

CYPRUS

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR EGGAR

PS/PUS

MR DEREK THOMAS

MR RATFORD

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HD/SED

HD/UND

DEP HD/PUSD (2)

HD/NEWS DEPT

RESIDENT CLERK

CONFIDENTIAL

FM ANKARA

TO DESKBY 14099.Z FCO

TELNO 203

OF 130730Z APRIL 86

AND TO IMMEDIATE ATHENS, NICOSIA, UKMIS NEW YORK.

PS/No.10 DOWNING STREET ✓

D I O CABINET OFFICE



IMMEDIATE

19.11.84

YOUR TELNO 127: CYPRUS: SECRETARY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR HELP

1. THE ONLY POINTER TO TURKISH ATTITUDES WHICH I CAN ADD TO THOSE SET OUT IN MY TELNO 200 IS A CONVERSATION WITH MESUT YILMAZ WHICH I HAD AT A SOCIAL FUNCTION ON 11 APRIL. YILMAZ IS A MINISTER OF STATE, WHO ACTS AS FOREIGN MINISTER IN MR HALEFOGLU'S ABSENCES ABROAD. HE IS CLOSE TO OZAL. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION HE SAID THAT DENKTASH WOULD AGREE TO THE NEW DOCUMENTATION. WHEN I COMMENTED THAT DENKTASH SEEMED INCLINED TO WANT TO SEE HOW THE GREEKS JUMPED, AND TO PUT DOWN SOME QUALIFICATIONS OF HIS OWN, YILMAZ SAID: " HE WILL AGREE. WHAT HE IS DOING NOW IS PLAYING POLITICS."

2. THAT REMARK GOES A GOOD DEAL FURTHER THAN LOGOGLU (MY TELNO 200) BUT COMES FROM A CONSIDERABLY MORE SENIOR SOURCE. ALTOGETHER I THINK THE INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE TURKS, AS THINGS STAND, ARE ON BOARD AND THAT WHATEVER DENKTASH'S MISGIVINGS, ANKARA (A) IS READY TO AGREE TO THE DOCUMENTATION IN PRESENT FORM AND (B) WILL REQUIRE DENKTASH ALSO TO AGREE. THE QUESTION THEREFORE, AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED HERE, IS WHETHER THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSALS IN UKMIS TELNO 357 WOULD RISK LOSING THE TURKS.

3. ON THAT ISSUE MY VIEWS ARE AS FOLLOWS:-

(A) ANKARA IS PROBABLY KEENER ON ACCEPTANCE THAN IS DENKTASH. THE LATTER MAY WELL BE LOOKING FOR AN EXCUSE TO DELAY MATTERS AND WOULD NOT BE TOO UNHAPPY TO SEE THE PROCESS BREAK DOWN PROVIDED THE BLAME DID NOT LIE WITH HIM.

(B) HE IS THEREFORE LIKELY TO SEIZE ON ANY MOVE AWAY FROM WHAT THE SEC GEN HAS ALREADY PROPOSED, PARTICULARLY IF IT CAN BE SHOWN AS A REVISION TO MEET KYPRIANOU.

(C) I WOULD NOT PLACE ANY RELIANCE ON FEISSEL'S OPTIMISM THAT THERE IS NOTHING IN THE SEC GEN'S NEW POINTS TO WHICH THE TURKS SHOULD OBJECT. DENKTASH HAS ON MANY OCCASIONS SHOWN HOW ADEPT HE IS AT NIT-PICKING. THOUGH THIS IS A POINT FOR MR WILBERFORCE, I DO NOT DOUBT HIS CAPACITY TO FIND OBJECTIONS TO THE SORT OF FORMULA THE SEC GEN HAS PROPOSED.

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(D) ANKARA, NOT WITHSTANDING (A) ABOVE IS IN NO MOOD TO MAKE LIFE EASIER FOR EITHER KYPRIANOU OR PAPANDREOU.

(E) IF THE TURKS SENCE THAT KYPRIANOU IS TRYING TO WRIGGLE OFF HOOK THEY WILL, IN FEAR, SEEK TO NAIL HIM. ON THIS THEY WOULD BE AT ONE WITH DENKTASH.

4. GIVEN THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, I THINK THERE IS A REAL RISK IN WHAT THE SEC GEN PROPOSES. BUT WE ARE AT A CRITICAL POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE PRIME OBJECTIVE IS TO KEEP THE PROCESS GOING. IT IS THEREFORE JUST AS IMPORTANT TO GET KYPRIANOU ON BOARD AS TO SECURE DENKTASH. THE QUESTION IS CAN WE GET KYPRIANOU (NEXT WORD UNDERLINED) WITHOUT THE SORT OF MANOEUVRE WHICH THE SEC GEN PROPOSES. THAT IS FOR MR WILBERFORCE AND MR THOMAS TO JUDGE. IF IT IS FELT THAT SUCH A MANOEUVRE COULD HAVE A CRITICAL EFFECT ON KYPRIANOU THEN I THINK WE PROBABLY SHOULD GIVE THE SEC GEN'S PROPOSAL A TRY, SUBJECT TO PARA 5 BELOW. BUT WE MUST RECKON WITH THE LIKELIHOOD THAT DENKTASH AND ANKARA WILL SEE IT AS A PRO-KYPRIANOU MOVE AND MAKE DIFFICULTIES, NOT NECESSARILY BY REJECTING THE DOCUMENTATION, BUT IN DEMANDS FOR AN UNEQUIVOCAL ACCEPTANCE BY KYPRIANOU.

5. WE NEED ALSO TO ADDRESS THE AFFECT THIS WOULD HAVE ON OUR RELATIONS WITH THE TURKS, GIVEN THAT WE MUST EXPECT THEM TO LEARN OF OUR INTERVENTION, POSSIBLY FROM THE GREEKS AND IN A WAY CALCULATED TO EMBARRASS US. ANKARA AND DENKTASH MAY FEEL THAT WE ARE INTERVENING TO GET KYPRIANOU OFF THE HOOK TO THEIR DISADVANTAGE. FOR THIS REASON I BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL TO ENSURE THAT IN WHATEVER WE SAY TO THE GREEKS WE CONFINE OURSELVES TO REASURANCES BASED ON THE EXISTING DOCUMENTATION AND AVOID SEEMING TO BROACH NEW, CONTENTIOUS, GROUND. DESPITE FEHSEL'S REMARKS, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT (C) OF THE SEC GEN'S THREE POINTS WOULD GET US INTO THAT POSITION I.E. IN SUGGESTING THAT THE FIRST HIGH LEVEL MEETING SHOULD BE A SUBSTANTIVE ONE RATHER THAN SYMBOLIC. IF, NOTWITHSTANDING, IT WAS DECIDED THAT (C) WAS AN INDISPENSIBLE ELEMENT TO THE APPROACH, THEN I MUST STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT WE SHOULD INFORM THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT OF OUR EXCHANGE WITH KYPRIANOU, TO GUARD AGAINST BEING ACCUSED SUBSEQUENTLY BY THE TURKS OF PARTIALITY.

RUSSELL

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