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 FM UKMIS GENEVA  
 TO DESKBY 080915Z FCC  
 TELNO 473  
 OF 080837Z AUGUST 1986  
 INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, KABUL, ISLAMABAD  
 INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN

AFGHANISTAN: UN TALKS

MT

## SUMMARY

1. TALKS, WHICH CONCLUDE TODAY 8 AUGUST, HAVE FOCUSED ON TIMEFRAME FOR SOVIET WITHDRAWAL AND MONITORING. SOVIET CONCESSIONS GRANTED OR IN PROSPECT, BUT NO FINAL AGREEMENT.

## DETAIL

2. CORDOVEZ BRIEFED ME YESTERDAY EVENING, 7 AUGUST, ON TALKS WHICH HE EXPECTED TO CONCLUDE THIS MORNING. DISCUSSION HAD FOCUSED ON TWO OUTSTANDING ISSUES: THE TIMEFRAME FOR A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL AND THE QUESTION OF MONITORING.

3. ON THE FORMER HE SAID THAT THE PAKISTANIS WERE INSISTING ON FOUR MONTHS; "A VERY MINIMALIST POSITION". THE INITIAL SOVIET DID, OF FOUR YEARS, HAD BEEN MODIFIED TWICE. CORDOVEZ WAS RELUCTANT TO DIVULGE THE PRECISE FIGURE, BUT IMPLIED THAT IT NOW STOOD AT THREE YEARS, WITH A POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER REDUCTION, SUBJECT TO SATISFACTORY ASSURANCES ON MONITORING. THE SOVIET UNION WERE ALSO PREPARED TO WITHDRAW A GREATER NUMBER OF TROOPS EARLIER IN THE PROCESS. HOWEVER THEIR POSITION WAS "STILL TOO MUCH" FOR THE PAKISTANIS. CORDOVEZ SUGGESTED THAT IF THE SOVIET SIDE MADE A FURTHER CONCESSION, THE PAKISTANIS WOULD PROBABLY RECONSIDER THEIR OWN POSITION. GIVEN SOVIET PUBLIC STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT THEIR POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL HAD BEEN AGREED WITH THE AFGHAN REGIME, IT WAS SIGNIFICANT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NOW MOVED.

4. CORDOVEZ SAID THAT THE QUESTION OF MONITORING THE WITHDRAWAL HAD "ACQUIRED CONSIDERABLE STATUS". EACH SIDE ADMITTED ITS IMPORTANCE IN RESPECT TO THE OTHER, BUT DENIED IT IN RESPECT TO THEMSELVES. BOTH WERE CONCERNED LEST A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT FACILITATE A MILITARY SOLUTION. THE SOVIETS FEARED THAT THE PAKISTANIS MIGHT STOP INTERVENTION DURING THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL BUT RESUME IT IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS: THE PAKISTANIS WERE FRIGHTENED THAT ONCE THEY STOPPED INTERVENTIONS THE REMAINING SOVIET TROOPS WOULD LIQUIDATE THE OPPOSITION. HENCE THE FOCUS ON MONITORING. THE SOVIETS, WHO WERE TRADITIONALLY OPPOSED TO UN MONITORING, NOW SEEMED PREPARED TO CONSIDER THIS POSSIBILITY. IF THEY ACCEPTED IT, IT WOULD

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CONSTITUTE A "DRAMATIC CHANGE OF POSITION" ON THEIR PART. THEY NEEDED MORE TIME TO STUDY THE QUESTION AND WOULD GIVE THEIR RESPONSE TO IT BY DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS IN A FEW DAYS. THE SOVIETS ALSO WANTED CLARIFICATIONS ON A FEW MORE POINTS AND EXCHANGES (PROBABLY BY DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS IN NEW YORK) WOULD CONTINUE.

5. CORDOVEZ SAID THAT THE SOVIETS CLAIMED THAT THE VLADIVOSTOK ANNOUNCEMENT ENTAILED THE WITHDRAWAL OF 8,000 TROOPS. THEY SAW THIS AS A GESTURE IN TERMS OF INTERNATIONAL GOODWILL. HOWEVER, THE PAKISTANIS WEIGHED IT AGAINST THE THREAT IMPLICIT IN THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR'S STATEMENT TO THEIR PRESIDENT ON 21 JUNE WHICH LINKED THWAFGHANISTAN NEGOTIATIONS TO PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR POLICY.

6. CORDOVEZ CONFIRMED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD AGREED TO "A FURTHER BROADENING OF THE GOVERNMENT IN KABUL".

7. AS TO THE WAY AHEAD, THIS DEPENDED ON WHEN THE SOVIETS REPLIED ON MONITORING (PARAGRAPH 4 ABOVE). FURTHER TALKS MIGHT POSSIBLY BE NECESSARY AND GENEVA WAS CONVENIENT FOR THEM.

8. CORDOVEZ CONFIRMED THAT HE WAS RETURNING DIRECT TO NEW YORK. HE HOPED THE POSSIBILITY OF A VISIT TO LONDON AT A FUTURE DATE COULD BE KEPT OPEN.

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