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From the Private Secretary

16 October 1986

Dear G. L.,

PRIME MINISTER'S TALK WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND: ARMS CONTROL

Following the Prime Minister's discussion of the Reykjavik meeting with President Mitterrand at lunch today, which I shall be recording separately, I telephoned Herr Teltschik in Chancellor Kohl's office to give him an account of the general conclusions which had been reached.


I said that the Prime Minister and President Mitterrand had agreed that the proposals discussed at Reykjavik for the elimination of strategic ballistic missiles and/or strategic offensive weapons posed serious potential dangers for the Alliance's strategy. The Prime Minister and the President were agreed that these proposals needed to be thoroughly discussed in NATO with the objective of reaffirming the validity of nuclear deterrence as the basis for the West's defence. At the same time the Prime Minister and the President could support further negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union directed towards achieving a fifty per cent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, an agreement on INF based on zero-zero in Europe and agreement to eliminate chemical weapons. All these agreements would of course have to be supported by thorough and reliable verification. The Prime Minister and the President had agreed to pass on these general conclusions to Chancellor Kohl in the hope that he would feel able to reflect them in his talks with President Reagan next week.

I told Herr Teltschik the Prime Minister would have spoken directly to Chancellor Kohl but, given the difficulties of interpretation on the telephone, thought it would be easier for me to pass the points on to him. President Mitterrand or his office would probably be in touch to speak in similar terms.

Herr Teltschik said that he was sure the Chancellor would be grateful for this information, would agree with the views expressed and be ready to speak in these terms to President Reagan. He enquired whether the Prime Minister and the President had taken a position on SDI. I explained that

British and French views differed in important respects on this. The Prime Minister fully supported the stand on SDI which President Reagan had taken at Reykjavik.

I am copying this letter to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,


(C.D. Powell)

Colin Budd, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.