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FM MOSCOW

TO DESKBY 061700Z FCO

TELNO 1469

OF 061556Z NOVEMBER 85

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN

INFO IMMEDIATE UKDEL NATO

MY TELNO 1467.

A more down-beat
report. Hartman was
present, but is also a
rather pessimistic fellow.
CDP

MF

SECRETARY SHULTZ IN MOSCOW - 4/5 NOVEMBER: SUMMIT PROSPECTS

1. MY US COLLEAGUE TODAY GAVE ME AND THE FRG AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF SHULTZ'S DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW WITH GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE. AS SHULTZ WILL NOT HIMSELF HAVE YET HAD TIME TO REPORT PERSONALLY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN, HARTMAN URGED WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS THAT HIS CONFIDENCE SHOULD BE RESPECTED: I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THIS TELEGRAM COULD BE HANDLED ACCORDINGLY.

SHEVARDNADZE

2. AT THEIR MEETING ON 4 NOVEMBER, SHEVARDNADZE WAS NOTABLY RELUCTANT TO MAKE THE RUNNING AND PASSED THE LEAD TO SHULTZ BY ASKING FOR A FULL EXPOSITION OF THE US POSITION ON ALL ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. SHULTZ OBLIGED WITH A SUBSTANTIAL PRESENTATION OF BOTH PHILOSOPHY AND DETAILED CONTENT, COVERING NOT ONLY NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ALL CATEGORIES BUT ALSO CW, MBFR AND CDE. THE US TEAM HAD COME ARMED WITH A DRAFT 'COMMUNIQUE', NOT WITH ANY INTENTION OF AGREEING SUCH A DOCUMENT BUT FOR USE AS A QUARRY FROM WHICH TO COMPARE US AND SOVIET FORMULATIONS. A WORKING GROUP OF THREE OFFICIALS FROM EACH SIDE WENT THROUGH THE DOCUMENT TO IDENTIFY POSSIBLE POINTS OF AGREEMENT BUT ACHIEVED ONLY MEAGRE RESULTS: A POSSIBLE STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT ON CULTURAL EXCHANGES (ALTHOUGH SIGNIFICANT DIFFICULTIES STILL REMAIN), . ALTHOUGH SHEVARDNADZE REPEATEDLY URGED THE DESIRABILITY OF SOME KIND OF FINAL DOCUMENT FOR THE SUMMIT, IT WAS CLEAR AT THE END OF THE MEETING THAT THE MATERIAL FOR ONE SIMPLY DOES NOT EXIST - AND PRESIDENT REAGAN IS IN ANY CASE OPPOSED TO SUCH DOCUMENTS IN PRINCIPLE. THE SESSION WITH SHEVARDNADZE WAS THEREFORE UNPRODUCTIVE: HARTMAN DESCRIBED IT AS A 'POTEMKIN' MEETING, SET UP FOR APPEARANCE'S SAKE ONLY, AS A PRELUDE TO THE KEY DISCUSSION WITH GORBACHEV.

GORBACHEV

3. IN A DISCUSSION LIMITED TO THREE ASIDE (GORBACHEV, SHEVARDNADZE, DOBRYNIN: SHULTZ, MACFARLANE, HARTMAN) WHICH LASTED FOR FOR FOUR HOURS, GORBACHEV ADOPTED HIS TOUGHEST TONE,

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WHILE NOT EXCEEDING THE BOUNDS OF COURTESY. HE BLAMED THE UNITED STATES FOR EVERY ASPECT OF THE DETERIORATION IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND PARTICULARLY FOR THE LACK OF PROGRESS AT GENEVA: THE VILLAIN ON ALL COUNTS WAS THE ABSURD US ASPIRATION TO PUT OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN SPACE. HE ACCUSED THE US OF AIMING AT MILITARY SUPERIORITY AND OF HARBOURING ILLUSIONS ABOUT SUPPOSED SOVIET WEAKNESS AND THE VULNERABILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION TO PRESSURE. GORBACHEV REVEALED AN EXTRAORDINARY IGNORANCE OF WESTERN REALITIES AND A DEPRESSING ATTACHMENT TO MARXIST-LENINIST SHIBBOLETHS: THE US AND OTHER CAPITALIST SOCIETIES WERE ENDEAVOURING TO ESCAPE FROM THEIR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS BY ACCELERATING THE ARMS RACE, SPURRED ON BY THE GREED AND AMBITIONS OF THE MILITARY/INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX. HE QUOTED FREQUENTLY FROM THE HOOVER INSTITUTE PAPER "AMERICA IN THE 80S", CLAIMING THAT ALL ITS PROPHECIES OF REDUCED SOCIAL EXPENDITURE, SWOLLEN MILITARY CAPACITY AND A CRUSADE AGAINST COMMUNISM HAD BEEN FULFILLED IN THE EVENT. HE CLAIMED, BY CONTRAST, THAT THE RECENT SERIES OF SOVIET ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS, PARTICULARLY THOSE FOR RADICAL CUTS IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS, HAD GIVEN RISE TO PROBLEMS WITH THE SOVIET MILITARY WHICH HAD NEVERTHELESS BEEN OVERCOME.

4. GORBACHEV REPEATEDLY INTERRUPTED THE INTERPRETER, WITH THE RESULT THAT MANY OF SHULTZ'S REJOINDERS WERE NEVER TRANSLATED. HE CONDUCTED THE DIALOGUE LIKE A TRIAL LAWYER, POUNCING ON WHAT HE SAW AS WEAK POINTS IN HIS OPPONENT'S ARGUMENT WITHOUT WAITING FOR THE END OF THE STATEMENT. SHULTZ ATTEMPTED TO EXPLAIN THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF THE US APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL AND PARTICULARLY THE US VIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WEAPONS: THIS MADE NO IMPRESSION ON GORBACHEV: WHO QUOTED PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S REMARK TO THE EFFECT THAT "HE WHO CONTROLS SPACE CONTROLS THE EARTH". VIRTUALLY THE ENTIRE DISCUSSION WAS DEVOTED TO ARMS CONTROL. SHULTZ'S ATTEMPT TO DESCRIBE THE ROOTS OF US CONCERN WITH HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES CUT NO ICE, AND GORBACHEV BRUSHED ASIDE REFERENCES TO REGIONAL PROBLEMS BY ACCUSING THE US OF SEEING THE SOVIET HAND IN EVERY THIRD WORLD PROBLEM: THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT ACCEPT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROPOSALS ON REGIONAL ISSUES SINCE THEY WERE DESIGNED TO PUT THE SOVIET UNION IN THE DOCK.

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CONCLUSION

5. HARTMAN'S OWN CONCLUSIONS FROM SHULTZ'S MEETINGS HERE IS THAT THEY HAVE ADVANCED THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE SUMMIT VERY LITTLE, IF AT ALL. SHULTZ HIMSELF APPARENTLY TAKES A LESS PESSIMISTIC VIEW AND STILL BELIEVES THAT IT MAY BE ALL RIGHT ON THE NIGHT. HARTMAN ACCEPTS THAT GORBACHEV'S AGGRESSIVE APPROACH AND HIS NOTABLY HISTRIONIC PERFORMANCE WERE PROBABLY DESIGNED TO IMPRESS SHULTZ WITH THE MESSAGE THAT UNLESS PRESIDENT REAGAN IS PREPARED TO RETREAT ON THE SDI, THERE CAN BE NO SIGNIFICANT AGREEMENT AT THE SUMMIT. GORBACHEV, FOR HIS PART, COMMENTED AT THE END OF THE MEETING THAT IF AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE REACHED IN GENEVA, THERE WOULD STILL BE A US/SOVIET RELATIONSHIP, BUT NOT A VERY GOOD ONE.

CARTLEDGE

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

LIMITED PS
ACDD PS/LADY YOUNG
DEFENCE D PS/MR RIFKIND
SOVIET D PS/MR RENTON
NEWS D PS/PUS
HAD MR DEREK THOMAS
EED MR GOODALL
WED MR SAMUEL
PLANNING STAFF MR DAUNT
RES D MR DAVID THOMAS
INFO D MR BRAITHWAITE
PUSD MR O'NEILL

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION ARMS CONTROL TALKS

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