

ADVANCE COPIES

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS / EAST WEST US / SOVIET RELATIONS

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PS/PUS
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MR ~~WATSON~~ FALL
MR FEARN

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RESIDENT CLERK

[HD/NAD SHOULD BE ADDED ON EAST WEST QUOTE]

IMMEDIATE

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INFO SAVING ANKARA, ATHENS, COPENHAGEN, LISBON, MADRID, OSLO

INFO SAVING OTTAWA, REYKJAVIK, CSCE VIENNA, UKDEL VIENNA

WEU MINISTERIAL MEETING: EUROPEAN SECURITY POST REYKJAVIK

SUMMARY

1. DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS UNDER DISCUSSION AT REYKJAVIK. AGREEMENT THAT THEY RAISED WORRYING IMPLICATIONS. GENERAL WELCOME FOR IDEA OF 50 PER CENT REDUCTION IN SOVIET AND US CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. ENDORSEMENT BY ALL EXCEPT FRANCE OF IDEA OF A SEPARATE INF AGREEMENT INVOLVING ZERO/ZERO IN EUROPE (BUT WITH NUANCES OVER THE EXTENT TO WHICH A COMMITMENT TO REDUCE SRINF, RATHER THAN JUST TO FREEZE IT, SHOULD BE A PRECONDITION TO SUCH AN AGREEMENT). WIDESPREAD SCEPTICISM ABOUT FEASIBILITY OR DESIRABILITY OF ELIMINATING BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND CONCERN THAT THE AMERICANS SHOULD BE DISPOSED TO GO DOWN THIS PATH WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF IMBALANCES IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN EUROPE. LITTLE DISPOSITION TO ARGUE TOSS WITH AMERICANS OVER HOW TO INTEREST ABM TREATY. AGREEMENT THAT EUROPEANS SHOULD PROJECT A DOUBLE MESSAGE: TO THE AMERICANS, THAT THERE MUST BE NO DECOUPLING OF US SECURITY FROM THAT OF ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE, AND NO SANCTIONISATION OF ANY PART OF ALLIANCE TERRITORY; TO THE SOVIET UNION, STRESS ON IMPORTANCE OF REMOVING IMBALANCES IN THE CONVENTIONAL SECTOR IN EUROPE, AND AN APPEAL TO ABANDON THEIR INSISTENCE ON LINKAGE. RECOGNITION OF THE NEED FOR PUBLIC SOLIDARITY.

DETAIL

2. MR YOUNGER OPENED DISCUSSION BY EMPHASISING THERE WAS MUCH TO WELCOME IN ACHIEVEMENTS OF REYKJAVIK: PROGRESS TOWARDS 50 PER CENT REDUCTIONS IN START, ON RESOLVING DIFFERENCES ON INF, AND ON NUCLEAR TESTING. BUT THE RADICAL VISION OF THE ABOLITION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES POSED PROBLEMS. ALLIANCE SECURITY WAS A UNIFIED WHOLE: INDIVIDUAL SECTORS COULD NOT BE ISOLATED FROM OTHERS. THERE HAD TO BE A VIABLE DETERRENT STRUCTURE AFTER REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ELIMINATION OF OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES WITHOUT MITIGATION OF

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ELIMINATION OF OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES WITHOUT MITIGATION OF IMBALANCES IN CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL SECTORS IN EUROPE WOULD NOT ENHANCE SECURITY. MOREOVER, IT WOULD CAUSE PRESENTATIONAL COMPLICATIONS. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC SUPPORT BOTH FOR THE BRITISH AND FRENCH STRATEGIC MODERNISATION PROGRAMMES, AND FOR THE CONTINUATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYMENTS IN SOME EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, IF THE IMPRESSION WAS GIVEN THAT BALLISTIC MISSILES WERE ABOUT TO DISAPPEAR COMPLETELY. ON SDI, SOVIET APPROACH OF TRYING TO CONSTRAIN US PROGRAMME WHILE LEAVING THEIR OWN UNIMPEDED WAS UNACCEPTABLE. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED THE IDEAL OF CONTINUED US SDI RESEARCH WITHIN RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF ABM TREATY. ON INF SOVIET CONFIRMATION THAT THIRD COUNTRY FORCES SHOULD NOT BE INVOLVED WAS WELCOME AND SOME PROGRESS SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN MADE ON ASIAN SYSTEMS, CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF, VERIFICATION, AND DURATION. IT WAS NECESSARY HOWEVER TO BEAR IN MIND THE DANGER WHICH A ZERO ZERO SOLUTION MIGHT BRING IN RELATION TO SHORT RANGE SYSTEMS, AND TO MAKE SURE THAT APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS IN RESPECT OF THEM WERE APPLIED.

3. GENSCHER (FRG) OBSERVED THAT THE IMPORTANCE FOR EUROPE OF THE ISSUES UNDER DISCUSSION DEMONSTRATED THE RELEVANCE OF THE WEU. IN A SENSE THERE HAD BEEN NO SURPRISES AT REYKJAVIK: THE INTENTIONS ON BOTH SIDES HAD BEEN DECLARED IN ADVANCE. IT WAS NOW ESSENTIAL FOR THE ALLIANCE TO JUSTIFY AN UNCHANGED STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE AND TO BRING HOME TO PUBLIC OPINION THAT ITS AIM WAS THE PREVENTION OF ALL WAR IN EUROPE, NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL. WE SHOULD ALSO ENSURE THAT SECURITY INTERESTS OF EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES WERE NOT SEEN AS DIVERGENT. ON INF, IT WAS NECESSARY TO AVOID CREATION A NEW GREY AREA. REDUCTIONS WERE REQUIRED IN SHORT RANGE SYSTEMS. A FREEZE AT THE SUB-PERSHING/CRUISE/SS20 LEVEL WAS INSUFFICIENT. THIS WOULD SIMPLY CONSOLIDATE SOVIET SUPERIORITY. THE INF AGREEMENT SHOULD CONTAIN A COMMITMENT TO REDUCE THESE SYSTEMS, INVOLVING A COMMON CEILING AT A LOWER LEVEL. AN EQUILIBRIUM WAS ALSO NEEDED ON CW. HE SUPPORTED THE BRITISH PROPOSALS ON CHALLENGE INSPECTION. BUT THE MAIN PRIORITY WAS TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN THE CONVENTIONAL FIELD. THE NATO TASK FORCE WAS DUE TO REPORT BY DECEMBER. A FRAMEWORK HAD TO BE FOUND ALLOWING ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE TO TAKE PART IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAD MADE A PROPOSAL TO THIS EFFECT WHICH HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY FRANCE. THE US SHOULD NOW ACCEPT IT AS WELL. IN THE MEANTIME, WE SHOULD MAINTAIN PRESSURE IN MBFR FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE WARSAW PACT RESPONSE TO THE WESTERN PROPOSALS OF 5 DECEMBER 1985.

4. ANDREOTTI (ITALY) ARGUED THAT DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING IN VIENNA SHOULD NOT DESTROY HOPES RAISED AT REYKJAVIK FOR NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL. PUBLIC SENSITIVITY IN BOTH NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR FIELDS WAS NOW HEIGHTENED. GOVERNMENTS HAD TO RECONCILE THESE EXPECTATIONS WITH EUROPEAN SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. THIS APPLIED BOTH TO DRASTIC REDUCTION OR ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD, AND TO ABOLITION OF LRINF IN EUROPE. CAREFUL REFLECTION ON THE DESIRABLE STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIUM WAS ESSENTIAL BEFORE PRESSING AHEAD IN THESE AREAS. INCREASING IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO CONVENTIONAL FORCES, IN WHICH AN EAST/WEST BALANCE WAS ESSENTIAL. THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT YET APPRECIATED THE STRICTLY DEFENSIVE CHARACTER OF US SDI RESEARCH. A FIXED PERIOD OF ABIDING BY THE ABM TREATY WAS IMPORTANT TO ALLAY CONCERNS AND ALLOW TIME TO ADAPT TO CHANGING SITUATIONS. JOINT WORK BY NUCLEAR SCIENTISTS FROM DIFFERENT COUNTRIES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED.

5. SPANDOLINI (ITALY) DREW ATTENTION TO THE ENDEMIC INSTABILITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION AND THE BENEFITS THIS COULD BRING TO THE USSR BY WEAKENING SOLIDARITY ON NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK. LACK OF A UNITED WESTERN RESPONSE TO EVENTS IN THIS AREA LEFT THE FLANK EXPOSED. EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORISM SHOULD BE REDOUBLED

FLANK EXPOSED. EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORISM SHOULD BE REDOUBLED BY GREATER CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO INVOLVE BOTH SUPER POWERS IN THE COMMON FIGHT, AND NOT TO ALLOW AN IMPRESSION TO GROW THAT EUROPE COULD NOT PULL TOGETHER. DESPITE EFFORTS IN OTHER FORA (NATO, EC, ETC), WEU COULD HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY.

6. GIRAUD (FRANCE) IN A POWERFUL INTERVENTION EXPRESSED CLEAR RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE EFFECT ON DETERRENCE OF THE US STAND AT REYKJAVIK AND MILDLY CRITICISED OTHER EUROPEANS FOR COMPLICITY AT GLENEAGLES. FRANCE FULLY SUPPORTED THE ALLIANCE, ALTHOUGH OUTSIDE A NUMBER OF ITS MAIN MILITARY AND OTHER GROUPINGS, BUT WISHED TO SPEAK STRONGLY FOR CONTINUING SECURITY IN EUROPE. IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR EUROPEANS TO WIN PUBLIC OPINION IN THE POST-REYKJAVIK ERA, IF DETERRENCE WERE TO CONTINUE. BALANCE WAS ESSENTIAL: PEACE WAS MAINTAINED THROUGH THE SECOND STRIKE CAPABILITY, WHICH COULD BE UPSET BY SUBTLE CHANGES IN TECHNICAL PARAMETERS. HE REITERATED STANDARD FRENCH CONDITIONS AGAINST INVOLVING THEIR NUCLEAR FORCES IN ARMS CONTROL TALKS. ALL SOVIET INF, REGARDLESS OF RANGE, WERE A THREAT TO WESTERN EUROPE, AND THE WEST SHOULD NOT ALLOW DIFFERENTIATION INTO LRINF/SRINF TO PERMIT THE RUSSIANS TO KEEP NUCLEAR MISSILES WHEN PERSHING/CRUISE HAD GONE. FRANCE FAVOURED 50 PER CENT STRATEGIC CUTS, BUT CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND CONVENTIONAL FORCE IMBALANCES REMAINED DANGEROUS FOR EUROPE. EUROPEAN CONCERNS ABOUT THIS PROBLEM, ABOUT THE DANGERS OF REQUIRING STRATEGIC WEAPONS BASED IN THE US TO BE USED TO DEFEND EUROPE, AND ABOUT THE NEED TO ENSURE ACCURATE VERIFICATION BEFORE ARMS REDUCTIONS WERE AGREED, SHOULD ALL BE BROUGHT TO AMERICAN ATTENTION. SO SHOULD CONCERNS OVER THE DESTABILISING POTENTIAL OF DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS. SATISFACTORY ANSWERS SHOULD BE OBTAINED BEFORE PROCEEDING.

7. WOERNER (FRG) EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR EUROPE TO SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE IN ORDER TO HAVE INFLUENCE. 50 PER CENT STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS WERE ACCEPTABLE, BUT NOT MORE. UK/FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES SHOULD REMAIN UNAFFECTED BY CURRENT ARMS CONTROL TALKS. APART FROM THE SRINF PROBLEM, THE FRG SUPPORTED THE US ON LRINF. BUT US PROPOSALS FOR ELIMINATING BALLISTIC MISSILES WERE SURPRISING, ALTHOUGH UNACCEPTABLE TO THE RUSSIANS. IT WAS ALSO ESSENTIAL IN THE CONVENTIONAL FIELD, IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO PUT THE BALANCE RIGHT. IT WAS ALSO ESSENTIAL TO DEVELOP STABILITY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE: OUR PARTNERS IN THE BALKANS SHOULD BE MORE HELPFUL. NOR SHOULD DIVISIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE BE ALLOWED TO SHOW. SOLIDARITY WAS ESSENTIAL TO CARRY PUBLIC OPINION, PARTICULARLY IN EUROPE. ANTI-NUCLEAR RHETORIC NEEDED CONTAINING TO PREVENT SOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD DECREASE EUROPEAN SECURITY. BUT GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT SEEM TO BE BLOCKING DISARMAMENT.

8. MRS CHALKER NOTED THE SOPHISTICATED PERFORMANCE OF SHEVARDNADZE IN VIENNA, AND THE DISAPPOINTING SOVIET PERSISTENCE IN RE-LINKING. THIS REPRESENTED SOVIET WEDGE DRIVING, HOLDING OUT THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN RETURN FOR CURTAILMENT OF SDI. BUT THERE WAS MUCH BLUFF AND PUBLIC POSTURING, AND THE DOOR TO FURTHER TALKS WAS NOT CLOSED. THE TASK FOR EUROPEANS WAS NOW TWO-FOLD. TO EMPHASISE PRIVATELY TO THE US CONCERNS ABOUT ELIMINATING BALLISTIC MISSILES, BECAUSE OF EFFECTS ON DETERRENCE AND UK/FRENCH FORCES, AND ABOUT ADDRESSING CHEMICAL AND CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCES. AND TO DISPLAY CONTINUING ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY TOWARDS THE RUSSIANS. AGREEMENT ON 50 PER CENT STRATEGIC CUTS, AND ON INF COULD BE PURSUED NOW IF THE RUSSIANS WOULD DE-LINK. THEY SHOULD BE PERSUADED NOT TO GIVE UP DOING BUSINESS WITH REAGAN. ON INF, UK COULD AGREE ZERO ZERO OUTCOME IN EUROPE PROVIDED WARHEADS IN ASIA WERE NOT EXCESSIVE AND GIVEN APPROPRIATE CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF. SDI WAS A GENUINE SOVIET CONCERN, AND RUSSIANS UNLIKELY TO MOVE TO 50 PER CENT CUTS WITHOUT PROGRESS ON IT. CW SEEMED A SECOND ORDER PRIORITY FOR SUPER POWERS, ALTHOUGH A EUROPEAN PRIORITY. UK

PRIORITY FOR SUPER POWERS, ALTHOUGH A EUROPEAN PRIORITY. UK SUPPORTED PHASED APPROACH TO FURTHER CONSTRAINTS ON NUCLEAR TESTING. IN CONVENTIONAL FIELD, OUTCOME OF STOCKHOLM WELCOME, BUT CURRENT IMPASSE IN TASK FORCE HAD TO BE RESOLVED. ADVANTAGES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ARGUMENT, ALTHOUGH US DECISION ILL-JUDGED. EUROPEANS HAD TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON US, BUT KEEP DIALOGUE OPEN. IN INTERESTS OF ALL TO ACHIEVE ACCEPTABLE MIX OF FORUM/CONSULTATIONS IN TIME FOR FINAL REPORT OF TASK FORCE IN DECEMBER. THE UK SYMPATHISED WITH ITALIAN CONCERNS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, BUT SAW THE EC AS MAIN FORUM FOR ACTION.

9. VAN DEN BROEK (NETHERLANDS) EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR A HARMONISED EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO REYKJAVIK. PRIVATE REPRESENTATIONS TO THE AMERICANS WERE ALL VERY WELL. BUT EVERYONE SHOULD SING THE SAME TUNE. IT WAS CLEAR THAT SDI WAS THE MAIN STUMBLING BLOCK TO AGREEMENT ON THE REYKJAVIK PROPOSALS!

HE NOTED MR YOUNGER'S SUPPORT FOR SDI RESEARCH WITHIN THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE ABM TREATY. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT FOR THE AMERICANS THIS INTERPRETATION ALLOWED EVERYTHING SHORT OF DEPLOYMENT. HE DOUBTED HOWEVER THAT IT WAS WORTH THE EUROPEANS ARGUING TH

INTERPRETATION ALLOWED EVERYTHING SHORT OF DEPLOYMENT. HE DOUBTED HOWEVER THAT IT WAS WORTH THE EUROPEANS ARGUING THE POINT WITH THE AMERICANS OVER THE EXACT MEANING OF ARTICLE 5. THE US ADMINISTRATION DID NOT SEEM DISPOSED TO MOVE.

10. FOR THE NETHERLANDS A SEPARATE INF AGREEMENT WAS HIGHLY DESIRABLE. THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS FOR ZERO ZERO IN EUROPE WITH LIMITED DEPLOYMENT IN ASIA WERE ACCEPTABLE. HE NOTED GENSCHER'S WISH TO INCLUDE IN SUCH AN AGREEMENT A COMMITMENT TO REDUCTIONS OF SHORT RANGE SYSTEMS. HE QUESTIONED HOWEVER WHETHER IT WAS REALISTIC TO INSIST ON THE RESOLUTION OF THIS IMBALANCE OR THE IMBALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AS A PRECURSOR TO PRECONDITIONS FOR AN INF AGREEMENT. IN THE DUTCH VIEW SUCH ELEMENTS WERE NOT ESSENTIAL AS REGARDS START, HE WELCOMED THE IDEA OF 50 PER CENT REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS BUT THE RAPID ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES POSED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS. IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IN THE SRIN F

CONTEXT THAT SHORT RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES WOULD PROBABLY ALSO BE ELIMINATED. THAT IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHY SECURITY OVERALL WOULD NECESSARILY BE ENHANCED. GIVEN THE GREATER RELIANCE BY THE ALLIANCE, INCLUDING BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE, ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS THANBY THE SOVIET UNION. HE SOUGHT (AND RECEIVED) CONFIRMATION FROM GIRAUD (FRANCE) THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR MISSILES, EUROPEAN COUNTRIES COULD NOT DEPEND ON FRENCH STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS BEING USED OTHER THAN IN THE DEFENCE OF FRANCE ITSELF. HE QUESTIONED ALSO WHETHER AIR BREATHING SYSTEMS ON THEIR OWN COULD OFFER THE GUARANTEE OF A SECOND STRIKE CAPABILITY.

11. VAN EEKELLEN (NETHERLANDS) NOTED THAT SOVIEY DESIRE TO ELIMINATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD REINFORCE ITS CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY. FOR THE US, OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THE FIRST STAGE INCLUDED ONLY ICBMS, BUT THE PICTURE WAS NOT CLEAR AFTERWARDS HE REFERRED TO ADELMANS'S COMMENT THAT MISSILES REGARDLESS OF RANGE MIGHT BE AFFECTED. THE US APPROACH TO SDI HAD CHANGED. IT WAS NO LONGER AN INSURANCE POLICY DURING THE ELIMINATION OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, BUT WOULD NOW BE PUT IN PLACE AFTER BALLISTIC MISSILES HAD BEEN ELIMINATED. EUROPE WOULD BE LESS SECURE THAN THE SUPER POWERS IF THEY RETAINED BOTH DEFENSIVE AND NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AFTER ABOLISHING STRATEGIC WEAPONS. THE GROWING SIGNIFICANCE OF AIR BREATHING MISSILES WOULD LEAD TO GREATER EMPHASIS IN THE FUTURE ON AIR DEFENCE FOR EUROPEANS. HE

GREATER EMPHASIS IN THE FUTURE ON AIR DEFENCE FOR EUROPEANS. HE OBSERVED THAT IN MBFR, THE MANPOWER CRITERION MADE SENSE, BUT THAT IN A WIDER AREA EQUIPMENT WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE INCLUDED.

12. TINDEMANS (BELGIUM) WELCOMED THE ZERO ZERO OPTION AND THE EXCLUSION OF THIRD COUNTRY FORCES. BUT SRINF SHOULD BE CATERED FOR, AS SHOULD THE CONVENTIONAL PROBLEM. CONVENTIONAL FORCES WERE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE BALANCE IN ANY NEGOTIATION AND SHOULD BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED. FOR THE HLTf, BELGIUM WANTED MACHINERY WHICH WOULD ALLOW FULL CO-OPERATION AND EVENTUALLY RESULTS. THIS WAS OF THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO EUROPE.

13. BOSSON (FRANCE), WHO ARRIVED LATE, OFFERED THREE ELABORATIONS ON GIRAUD'S STATEMENT. THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD NOT RETAIN A CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY AFTER US MISSILES HAD GONE, OR SHOULD IT BE A SAFE SANCTUARY WHEN EUROPE WAS NOT. FRENCH/UK FORCES SHOULD THEREFORE BE MODERNISED. SECOND, THE ZERO ZERO OPTION COULD ONLY BE VALID IF THERE WERE A NEW SRINF/CW BALANCE. AND THIRD ALL THE ELEMENTS IN THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS SHOULD BE HANDLED AS TO PRESERVE STABILITY DURING REDUCTIONS.

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