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TO PRIORITY FCO

TELNO 230

OF 301325Z APRIL 86

INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, NICOSIA, ATHENS, WASHINGTON

NICOSIA TELNO 162: CYPRUS/UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. TURKS BACK DENTKASH'S POSITION TO THE FULL, SEEKING TO EXTRACT MAXIMUM VALUE FROM HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE DOCUMENTATION. NO GIVE ON SUBSTANCE, BUT TURKS SEEM PREPARED TO RETAIN SOME ROOM FOR FURTHER MANOEUVREING BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

DETAIL

2. WHEN HEAD OF CHANCERY CALLED ON LOGOGLU (HEAD CYPRUS DEPARTMENT, MFA) THIS MORNING, HE WAS SHOWN THE TEXT OF DENKTASH'S SECOND LETTER OF 27 APRIL (AS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF TUR). LOGOGLU SAID THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WERE NOT PRESSURISED TO PAY THE PRICE OF GREEK CYPRIOT 'REJECTION' OF THE DRAFT FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT BY MAKING FURTHER CONCESSIONS THEMSELVES. HOWEVER MUCH WE MIGHT ARGUE THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOT REPLY HAD NOT EXPLICITLY REJECTED THE DOCUMENTATION, THIS WAS ONLY TRUE IN A STRICTLY TECHNICAL AND LEGAL SENSE. STATEMENTS MADE SUBSEQUENTLY BY THE GREEK CYPRIOTS, AND ABOVE ALL BY PAPANDREOU IN THE GREEK PARLIAMENT (ATHENS TELNO 202) LEFT NO PRACTICAL ROOM FOR DOUBT. ON THE OTHER HAND, DENKTASH HAD ACCEPTED THE DRAFT FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT WITHOUT ANY RESERVATION (HERE LOGOGLU WAS AT PAINS TO EMPHASISE THAT THE POINTS MADE IN DENKTASH'S FIRST REPLY SHOULD BE REGARDED AS 'OBSERVATIONS ONLY').

3. IN RESPONSE TO THE SUGGESTION THAT DENKTASH MIGHT APPEAR TO BE SHUTTING THE DOOR TO FURTHER DISCUSSIONS BY REFUSING 'ANY FORM OF SECRET OR SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY', LOGOGLU SAID THAT THIS WAS DEFINITELY NOT THE CASE. TURKEY FULLY ACCEPTED DENKTASH'S POSITION THAT THERE COULD BE NO HIGH LEVEL MEETING WITHOUT PRIOR ACCEPTANCE OF THE CURRENT DOCUMENTATION BUT IT WAS UNCONCEIVABLE THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WOULD REFUSE ANY FURTHER CONTACT ON THE MATTER WITH THE UN SECRETARIAT. THEIR POLICY OF SUPPORTING THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S INITIATIVE REQUIRED IT AND WAS ALSO TO THEIR TACTICAL ADVANTAGE TO DO SO. HAVING SAID THAT, THERE WAS NOTHING THEY COULD SAY ON SUBSTANCE BEYOND THEIR ACCEPTANCE IN FULL OF THE LATEST DOCUMENT. THIS DOCUMENT HAD NOT DROPPED FROM THE SKY AS THE GREEKS NOW SOUGHT TO PRETEND BUT HAD BEEN THE RESULT OF LONG AND CAREFUL PREPARATION WITH BOTH SIDES. THE TURKS WANTED THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO PERSEVERE WITH HIS INITIATIVE AND WERE WAITING WITH INTEREST TO KNOW OF HIS NEXT MOVE. BUT THIS WOULD NEED TO BE GEARED TO PRESSURISING THE GREEKS TO ACCEPT WHAT HAD BEEN OFFERED.

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4. LOGOGLU RAISED KYPRIANOU'S PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. TURKEY GAVE LITTLE CREDENCE TO THESE, DESPITE THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH MIGHT NOW BE GOING ON IN MOSCOW DURING THE GREEK CYPRIOT VISIT. IT SERVED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THERE WAS NO SINCERE COMMITMENT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S EFFORTS. DENKTASH HAD SAID THAT HE WOULD PARTICIPATE IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ONLY ON CONDITION THAT THERE WAS PRIOR UN RECOGNITION OF THE TRNC AND THEIR RIGHT TO PARTICIPATION ON EQUAL TERMS. THIS WAS HARDLY A REALISTIC POSITION, BUT NOR WAS THE GREEK EFFORT AT INTERNATIONALISATION.

5. LUGOGLU ADDED THAT THERE WAS NO INTENTION OF SWITCHING TO THE "RECOGNITION CHANNEL" AT THIS STAGE BUT THIS WAS BECOMING AN INCREASINGLY STRONG POSSIBILITY. IT WAS NOT INTENDED AS A THREAT BUT WAS RATHER AN INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCE OF THE GREEK CYPRIOT ATTITUDE. THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS COULD NOT WAIT FOR EVER AND THEY WERE INCREASINGLY DEFINING THEIR RIGHT TO EQUAL STATUS AS MEANING THEIR RIGHT TO AN EQUAL STATE. THIS POSITION WAS MORE ADVANCED THAN IT HAD BEEN DURING 1985 AND IT WAS A MESSAGE WHICH OZAL HAD SPELT OUT PUBLICLY (ALBEIT "IN CRUDE TERMS") IN HIS SPEECHES ON 25, 26 AND 27 APRIL (MY TELNO 226). THE OLIVE BRANCH WOULD NOT BE THERE FOR EVER.

6. LOGOGLU WISHED TO CLARIFY ONE ASPECT OF SUBSTANCE. THE TURKISH VIEW ABOUT TROOP WITHDRAWALS AND GUARANTEES RESTED WITH THE GENERAL FORMULA OF "1960 PLUS". THERE HAD NEVER BEEN A SPECIFIC PREFERENCE OVER A TIMESABLE FOR WITHDRAWALS EXCEPT THAT THE TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAD TO COME INTO EXISTENCE BEFORE ANY REDUCTION COULD BE IMPLEMENTED. THIS, HE CLAIMED, HAD BEEN A CONSTANT POSITION SINCE EXCHANGES IN VIENNA IN 1984 AND THERE HAD NEVER BEEN ANY POSSIBILITY THAT TURKEY WOULD OFFER MORE. HE DID NOT MAKE EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO HALEFOGLU'S LETTER TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL ON GUARANTEES AND TROOPS.

COMMENT

7. THE TURKS AT THIS STAGE SEEM BENT ON ASSISTING THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS TO 'CLARIFY' THEIR POSITION IN A WAY DESIGNED TO SECURE MAXIMUM PRESENTATIONAL ADVANTAGE WHILE GIVING AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE ON SUBSTANCE. LOGLOGLU'S INTERPRETATION OF DENKTASH'S POSITION ON FURTHER CONTACT WITH THE SECRETARIAT APPEARS TO PROVIDE SOME LIMITED ROOM FOR FURTHER MANOEUVRE. BUT

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THERE SEEMS NO PROSPECT THAT THE TURKS WOULD BE PREPARED TO PUT FURTHER PRESSURE ON DENKTASH OVER A HIGH LEVEL MEETING WITHOUT THE GREEK CYPRIOTS FIRST BEING SEEN TO CONCEDE ON THE DOCUMENTATION. IF THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS THINKING ALONG THOSE LINES (PARA 2 OF GORE-BOOTH'S TELELETTER OF 23 APRIL) ALL THE SIGNS HERE ARE THAT HE WILL RUN UP AGAINST A BRICK WALL.

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