

CONFIDENTIAL



Prime Minister

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

I think your instinct to send Gorbachev a message is right. The FO draft was very woolly. I've had another go, but you may want to personalize it.

29 November 1985

CDP
29/11

Charles - this message is not worth sending. I will write another if time permits.

Dear Charles,

US/Soviet Summit

In your letter of 25 November you said that the Prime Minister was considering whether she should take the initiative in writing to Mr Gorbachev about the outcome of the US/Soviet Summit.

The Foreign Secretary believes that it would be valuable for the Prime Minister to write to Mr Gorbachev. We know that Mr Gorbachev attaches importance to his personal exchanges with the Prime Minister. Sir Bryan Cartledge is now likely to pay his first call on Mr Shevardnadze on 3 or 4 December. This would be a suitable opportunity for him to hand over the message to Mr Gorbachev, since he is unlikely to get an opportunity to see Mr Gorbachev himself in the immediate future.

I attach a draft message. It seeks to convey the personal note which has proved so useful in the Prime Minister's letters to Mr Gorbachev. You will see that it reaffirms our interest in a visit to Britain by Mr Shevardnadze. It also refers to the possibility that the Prime Minister and Mr Gorbachev might resume discussions at a suitable moment. If the Prime Minister agreed, this might be a useful trailer to a possible visit to the Soviet Union in the course of next year.

The Prime Minister may also be interested to see a series of telegrams from Moscow with the background to Mr Gorbachev's speech to the Supreme Soviet on 27 November.

[You have already seen them]

Yours ever,

L. V. Appleyard

(L. V. Appleyard)
Private Secretary

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10 DOWNING STREET

THE PRIME MINISTER

As you can imagine, I followed your meetings with President Reagan in Geneva with the greatest interest. They seem to me to have laid the foundations for better understanding between East and West, on which we now need to build.

I hope in particular that some basic misconceptions have been dispelled. I noted for instance that you appear to see defence spending in the United States as a dynamo in their economy, but rightly regard it as a brake on the Soviet economy. None of us in the West see defence expenditure as an essential part of economic growth. This really isn't how capitalist societies work. Nor, I am sure, does President Reagan think that the Soviet economy can be brought to its knees by a competitive arms race. I take these examples simply to illustrate the point that we need a sustained effort by both sides to remove the mistrust and misunderstanding which stand in the way of agreement.

I am encouraged by the Joint Statement issued at the end of your meeting with President Reagan to hope for fresh impetus in your negotiations with the United States on reductions in strategic nuclear weapons, in the discussions of a global ban on chemical weapons, in the MBFR talks, and at the CDE in Stockholm. I believe it would be helpful if Sir Geoffrey Howe had an opportunity to discuss our thinking on some of these issues with M. Shevardnadze. I hope that we can soon agree a date for his visit to

Britain, in the course of which I look forward to seeing him myself.

I recognise that there is still a difficult road to be travelled before definite agreements are reached. We must not raise the hopes of our peoples too high. But I was struck by something which Mr. Kadar said to me during a recent talk we had: "Our peoples want peace and security and we must give it to them". The successful outcome of the Geneva meeting was an important step on the road to satisfying that basic demand and I pay tribute to your personal contribution to it. I hope that you and I will be able to resume our discussions at an appropriate moment.

I send you and Mrs. Gorbachev my best wishes.

Mr. Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev

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Bm



10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

25 November 1985

US/SOVIET SUMMIT

11

The Prime Minister is considering whether she should take the initiative in writing to Mr. Gorbachev about the outcome of the US/Soviet Summit. Her inclination is to do so. I should be grateful for advice and, if appropriate, a draft letter. This will of course need to take account of what Popov has to tell Mr. Rifkind.

(C.D. Powell)

Len Appleyard, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office