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10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

24 February, 1986.

PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH MR. OZAL

Thank you for your letter of 21 February enclosing a draft telegram to UKMIS New York about that part of the Prime Minister's discussions with Mr. Ozal which dealt with Cyprus.

You asked whether I had any comments to add on the atmosphere of the discussion. The only point which I would make was that Mr. Ozal seemed to me a good deal less confident in dealing with Cyprus than in the rest of the discussion. I rather got the feeling that he was not in the lead on this subject. But Mark Russell will be much better able to judge. Otherwise I am content with the telegram.

(C.D. Powell)

C.R. Budd, Esq., Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

21 February 1986

boar Charles,

Prime Minister's Meeting with Ozal

We believe the UN Secretary-General would find it helpful to be briefed on the main points to emerge from the Prime Minister's discussion with Ozal and on our assessment of where the Turks now stand on Cyprus. This would be particularly timely given that the second round of low-level talks involving the two Cyprus communities is due to start in Geneva on 26 February.

The assessment of the underlying Turkish attitudes which is given in the enclosed draft telegram of instructions to UKMIS New York and Washington is our own. But it would be helpful if you could cast an eye over the draft to see whether there is anything which could usefully be passed on to the Secretary-General about the atmosphere of this particular part of the Prime Minister's discussion with Ozal.

Domo ma

(C R Budd)

Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq PS/10 Downing Street

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

	Classification	Caveat .	Precedence		
•	CONFIDENTIAL				
TC CAVEAT	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION				
FM	FM (post)				
то	TO (precedence/post) IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK. TELNO/TELELETTER				
TELNO					
OF	OF (Time of origin)	Z (Month)(Y	'ear)		
AND TO	AND TO (precedence/post) IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON				
. INFO		IMMEDIATE ATHENS, ANKARA, NICOSIA IS, BONN, ROME UKREP BRUSSELS, UK			
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Additional Cyprus

FCO TELEGRAM NO 62: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH OZAL: CYPRUS

- 1. As you will have seen from the record of the meetin TUR, the Prime Minister covered the points proposed
 by the Secretary-General in speaking to Ozal. You
 will want to give him an account and assessment of the
 meeting prior to the restart of low-level talks
 next week.
- 2. We do not regard Ozal's insistence that the

 Turkish Cypriots can accept no more than the January 1985

 documentation as his last word. The production of

 a third set of documentation will create a new situation.

 The Turks know full well that sticking to that position

 would spell the end of the Secretary-General's initiative,

 with the blame falling on them. They wish to avoid that.

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- 3. On troop withdrawals, we believe he may be prepared to show flexibility in practice although we see little or no point in pursuing the point further before we have a new peg, such as a new set of documentation presented to the parties to hang it on.
- 4. Ozal in public took a tough line, claiming the onus was on the Greek Cypriots to make a move. He spoke several times about there being no incentive for the Greek Cypriots to find a settlement semi colon the present situation suited them too well. But we still believe the Turks will not stand in the way of agreement if they are convinced that Turkish Cypriot interests are protected.
- 5. Please therefore seek an early meeting with the Secretary General and draw on preceding paragraphs and TUR. He can additionally be assured we are ready to speak to the Greeks in similarly direct terms when the Secretary of State visits Athens next month. By then the low-level talks will have taken place. It will be helpful to us to have a read-out of their progress and a clear idea of the Secretary General's intentions so best use of the Athens visit can be made.

For Washington.

6. Please pass on to the Americans the course of discussions and our thinking on the current Turkish position.

