



10 DOWNING STREET

Prime Minister

If you have time,
you might glance
at the under-lined
passages in this
rather good speech
by the French
Foreign Minister.

You will see him
on Friday. Lesdrennes

EDD 15/11

1-

YOUR MEETING IN SAINT PAUL DE VENCE HAS CHOSEN TO DEAL WITH THE SUBJECT OF THE NEW GENERATION OF LEADERSHIP IN THE USSR, AND ITS IMPACT ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

THIS IS A PARTICULARLY GOOD TIME TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE: IN THE WAKE OF THE REKJAVIK SUMMIT, THE USSR'S NEW DIPLOMATIC STYLE- MORE AGGRESSIVE, MORE IMAGINATIVE, MORE MOBILE AND, FRANKLY, MORE DANGEROUS- IS CLEARLY PERCEPTIBLE.

ON THE DOMESTIC SIDE, THE POLICY OF THE GORBACHEV TEAM IS ALSO TAKING SHAPE. IT IS NOT ONE OF ZEALOUS LIBERAL REFORM AS SOME THOUGHT. NOR IS IT A MERE MOVE TOWARD STRENGTHENING SOCIAL DISCIPLINE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE ABUSES DURING THE END OF THE BREZHNEV ERA.

THE VERY IMAGE OF MR. GORBACHEV IN THE WEST HAS GONE THROUGH A SERIES OF CHANGES THAT BRING TO MIND SOMETHING OSCAR WILDE SAID, NAMELY "NOTHING IS MORE DANGEROUS THAN BEING TOO MODERN. YOU MIGHT SUDDENLY FIND YOURSELF OUT OF DATE."

NOTWITHSTANDING MR. GORBACHEV'S FLUCTUATING IMAGE, OUR NEED IS TO WORK OUT A MEDIUM AND LONG-TERM STRATEGY TOWARD THE USSR. THAT IS THE ONLY WAY WE SHALL BE ABLE TO AVOID THE VIOLENT SWINGS BETWEEN MOMENTS OF EXAGGERATED EUPHORIA AND PERIODS OF DEEP GLOOM SO CHARACTERISTIC OF THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS.

FOR THIS PURPOSE, I BELIEVE WE SHALL HAVE TO PAY HEED TO SEVERAL FACTORS:

1) THE FIRST OF THESE, IN MY VIEW, IS THE FACT THAT MR. GORBACHEV IS NOT PRESSED FOR TIME. OR AT LEAST, NOT AS MUCH AS PEOPLE TEND TO SAY

27
OR WRITE IN THE WEST.

THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS ADMITTEDLY IN POOR SHAPE, AND THE LAST YEARS OF BREZHNEVISM BEQUEATHED A SORRY LEGACY. GORBACHEV SEEMS TO HAVE REALIZED THAT THE SOVIET SYSTEM IS INEFFICIENT, BREEDING LOW MORALE AND LOW PRODUCTIVITY. HE WANTS MAJOR CHANGES, AND WESTERN ANALYSTS ARE DEBATING JUST HOW FAR AND HOW FAST HE IS ABLE TO GO. MY OWN VIEW IS THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS NOT AS GLOOMY ABOUT THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS AS WESTERNERS BELIEVE THEY OUGHT TO BE.

PEOPLE IN THE WEST OFTEN SAY THAT THE SOVIET ECONOMY CANNOT GO ON "MUDDLING THROUGH", AND THAT THE OCCASIONAL PRODUCTIVITY BOOST BY MEANS OF "QUICK FIXES" WILL BE FOLLOWED BY THE PAINFUL REALIZATION THAT SUCH CHANGES ARE INSUFFICIENT. WESTERN OBSERVERS ARGUE TOO THAT THE DIFFICULTY OF EARNING WESTERN CURRENCY TO PAY FOR MODERN TECHNOLOGY WILL LEAD TO GREATER EXPLOITATION OF EASTERN EUROPE, WHICH WILL IN TURN HEIGHTEN RESENTMENT IN THAT PART OF EUROPE, AND MAYBE POLITICAL UPHEAVAL.

ALL THAT IS TRUE INDEED, BUT WE DO NOT KNOW THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP'S ASSESSMENT OF JUST HOW URGENT REFORMS ARE.

MY FEELING IS THAT THEY WANT TO TAKE THEIR TIME. GORBACHEV'S TEAM NEEDS TO CONSOLIDATE ITS GRIP ON THE POWER STRUCTURE AT ALL LEVELS. IT HAS ALREADY MOVED FAST, BUT IT PROBABLY NEEDS ANOTHER COUPLE OF YEARS BEFORE BEING ABLE TO MAKE THE MUCH-NEEDED CHANGES, ALWAYS ASSUMING THEY ARE ABLE TO REACH DECISIONS ON THEM.

2) THE SECOND FACTOR THAT NEEDS TO BE CONSIDERED IS THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP'S CONTINUING CONFIDENCE IN ITS POSITION.

ALTHOUGH SOVIET POLICYMAKERS MAY PONDER THE LONG TERM BALANCE OF POWER WITH THE WEST AND THEIR ABILITY TO SUSTAIN TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETITION, THEY ARE NOT ANXIOUS TO THE POINT OF BEING PREPARED TO SUE FOR ARMS CONTROL AT ANY PRICE. QUITE THE REVERSE: SO CONFIDENT IS GORBACHEV'S INTERNATIONAL STANCE THAT THERE MAY BE A GRAVE DANGER OF SOVIET MISPERCEPTIONS OF WESTERN ATTITUDES IN THE YEARS TO COME.

3) THE THIRD POINT, WHICH FLOWS FROM THE FIRST TWO OBSERVATIONS, IS THAT IT WOULD BE POINTLESS, AT LEAST FOR THE NEXT TWO OR THREE YEARS, TO EXPECT THE PRESENT SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO TAKE DECISIONS LIABLE TO HAVE A FUNDAMENTAL IMPACT ON THE STRATEGY AND THE ECONOMY OF THE USSR BETWEEN NOW AND THE END OF THE CENTURY.

THERE IS A POWERFUL CURRENT OF OPINION IN THE WEST THAT THE USSR SHOULD BE GIVEN A CHOICE, NOW RATHER THAN LATER: IF THEY WANT TO JOIN THE NEW GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, THEY SHOULD CUT DEFENSE SPENDING, AGREE TO TRULY EFFECTIVE ARMS LIMITATIONS, AND LIBERALIZE THEIR ECONOMY AND SOCIETY.

I BELIEVE THAT WE MUST STAND FIRM BY THIS POSITION. HOWEVER, LET US NOT DELUDE OURSELVES AS TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF MR. GORBACHEV SITTING DOWN TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON THIS BASIS AND TAKING THE APPROPRIATE DOMESTIC MEASURES WITHIN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE YEARS.

THIS IS NOT, AS HAS OFTEN BEEN CLAIMED, A QUESTION OF CLANS OR FACTIONS VYING FOR POWER INSIDE THE POLITBURO. MR. GORBACHEV IS NOW FIRMLY ESTABLISHED, AT LEAST IF WE GO BY THE NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT AND PARTY APPOINTMENTS HE HAS MADE IN RECORD TIME.

SO I THINK MR. GORBACHEV IS PURSUING A DELIBERATE STRATEGY THAT TAKES ACCOUNT OF HIS MAIN ADVANTAGE OVER HIS PREDECESSORS, AND OVER WESTERN LEADERS, WHICH IS THAT HE CAN EXPECT TO BE IN POWER FOR SOME TIME.

I FURTHER BELIEVE THAT SOVIET DIPLOMACY'S MAIN STRENGTH LIES IN THE WEST'S IMPATIENCE, ESPECIALLY ON THE ISSUE OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL.

I DISAGREE WITH THOSE WHO CLAIM THAT THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES SHOULD WASTE NO TIME FINDING AN ALTERNATIVE TO DETERRENCE, INsofar AS THE LATTER IS BOUND TO ENCOUNTER INCREASING HOSTILITY FROM WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION, WHICH, THEY CLAIM, IS INCAPABLE OF LIVING INDEFINITELY WITH A SYSTEM OF SECURITY BASED ON THE THREAT OF MUTUAL DESTRUCTION.

I AM WELL AWARE THAT MANY AMERICAN OFFICIALS ARE CURRENTLY PUTTING FORWARD THIS VIEW.

NOR IS IT AS NEW AS ALL THAT. BACK IN THE 1970'S HENRY KISSINGER QUESTIONED THE WILLINGNESS OF THE US CONGRESS TO FUND THE NECESSARY MODERNIZATION OF STRATEGIC FORCES, AND MR. FRED IKLE, IN A FAMOUS ARTICLE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS PUBLISHED IN 1973, ALREADY WONDERED "CAN DETERRENCE LAST OUT THE CENTURY?"

MR. GORBACHEV'S TEAM IS BETTING ON BEING ABLE TO PURSUE A MORE IMAGINATIVE AND OFFENSIVE POLICY TOWARDS THE WEST WITHOUT CREATING CONDITIONS LIABLE TO JEOPARDIZE SOVIET CONTROL OVER POSSIBLE STRAINS WITHIN ITS CAMP, AND WITHOUT UNDERMINING COMMUNIST PARTY CONTROL OF POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY. AS IN ALL CENTRALIZED SYSTEMS, SPONTANEITY AND THE UNEXPECTED ARE THE BIG NIGHTMARES.

HERE, THE USSR CAN BE EXPECTED TO EXPLOIT TWO OPPORTUNITIES, NAMELY THE INF NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE PROSPECT OF ELIMINATING ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHIN TEN YEARS WHICH WAS RAISED AT REKJAVIK.

. . .

I - MOSCOW PRESUMABLY ORIGINALLY VIEWED THE EUROMISSILES ISSUE AS A MATTER OF PRESERVING THE STRATEGIC STATUS QUO. THE IDEA WAS TO PREVENT THE UNITED STATES FROM INSTALLING NUCLEAR SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF HITTING THE SOVIET SANCTUARY FROM WESTERN EUROPE, WHICH WERE INTENDED TO STRENGTHEN THE COUPLING BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES. SO MOSCOW'S FIRST PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVES FOCUSED ON THE CHANGE IN THE BALANCE BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE NATO INITIATIVE.

HOW DO THINGS STAND TODAY? WHAT SHOULD BE THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE?

MOSCOW HAS ADOPTED A NEW TONE VIS A VIS THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE. THE IDEA IS NO LONGER TO RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE, BUT RATHER TO CREATE A NEW DYNAMIC EXPLICITLY AIMED AT A WITHDRAWAL OF ALL US NUCLEAR ARMS FROM EUROPE. THIS IS WHY I PERSONALLY BELIEVE THAT THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE SIGNATURE OF A SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON

ON INF AND SDI, ORIGINALLY ESTABLISHED BY MR. GROMYKO, THEN BROKEN BY MR. GORBACHEV LAST SPRING, BEFORE BEING REASSERTED AGAIN IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE REKJAVIK MEETING, COULD WELL BE DISCARDED ONCE AGAIN.

THE IMPORTANT POINT FOR THE USSR IN THE INF AFFAIR IS TO BIND THE AMERICANS AND THE EUROPEANS TOGETHER IN A NEGOTIATING PROCESS WITH THE SOLE AIM OF TURNING WESTERN EUROPE INTO A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE.

THE BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES NATURALLY REPRESENT AN ADDITIONAL OBSTACLE TO THIS, BUT THE SOVIETS TAKE THE LONG VIEW AND MAY WELL FEEL THEY CAN AFFORD TO BE A LITTLE GENEROUS: CUTS IN, OR EVEN THE ELIMINATION, OF THOSE FORCES CAN WAIT FOR LATER. AT THIS JUNCTURE, WHAT THE SOVIETS ARE AFTER IS PLANNED OBSOLESCENCE, E.G. BY PREVENTING TRANSFERS TO GREAT BRITAIN, A FREEZE, IMMEDIATE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS GIVING THE SOVIETS A SAY IN, AND A POSSIBLE VETO OVER, CERTAIN DEVELOPMENTS). AT THIS STAGE, TOO, AND THE POLITICAL BENEFIT TO MOSCOW COULD PROVE BY NO MEANS INSIGNIFICANT, THEIR AIM IS ALSO TO FORCE A SPLIT BETWEEN EUROPE'S TWO NUCLEAR POWERS AND THEIR PARTNERS. MR. SCHEVARDNADZE IN VIENNA LAST WEDNESDAY PUT IT BLUNTLY WHEN SPEAKING AT THE HOFBURG: HE SAID THAT THE REASON WHY FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN ARE SO WORRIED ABOUT THE ZERO OPTION AND THE POST-REKJAVIK CLIMATE IS BECAUSE THEY WANT TO CLING TO THEIR NUCLEAR PRIVILEGES, WITH NO THOUGHT TO THE OVERRIDING INTERESTS OF THE REST OF EUROPE.

x

HOW SHOULD THE WEST REACT TO THIS SUBSTANTIAL NEW SOVIET OFFENSIVE?

FIRST, LET ME POINT OUT A PARADOX: FOR THE LAST FOUR OR FIVE YEARS, ALL THE TALK IN THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN OF THE EUROPEANS' SOFTNESS TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AND OF THEIR OBSESSION WITH DISARMAMENT. NOW WE ARE HEARING ABOUT "EUROHAWKS".

THE SPD'S BRAINCHILD, THE ZERO OPTION, WHICH WAS DEvised TO BRIDGE THE GULF BETWEEN PARTISANS AND OPPONENTS OF THE SO-CALLED "DOUBLE-TRACK" DECISION OF 1979, WAS TAKEN ON BOARD BY PRESIDENT REAGAN IN 1981 IN THE HOPES OF REASSURING EUROPEAN OPINION.

GIVEN THE CONFUSION OF THE PACIFISTS WHEN FACED WITH THIS BOLD PROPOSAL, THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED ENTHUSIASTICALLY ENDORSED IT. IRONICALLY, THE UNITED STATES TODAY DEFENDS THIS PROPOSAL AS WELL AS THE ARGUMENTS PREVIOUSLY SET FORTH BY THE OPPONENTS OF THE PERSHING AND CRUISE MISSILES, A POSITION WHICH IMPLIES THAT COUPLING IS A POLITICAL, NOT A MILITARY AFFAIR. ON THIS VIEW, THE NEW SYSTEMS ARE NOT INDISPENSABLE, AND LOGICALLY THE 1979 DOUBLE TRACK DECISION WOULD ENTAIL ABANDONMENT OF DEPLOYMENT.

PUBLIC OPINION MUST BE SOMEWHAT PERPLEXED BY NOW. ESPECIALLY AS THE RISK THAT AN INF AGREEMENT COULD BE CIRCUMVENTED BY SHORTER-RANGE SYSTEMS IS SHIFTING OUR PARTNERS' ATTENTION TO A NEW "GREY ZONE" (I AM PURPOSELY EMPLOYING THE 1970'S FORMULA, WHICH USED TO REFER TO THE PROBLEM OF THE SS20'S) COVERING WEAPONS WITH A RANGE OF LESS THAN 1,000 KILOMETERS.

I WAS ONE OF THE FIRST TO PUBLICLY VOICE MISGIVINGS OVER THIS POSSIBLE INTERPRETATION OF TALKS TO ELIMINATE AMERICAN NUCLEAR ARMS IN EUROPE, MUCH TO PRAVDA'S ANNOYANCE.

SO GREAT WAS THE CONSENSUS AMONG EUROPE'S LEADERS THAT, WITHOUT ANY NEED FOR PRIOR CONSULTATION, THEIR NATURAL REACTION WAS TO STRESS THE OTHER FACTORS OF SECURITY IN EUROPE, E.G. THE IMBALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES, AS WELL AS CHEMICAL WEAPONS. WE ARE PLEASED TO NOTE THAT OUR AMERICAN FRIENDS HAVE ALSO PERCEIVED THIS AS A GENUINE PROBLEM.

HOWEVER, IT IS AT THIS POINT THAT MISUNDERSTANDINGS COULD ARISE IN THE COMING MONTHS AND YEARS.

OUR AMERICAN FRIENDS CLAIM THAT THE ANSWER IS CLEAR: THAT WE SHOULD BUILD UP OUR CONVENTIONAL FORCES. THEY ARE REVIVING LONGSTANDING MILITARY PROPOSALS, NAMELY THE NEED TO RAISE THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD AND TO USE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NEW CONVENTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES. THEY ALSO ADDUCE EQUALLY LONGSTANDING ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS, E.G. RE-APPORTIONMENT OF THE BURDEN BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES, AND THE GREATER CAPACITY OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIES TO SPEND MORE ON DEFENSE AS THEY PROGRESSIVELY BREAK FREE OF THE COSTS OF SOCIAL PROTECTION, INHERITED FROM A LONG TRADITION OF STATE INTERVENTION.

IN EUROPE, THERE IS A GROWING NUMBER OF PEOPLE STATING JUST THE OPPOSITE. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COSTS OF CONVENTIONAL REARMAMENT TO MEET WARSAW PACT SUPERIORITY IS PERCEIVED AS UNACCEPTABLE. EUROPE'S ECONOMY IS STILL SLUGGISH; ELIMINATING SHORT AND MEDIUM RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS CANNOT BE OFFSET BY CONVENTIONAL MEANS; FOR AN AGGRESSOR,

5.

THE RISK OF GOING NUCLEAR REPRESENTS A DETERRENT OF A DIFFERENT ORDER WHILE AT THE SAME TIME FORCING THE ENEMY TO AVOID TROOP CONCENTRATIONS DURING AN ATTACK; LASTLY, AND THIS IS NOT THE LEAST OF THE EUROPEANS' OBJECTIONS, POPULATION TRENDS IN MOST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, MAKE SUCH A DEVELOPMENT HIGHLY UNLIKELY.

THE AFTERMATH OF REKJAVIK COULD THEREFORE USHER IN A WIDE-RANGING DEBATE ON SECURITY IN EUROPE. WE DON'T WANT "TO CRY OVER SPILT MILK" ABOUT INF. JUST AS SDI IS PRESENTED AS AN INSURANCE POLICY AGAINST THE CONSEQUENCES OF STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS, CONVENTIONAL BALANCE MUST BE RECOGNIZED AS THE INSURANCE POLICY AGAINST THE WIDE-RANGING EFFECTS OF DRASTIC REDUCTIONS IN THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR PRESENCE IN EUROPE.

II - THERE IS A SECOND DEBATE IN PROSPECT, NAMELY THE REKJAVIC PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHIN 10 YEARS.

WILL NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STILL BE VALID INTO THE NEXT CENTURY? IS THIS POSSIBLE? IS IT DESIRABLE? CONTRARY TO WHAT MIGHT BE THOUGHT, THIS ISSUE IS NOT EXCLUSIVELY CONFINED TO SDI. REKJAVIK HAS OPENED UP A NEW QUESTION, NAMELY THAT OF THE VIABILITY OF A NUCLEAR DETERRENCE SHORN OF ITS MISSILES.

I LEAVE IT TO THE SPECIALISTS TO DISCUSS THE SPECIFICALLY STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF THIS QUESTION: IS IT REASONABLE TO GIVE UP THE LEAST VULNERABLE ELEMENT OF THE STRATEGIC TRIAD, I.E. SUBMARINES? AND DO CRUISE MISSILES STILL OFFER A GENUINE ALTERNATIVE? SURELY THE DIFFICULTIES OF PENETRATING THE FORMIDABLE SOVIET DEFENSES REQUIRES

THAT WE MAINTAIN THE SYNERGY THAT EXISTS BETWEEN BALLISTIC MISSILES AND BOMBERS OR CRUISE MISSILES? HOW CAN WE VERIFY THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR-ARMED BALLISTIC MISSILES WHEN IN THEORY THE DEPLOYMENT OF SDI REQUIRES PUTTING HARDWARE ORBIT WITH ALMOST THE SAME LAUNCHERS ? HOW COULD FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN SERIOUSLY RESTRUCTURE THEIR DETERRENT CAPABILITY - WHICH IS BASED ESSENTIALLY ON BALLISTIC SYSTEMS - WITHIN TEN YEARS? GIVEN THE NEARNESS OF THE SOVIET ADVERSARY, WHAT REASSURANCE IS THERE FOR EUROPE IN ARGUMENTS BASED ON BOMBER AND CRUISE MISSILE FLIGHT TIMES?

POLITICALLY SPEAKING, I WOULD MENTION JUST ONE PROBLEM, ALBEIT A MAJOR ONE: PUBLIC OPINION IS INCAPABLE OF MAKING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES ONLY, AND THE ELIMINATION OF ALL STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS. WE HAVE SEEN WHAT HAPPENED AFTER REKJAVIK, EVEN IN THE UNITED STATES. WE MAY DEPEND ON THE SOVIETS TO SKILLFULLY SOW UTTER CONFUSION ON THIS SCORE.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

I HAVE DELIBERATELY SOUGHT TO SHED LIGHT ON THE TERMS OF THE POST-REKJAVIK DEBATE.

ON THE SUBJECT OF EUROPEAN SECURITY, I MENTIONED THE RISK OF MISUNDERSTANDING. LET ME MAKE MY FEELINGS PERFECTLY CLEAR ON THIS:
NEITHER CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE NOR CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT CAN REPLACE NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN EUROPE. WE ARE PREPARED TO COUNTENANCE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL BALANCES TO THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL. WE REJECT WHAT IS REFERRED TO AS THE "DENUCLEARIZATION OF EUROPE", WHICH IN FACT MEANS THE "DENUCLEARIZATION OF WESTERN EUROPE", SINCE A EUROPE STRIPPED OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR ARMS WOULD REMAIN UNDER THE THREAT OF SOVIET MISSILES;

CONCERNING THE PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE BALLISTIC STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, I BELIEVE THAT THIS IS BASED ON AN ILLUSION, THE ILLUSION THAT WE COULD TURN THE CLOCK BACK AND REVERT TO THE KIND OF DETERRENCE WE HAD BEFORE THE ADVENT OF BALLISTIC LAUNCHERS.

LASTLY, I AM STRUCK BY THE PARALLEL BETWEEN THE OPTIMISTIC VIEW THAT IS TAKEN OF THE FUTURE OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND THE IDEA OF A DELIBERATELY PLANNED "DISINVENTION" OF DETERRENCE.

IN EITHER CASE, AS A EUROPEAN, I SUSPECT THAT THE MARCH OF HISTORY IS MORE OBSCURE THAN ANY PURELY LOGICAL EXTRAPOLATION WOULD ALLOW.

TO PARAPHRASE RAYMOND ARON, I WOULD BE INCLINED TO THINK THAT

- ANY DEEP CHANGE IN THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM WOULD BE IMPROBABLE BEFORE MANY YEARS,

- NUCLEAR DETERRENCE WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO BE DISCARDED AWAY WITHIN OUR LIFETIME./.

