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FM WASHINGTON  
TO DESKBY 270800Z FCOLX  
TELNO 2724  
OF 251645Z OCTOBER 86  
INFO PRIORITY BONN, MODUK  
INFO ROUTINE PARIS, UKDEL NATO, ROME, MOSCOW  
INFO SAYING UKDIS GENEVA, UKDEL VIENNA

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MODUK FOR DACU  
BONN TELNO 900 : CHANCELLOR KOHL'S VISIT TO THE US  
SUMMARY

1. BOTH SIDES RATE THE VISIT A SUCCESS. REYKJAVIK AND ARMS CONTROL THE MAIN ISSUES. SOUTH AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST ALSO DISCUSSED. NO GREAT PRESSURE FROM THE US ON INTEREST RATES.

DETAIL:

2. CHANCELLOR KOHL, ACCOMPANIED BY GENSCHER, WOERNER AND RUEHE, PAID AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO WASHINGTON ON 20-23 OCTOBER AND MADE A SPEECH IN CHICAGO ON 23 OCTOBER. HE HAD TALKS AND DINNER WITH THE PRESIDENT ON 21 OCTOBER, AND MEETINGS WITH SHULTZ, WEINBERGER AND BAKER. SHULTZ AND GENSCHER HAD A SEPARATE SESSION. AMBASSADOR VAN WELL GAVE A COMMUNITY BRIEFING LATE ON 24 OCTOBER; WE HAVE ALSO FOLLOWED UP WITH STATE AND WITH THE GERMAN EMBASSY. THE MAIN ISSUES WERE REYKJAVIK AND ARMS CONTROL. FOR OTHER POINTS SEE MIFT (NOT TO ALL).

3. BOTH SIDES SEEM SATISFIED WITH THE TALKS: THE US BECAUSE THEY SECURED KOHL'S BACKING FOR MOST US REYKJAVIK POSITIONS; THE GERMANS BECAUSE THE (LONG-DELAYED) VISIT MEANT KOHL WAS THE FIRST ALLIED LEADER TO DO THE ROUNDS HERE POST-REYKJAVIK. PRESS COVERAGE WAS NOT EXTENSIVE, BUT WARM IN TONE.

REYKJAVIK

4. VAN WELL ECHOED RUEHE'S COMMENTS (TUR) ON THE AMERICAN MOOD POST-REYKJAVIK. SHULTZ IN PARTICULAR HAD SEVERAL TIMES REFERRED TO THAT MEETING AS A WATERSHED IN THE SEARCH FOR NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL. FROM NOW ON, THE TREND WOULD BE TOWARDS REDUCTIONS. THIS WOULD REQUIRE A CHANGE OF ATTITUDE IN THE WEST. KOHL HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE DETERMINATION OF THE PRESIDENT AND SHULTZ TO PRESS AHEAD WITH THE IDEAS PUT FORWARD AT REYKJAVIK. NUCLEAR/CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE

5. KOHL SUPPORTED THE PROPOSAL FOR 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ON THE PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE ALL BALLISTIC MISSILES WITHIN TEN YEARS, HE ARGUED THAT THE MORE SIZEABLE THE REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, THE MORE IMPORTANT THE REQUIREMENT TO CORRECT THE IMBALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE. HE SEEMS TO HAVE LEFT SOME AMBIGUITY ON THE PRECISE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO. HIS SPOKESMAN TOOK THE SAME LINE AS RUEHE (PARA 5 OF TUR) NAMELY THAT KOHL HAD SAID THAT THE SECOND PHASE OF REDUCTIONS IN BALLISTIC MISSILES (IE AFTER 50 PERCENT CUTS IN STRATEGIC SYSTEMS) COULD NOT START UNTIL THE CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE WAS CORRECTED. BUT WHEN JENKINS PROBED THIS POINT AT THE COMMUNITY BRIEFING, VAN WELL SAID THAT THE CHANCELLOR

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HAD SPOKEN OF A QUOTE PARALLEL APPROACH UNQUOTE, AND THAT THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN RESPONSIVE TO THIS THOUGHT. OTHER CONTACTS IN THE GERMAN EMBASSY CONFIRM THAT KOHL'S POSITION IS NOT CLEAR-CUT. AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE HE COMMENTED THAT UNLESS THE ISSUE OF SOVIET CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY WAS QUOTE PUT ON THE TABLE AT THE SAME TIME UNQUOTE AS THAT OF SHARP REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS QUOTE NATO'S STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE WOULD BE DEPRIVED OF ITS CREDIBILITY UNQUOTE.

6. GERMAN EMBASSY CONTACTS CONFIRM (THOUGH VAN WELL DID NOT MENTION AT HIS BRIEFING) THAT SHULTZ HAD PUT FORWARD HIS PERSONAL SUGGESTION FOR A HIGH LEVEL SECRET DISCUSSION, AMONG KEY ALLIES, OF THE STRATEGIC ISSUES BROUGHT INTO FOCUS BY REYKJAVIK (PARA 9 OF MY TELNO 2703, NOT TO ALL). THE GERMANS THOUGHT HE MIGHT HAVE IN MIND A MEETING OR MEETINGS AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL. BUT IT WAS FAR FROM CLEAR.

INF

7. KOHL AND GENSCHER ACCEPTED THE REYKJAVIK LRINF FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT. ON SRINF THEIR LINE WAS AS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S RECENT STATEMENT. THE AMERICANS ACKNOWLEDGED GERMAN CONCERNS, BUT GAVE NO COMMITMENTS ABOUT FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS ON SRINF.

8. IN ADDITION TO SUPPORTING RESEARCH WITHIN THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY, KOHL URGED THE ADMINISTRATION TO MAKE PUBLIC MORE OF THE EVIDENCE ON THE SOVIET SDI PROGRAMME. CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

9. AS RUEHE INDICATED, THE GERMANS MADE A MAJOR EFFORT TO MOVE THE US OFF THEIR PRESENT POSITION ON THE FORUM FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS. KOHL STRESSED THAT IT WAS INDISPENSABLE THAT FRANCE SHOULD TAKE PART. GENSCHER (TO SHULTZ) AND RUTH (TO PERLE, KRAEMER AND THOMAS) EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR US FLEXIBILITY ON THIS POINT. KRAEMER AND THOMAS APPARENTLY SHOWED SOME INTEREST IN LOOKING FOR COMMON GROUND. BUT STATE TELL US THAT THERE WAS NO SIGN OF GIVE IN SHULTZ'S POSITION AND THAT KOHL AND GENSCHER WERE TAKEN ABACK BY WEINBERGER'S DISMISSAL OF THE CSCE PROCESS.

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10. THE GERMAN EMBASSY ADD THAT RUTH FLOATED THE SUGGESTION (ALSO TO HAVE BEEN UNVEILED IN THE HLTF IN BRUSSELS ON 24 OCTOBER) THAT THE HLTF SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED AS A SEMI-PERMANENT BODY TO COORDINATE NATO GUIDANCE (NOT INSTRUCTIONS) FOR ANY FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE LIMITATIONS/REDUCTIONS (CF THE SCG'S ROLE IN RELATION TO INF).

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