

YOUR ORAL MESSAGE DOES RECOGNIZE THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF THE THREE ISSUES SET OUT IN MY LETTER TO YOU OF 20 APRIL 1986, NAMELY THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE TURKISH TROOPS AND SETTLERS, EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES AND THE THREE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS (FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND SETTLEMENT AND THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY). THESE ISSUES ARE OF DETERMINATIVE IMPORTANCE TO A SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. THEY SHOULD, OF COURSE HAVE BEEN URGENTLY RESOLVED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE TURKISH INVASION, IN CONFORMITY WITH THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS. REGRETTABLY, NOT ONLY HAVE THEY NOT BEEN RESOLVED ACCORDING THE WISHES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, BUT THEY HAVE NOT EVEN BEEN DISCUSSED. THE REFUSAL OF THE TURKISH SIDE TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES IS A MEASURE OF ITS INTRANSIGENCE. THE FACT THAT WE HAVE SO FAR AGREED TO A PROCEDURE INVOLVING DISCUSSION OF MAINLY CONSTITUTIONAL AND TERRITORIAL ISSUES IS A MEASURE OF OUR CONCILIATORY ATTITUDE AND EVIDENCE OF OUR COOPERATION WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. IT SHOULD BE RECALLED THAT, THROUGHOUT THIS TWELVE-YEAR PERIOD, PROPOSALS MADE BY THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE WERE LINKED WITH CONDITIONS REGARDING THE RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTIONS OF WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS AND SETTLERS, OF GUARANTEES AND OF THE THREE FREEDOMS. IT HAS BEEN A MATTER OF CONCERN THAT, WHILST ALL THE CONCESSIONS MADE BY THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED IN RECENT TEXTS, THE ASSOCIATED SINE-QUA-NON CONDITIONS, RELATING TO THE MAJOR QUESTIONS, HAVE BEEN OMITTED. A PROMISE TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS IN THE FUTURE IS CERTAINLY NO SUBSTITUTE FOR THEIR ACTUAL RESOLUTION, NOR DOES IT REPRESENT A CONCESSION ON THE PART OF THE OTHER SIDE.

THE GREEK CYPRIOT POSITION HAS BEEN CLEAR ALL ALONG. THROUGHOUT YOUR LATEST INITIATIVE, WHICH STARTED IN VIENNA IN AUGUST 1984, THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE INSISTED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO DISCUSS AS A MATTER OF PRIORITY THE QUESTIONS OF WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS AND SETTLERS, GUARANTEES AND THE THREE FREEDOMS. OUR PRESENT POSITION IS THEREFORE CONSISTENT WITH OUR POSITION ALL ALONG.

FOR MANY YEARS IT HAD BEEN UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM WOULD BE IN THE FORM OF A PACKAGE OF INTERRELATED ELEMENTS. IT SHOULD THEREFORE BE IMPOSSIBLE TO EXPECT THAT EITHER SIDE COULD BE ASKED TO ACCEPT SOME ELEMENTS, OR PART OF THE PACKAGE. IT IS ALSO CONCEPTUALLY UNSOUND TO EXPECT VIEWS ON ELEMENTS WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED IN DETAIL WITHOUT HAVING THE SAME OR AT LEAST SOME LEVEL OF DETAIL IN RESPECT OF OTHER INTERRELATED ELEMENTS.

WHEN CONFRONTED WITH THE PROPOSALS OF THE 'DRAFT FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT' THE CONCEPT OF THE INTEGRATED WHOLE ON ITS OWN IS NOT SUFFICIENT PROTECTION FOR OUR POSITION, AS THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE WOULD FIND ITSELF BOUND BY UNWORKABLE CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS PREJUDICIAL TO IT, WITHOUT BENEFITTING FROM ANY CORRESPONDING OBLIGATION ON THE PART OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADERSHIP WITH REGARD TO ALL THOSE MATTERS WHICH ARE OF VITAL CONCERN TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS. THE INEVITABLE RESULT WOULD BE THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADERSHIP, HAVING OBTAINED ALL THEY WANTED, WOULD HAVE NO INCENTIVE WHATSOEVER TO MOVE FROM THEIR KNOWN POSITIONS ON ANY OF THE MATTERS OF CONCERN TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS, WHO WOULD BE COMPLETELY DEPRIVED OF THEIR NEGOTIATING POTENTIAL.

THE PROPOSITION OF THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE THAT THE THREE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES MUST NOW AT LAST RECEIVE PRIORITY IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE ARGUMENTATION ADVANCED ABOVE. THE VALIDITY OF THE GREEK CYPRIOT POSITION IS ALSO BORNE OUT BY RECENT TURKISH MENACING UTTERANCES.

MR. DENKTASH, IN HIS LETTER TO YOU OF 21 APRIL 1986, LEAVES NO DOUBT AS TO HIS POSITION THAT THE TURKISH TROOPS MUST REMAIN IN CYPRUS INDEFINITELY, NOR AS TO THE NATURE OF GUARANTEES HE ENVISAGES AND THE RESUSAL OF SERIOUS NEGOTIATION REGARDING ON THE VITAL MATTER OF TURKEY'S EFFECTIVE GUARANTEE AND ON THE ISSUE OF WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS HAVE COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNICATED TO YOUR EXCELLENCY'S REPRESENTATIVES THROUGHOUT THE COURSE OF THE LOWER-LEVEL TALKS''. AND HE ADDS: ''AS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF NON-CYPRIOT TROOPS, EXCLUDING THOSE THAT ARE TO REMAIN ON THE ISLAND, THERE CAN BE NO WITHDRAWAL UNTIL ALL ASPECTS OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM HAVE BEEN SETTLED, AGREED TO AND APPROVED BY THE TWO SIDES, THAT IS, UNTIL THE GREEK CYPRIOT ADMINISTRATION REPRESENTING EXCLUSIVELY ONE OF THE TWO NATIONAL COMMUNITIES OF CYPRUS IS ACTUALLY REPLACED BY THE TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY TROOPS AND ELEMENTS IN THE SOUTH ARE DISPOSED OF IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT - WHOSE AIM WOULD BE TO ASSURE THAT NO SECURITY GAP FOR US IS CREATED AT ANY TIME''. MR. DENKTASH FURTHER STATES: ''ANOTHER CRUCIAL ISSUE IS THE QUESTION OF THE 'THREE FREEDOMS' REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 6.1 OF THE 'DRAFT FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT'. DURING THE LOWER-LEVEL TALKS, IT WAS ENUNCIATED BY THE TURKISH CYPRIOT SIDE THAT THOSE 'FREEDOMS' SHOULD BE REGULATED, AS ALREADY AGREED AT THE SUMMIT MEETING OF 1977, IN SUCH A WAY AS TO INSURE THAT THE SECURITY OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS WOULD NOT IN ANY WAY BE ENDANGERED AND THAT THE AGREED BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FEDERATION (I.E. BI-COMMUNALITY AND BI-ZONALITY) ARE PRESERVED AND PROTECTED''.

THE AGGRESSIVE TURKISH INTENTIONS AND THE BLANK TURKISH REFUSAL TO FACE UP TO THESE QUESTIONS IS APPARENT ALSO IN RECENT STATEMENTS BY TURKISH LEADERS THREATENING TO OCCUPY THE WHOLE OF CYPRUS. SUCH STATEMENTS PROVIDE FULL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE DEMAND THAT THE QUESTIONS OF TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND GUARANTEES MUST BE RESOLVED FIRST.

AS STATED EARLIER, NUMEROUS GREEK CYPRIOT CONCESSIONS HAVE BEEN MADE ON CONDITION THAT THE MAJOR QUESTIONS WOULD BE RESOLVED SPEEDILY. THE PICTURE REFLECTED IN THE ''DRAFT FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT'' IS ONE OF IMBALANCE AMONGST ITS VARIOUS ELEMENTS. THIS IMBALANCE MUST BE REDRESSED URGENTLY. IN THE LIGHT OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE ''DRAFT FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT'' A VALID EXPRESSION OF VIEWS ON SOME OF ITS ELEMENTS IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY INFORMATION ON THE MAJOR ELEMENTS IS IMPOSSIBLE. SOME VIEWS OF AN INDICATIVE NATURE ARE GIVEN BELOW ILLUSTRATING THE PROBLEMS POSED BY THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF ELEMENTS AND FULLY SUPPORTING THE SOUNDNESS OF OUR POSITION.

THE THREE FREEDOMS (PARA 6.1)

THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE CANNOT BE UNDERESTIMATED AS THE NON-APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO DEPARTURE FROM THOSE MINIMUM STANDARDS SET BY THE UNITED NATIONS IN ORDER TO ENSURE A DEMOCRATIC REGIME AND THE UNITY OF THE COUNTRY.

FURTHERMORE, THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE HAS ALWAYS ATTACHED THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO THE THREE FREEDOMS, AS THESE WILL ENSURE THE ABILITY OF REFUGEES TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES AND WILL KEEP THE WHOLE COUNTRY OPEN TO ALL ITS INHABITANTS. IT HAS THEREFORE INSISTED THAT THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND OF SETTLEMENT AND THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY AS SET OUT IN ARTICLES 13 AND 23 OF THE 1960 CONSTITUTION MUST BE IMPLEMENTED IN PRACTICE AND NOT MERELY AGREED IN PRINCIPLE.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE APPLICATION OF THE THREE FREEDOMS AND THE VITAL ISSUE OF TERRITORY BECOMES ABVIOUS. PART FROM ITS INHERENT IMPORTANCE, AS THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE RIGHTFUL EXPECTATIONS OF THE GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY REPRESENTING 82 0/0 OF THE CYPRIOT PEOPLE AND THOSE OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY REPRESENTING 18 0/0 OF THE CYPRIOT PEOPLE, IT IS ALSO CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES. INDEED, THROUGHOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE MAJOR SUSTAINING FACTOR FOR THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE HAS BEEN ITS DESIRE TO RESOLVE, THROUGH SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS, THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. THUS, WHEN THE VIENNA WORKING POINTS, WHICH FORMED THE BASIS OF YOUR CURRENT INITIATIVE, WERE ADOPTED IN AUGUST 1984, THE CRITERION, WITH REGARD TO TERRITORY, OF "THE NUMBER OF GREEK CYPRIOT DISPLACED PERSONS TO BE RESETTLED" WAS ~~NUMBER OF GREEK &XXXXX~~ TO BE A MAJOR FACTOR, AS WAS ALSO THE MUTUAL RECOMMITMENT OF THE TWO SIDES TO THE MAY 1979 HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT, POINT 5 OF WHICH PROVIDES FOR THE PRIORITY RESETTLEMENT OF VAROSHA.

THE OMISSION FROM THE "DRAFT FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT" OF THE YARDSTICK OF "THE NUMBER OF GREEK CYPRIOT DISPLACED PERSONS TO BE RESETTLED" CASTS DOUBTS ON SUCH RESETTLEMENT WHILST THE
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WORDING OF THE PROVISION RELATING TO THE RESETTLEMENT OF VAROSHA (PARA 10.1) RELEGATES IT TO AN INDEFINITE TIME IN THE FUTURE. THUS, ALTHOUGH THE 1979 HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT IS REAFFIRMED, THE APPLICABILITY OF ITS POINT 5 IS IN FACT PRECLUDED.

THE STATEMENT THAT THE TWO SIDES WILL HAVE IN MIND "THE QUESTIONS RELATED TO RESETTLEMENT" (PARA 7.1), RATHER THAN THE SPECIFIC RIGHTS OF GREEK CYPRIOT REFUGEES, IS A CAUSE OF GREAT ANXIETY TO THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE. THE NET EFFECT OF THE FORMULATION WOULD BE THAT A CRITERION RELATING TO A BASIC RIGHT LONG AGREED BY THE TWO SIDES AND THE BASIS, ON WHICH THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, WOULD BE SUBSTITUTED BY A NEW CRITERION WHICH MIGHT BE USED TO PROTECT SETTLERS AND OTHERS WHO HAVE USURPED GREEK CYPRIOT REFUGEES' HOMES, LANDS AND PROPERTIES.

IT SHOULD ALSO BE POINTED OUT THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE HAS NEVER AGREED TO THE FIGURE "IN THE ORDER OF 29+ PER CENT" (PARA 7.1). FURTHERMORE, THE UNDERSTANDING CONTAINED IN NON-PAPAER 2 (NOVEMBER 1984) AND REPEATED TOT HE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE AT THE LOWER LEVEL TALKS, THAT THE LINE ON VAROSHA, AS PER THE TURKISH MAP OF AUGUST 1981, DOES NOT REPRESENT THE LAST WORD, IS OMITTED (PARA 10.1).

THE FORMULATION OF PARAGRAPH 7.1 HAS FURTHER SUFFERED THROUGH THE INTRODUCTION OF THE ELEMENT OF "PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES WHICH MAY ARISE FOR THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY". THIS QUOTATION, WHICH IS EXTRACTED FROM GUIDELINE 3 OF THE HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENT OF 1977, RELATES EXCLUSIVELY TO THE THREE FREEDOMS. THE EXTENSION OF THE "PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES" IDEA TO THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION REPRESENTS AN UNWARRANTED EXTENSION OF A GUIDELINE. THE EXTENSION HAS NOT BEEN AGREED UPON BY THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE. IT IS THEREFORE MOST SURPRISING THAT IT SHOULD NOW FIND ITS WAY INTO THE "DRAFT FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT". THE FORMULATION OF THIS PARAGRAPH ALSO VIRTUALLY NEGATES THE PROPOSITION OF SPECIAL STATUS AREAS.

ADEQUATE INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES (PARA 8.1)

THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE HAS ALWAYS INSISTED ON ADEQUATE INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES. THIS EMANATES FROM ITS EXPERIENCE OF THE ARBITRARY INTERPRETATION OF THE 1960 TREATY OF GUARANTEE GIVEN BY TURKEY WHEN ATTEMPTING TO JUSTIFY ITS INVASION OF CYPRUS IN 1974. THE GREEK CYPRIOT POSITION IS THAT ANY TREATY OF GUARANTEE, IF AGREED TO BE NECESSARY, WOULD BE A MULTILATERAL ONE NOT GIVING UNILATERAL RIGHTS TO ANY ONE COUNTRY. AS TO THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SCHEME OF GUARANTEES, THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE HAS ALWAYS EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT STATES WITH DIRECT INTERESTS IN CYPRUS SHOULD NOT BE INVOLVED IN SUCH A SCHEME.

HOWEVER, IN AN ATTEMPT TO SEEK AGREEMENT, IT ACCEPTED THE FORMULATION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT IT WOULD NOT A PRIORI EXCLUDE ANY GUARANTOR, IN EXCHANGE FOR A COMMITMENT OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT SIDE THAT IT WOULD NOT EXCLUDE A PRIORI ANY DATE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE TURKISH TROOPS. THE 'DRAFT FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT', UNDER THE INNOCENT HEADING OF POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, DEFENCE (2.1.(1)) REINTRODUCES THE TERMS 'TREATIES OF GUARANTEE AND OF ALLIANCE' IN PREFERENCE TO THE PREVIOUS TERMINOLOGY OF 'INTERNATIONAL TREATIES'. THIS HAS NEVER BEEN AGREED.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE AGREEMENT FOR A FEDERAL SOLUTION BUT TO THE EXCLUSION OF A CONFEDERAL ONE, THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE FINDS THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS WHICH ARE ENVISAGED IN THE 'DRAFT FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT' (PARAS 3 AND 4) TO BE CONTRARY TO THE FEDERAL CONCEPT AND UNWORKABLE. IT HAS ALWAYS INSISTED ON THE FUNCTIONALITY OF ANY CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. THE PRINCIPLES OF FUNCTIONALITY AND WORKABILITY OF THE FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS WERE EXPRESSLY STATED IN THE VIENNA WORKING POINTS OF 1984. IT IS AN IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION WHICH MUST BE SATISFIED. YET THE WORDING OF THE 'DRAFT FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT' IS SUCH AS TO CONVERT THIS PRIMARY CONSIDERATION INTO A MERE SUPPLEMENTARY AFTERTHOUGHT.

THE UNWORKABILITY OF THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS ENVISAGED IN THE 'DRAFT FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT' (PARAS 3 AND 4), COUPLED WITH ANY CLAIMED RIGHTS OF INTERVENTION UNDER A TREATY OF GUARANTEE WHICH THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE IS NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT, WOULD BE DISASTROUS FOR THE FUTURE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS. THIS IS OBVIOUS FROM A STUDY OF THE PROVISION RELATING TO WEIGHTED VOTING (PARAS 3.1 AND 4.3), VETO POWERS (PARA 4.2) AND DEADLOCK-RESOLVING MACHINERY (PARAS 3.2 AND 4.4).

THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE IS, AND HAS ALWAYS BEEN, OPPOSED TO A GENERAL PRACTICE OF WEIGHTED VOTING IN THE EXECUTIVE FUNCTION SUCH AS PROCESS WOULD INEVITABLE IMPEDE THE EXECUTIVE FUNCTION AND CREATE CONSTANT DEADLOCKS. FOR THIS REASON, THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE WAS ONLY PREPARED TO CONSIDER IT IN RELATION TO MATTERS OF SPECIAL CONCERN TO THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY.

ANOTHER RELATIVE FACTOR IS THE EXTENT OF VETOES. UNDER THE 1960 CONSTITUTION, VETOES OVER EXECUTIVE DECISIONS ARE CONFINED TO DECISIONS RELATING TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND SECURITY (ARTICLES 50 AND 57 OF THE 1960 CONSTITUTION). THE 'DRAFT FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT' EXTENDS VETOES BEYOND THIS SCOPE (PARA 4.2). IN ANY CASE, THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE CONSIDERS THAT WEIGHTED VOTING IN MATTERS OF SPECIAL CONCERN TO THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY WOULD MAKE PROVISIONS WITH REGARD TO VETOES SUPERFLUOUS AND WOULD RENDER AN ALREADY CUMBERSOME EXECUTIVE EVEN LESS FUNCTIONAL AND MORE UNWORKABLE.

ANOTHER ELEMENT CONDUCTIVE TO FUNCTIONALITY OF GOVERNMENT IS SPEEDY AND EFFECTIVE DEADLOCK-RESOLVING MACHINERY IN BOTH THE EXECUTIVE AND THE LEGISLATURE. THE PROCEDURE NOW ENVISAGED (PARAS 3.2 AND 4.4) IS CUMBERSOME AND SO DEPENDENT ON CONSIDERATIONS THAT MUST FIRST BE SATISFIED, AS TO BE VIRTUALLY INEFFECTIVE, RENDERING THE GOVERNMENT ORGANS IMPOTENT.

ANOTHER FACTOR CONNECTED WITH INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES IS THE QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY WHICH IS CLOSELY LINKED WITH THE ESSENTIAL ATTRIBUTE OF SOVEREIGNTY AND IS VITAL IN ENSURING THE UNITY OF THE COUNTRY AND THE LIMITATION OF DISPUTES. FOR THESE REASONS AND IN THE LIGHT OF ITS COMMITMENT TO A FEDERAL SOLUTION, THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE HAS INSISTED ALL ALONG THAT IT SHOULD BE BEYOND DOUBT THAT ONLY THE FEDERATION AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD HAVE INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY.

ANY FORMULATION WHICH IS OPEN TO MISREPRESENTATION AND CONFUSION WOULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO THE VIABILITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE FUTURE FEDERATION.

WITHDRAWAL OF ALL NON-CYPRIOT TROOPS AND ELEMENTS (PARA 8.1)

THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE'S POSITION IN THE CURRENT INITIATIVE HAS BEEN THAT ALL TURKISH TROOPS WILL WITHDRAW BEFORE

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ANY TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT. IT WOULD BE IRRESPONSIBLE FOR ANY GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS TO AGREE TO DISSOLVE ITSELF AND TO HAND OVER TO A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT WHEN THERE WERE TURKISH TROOPS ON ITS SOIL AND WHEN THERE WERE 60,000 TURKISH COLONIST SETTLERS, RELATED TO THE DEMAND FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF SETTLERS BUT ALSO MORE GENERALLY IMPORTANT, IS THE NEED TO CLARIFY UNDER THE POWERS OF THE FEDERATION QUESTIONS RELATING TO IMMIGRATION, NATIONALITY AND PASSPORTS.

THE ABSENCE FROM THE 'DRAFT FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT' OF ANY PROVISION FOR A DEFINITE TIMETABLE FOR THE SPEEDY DEPARTURE OF ALL TURKISH TROOPS BEFORE A TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS ESTABLISHED AND THE INCLUSION OF A PROVISION THAT MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS A CONTINUATION OF THE TREATIES OF GUARANTEE AND ALLIANCE (PARA 2.1.(1))- WHICH TURKEY INTERPRETS AS GIVING IT THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN CYPRUS-WOULD HAVE CALAMITOUS CONSEQUENCES ON THE FUTURE OF CYPRUS. NOT ONLY WOULD THE 'DRAFT FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT' ENTITLE THE TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADERSHIP TO CONTEND THAT TURKISH TROOPS SHOULD REMAIN IN CYPRUS AFTER DISSOLUTION OF THE PRESENT REPUBLIC AND THE HAND-OVER OF POWER TO AN IMPOTENT TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT, BUT IT WOULD EVEN PERMIT THE TURKISH CYPRIOT LEADERSHIP TO CONTEND (A CONTENTION REASSERTED IN MR. DENKTASH'S LETTER OF 21 APRIL 1986) THAT WITHDRAWAL OF ALL TURKISH TROOPS CANNOT BE TIMETABLED EVEN AT A HIGH LEVEL MEETING.

THE COMBINATION OF TURKISH TROOPS, UNILATERAL RIGHTS OF TURKISH INTERVENTION FOR EXTINCTION OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CYPRUS, AND WOULD ALSO JEOPARDISE INTERNATIONAL PEACE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE EARLY WITHDRAWAL OF THE TURKISH TROOPS WOULD GREATLY CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY IN THE AREA.

THESE REASONS, ABOVE ALL OTHERS, DEMONSTRATE THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE'S JUSTIFIABLE ANXIETY THAT THE QUESTION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL TURKISH TROOPS AND SETTLERS AND THE MATTER OF GUARANTEES MUST BE RESOLVED FIRST.

YOU WILL RECALL OF THE NUMEROUS AND LONGSTANDING ASSURANCES THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE TURKISH TROOPS AND ELEMENTS, I.E. SETTLERS, AND INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES WOULD BE DISCUSSED AT THE FIRST HIGH LEVEL MEETING.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

WE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN ANXIOUS TO SEE AGREEMENT ON AN EFFICIENT NEGOTIATING PROCESS LEADING TO AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT. IT IS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT THE GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE HAS INSISTED THAT IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUES SHOULD BE DEALT WITH AT THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE POLITICAL LEVEL. IN THE CASE OF THE ISSUES OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF TURKISH TROOPS AND SETTLERS AND INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES WE HAVE ALREADY PROPOSED THAT THESE SHOULD BE DEALT WITH EITHER BY AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OR A HIGH LEVEL MEETING. THE QUESTION OF THE THREE FREEDOMS SHOULD BE DEALT WITH AT A HIGH LEVEL MEETING. THE TWO PROPOSALS SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS BEING CONFLICTING BUT RATHER AS BEING COMPLEMENTARY.

THE INTEGRATED WHOLE APPROACH IMPLIES THAT ISSUES WHICH HAVE NEVER BEEN DISCUSSED BEFORE MUST BE BROUGHT INTO THE FOREGROUND WITHOUT DELAY. THIS HAS BEEN HIGHLIGHTED EARLIER. WE THEREFORE PROPOSE ONCE AGAIN, MR. SECRETARY-GENERAL, THAT YOU CONVENE AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OR A HIGH LEVEL MEETING TO CONSIDER URGENTLY THOSE ISSUES WHICH HAVE NEVER BEEN DEALT WITH, MORE SPECIFICALLY THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE TURKISH TROOPS AND SETTLERS, THE QUESTION OF GUARANTEES AND THE APPLICATION OF THE THREE FREEDOMS.

WHEN THE SUBSTANTIVE DECISIONS FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE THREE MAJOR ISSUES IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS ARE TAKEN AS A MATTER OF PRIORITY, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO ASSESS TOGETHER THE JOINT RESULTS OF THE OUTCOME OF THIS HIGH LEVEL MEETING OR INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AND THE CONTENT OF YOUR "DRAFT FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT".

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

I SHOULD LIKE TO ASSURE YOU OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH YOU IN PURSUING THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS FURTHER AND THROUGH IT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM.

PLEASE ACCEPT, YOUR EXCELLENCY, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

(SPYROS KYPRIANOU)
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS.

UNQUOTE

ME NEOTERO TELEX THA SAS STALI EPIHIRIMATOLOGIA I OPIA KATA TO MEGISTO MEROS SAS INE GNOSTI APO PROIGOUMENA TILEMINIMATA MAS KE EGGRAFA MAS. SIMIOSTE OTI I EMPISTEFTIKOTIS TIS APANTISIS ISHII MONO GIA MIA-DIO MERES GIATI THA DIMOSIEFTHI OS PARARTIMA TIS EKTHESIS G.G. PROS TO SIMVOULIO ASFALIAS, GI AFTO APOSTELLETE ANIKTA.

G.D.
/MAM, KP, LV