAGINE THAT GORBACHEV WOULD AGAIN PROVE SO RETICENT.

TERRORISM

14. SHULTZ HAD ALSO RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF CO-OPERATION ON COMBATTING TERRORISM. AS IN NEW YORK, THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN NON-COMMITTAL.

FUTURE SUMMITS

15. RIDGEWAY WAS ASKED WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY AGREEMENT ON HOLDING FUTURE SUMMITS. SHE REPLIED THAT THE TWO SIDES HAD AGREED THAT THE QUESTION WAS A VALID ONE BUT NO DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN. THE OUTCOME OF THE SUMMIT WOULD DETERMINE WHETHER THEY WOULD BE, AND THEIR NATURE, BUT THE US HOPED THAT AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE COULD BE AGREED IN GENEVA, THUS IMPLYING THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER SUMMITS.

SUMMIT AGENDA/FINAL DOCUMENT

16. THE AMERICANS HAD NOT TRIED TO WORK OUT A PRECISE SUMMIT AGENDA. THERE WAS NOW, HOWEVER, BROAD AGREEMENT ON THE FOUR US CATEGORIES FOR DISCUSSION, ARMS CONTROL, REGIONAL ISSUES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND BILATERAL ISSUES, WHICH HAD GRADUALLY EMERGED OUT OF THE SIFTING PROCESS INITIATED BY SHULTZ AND SHEVARNADZE AT HELSINKI. THERE WAS ALSO A SENSE OF HOW THE FLOW OF DIALOGUE AND EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN REAGAN AND GORBACHEV WOULD GO. PERIODS OF TIME WHICH MIGHT BE ALLOTTED TO EACH SUBJECT HAD BEEN TENTATIVELY PROPOSED, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE FOR THE TWO LEADERS TO MAKE FINAL DECISIONS.

17. THE RUSSIANS HAD ALSO SHOWN SOME INITIAL INTEREST IN A FINAL SUMMIT DOCUMENT, THE US COUNTERING THAT AGREEMENT ON THIS WOULD DEPEND ON THE DEGREE TO WHICH IT WOULD EMBODY SUBSTANCE. THE TWO SIDES HAD, NEVERTHELESS, EXCHANGED IDEAS ABOUT, AND LISTS OF ITEMS

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FOR INCLUSION IN, POSSIBLE DOCUMENTS. THE QUOTE IDEAS UNQUOTE INCLUDED THE PREPARATION OF SEPARATE DOCUMENTS, A COMMUNIQUE, OR A SIMPLE STATEMENT RECORDING THE FACT OF THE MEETING. WHAT FINALLY EMERGED WOULD DERIVE FROM THE SUMMIT ITSELF BUT CURRENT US THINKING WAS THAT A JOINT COMMUNIQUE WOULD CONTRIBUTE LITTLE TO THE QUOTE FORWARD LOOKING RELATIONS UNQUOTE THEY SOUGHT IF IT DID NO MORE THAN RECORD DEEP AND FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES.

CONCLUSION

18. RIDGEWAY SUMMED UP AS IN PARA 1: THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT RULED OUT AGREEMENTS ON NON-NUCLEAR ISSUES. MOREOVER, SHEVARDNADZE'S PRESENTATION AT THE FINAL SESSION HAD BEEN QUOTE UPBEAT UNQUOTE. THIS SUGGESTED THAT THE RUSSIANS DID NOT WANT TO SEE THE SUMMIT FAIL. THE AMERICANS WERE FOR THEIR PART DETERMINED TO WORK HARD FOR RESULTS. THEIR JUDGEMENT OF THE OUTCOME WOULD BE BASED NOT ON THE DOCUMENTS WHICH EMERGED BUT ON THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE SUMMIT LAYED DOWN A FIRM BASIS FOR FUTURE PROGRESS AND BETTER UNDERSTANDING.

18. SEE MY LFT.

PH/KE

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EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

LIMITED

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DEFENCE D	PS/LADY YOUNG
RESEARCH D	PS/MR RIFKIND
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EED	PS/PUS
NAD	MR DEREK THOMAS
WED	SIR W HARDING
ACDD	MR FERGUSSON
CRD	MR GOODALL
FED	MR SAMUEL
NED	MR DAUNT
PUSD	MR DAVID THOMAS
	MR LONG

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TO DESKBY 061730Z FCO

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AND TO IMMEDIATE MODUK (FOR DACU AND DNPS)

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN MOSCOW

INFO ROUTINE OTHER NATO AND EASTERN EUROPEAN POSTS, UKMIS NEW YORK

INFO ROUTINE UKDEL VIENNA

MPT: US NAC BRIEFING ON SHULTZ'S MOSCOW TALKS: NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL

SUMMARY

1. NITZE UPDATED THE COUNCIL ON PROGRESS IN GENEVA AND REVIEWED SHULTZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW: THE US GENEVA TEAM WOULD RETURN DIRECTLY TO WASHINGTON AFTER TOMORROW'S FINAL PLENARY. THE US SIDE HAD SET THEIR QUOTE COUNTER COUNTER UNQUOTE PROPOSALS IN FULL BUT THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT ELABORATED ON THEIRS. THERE HAD BEEN QUOTE VIGOROUS UNQUOTE EXCHANGES IN MOSCOW BUT US/SOVIET POSITIONS ON SPACE AND DEFENCE, DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC FORCES, AND THIRD COUNTRY FORCES, REMAINED FAR APART.

DETAIL

2. IN REVIEWING EVENTS IN GENEVA, NITZE SAID THE SOVIET SIDE HAD ADDED LITTLE CLARIFICATION SINCE HIS REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON 9 OCTOBER. THE SOVIET PROPOSALS HAD BEEN FLAWED AND SELF-SERVING, BUT THE PRESIDENT REMAINED COMMITTED TO THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS AND HAD CONSEQUENTLY DIRECTED THAT ADDITIONAL US PROPOSALS BE ADVANCED TO ADD MOMENTUM. THESE HAD BEEN SUMMARISED IN THE PLENARY SESSION ON 1 NOVEMBER AND DISCUSSED IN MORE DETAIL IN SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS OF THE 3 GROUPS.

3. NITZE WENT ON TO DESCRIBE THE NEW US PROPOSALS WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN COMMUNICATED TO ALLIED HEADS OF GOVERNMENT (YOUR TELNO 1744 OF 1 NOVEMBER NOT REPEATED TO ALL). IN THE STRATEGIC FIELD HE STRESSED, IN PARTICULAR, THAT THE US COULD NOT ACCEPT AN AGGREGATION OF STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND REENTRY VEHICLES WHICH FAILED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN BALLISTIC MISSILES AND AIRCRAFT OR CRUISE MISSILES. NOR COULD THEY ACCEPT THE EQUATION OF GRAVITY BOMBS AND SRAMS WITH OTHER TYPES OF STRATEGIC WARHEADS. ON INF HE CONFIRMED THAT THE US WOULD SEEK AN EQUAL GLOBAL LIMIT ALTHOUGH THE US HAD NO CURRENT PLANS TO DEPLOY LRINF IN THE FAR EAST. THE US PROPOSAL FOR PROPORTIONATE REDUCTIONS IN THE FAR EAST, AS OPPOSED TO A QUOTE FREEZE UNQUOTE ON SOVIET DEPLOYMENT, HAD DRAWN A SHARP RESPONSE FROM KVITSINSKY.

4. FOR THEIR PART, THE SOVIET SIDE HAD ADHERED TO FAMILIAR POSITIONS. NOTHING WOULD BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT A BAN ON QUOTE SPACE STRIKE WEAPONS UNQUOTE AND A US DECISION TO ABANDON

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EXTRA.

EXTRA-LABORATORY WORK ON THE CREATION OF SUCH WEAPONS. THEY CONTINUED TO DEMAND FULL COMPENSATION FOR BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES, AND TO INSIST ON THEIR DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS I.E. WEAPONS CAPABLE OF STRIKING THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER PARTY. THE US HAD MADE CLEAR THEIR COMPLETE DISAGREEMENT WITH THIS DEFINITION BECAUSE IT FAILED TO LIMIT SOVIET FORCES CONSTITUTING A THREAT TO US FORCES DEFENDING EUROPE AND ALLIED FORCES THERE. ALTHOUGH NITZE FELT THEY HAD GOT THE BETTER OF THE ARGUMENT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE TWO SIDES WERE ANY CLOSER TO RESOLVING THIS FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE OF VIEW.

5. IN RESPONSE TO A RANGE OF QUESTIONS NITZE ALSO PROVIDED SOME CLARIFICATION OF THE NEW US PROPOSALS:

A) THE 50 PER CENT REDUCTION IN BALLISTIC MISSILE THROW WEIGHT WOULD APPLY TO THE AGGREGATE OF FORCES IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THE REDUCTION WOULD BE SPREAD BETWEEN LIGHT AND HEAVY REENTRY VEHICLES. IT LATER EMERGED THAT THE RELEVANT REDUCTION WOULD BE 50 PER CENT OF THE CURRENT SOVIET AGGREGATE, I.E., FROM ABOUT 6,000 TO 3,000 KG.

B) BOTH SIDES WOULD BE FREE TO HAVE MORE THAN 3,000 SLBM WARHEADS, BUT NOT MORE THAN THAT NUMBER OF ICBM WARHEADS.

C) ALL MOBILE ICBMS WOULD BE BANNED (NOT JUST NEW ONES) AND THERE WOULD BE NO NEW HEAVY ICBMS, INCLUDING MODERNISED SS18S.

D) THE PROPOSAL TO CAP US LRMF LAUNCHERS IN EUROPE AT 140 DID NOT IMPLY THAT THE MIX OF GLCM AND P2 COULD NOT BE CHANGED AND THE WARHEAD TOTAL CONSEQUENTLY INCREASED. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD SHOWN NO INTEREST IN THE SUGGESTION THAT WARHEAD TOTALS ON BOTH SIDES COULD BE REDUCED BELOW 420.

6. SUMMARISING, NITZE SAID HE COULD NOT PUT HIS FINGER ON ANY PARTICULAR AREAS OF CONVERGENCE IN THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD BUT THE QUOTE UPBEAT TONE UNQUOTE OF SHEVARDNADZE'S FINAL PRESENTATION SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE DID NOT WISH TO SEE A FAILURE AT THE SUMMIT.

PIKE

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

LIMITED

ACDD

DEFENCE D

SOVIET D

NEWS D

NAD

EED

WED

PLANNING STAFF

RES D

INFO D

FUSD

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RIFKIND

PS/MR RENTON

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