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OF 211937Z NOVEMBER 85
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MIPT: REAGAN/GORBACHEV MEETING, GENEVA, 19-20 NOVEMBER: PRESIDENT
 REAGAN'S BRIEFING OF NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, 21 NOVEMBER

SUMMARY

1. PRESIDENT REAGAN DESCRIBED THE SUMMIT AS A SUCCESS, A GOOD BEGINNING. HE AND GORBACHEV HAD NOT GONE INTO SPECIFICS, BUT HAD AGREED THAT THE GENEVA NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD QUOTE GO TO IT UNQUOTE ON THE BASIS OF 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS AND THAT INF COULD BE NEGOTIATED SEPARATELY. SIMILARLY THERE HAD BEEN NO SPECIFIC DISCUSSION WITH GORBACHEV OF REGIONAL ISSUES AND NOTHING TO REPORT THERE FROM THE SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE TALKS BEYOND THE AGREEMENT THAT THE ISSUES SHOULD BE DISCUSSED REGULARLY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD URGED GORBACHEV TO MAKE IMPROVEMENTS, EMPHASISING THAT HE WOULD NOT WISH TO MAKE A PROPAGANDA POINT OF IT IF GORBACHEV DID, BUT THAT PROGRESS WOULD HELP TO RALLY SUPPORT FOR AGREEMENT IN OTHER FIELDS.

DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT REAGAN OPENED BY THANKING THE ALLIES FOR THEIR PART IN THE PREPARATION OF THE SUMMIT AND THEREFORE IN ITS SUCCESS - AND HE BELIEVED IT HAD BEEN A SUCCESS. WHEN HE PARTED FROM GORBACHEV THE LATTER HAD SAID HE WAS ON THE WAY TO PRAGUE TO BRIEF THE WARSAW PACT AND HAD SENT HIS BEST WISHES TO THE MEMBERS OF NATO, WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAD RECIPROCATED.

3. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT EAST/WEST RELATIONS SHOULD BE FOUNDED ON REALISM, STRENGTH AND DIALOGUE. HIS ADMINISTRATION HAD WORKED TO REPAIR U S DEFENCES, TO RE-ESTABLISH THE ECONOMY AND TO CREATE SOLIDARITY. A DIALOGUE BASED ON REALISM AND STRENGTH HAD TO BE GRADUAL. THE MEETING WITH GORBACHEV WAS NOT AN END BUT A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, A FRESH START.

4. THE OPENING MEETING WITH GORBACHEV HAD BEEN PLANNED FOR 15 MINUTES BUT HAD LASTED ONE HOUR. THE PRESIDENT HAD EMPHASISED THE U.S DESIRE FOR A STABLE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP. HE HAD SAID THAT TO DISCUSS ARMS CONTROL WAS IN A SENSE TO PUT THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE. NATIONS DID NOT DISTRUST EACH OTHER BECAUSE THEY WERE ARMED BUT WERE ARMED BECAUSE THEY DISTRUSTED EACH OTHER. WORDS ALONE WERE NOT ENOUGH: DEEDS WERE NECESSARY. GORBACHEV HAD AGREED.

5. GORBACHEV HAD CLAIMED THAT US/SOVIET RELATIONS WERE AT THEIR *LOWES*

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LOWEST LEVEL EVER, BUT HAD SAID THAT THERE WAS QUOTE NO OPPOSITION IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP UNQUOTE TO AN IMMEDIATE IMPROVEMENT. COMMENTING ON GORBACHEV THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE WAS OBVIOUSLY IN CHARGE ON THE SOVIET SIDE, THAT HE EVIDENTLY BELIEVED DEEPLY IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND ALSO BELIEVED SOME OF THE WILDER ACCUSATIONS ABOUT THE U.S. E.G. THAT IT WAS OUT TO BANKRUPT THE SOVIET UNION, WAS DRIVEN BY THE ARMS MANUFACTURERS, ETC. GORBACHEV HAD REMINDED PRESIDENT REAGAN THAT THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION HAD ONCE BEEN ALLIES AND HAD SAID QUOTE I PRAY TO GOD THAT WAR BETWEEN US WILL NEVER HAPPEN UNQUOTE. HE HAD ADMITTED THAT HE WANTED TO FREE RESOURCES WHICH WERE NOW GOING ON DEFENCE.

6. ON SDI, GORBACHEV HAD BASED HIS OPPOSITION TO RESEARCH ON AN ARGUMENT THAT THE PRESIDENT HE NOT THOUGHT ANYBODY WOULD USE, NAMELY THAT RESEARCH MIGHT RESULT IN THE DISCOVERY OF HITHERTO UNKNOWN OFFENSIVE WEAPONS FOR USE FROM SPACE. THE PRESIDENT HAD REAFFIRMED THAT IF RESEARCH SHOWED THAT STRATEGIC DEFENCE WAS POSSIBLE, THE U S WOULD SHARE IT WITH ITS ALLIES AND WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

7. GORBACHEV HAD REAFFIRMED HIS WISH TO PROCEED TO REDUCTIONS OF NUCLEAR ARMS ON THE BASIS OF 50 PERCENT. THE U.S. HAD AGREED. THE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA WERE TO GO FORWARD ON THAT BASIS. REAGAN HAD OFFERED AN INTERIM AGREEMENT ON INF, INVOLVING A LIMIT ON NATO DEPLOYMENTS AT THE LEVEL WHICH WOULD BE REACHED AT THE END OF THE YEAR, THE SOVIET UNION REDUCING TO THAT LEVEL. THEY HAD TALKED ALSO OF THE NEED FOR A GLOBAL LIMIT. GORBACHEV HAD AGREED TO TACKLE INF SEPARATELY. REAGAN HAD MADE PLAIN THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT GIVE UP RESEARCH ON STRATEGIC DEFENCE.

8. THE PRESIDENT THEN LISTED SOME OF THE TOPICS COVERED IN THE JOINT STATEMENT: THE NPT, JOINT RISK REDUCTION CENTRES, A CW BAN, MBFR AND THE CDE.

9. ON HUMAN RIGHTS THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE HAD MADE PLAIN THAT THE U.S HAD NO INTENTION OF INTERFERING IN SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS. HE SOUGHT NO AGREEMENT ON THE MATTER AND WOULD NOT BRING IT UP IN PUBLIC. NEVERTHELESS IT WAS EASIER TO RALLY SUPPORT FOR AGREEMENTS IN OTHER FIELDS IF THERE COULD BE SOME PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS: AND IF THERE WERE, THE U.S. WOULD NOT CLAIM CREDIT FOR IT. HE HAD SPECIFICALLY RAISED THE CASE OF GERMANS IN THE SOVIET UNION.

9. REGIONAL PROBLEMS. THE PRESIDENT HAD POINTED OUT THAT SOVIET ACTION IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD WAS UNACCEPTABLE, NOTABLY IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND SE ASIA THROUGH CUBAN AND VIETNAMESE SURROGATES. HE HAD EMPHASISED THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT SEEKING ADVANTAGE AND HAD RE-STATE THE PROPOSALS IN HIS SPEECH TO THE U N GENERAL ASSEMBLY. GORBACHEV HAD SHOWN SOME SENSITIVITY TO THE ISSUES. THEY HAD AGREED TO DISAGREE ON THE SUBSTANCE WHILE AGREEING TO HOLD REGULAR MEETINGS TO DISCUSS THE ISSUES.

10. GORBACHEV WOULD VISIT THE U.S. IN 1986 AND THE PRESIDENT MOSCOW IN 1987.

11. CONCLUDING, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE MEETING WAS NOT AN END BUT A BEGINNING. THE ATMOSPHERE HAD BEEN CORDIAL. GORBACHEV WAS FORCEFUL IN RECOGNISING THAT THEY WERE TALKING ABOUT MATTERS OF POTENTIAL BENEFIT TO THE WHOLE WORLD. WHILE CLEARLY BE BELIEVED SOME THINGS THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT, THE SUMMIT HAD BEEN A SUCCESS. /1

12. IN THE GENERAL DISCUSSION THAT FOLLOWED ALL SPEAKERS THANKED THE PRESIDENT FOR COMING TO NATO AND EXPRESSED SOLIDARITY WITH HIM IN HIS EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A BETTER EAST/WEST RELATIONSHIP. MARTENS (BELGIUM) OPENED. FOR BELGIUM SECURITY DEPENDED ON THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL. HE ASKED HOW REAGAN INTERPRETED THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TO INF AND WHETHER THEY SOUGHT EQUALITY WITH THE U.S. THE PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT GOT DOWN TO SPECIFICS. THE SOVIET SIDE KNEW THAT THE U.S. POSITION WAS ZERO. THEY HAD, HOWEVER, AGREED ON THE SEPARATION OF INF FROM SDI.

13. KOHL (FRG) CONTRASTED THE PRESENT SITUATION WITH THE QUOTE NEW ICE AGE UNQUOTE TWO YEARS AGO WHEN INF DEPLOYMENT STARTED. THE MEETING HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL, IN LINE WITH REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DIALOGUE ON A REGULAR BASIS WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO EUROPE, AS WAS THE CW ISSUE. HE AGREED THAT IF WE WANTED TO HELP PEOPLE WE SHOULD AVOID PROPAGANDA. HE ASKED IF A TIMETABLE FOR THE FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN ENVISAGED, BUT RECEIVED NO ANSWER, THE PRESIDENT TAKING TO OPPORTUNITY TO REPEAT THAT HE HAD TOLD GORBACHEV THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT LOOKING FOR SUPERIORITY BUT WOULD NOT ACCEPT SOVIET SUPERIORITY.

14. ORDONEZ (SPAIN) ASKED IF ANY TRADE-OFFS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SPACE DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC WEAPONS. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE FELT STRONGLY THAT THE U.S. RIGHT TO RESEARCH MUST NOT BE BARGAINED AWAY. SUCH RESEARCH WAS BEING CONDUCTED IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY AND DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO DISCUSSION. THE ISSUE HAD BEEN LEFT OPEN BETWEEN HIM AND GORBACHEV.

15. WILLOCH (NORWAY) AGREED THAT ARMS CONTROL SHOULD NOT CARRY THE WHOLE BURDEN OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS. REGIONAL ISSUES WERE IMPORTANT. THROUGH QUIET DIPLOMACY IN SUCH MATTERS AS HUMAN RIGHTS, WE SHOULD TRY GRADUALLY TO REINTEGRATE THE SOVIET UNION INTO EUROPE. NORWAY FAVOURED FLEXIBILITY IN STRATEGIC DEFENCE IN ORDER TO OBTAIN REDUCTION OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. HAD THERE BEEN DISCUSSION OF EXTENDING SALT II AND OF THE ABM TREATY? HAD THE SOVIET UNION ABANDONED ITS INSISTENCE ON AN END OT RESEARCH? THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE LAST POINT WAS UNRESOLVED. IN ANSWER TO THE OTHER TWO HE REFERRED TO SOVIET VIOLATIONS: THE U.S. HAD NOT COME TO A FINAL DECISION ABOUT SALT II.

16. THE PRIME MINISTER CONGRATULATED THE PRESIDENT WARMLY, FIRST, ON THE ACHIEVEMENT OF CONFIDENCE BETWEEN HIMSELF AND GORBACHEV AND ON THE WAY THAT THAT HAD COME ACROSS IN PUBLIC AND, SECONDLY, ON THE JOINT STATEMENT WHICH HAD CONTAINED RATHER MORE DETAIL THAN HAD BEEN EXPECTED. MAKING THREE POINTS SHE SAID SHE BELIEVED WE SHOULD PRESENT THE MEETING IN A POSITIVE BUT NOT EUPHORIC LIGHT: THERE WAS A RISK THAT IF WE RAISED EXPECTATIONS TOO HIGH THERE MIGHT BE DISAPPOINTMENT WHEN DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS RAN INTO THE INEVITABLE DIFFICULTIES. SECONDLY WHILE THE PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF THE SOVIET UNION HAD CHANGED, THE SYSTEM REMAINED THE SAME. GORBACHEV HAD SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY TO REDUCE NUCLEAR ARMS ON CONDITION THAT THE U.S. GAVE UP SDI RESEARCH: SHE BELIEVED THE SOVIET UNION WOULD MOUNT A CAMPAIGN TO PRESS THAT THESIS AND THAT THE ALLIES WOULD NEED TO DEMONSTRATE SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. OVER ITS RESEARCH. THIRDLY, SHE WELCOMED THE CONFIRMATION THAT THE U.S. WAS STICKING TO THE ABM TREATY AND WAS READY TO GO ON OBSERVING THE SALT II LIMITS. /IN 1

IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD IT WAS VITAL THAT THE TWO GREAT POWERS SHOULD OBSERVE THOSE TREATIES.

17. MULRONEY (CANADA) MADE A GENERAL AND EFFUSIVE STATEMENT OF SUPPORT. CANADA WAS PLEASED WITH THE PROOF OF THE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP THAT HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. DUMAS (FRANCE) AGREED THAT CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD AIM AT MAINTAINING OUR OWN NUCLEAR DETERRENT WHICH WOULD BE NEEDED FOR SOME TIME. THERE WAS NO MENTION IN THE JOINT STATEMENT OF THE EVENTUAL ELIMINATION OF SUCH WEAPONS, A DIFFERENCE FROM THE STATEMENT OF 8 JANUARY. HE WELCOMED ALSO THE INDICATION THAT A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT WOULD BE BASED ON A SOVIET/U.S. BALANCE AT THE LOWEST LEVEL AND NOT A BALANCE BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND ALL THE REST. HAD THERE BEEN ANY PROGRESS ON A DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE AGREED 50 PERCENT REDUCTION? AND WHAT WERE THE ELEMENTS SUPPORTING THE BELIEF THAT AN INTERIM INF AGREEMENT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE? THE PRESIDENT REPEATED THAT HE HAD NOT GONE INTO SPECIFICS. SHULTZ CONFIRMED THIS: THERE HAD BEEN NO ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THE DIFFERENCE OF OPINION ABOUT WHAT THE 50 PERCENT SHOULD APPLY TO, NOR THE INF DETAILS: THEY HAD MERELY WISHED TO ESTABLISH THAT INF COULD BE NEGOTIATED SEPARATELY.

18. CRAXI (ITALY) GAVE A GENERAL WELCOME TO THE MEETING. THE PEACE OF THE WORLD DESERVED CONTINUOUS COMMITMENT COUPLED WITH CAUTION. OZAL (TURKEY) AGREED WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ABOUT LIKELY FUTURE SOVIET PROPAGANDA. HAD THE MIDDLE EAST OR THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR BEEN DISCUSSED? SHULTZ CONFIRMED THAT BOTH HAD BEEN RAISED WITH SHEVARDNADZE BUT THERE WAS NOTHING PARTICULAR TO REPORT. THEY HAD NOT COME UP IN PLENARY EXCEPT IN THE GENERAL CONTEXT OF REGIONAL ISSUES.

19. SHLUTER (DENMARK) ASKED IF THE RUSSIANS ACCEPTED THE CONCEPT OF EVEN LIMITED SDI WEAPONS, TO WHICH THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT AT LEAST THEY KNEW HOW STRONGLY THE U.S. FELT ABOUT THE ISSUE. CARRACO SILVA (PORTUGAL) STRESSED THE NEED FOR VERIFICATION AND STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL MEASURES, AS WELL AS SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION. EAST/WEST RELATIONS COULD NOT CONSIST ONLY OF ARMS CONTROL. REGIONAL ISSUES WERE IMPORTANT. HAD SOUTHERN AFRICA BEEN DISCUSSED? THE PRESIDENT REPLIED QUOTE NOT WITH GORBACHEV UNQUOTE AND SHULTZ ADDED BRIEFLY WITH SHEVARDNADZE. SHULTZ SAID THAT THE REGIONAL DISCUSSIONS WITH SHEVARDNADZE HAD BEEN SIGNIFICANT. THE SOVIET SIDE HAD RECOGNISED THEIR IMPORTANCE PARTICULARLY AFGHANISTAN, WHICH HAD BEEN GONE INTO IN GREAT DETAIL, AND HAD AGREED TO DISCUSS THEM ON A REGULAR BASIS.

20. HARALAMBOPOULOS (GREECE) SAID THAT GREECE FAVOURED THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS TO THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL AND REMINDED THE COUNCIL (UNNECESSARILY) THAT GREECE WAS A SIGNATORY TO THE FIVE CONTINENT PEACE APPEAL. HERMANNSSON (ICELAND) SPOKE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CONFIDENCE BETWEEN LEADERS OF NATIONS AND PEOPLES AND WONDERED WHETHER, IN THE LIGHT OF HIS PAST STATEMENTS ABOUT THE HOPELESSNESS OF SPEAKING TO THE RUSSIANS, PRESIDENT REAGAN FELT A REAL STEP HAD BEEN TAKEN. HE ALSO ASKED ABOUT GORBACHEV'S REFERENCE TO A BAN ON NUCLEAR TESTS. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT OF COURSE THE U.S WAS PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN A TEST BAN, PROVIDED THAT IT ENTERED INTO EFFECT WHEN BOTH SIDES WERE AT AN EQUAL STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT. HE /RECALLED

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RECALLED THAT THE LAST THREE YEAR TEST BAN HAD BEEN IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY A BURST OF SOVIET TESTING WHICH HAD OBVIOUSLY BEEN PREPARED DURING THE PERIOD OF THE BAN.

21. LUBBERS (NETHERLANDS) REFERRED TO THE NEED FOR THE ALLIES TO CONSIDER HOW BEST TO CO-ORDINATE THE DIALOGUE WITH THE EAST, AND STRESSED THE NEED TO AVOID DISTRUST. SANTER (LUXEMBOURG) SPOKE BRIEFLY, SAYING THAT THE FURTHER PLANNED MEETINGS WERE A DECISIVE STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

22. CONCLUDING, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT NO TIMETABLE HAD BEEN DISCUSSED FOR THE NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, BUT IT HAD BEEN MADE PLAIN THAT THE NEGOTIATORS SHOULD QUOTE GO TO IT UNQUOTE. MOREOVER HE AND GORBACHEV HAD AGREED ON A DIRECT METHOD OF COMMUNICATION, TO BE USED BETWEEN MEETINGS.

23. CARRINGTON MADE NO ATTEMPT TO SUM UP BUT WISHED THE PRESIDENT WELL WITH CONGRESS.

GRAHAM

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

LIMITED
ACDD
DEFENCE D
SOVIET D
NEWS D
NAD
EED
WED
PLANNING STAFF
RES D
INFO D
PUSD
NED

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RIFKIND
PS/MR RENTON
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
MR GOODALL
MR SAMUEL
MR DAUNT
MR DAVID THOMAS
MR BRAITHWAITE
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PRIME MINISTER'S OPENING REMARKS AT REAGAN DEBRIEFING

The Prime Minister congratulated the President warmly on the outcome of the meeting and on the achievement of a degree of confidence in relations with Mr. Gorbachev and the Soviet Union.

She thought the result had been presented very effectively to the public.

The areas of agreement listed in the Joint Statement exceeded expectations.

The Prime Minister stressed three points:

- the Alliance should follow the President's example in presenting the results positively but not euphorically. As the President himself had said, deeds not words would count. There was no doubt that very difficult detailed negotiations lay ahead. We should not build public expectations too high. Otherwise we would only create difficulties for ourselves.

- It was very important always to bear in mind that the Soviet Union was making great efforts to improve its image. But the Soviet system had not changed. Nor had their opposition to SDI weakened. We must calculate that they will spend the next year in a concentrated propaganda campaign to convince Western (and particularly European) public opinion that the SDI was the main obstacle to substantial reductions in nuclear weapons. We must be ready to counter this and support the USA

in continuing SDI research.

- She was pleased that the President had confirmed that the US continued to observe the ABM Treaty and would observe SALT II limits on a reciprocal basis. It was vital in an uncertain world that big powers should observe their agreement.

The Prime Minister concluded that she congratulated the President, fully supported him in the course he had charted and expressed particular appreciation of the great personal role which he had played in the Summit.