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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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Press

20.11.85

*EWJ.*

*Dear Charles,*

Prime Minister's Visit to Brussels, 21 November: President Reagan's Briefing of the NAC

In preparation for the Prime Minister's visit to Brussels on 21 November, I enclose a provisional brief. This will be updated as necessary, in the light of the outcome of the Summit.

I enclose a list of possible participants from other countries in the NAC meeting, and the programme. We suggest that the three delegates at the meeting should be Sir John Graham, yourself plus me to take the note.

We expect that the Prime Minister will not wish to make an official statement on the summit until after the President has briefed Alliance leaders. The US are concerned in any event about critical comment by Allies leaders, especially before the President has briefed Congress and the US public on the evening of 21 November. We suggest that in her immediate, post-NAC comment the Prime Minister might welcome the briefing; congratulate the President on his handling of the Summit; emphasize that the meeting was only one step (perhaps encouraging) in a long haul; and welcome the impetus it has given towards a sounder US-Soviet relationship and progress in arms control. Clearly the detailed line will need to be brought up to date after the briefing itself.

*Yours ever,*

*Le Appleyard*

(L V Appleyard)  
Private Secretary


C D Powell Esq  
10 Downing Street

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PRESIDENT REAGAN'S BRIEFING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL: 21  
NOVEMBER 1985

[List of Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers attending (other than UK and US)]

<u>Country</u>	Head of Government	Foreign Minister
Belgium	Wilfred Martens	Leo Tindemans
Canada	Brian Mulroney	Joe Clark
Denmark	Paul Schluter	Uffe Elleman-Jensen
France	-	Roland Dumas
Germany	Helmut Kohl	Hans Dietrich Genscher
Greece	Yannis Haralambopoulos (Deputy PM)	-
Iceland	Steingrimur Hermansson(?)	Geir Hallgrimsson
Italy	Bettino Craxi	Giulio Andreotti
Luxembourg	Jacques Santer	Jacques Poos
Netherlands	Ruud Lubbers	Hans van den Broek
Norway	Kare Willoch	Svenn Stray
Portugal	Kavaco Silva	Pedro Pires Miranda
Spain	Felipe Gonzales(?)	Fernandez Ordonez(?)
Turkey	Turgut Ozal	Vahit Halefoglou







BELGIUM: M. W. MARTENS, Premier Ministre  
M. L. TINDEMANS, Ministre des Relations Extérieures

CANADA: The Rt.Hon. B. MULRONEY, Prime Minister, Head of Delegation  
The Rt.Hon. J. CLARK, Secretary of State for External Affairs

DENMARK: Mr. P. SCHLÜTER, Prime Minister  
Mr. U. ELLEMAN-JENSEN, Minister of Foreign Affairs

FRANCE M. R. DUMAS, Ministre des Relations Extérieures  
M. C. ARNAUD, Ambassadeur de France, Conseiller du Ministre

GERMANY: Dr. H. KOHL, Federal Chancellor  
Mr. H.-D. GENSCHER, Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs

GREECE: S.E.M. Y. HARALAMBOPOULOS, Vice Président du Conseil des Ministres,  
de la République Hellénique  
M. St. VASSILICOS, Ambassadeur, Représentant Permanent

ICELAND: H.E. S. HERMANNSSON, Prime Minister  
H.E. G. HALLGRÍMSSON, Minister for Foreign Affairs

ITALY: On. B. CRAXI, Président du Conseil des Ministres  
On. G. ANDREOTTI, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères

LUXEMBOURG. M. J. SANTER, Président du Gouvernement, Ministre d'Etat  
M. J.F. POOS, Vice-Président du Gouvernement, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères

NETHERLANDS: H.E. Mr. R.F.M. LUBBERS, Prime Minister  
H.E. Mr. H. VAN DEN BROEK, Minister for Foreign Affairs

NORWAY: H.E. K. WILLOCH, Prime Minister  
H.E. S. STRAY, Minister of Foreign Affairs

PORTUGAL S.E. Prof. A. CAVACO SILVA, Premier Ministre  
S.E. M. P. PIRES DE MIRANDA, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères

SPAIN: S.E.M. F. FERNANDEZ-ORDONEZ, Ministre des Affaires Extérieures  
S.E.M. J. DE OJEDA, Représentant Permanent

TURKEY: S.E.M. T. ÖZAL, Premier Ministre  
S.E.M. V. HALEFOGLU, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères

UNITED KINGDOM: The Rt.Hon. Mrs. M. THATCHER, Prime Minister  
The Rt.Hon. Sir Geoffrey HOWE, Secretary of State for Foreign and  
Commonwealth Affairs

UNITED STATES: President R. REAGAN  
The Honorable George C. SHULTZ, Secretary of State





PRESIDENT REAGAN'S BRIEFING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL:  
21 NOVEMBER 1985 PROGRAMME

(all times local)

- 1300 Prime Minister and party depart London Heathrow  
(South Side)
- 1510 Arrive Brussels Abelag. Met by Sir J Graham
- 1515 Party leave airport
- 1525 Party arrive NATO HQ and go to UK Delegation offices
- 1540 Delegates (other than principals) go to conference  
room
- 1545 Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and Sir J Graham  
go to foyer outside conference room
- [1600] President Reagan arrives. "Family Portrait".
- 1615 Special Council Meeting begins
- 1745 Special Council Meeting ends  
President Reagan leaves
- 1755 Prime Minister and party leave NATO HQ
- 1805 Prime Minister and party depart Brussels airport
- 1815 Arrive London Heathrow
- 2000 Press Conference at No 12 Downing Street



PRESIDENT REAGAN'S BRIEFING OF THE NAC, 21 NOVEMBER 1985:  
PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT

Your Objective

- To underline Allied unity behind the US position.
- To encourage the US to press ahead in the Geneva negotiations.
- ✓ (if appropriate) To emphasize need to maintain existing arms control regime (SALT-ABM Treaty).
- (if appropriate) To welcome progress made on regional issues and human rights.

Arguments

- Congratulate President on handling of difficult negotiations. Welcome consultations.
- ✓ Allied cohesion essential. Already extracted Soviet counter-proposals before Summit. Now greater need to stick together.
- Right to have engaged Gorbachev across whole agenda of East-West relations. Useful to have shown that non-arms control issues not gratuitous irritants introduced by US; influence wider Western perception of Soviet behaviour.
- (if appropriate) Welcome impulse given to arms control negotiations, and progress in other areas. [Regional] Right to show Soviet behaviour in Third World will not be overlooked, whatever progress on arms control. [Human Rights] Valuable to have raised.
- Need to maintain existing arms control regime viz. SALT-ABM Treaty (Annex A).
- (if appropriate) Welcome agreement on further meeting(s). Hope can build on this prospect.

Tactical Arguments

- Summit first step in long process. Should not under-sell results. Maintain impetus, without creating unrealistic expectations of results.
- Important West continue to hold high ground on arms control. Ensure we keep the initiative. Unhelpful to cast doubt on agreed Allied positions on existing arms control regime.

President Reagan's Objectives

- To secure public Allied endorsement of US handling of Summit; and continued Allied support for US approach to negotiations with Soviet Union.

/Media



Media

US Government concerned to avoid detailed Allied comment before President Reagan briefs Congress late on 21 November, and any subsequent Allied criticism about outcome. Lord Carrington will make short factual statement. Allies should agree to express:

- appreciation for US briefing;
- broad support for US approach to, and handling, of summit (on lines of October NPG Ministerial communique (Annex B)).



BACKGROUND

1. A summary of current US and Soviet proposals is at Annex C.
2. In arms control terms, the degree to which the Summit can be judged a success depends upon the amount of agreement on the following points, in ascending order of importance:
  - i) to meet again at an unspecified time;
  - ii) to urge the need for progress at Geneva;
  - iii) to hold another summit in 9 months/1 year;
  - iv) to issue more precise guidelines to the Geneva negotiator (perhaps incorporating a range of numbers for reductions) for pursuing their work;
  - v) to seek to have this completed by the next meeting;
  - vi) to agree to preserve the SALT constraints;
  - vii) to reaffirm the ABM Treaty;
  - viii) to agree on the need for mutually acceptable clarifications of ambiguities in the Treaty;
  - ix) to extend to 5 years the notice period for withdrawal from the Treaty;
  - x) to explore possible limitations on anti-Satellite systems (ASATs).

Anything beyond (iii) above would produce a qualified success for the Summit; it is most unlikely that the two leaders could get as far as (ix). A mere agreement to meet again, even at an unspecified date, would have to rank as a qualified failure.

3. The key issue will be the extent to which President Reagan is prepared to accept what will in practice increasingly become constraints on the strategic defence research programme of the US, while being able to represent it as in principle unconstrained. If this is to happen, Mr Gorbachev will have to offer the President some real concessions over offensive arms (particularly in START). And for this in turn to happen, Mr Gorbachev will have to take the view that the short-term advantage of resisting any movement towards compromise, and of hoping over the next year to draw on Western disappointment with the result of this Summit, is outweighed by the strategic problems he faces over the next decade: the twin prospects of unconstrained US modernisation of offensive forces, and of an unconstrained SDI building an unstoppable momentum; of a future US Administration no less easy to handle than the present; and of the growing internal problems of the Soviet economy. If Mr Gorbachev returns the ball, which is now in his court,

/it will



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it will be an indication of where over the next few years his priorities and concerns are likely to lie.

4. The Soviet Union will continue trying to exploit potential divisions within the West, and in Washington. The latest example of the latter is the leak on 17 November of a letter from Mr Weinberger to the President arguing against any US commitment at the Summit to maintain the SALT constraints; to any restraints on SDI research, development and testing; and to any formula which glosses over Soviet arms control violations.

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EXTRACT FROM SPEECH GIVEN BY PRIME MINISTER AT THE LORD MAYOR'S  
BANQUET, GUILDHALL, ON MONDAY, 11 NOVEMBER 1985

"My hopes for the Geneva meeting are therefore :

- That it will establish a better basis of confidence between the United States and the Soviet Union;
- That it will give an impetus to negotiations on substantial reductions in nuclear weapons;
- That it will strengthen existing arms control agreements;
- That it will lead to a better understanding on the goals of their SDI research programmes and on the constraints which will be observed in developing them.

I believe this would be a realistic outcome."

EXTRACT FROM SPEECH GIVEN BY PRIME MINISTER AT THE DEBATE  
ON THE ADDRESS ON 6 NOVEMBER 1985

"Indeed, I believe that a reaffirmation and strengthening of the ABM Treaty would be a positive and commendable outcome of the summit."



EXTRACT FROM NPG MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE, 30 OCTOBER 1985

"We declare that the President goes to Geneva with the full support and solidarity of the Alliance ... We welcome the opportunity for effective arms control offered by the Geneva negotiations now underway. We expressed strong support for US positions concerning intermediate, strategic, and defence and spaces systems. We (stressed) that close consultation among the Alliance partners remains essential. We hope that the recent Soviet counter-proposals, despite their one-sided and self-serving nature, indicate a Soviet willingness to accept verifiable and equitable arms control agreements involving deep reductions in numbers of nuclear weapons. We stressed the flexibility contained in the US proposals for significant reductions, which have been on the table since the opening of the negotiations".



ANNEX: US AND USSR POSITIONS ON ARMS CONTROL (TAKING INTO ACCOUNT PROPOSALS TABLED AT GENEVA SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1985)

## US PROPOSALS/VIEW

1. Linkage

Accept that three issues - space/defence; START; INF - to be resolved "in inter-relationship" (Shultz/Gromyko communique). But progress in one area not to be held hostage to progress in another. Separate agreements in each not to be excluded if desirable/necessary

2. Nuclear Arms Control

START (31 October)  
Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs)

- limits on ICBM/SLBM 1250-1450
 

Bombers	350
Total SNDVs	1800
- but no agreement to single limit on both ballistic missiles and bombers
- ban "new" heavy ICBMs and mobile ICBMs
- reiteration of "build down" proposal to assure prompt reductions

Strategic Warheads

- reduce warheads on all ballistic missiles to 4500 of which 3000 on ICBM

## SOVIET PROPOSALS/VIEW

Still insist on all issues, but especially space/START, to be resolved in inter-relationship. No progress on START if SDI continues unchecked. But prepared to de-link INF basket from other two.

All offensive nuclear weapons (30 September/1 October 1985)

Delivery Vehicles

- 50 per cent reduction in each side's "strategic" systems, ie those capable of striking the other's territory. Includes: ICBM, SLBM and bombers on each side. Plus US medium range aircraft and missiles (including GLCM) and carrier-based aircraft. But excluding comparable Soviet systems - eg SS20 and medium range aircraft.
- Reductions would result in:
 

1680 US delivery vehicles
1250 Soviet delivery vehicles



## US PROPOSALS

- ALCM limit of 1500
- But no single aggregate limit on ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs.
- SLCM: not covered in proposals

- Gravity bombs/SRAMs: not covered in proposals

Throw-weight

- 50 per cent cut in maximum ballistic missile throw-weight

## SOVIET PROPOSALS

- PERSHING II: no deployment permitted whether considered in INF or strategic category
- A ban on all long-range cruise missiles. (But see INF below for GLCM)
- A ban on all new types of delivery systems defined as those not flight tested on an agreed date.

"Nuclear charges"

- Maximum aggregate of 6000 "nuclear charges" on each side ie including gravity bombs and short range attack missiles (SRAMs), as well as ballistic missile warheads
- 60 per cent maximum of total weapons permitted on any one leg of the triad.
- Throwweight: no proposal
- Freeze US and Soviet medium range systems, followed by deepest possible reductions
- No deployment of nuclear arms in states where none currently exists
- No increase in stockpile, or replacement with new weapons, in those countries where weapons already deployed
- As confidence building measure, remove from combat alert and dismantle agreed number of nuclear systems, including 200-300 ICBM



US PROPOSALS

INF (31 October)

- Previous US proposals remain on table: zero/zero outcome remains ultimate objective
- But interim proposals as follows:
  - cap on US LRINF missiles in Europe of 140 launchers (31 December 1985) level)
  - USSR to reduce SS20s in range of Europe to 140 launchers
  - US to have freedom to mix between GLCM and PII but mix subject to discussion
  - proportional reductions of Soviet SS20s in Asia
  - resulting in equal global limits on LRINF missile warheads
- collateral constraints on SRINF systems
- discussion of constraints on aircraft

SOVIET PROPOSALS

INF (tabled informally 14 October)

- US to freeze its INF deployments as of 1 December 1985
- USSR to continue moratorium declared on 7 April
- As interim measure, US reductions over following 18 months to 100-120 GLCMs; and
- Soviet reductions in Europe to level of US GLCM warheads plus the level of UK/French warheads
- Final outcome would be no US GLCM deployments, and Soviet forces to equal UK/French levels
- SOVIET LRINF warheads in Asia to be frozen



US PROPOSALS

Duration of nuclear arms control agreement: not specified

3. Space/Defence Proposals

Want in-depth discussion (but not at this stage negotiation) of offensive/defensive relationship, focussing on greater role for defensive systems. Not ready for any constraints on SDI research.

- Envisage "open labs" ie, exchange of information/visits on respective research projects.

- Krasnoyarsk LPAR: violation of ABM Treaty

4. BMD Research

(a) SDI research programme designed to establish if greater stability achievable by more defences. Consistent with ABM Treaty, and other obligations. Commitment to discuss with Allies steps beyond research and negotiate with Russians on deployments. But no Soviet veto.

(b) Russians carry out extensive BMD research.

SOVIET PROPOSALS

Duration: not specified. Soviet willingness to extend observance of SALF II limits until end 1986.

Want ban on "space-strike" weapons defined as weapons based in space or air and capable of striking objects in space (ie omitting systems). Permit laboratory research, but insist on "traditional" ABM Treaty limits on and steps beyond that. Owing to objective, SDI research illegal, must be banned.

- Large phased array radars: Soviet Union to cease construction on Krasnoyarsk if US forego modernisation of existing BMEWs at Thule and Fylingdales (tabled informally 14 October)

(a) US SDI (but not Soviet BMD) research is intended as first stage in development of new systems, prohibited by ABM Treaty as such it contravenes the Treaty.

(b) Soviet Union carries out non-weapon scientific research in space, including some military research, eg space early warning.



5. ASATs

(a) US testing of current ASAT essential, consistent with ABM Treaty, Claims ready to seek ASAT limitations, though no evidence of real interest.

(b) Soviet Union has only deployed ASAT system. Constraints inhibited by verification difficulties.

(a) US developed first ASAT, in 1950s. No catch-up necessary. Current testing a breach of ABM Treaty since involves first component of ABM system.

(b) Proposed ban on "space-strike" weapons covers US ASAT.