

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

PS  
 PS/LADY YOUNG  
 PS/MR RENTON  
 PS/PUS  
 MR DEREK THOMAS  
 MR GOODALL  
~~MR ROTTGER~~  
 MR ~~DAUNT~~ DAUNT  
 MR DAVID THOMAS

MR POWELL, NO 10 DOWNING ST  
 MR D NICHOLLS, DUS(P) } MOD  
 B. NPS( ) }  
 DACU }  
 CDI }

HD/DEFENCE D  
 HD/ACDD  
 HD/SOVIET D

RESIDENT CLERK

15.1.85

WNS 1700

CONFIDENTIAL

FM MOSCOW

TO DESKBY 101600Z FCO

TELNO 845

OF 101440Z JULY 86

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY: DR OWEN'S CALL ON DOBRYNIN

1. AT HIS INVITATION, I ACCOMPANIED DR DAVID OWEN ON HIS CALL ON DOBRYNIN (SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN CHARGE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS) ON 10 JULY, FOR WHICH I HAD EARLIER PUT IN A REQUEST ON HIS BEHALF.

(DR OWEN HAS JUST COMPLETED A SHORT VISIT TO MOSCOW FOR A PREPARATORY MEETING OF THE PALME COMMISSION). THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF THE MAIN POINTS WHICH AROSE DURING A DISCUSSION LASTING FOR ONE AND THREE QUARTER HOURS MAY BE OF INTEREST IN THE CONTEXT OF SHEVARDNAZDE'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO LONDON.

ARMS CONTROL

2. AFTER A SHORT INTRODUCTORY EXCHANGE ON PALME COMMISSION BUSINESS (FROM WHICH, INCIDENTALLY, IT EMERGED THAT THE COMMISSION HAS IT IN MIND TO LAUNCH IN OCTOBER PROPOSALS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS WHICH BEAR A STRIKING RESEMBLANCE TO THOSE DISCUSSED AT THE HEADS OF MISSION ARMS CONTROL CONFERENCE IN THE FCO ON 7 JULY) THERE WAS A LONG AND DETAILED EXCHANGE ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES:

(1) UK/FRENCH SYSTEMS.

DOBRYNIN SAID THAT IF, AS THE SOVIET UNION HOPED, AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED WITH THE US ON 50% REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS, UK AND FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES SHOULD BE COUNTED IN AT THAT STAGE, FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW THERE WAS NO POINT IN SIGNING A

FORCES SHOULD BE COUNTED IN AT THAT STAGE. FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW THERE WAS NO POINT IN SIGNING A REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT WITH THE US IF THE AMERICANS STILL RETAINED THE OPTION OF TRANSFERRING IMMEDIATELY TO THEIR CLOSEST ALLY ADVANCED STRATEGIC SYSTEMS (WHETHER TRIDENT OR ANYTHING ELSE) WHICH WOULD RETAIN SUPERIORITY FOR NATO. THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT GUNNING SPECIFICALLY FOR TRIDENT, BUT FOR AN OPTION WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE US TO CIRCUMVENT SALT 2 AND ANY FUTURE REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO AGREE TO A ZERO SOLUTION ON INF IN EUROPE, UK AND FRENCH SYSTEMS COULD REMAIN IN PLACE, THOUGH WITHOUT FURTHER ENHANCEMENT.

(11) LATEST SOVIET PROPOSALS. DOBRYNIN SUMMARISED THESE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) THE TWO SIDES SHOULD COMMIT THEMSELVES NOT TO BREAK OUT OF THE ABM TREATY FOR 15 YEARS 'OR FOR SOME LESSER PERIOD'. THIS WOULD NOT REQUIRE RE-NEGOTIATION OF THE WHOLE TREATY BUT COULD BE AGREED BY MEANS OF A NEW PROTOCOL.

(B) AGREEMENT ON A BAN ON ASATS.

(C) AGREEMENT ON THE FRONTIERS OF THE RESEARCH PERMITTED UNDER THE ABM TREATY. THE US HAD TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF THE TREATY AND WERE CURRENTLY ESPOUSING THE MORE RESTRICTIVE OF THOSE: IT WAS NECESSARY TO DO AWAY WITH AMBIGUITY AND REACH AN INTERPRETATION AGREED BY BOTH SIDES.

(D) THE SOVIET UNION HAD OFFERED AN ALTERNATIVE: EITHER A 50% REDUCTION OR REDUCTIONS TO 8,000 WARHEADS AND 1,600 DELIVERY VEHICLES, LEAVING FBS UNTOUCHED.

DOBRYNIN SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD SO FAR RECEIVED NO RESPONSE FROM THE US TO ANY OF THESE IDEAS: THE SOVIET SIDE REMAINED OPEN TO ANY COUNTER SUGGESTIONS.

#### NON-COMPLIANCE

---

3. DOBRYNIN MAINTAINED THAT CURRENT SOVIET PRACTICE WITH REGARD TO ENCRYPTION WAS ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH THE AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN KISSINGER AND GROMYKO IN WHICH, SPECIFICALLY AT US REQUEST, A DEGREE OF VAGUENESS HAD DELIBERATELY BEEN INCORPORATED.

#### NUCLEAR TESTING

---

4. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, DOBRYNIN CONFIRMED THAT US RATIFICATION OF THE THRESHOLD AND PNE TREATIES WOULD BE OF SIGNIFICANT HELP IN THE CONTEXT OF SUMMIT PROSPECTS. SINCE THE TREATIES HAD BEEN CONCLUDED, SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION HAD IMPROVED TO AN EXTENT AT WHICH THEY WERE NOW MORE THAN ADEQUATE TO VERIFY TESTS OF THE RELEVANT MAGNITUDE. IN ANY CASE, BOTH TREATIES CONTAINED A PROVISION THAT THEIR EFFECTIVENESS COULD BE REVIEWED AFTER ONE YEAR POST-RATIFICATION. UNLIKE THE US, THE SOVIET UNION SAW NO NEED TO RE-NEGOTIATE THE TREATIES.

5. MBFR.

---

DOBRYNIN ARGUED THAT THE MASSIVE VERIFICATION APPARATUS PUT FORWARD BY THE WEST IN DECEMBER WAS QUITE INAPPROPRIATE

DOBRYNIN ARGUED THAT THE MASSIVE VERIFICATION APPARATUS PUT FORWARD BY THE WEST IN DECEMBER WAS QUITE INAPPROPRIATE TO THE MINUTE SCALE OF REDUCTIONS PROPOSED: THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS SIGNIFICANT VERIFICATION IN THE CONTEXT OF LARGER REDUCTIONS AND OF THE LARGER ATLANTIC/URALS REDUCTIONS ZONE. DOBRYNIN RULED OUT EVEN A PARTIAL MBFR AGREEMENT AS POTENTIAL SUMMIT MATERIAL.

CDE

6. ON CDE, DOBRYNIN SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY TO DO A DEAL IN STOCKHOLM IN THE INTERESTS OF PRODUCING AN AGREED OUTCOME BEFORE 19 SEPTEMBER. (THIS SQUARE WITH WHAT HE AND SHEVARDNADZE EARLIER TOLD THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER, WHOSE DEBRIEFING I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY). THE SOVIET DELEGATE IN STOCKHOLM WOULD SHORTLY BE TABLING NEW PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD DEMONSTRATE THE SOVIET WILL TO REACH AGREEMENT.

#### SUMMIT PROSPECTS

7. DOBRYNIN SAID THAT HE STILL THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE THAT A SUMMIT COULD BE HELD IN DECEMBER THIS YEAR AND THE MOSCOW SUMMIT IN 1987: THE FIRST MIGHT PRODUCE A RELATIVELY MODEST RESULT AND THE SECOND A MORE SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENT. IT WAS UP TO THE AMERICANS TO AGREE TO CONCENTRATE NOW ON ONE OR TWO AREAS OF POSSIBLE AGREEMENT, ON WHICH INTENSIVE WORK COULD BE CARRIED ON DURING THE NEXT FOUR MONTHS IN ORDER TO HAVE AN AGREEMENT 85% READY IN ADVANCE OF A DECEMBER SUMMIT MEETING. IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO DEVISE SOME KIND OF 'BACK CHANNEL' FOR THIS PURPOSE. AT THE MOMENT, HOWEVER, THERE WAS SIMPLY NOTHING TO DISCUSS VIA A BACK CHANNEL: THE AMERICANS WERE INSISTING THAT THE SOVIET SIDE SHOULD PROPOSE A SUMMIT DATE BEFORE SUBSTANTIAL DISCUSSIONS COULD BEGIN, WHEREAS THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP FOR ITS PART WAS INSISTING THAT AGREEMENT ON A POSSIBLE AGENDA MUST PRECEDE AGREEMENT ON DATES. GORBACHEV COULD NOT TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON WITHOUT THE ASSURANCE OF A SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOME.

#### MIDDLE EAST

8. DOBRYNIN CONFIRMED, IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM DR OWEN BASED ON BBC REPORTS, THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD PROPOSED TO MITTERRAND THAT THERE SHOULD BE A PREPARATORY MEETING OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AT THE EARLIEST MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE DATE, TO PAVE THE WAY FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST. (RAYMOND, IN HIS DEBRIEFING OF THE 12, HAD REFERRED TO 'INDICATIONS OF A POSSIBLE SOVIET INITIATIVE FOR A MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE').

DOBRYNIN STRESSED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE SHOULD BE A PROCESS RATHER THAN AN OCCASION: AN INITIAL SESSION COULD PREPARE THE WAY FOR A MULTIPLICITY OF DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS IN A VARIETY OF FORA, WHICH COULD THEN BE DRAWN TOGETHER IN A FINAL PLENARY SESSION. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD AS YET GIVEN NO THOUGHT TO A POSSIBLE ROLE FOR THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL, NOR HAD ANY RECENT APPROACH BEEN MADE TO THE UNITED STATES. DOBRYNIN DID NOT REFER TO A US/SOVIET CO-CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE.

9. ON SOVIET/ISRAELI RELATIONS, DOBRYNIN SAID THAT THERE

CONFERENCE.

9. ON SOVIET/ISRAELI RELATIONS, DOBRYNIN SAID THAT THERE WAS NOT MUCH MOVEMENT AT PRESENT. GIVEN SOME CHANGE IN ISRAELI POLICIES TOWARDS THE WEST BANK, IT WAS POSSIBLE TO ENVISAGE THE EVENTUAL OPENING UP OF SOVIET/ISRAELI RELATIONS, PERHAPS BEGINNING WITH THE APPOINTMENT OF A CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN EACH CAPITAL.

AFGHANISTAN

10. ON AFGHANISTAN, DOBRYNIN SAID THAT THE MAJOR OBSTACLE TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WAS STILL PAKISTANI RELUCTANCE TO GIVE A GUARANTEE OF NON-INTERFERENCE FOLLOWING THE SIGNATURE OF AN AGREEMENT. PAKISTANI INSISTENCE ON A RIGID TIMETABLE FOR AND VERIFICATION OF TROOP WITHDRAWALS ALSO CREATED DIFFICULTIES.

HUMAN RIGHTS

11. DR OWEN RAISED THE CASE OF IRINA RATUSHINSKAYA, OF WHOM DOBRYNIN PROFESSED COMPLETE IGNORANCE. DR OWEN SAID THAT CONCERN FOR RATUSHINSKAYA WAS BUILDING UP IN THE UK AND THAT SHEVARDNADZE MIGHT WELL BE AWARE OF IT (I.E. BY DEMONSTRATIONS DURING HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO LONDON). DOBRYNIN COUNTERED WITH THE ALLEGATION THAT MRS BONNER'S JOURNEYS TO THE WEST WERE MADE FOR POLITICAL RATHER THAN MEDICAL REASONS SINCE SHE HAD BEEN GIVEN NO TREATMENT IN THE WEST WHICH SHE COULD NOT HAVE RECEIVED EQUALLY WELL IN THE SOVIET UNION.

COMMENT

12. THE CALL PROVIDED A USEFUL READ-OUT ON CURRENT SOVIET POSITIONS ON THE EVE OF SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT. DOBRYNIN SHOWED NO INCLINATION TO CONFUSE, MISCHIEVOUSLY OR OTHERWISE, THE VIEWS OF THE SDP WITH THOSE OF HMG. I WAS ABLE AT VARIOUS POINTS TO SPEAK ON HMG'S BEHALF, E.G. ON THE DESIRABILITY OF AN AD HOC COMMITTEE OF THE CD, WITH A NON-NEGOTIATING MANDATE, TO THRASH OUT NUCLEAR TEST ISSUES SEMICOLON AND ON THE CAMP DAVID 'FOUR POINTS'.

CARTLEDGE

YYYY

MXHPAN 3781

NNNN