



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

10 July 1986

Dear Charles

Arms Control: Prime Minister's Talks with Shevardnadze,
14 July

I enclose, as requested in your letter of 1 July, a note setting out the main details of the most recent Soviet arms control proposals, together with the most recent US proposals and an indication of what, in the light of our existing knowledge, might be a "tolerable result", although clearly it would be premature to settle on our bottom line now. Owing to his absence abroad, I have not been able to seek the Foreign Secretary's views on this note, but it has been cleared with Mr Renton and MOD Ministers. If Sir Geoffrey Howe has further comments, I shall of course ensure that you are made aware of these.

I am sending copies of this letter to John Howe and Christopher Mallaby.

Yours ever

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
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SECRET

EAST-WEST ARMS CONTROL : SUMMARY OF MAIN POINTS AT ISSUE

<u>START</u>	<u>INF</u>	<u>Space/Defence</u>	<u>Linkages</u>	<u>Chemical</u>	<u>Conventional</u>
1. Definition of systems to be covered	1. Extent of US deployments in Europe	1. Future of ABMT	1. Degree to which agreements can be concluded separately, or must depend on progress/agreement in other areas	1. Stringency of challenge inspection regime	1. Special treatment for Central Front in Europe
2. Treatment of new systems	2. Treatment of Asian systems on each side	2. Definitions of ambiguities		2. Limits on civil industry	2. Extent of verification
3. Handling of long-range cruise missiles heavy bombers.	3. Verification	3. Extent of systems to continue to be banned		3. Initial declaration of stocks	3. Inclusion of equipment/material.
4. Aggregation of separate systems	4. Third-country forces	4. Degree of permissible research		4. Constitution of international body.	4. Precise geographical limits.
5. Verification	5. Collateral constraints on shorter-range systems.	5. Current compliance.			
6. Throwweight					
7. Mobile ICBMs.					

I. START

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Soviet Proposals</u> <u>June 1985</u>	<u>Soviet Proposals</u> <u>1 Oct 1985</u>	<u>US Proposals</u> <u>1 Nov 1985</u>	<u>UK Views</u>
Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs)	1,600 ICBM, SLBM, heavy bombers and SLCM launchers	1,680 US) ICBM) SLBM 1,250 Sov) bombers (but US total to include PBS and LRINF).	1,250-1,450 ICBM/SLBM 350 heavy bombers + 1,800 total	Seeking deepest reductions possible. Soviet June proposals step backward in that respect. Agree on need to capture SS18 and SS19 force. Some aggregation of SNDV totals may be necessary.
Warheads/"Nuclear Charges"	a) 6,000 if US accept all space/defence proposals b) 8,000 if only 29 May proposals (ABMT) agreed.	6,000	4,500 ballistic missile warheads + 1,500 ALCMs.	BH warheads and bomber weapons not to be equated.
Warheads Sub-Limits	a) 3,600 b) 4,800 on any one leg of triad (as above)	3,600 on any one leg	3,000 ICBM re-entry vehicles (RVs)	Need to constrain Soviet ICBM warhead numbers.
New Types/Modernisation	Ban or limits on SNDVs not flight-tested at date of agreement.	Ban on all new types.	Ban on new heavy ICBMs and mobile ICBMs.	Need to maintain UK ability to deploy Trident D5, and prevent any relevant constraints therefore on US programmes. US position on mobiles may require adjustment.
Cruise Missiles (CM)	Ban on all CM on surface ships; limits on SLCM- carrying submarines. Long range ALCMs permitted.	Ban on all CMs over 600 km range.	No limits on SLCMs, some (see above) on ALCMs	Some constraints on SLCMs could be acceptable, if verifiable.
Throwweight (TW)	None.	None	50% Soviet reduction	Reduce 3:1 Soviet advantage.

II. INF (Note: all proposals below remain on table)

Soviet INF proposals
of 15 January
(subsequently tabled
at Geneva)

Soviet "interim" proposals
of 14 October 1985

US proposals
24 February 1986

US "interim" proposals
of 1 November 1985

UK View

Destruction of all US-Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles in Europe by 1993. UK and France not to increase; US not to transfer missiles.

Two further stages leading to elimination of all nuclear weapons by 2000.

Verification to include on-site inspection (OSI)

- US to freeze as of 1 Dec 1985 and Soviet Union to continue its freeze.
- Then US reductions over 18 months to 100-120 cruise (GLCM) - no Pershing II.
- SS20s in Europe reduced to total of US GLCMs plus number of UK/French warheads.
- Freeze on SS20 in Asia.
- Finally, no US deployments, Russian forces limited to UK/French levels.

US/Soviet Union to reduce to 140 LRINF launchers by end 1987; proportionate Soviet reductions in Asia.

Further reductions of 50% in Europe and Asia by end 1988.

Zero globally by end 1989.

SRINF constraints.

Forces of third countries excluded.

Detailed verification.

- Equal global limits on LRINF warheads.
- US cap of 140 PII/GLCM launchers in Europe

- SS20s launchers in range of Europe reduced to 140.

- proportionate reductions (ie about 50%) in SS20s in Soviet Asia.

- SRINF constraints.

- Forces of third countries excluded.

- Global limit on warheads.

Support for both US proposals (nonetheless misgivings about zero-zero. Need global solution.
- Insistence on exclusion of third country forces (Soviet "compensation" and no increase/no transfer demands unacceptable) and safeguards against circumvention through constraints in SRINF (notably SS22 and SS23).

- Adequate verification (but need to scrutinise details affecting UK territory), for LRINF plus collateral constraints on shorter-range systems.

III. Space/Defence Basket

	<u>Soviet June Proposals</u>	<u>Previous Soviet Position</u>	<u>US Position</u>	<u>UK View</u>
1. <u>ABM Treaty</u>	a) no withdrawal commitment for 15-20 years b) clarification of terms in ABM Treaty (eg. component, prototype)	No previous proposals, but Treaty seen as immutable. Not prepared to engage in dialogue on offensive/defensive relationship.	Seeking discussion of offensive/defensive relationship with view to co-operative transition to more defence-oriented strategic regime.	Want Treaty clarified/strengthened. Means of resolving problem of offensive/defensive relationship. If Soviet proposals handled correctly, could be positive step. But need for caution about extent of Soviet movement, and more details.
2. <u>BMD Research</u>	Limited to level of laboratory research, with perhaps some constraints even on that.	Soviet BMD permissible, but "purposeful" US SDI not, since intended as first stage in development of new ABM system. Verification to monitor compliance with Treaty obligations i.e. no research designed to exceed Treaty limits.	SDI not negotiable. Conducted within restrictive interpretation of ABM Treaty, though broader justified. Commitment to discuss with Allies stages beyond research and discuss/negotiate with Soviet Union. No Soviet veto on deployments. "Open laboratories" to verify compliance of SDI with treaty obligations.	Restrictive interpretation of Treaty crucial. Soviet proposal may be acceptable if permits US research only.
3. <u>ASATs</u>	Total ban	Total Ban	Total ban not acceptable. Claims ready to seek ASAT limitations, but no evidence of this.	Some limits acceptable (eg. high altitude), provided verifiable.
4. <u>Offensive Use of Defensive Weapons</u>	Ban on space-based systems capable of attacking targets on earth/in air. But now exclude space-based systems capable of attacking space targets and land-based systems.	Ban on "space-strike weapons" defined as weapons based in space intended to attack objects in space, air or on earth; and weapons - wherever based - intended to attack space objects.	Ban on space-strike-weapons unacceptable as constraint on SDI.	Soviet exclusion of space weapons interesting. But might be re-included through Treaty re-definitions.

IV. Linkages

(i) US proposals envisage no formal linkages. That is UK preference.

(ii) Soviet proposals of May/June for cuts in strategic systems envisage:

(a) 30% cuts

achieved under the following conditions

- ABMT 15 year no-withdrawal commitment and* clarification of terms;
- Agreed definition on permissible research;*
- No increase in US forward-based systems (missiles and aircraft) including relevant carrier-based aircraft;
- elimination of LRINF in Europe;*
- no deployment of LRINF anywhere in world within range of Soviet Union where not already deployed.

Comment: concessions on BMD research and the willingness to discuss ABM Treaty issues is balanced by re-introduction of link with the INF talks, and unacceptable conditions on latter. But those elements marked * still unclear.

(b) 50% cuts

achieved under the following conditions

- all the above, except that the Soviet Union would drop its concession on forward-based systems;
- plus: ban on ASATs
ban on offensive use of defensive weapons.

Comment: Soviet Union has increased conditionality for a 50% reduction.

(iii) Existing Soviet INF proposals still contain conditions on "no-increase" in third country systems, plus a ban on transfer of US strategic and medium-range missiles to other countries. Soviet Union has portrayed dropping of no-modernisation condition for 3rd country forces as major concession. No-transfer provision obviously directed primarily at the UK, and wholly unacceptable.

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V. CHEMICAL WEAPONS

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Soviet/Socialist</u> <u>Position</u>	<u>US/Western</u> <u>Position</u>	<u>UK</u> <u>Position</u>
<u>Areas of Agreement</u> (in principle)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ban on all aspects of CW. 2. Existing stocks/production facilities to be destroyed over 10 years. 3. Each state permitted one facility for defensive research. 4. Routine verification of destruction of stocks/production facilities; research facility; and (recently) civil industry. 5. Need for organisation to implement CW Convention. 		
<u>Other Areas:</u>			
Verification	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. No verification of accuracy of initial stockpile declarations. 2. Accept <u>challenge</u> inspection in principle but with right of refusal; and procedural and timing arrangements which would make challenge an ineffective deterrent. 	<p>Inspection of weapons stocks, "on agreed basis" to confirm accuracy.</p> <p>"Anytime/Anywhere" inspection on challenge at 24 hours notice. No rights of refusal of access.</p>	<p>Current Western position may be unnecessarily stringent.</p> <p>Stringent challenge inspection regime essential. New UK proposal envisages limited right of refusal i.e. no ultimate right of inspection. If inspection refused, a state must satisfy its challenge by other means and within a tight timescale.</p>
Organisation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3. Main authority to rest with weak Consultative Committee. 	<p>Main authority to rest with strong Executive Council.</p>	<p>Western position based on UK ideas.</p>

VI. Conventional Arms Control

<u>Soviet Proposals</u>	<u>Western Proposals</u>	<u>UK View</u>
(a) <u>CDE</u> : Agreement that includes	Agreement that includes	Agreement that includes
i) Treaty on Non Use of Force	Reaffirmation of Principle of Non Use of Force	Reaffirmation of Principle of Non Use of Force
ii) Prior Notification of Independent Air Activities	Prior Notification of Ground and functionally related Naval and Air activities only.	Prior Notification of similar activities only as in Western proposal ^a
iii) Prior Notification of Ground Manoeuvres above 18,000 men	Prior Notification of Ground Activities above 6,000 men	Prior Notification of Ground Activities above 10,000 men.
iv) Observation of some, but not all, notifiable activities	Mandatory observation of all notifiable activities	Mandatory observation of all notifiable activities
v) Verification through National Technical Means plus consultations	Verification through National Technical Means plus on-site inspection without right of refusal.	Verification through National Technical Means plus on-site inspection without right of refusal.
vi) Annual Calendar of notifiable activities	Annual Calendar of notifiable activities	Annual Calendar of notifiable activities
vii) Limits on size of military exercises	-	No limits on size of military exercises
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(b) <u>MBFR</u> : Time limited agreement involving 6,500 / 11,500 US/Soviet reductions, followed by a three year No-Increase commitment. Verification on basis of exchanges of gross manpower totals plus limited on-site inspections on basis of well-substantiated requests with right of refusal.	Time limited agreement on lines of Soviet proposal, but with 5,000/11,500 US/Soviet reductions. Verification on basis of exchanges of breakdown of manpower down to battalion (with locations) plus 30 mandatory on-site inspections per side per year.	Time limited agreement with limited, asymmetrical US/Soviet reductions. Verification as in current Western proposal.
Objective already agreed by all is parity at 900,000 troops in the reductions zone.		
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(c) <u>Budapest Appeal</u> : Reductions from Atlantic to Urals of 100-150,000 men in one to two years, with subsequent reductions to 25% of totals by early 1990s. Armaments of withdrawn troops dismantled or stored on national territories, including tactical nuclear weapons up to 1,000 km range.		Reductions that take account of particular Western security requirements on the Central Front. Nuclear Weapons to be excluded. NATO Task Force on new initiative to report by December.