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## 10 DOWNING STREET

From the Private Secretary

30 April 1986

## CYPRUS: PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU'S MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER

I have shown the Prime Minister your letter of 29 April, commenting on President Kyprianou's message of 21 April. She agrees that it is a disappointing reply.

What concerns the Prime Minister more is that, once again, we have been led to believe by the Secretary-General that a make or break point had been reached: instead we now learn that he intends to make a generally low-key response to the Greek Cypriots and to explore ways to try to continue to take matters forward. This considerably reduces the credibility of the Prime Minister's tactics with Kyprianou. Whatever we are led to believe in advance, the Secretary-General is never prepared to push matters to the very edge of a breakdown.


In the circumstances, the Prime Minister does not feel inclined to continue to play as active a part as in the past in support of the Secretary-General's efforts. She is likely to make this clear to him when they meet on 14 May.

CHARLES POWELL

C. R. Budd, Esq., Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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You will have seen President Kyprianou's message of 21 April to the Prime Minister defending the response he made on 20 April to the Secretary-General's third set of documentation. It is disappointing that he has again ignored the Prime Minister's advice (both messages attached for ease of reference). In these circumstances, we do not recommend a further message from the Prime Minister at this stage. We should first await a reaction from the Secretary-General before considering the possibility of any further intervention.

Meanwhile, we are making clear to the Greek Cypriots our disappointment over their response. The UN (and Denktash, who made a generally positive response to the Secretary-General on 21 April) see Kyprianou's reply as an unequivocable rejection. Kyprianou's failure to take heed of the international pressure on him to accept demonstrates the strength of opposition to the Secretary-General's proposals in all the Cyprus political parties. This is shared, probably for Greek reasons, by Papandreou. The Greek side will not agree to anything unless and until what they regard as the substantive issues have been satisfactorily negotiated. The outlook is unattractive.

We believe the UN Secretary-General will make a generally low-key response. Both parties say they are committed to the Secretary-General's initiative and do not want to be blamed for its breakdown. That remains the Secretary-General's strongest card and one which he will no doubt continue to exploit. He has not ruled out the possibility of trying for a high-level meeting as favoured by the Greek Cypriots but it will be hard to persuade the Turks and Denktash to agree to this in the absence of a positive Greek Cypriot response. Coincidentally, FCO officials will be in New York next week to discuss Cyprus; we hope then to get a clearer picture of how the Secretary-General intends to play things and he will of course see the Prime Minister on 14 May during his visit to London.

In the meantime, we know the Prime Minister's efforts in support of his initiative are greatly appreciated by the Secretary-General and his officials. While there is no immediate danger of a collapse of his initiative and while he

/decides



decides how to take things forward, we should stay our hand.
But we should be ready, as before, to help him out wherever we can. Whatever the apparent impossibility of bringing Greek and Turkish Cypriots to agreement, his initiative remains the best hope and infinitely preferable to the alternative, touted by the Russians, of an international conference.

Yours ever, Colin Budd

(C R Budd) Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq PS/10 Downing Street

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TOPON

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT KYPPIANOU TO THE PRIME MINISTER

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU'S REPLY (DELIVERED TO ME LAST NIGHT) TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO HIM OF 14 APRIL. THE SIGNED ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG TO SED. BEGINS:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF THE 14 APRIL 1986. I GREATLY VALUE YOUR PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE PROBLEMS OF CYPRUS. AFTER LENGTHY CONSULTATIONS WITH ALL POLITICAL PARTIES IN CYPRUS UNANIMITY WAS REACHED ON A RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT PRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL. ALTHOUGH ANXIOUS TO MAKE RAPID PROGRESS TOWARDS AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, WE BELIEVE THAT EVEN CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF THOSE PROPOSALS WOULD HAVE IRREPARABLY PREJUDICED OUR POSITION. NONETHELESS, PRECISELY BECAUSE WE ARE FIRMLY COMMITTED AS A MATTER OF URGENCY TO A JUST AND VIABLE SOLUTION OF THE CYPURS PROBLEM, WE HAVE PROPOSED TWO ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES. IF THERE IS A SINCERE DESIRE FOR A SOLUTION EITHER PROCEDURE WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE THE RESOLUTION OF THE BASIC OUTSTANDING ISSUES OF TROOP AND SETTLER WITHDRAWALS. OF GUARANTEES AND THE APPLICATION OF THE THREE FREEDOMS. WE PELIEVE THAT PROGRESS CAN BE MADE TOWARDS AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT ONLY IF THESE BASIC ISSUES ARE SETTLED AS A MATTER OF PRIOPITY. SINCE AGREEMENT ON SUCH ISSUES WILL CRUCIALLY AFFECT WHAT IS ACCEPTABLE ON THE OTHER ISSUES. WE SHALL REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON OUR PROPOSAL. WE HOPE THAT THE TURKISH SIDE WILL BE PERSUADED TO RAISE NO OBJECTIONS TO THIS CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL WHICH OFFERS THE BEST CHANCE AT THIS STAGE FOR BREAKING THE DEADLOCK. I SHOULD LIKE TO HOPE THAT YOU WILL REMAIN WILLING TO HELP US IN OUR EFFORT TO MAKE RAPID PROGRESS TOWARDS RESOLUTION OF THESE IMPORTANT ISSUES. ENDS.

WILBERFORCE

CYPRUS

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