



MO 14/4E

24th November 1986

PS/PUS

*This is very worrying
We must have a
joint meeting
NB*

Copy to:
PSO/CDS
DUS(P)
ACDS(Pol/Nuc)

*Prime Minister
I am concerned
that M. Giraud's
enthusiasm risks
carrying Mr. Younger
along too far &
too fast. 3(c) in
particular goes well beyond
our agreed position, &
will surprise the Americans
if pursued. They may
deduce less interest on
our part in Trident.*

ANGLO-FRENCH CO-OPERATION: PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH M. GIRAUD
ON 21ST NOVEMBER 1986

The greater part of the private meeting between Mr Younger and M. Giraud in the margin of the Summit in Paris was taken up with the theme of nuclear defence co-operation. Their discussion took place against the background of Mr Younger's letter to M. Giraud at the end of September, and M. Giraud's startling private remarks to Mr Younger at Luxembourg last week in which he expressed the hope that we might consider purchasing French systems. What follows is based on Mr Younger's account to me afterwards; it is not a blow-by-blow record.

*Agree to collective
consideration
of how
to respond
to
M. Giraud?*

2. M. Giraud accepted, in the light of the Camp David statement, that we were committed to Trident. He suggested, however, that we should bear in mind that French SSBNs, though smaller than the ones we were building, were large enough to take Trident. As to the missiles, he asked that we should do what we could as we developed the detailed submarine design so as not to make it impossible to convert to French missiles if we wished to do so in the future. He suggested that, after Reykjavik, we could have no confidence in the Americans' reliability as a source of supply.

*Yes Mr CDP
27/11*

3. He welcomed Mr Younger's suggestions for co-operation. Building in part on them, but going a good deal further, he suggested:

- a. a joint analysis of the Soviet nuclear threat, and of Soviet defensive systems, compared with a study of the survivability and vulnerability of allied systems; it was felt that CDS and General Saulmier should pursue this;
- b. a joint study of nuclear weapons' effects, and an exchange of testing technology (M. Chevallier and CDP to pursue);

*Think
not on*




Why?
 c. a study of the possible joint development of a short-range nuclear cruise missile, to be launched from aircraft, with a range of 80km or with a part-cruise, part-ballistic range of 250km (M. Chevallier and CDP to pursue);

d. an exchange on nuclear safety and security (M. Chavallier and CDP, perhaps, to pursue).

4. The Ministers also agreed that it would be useful to exchange information with a view to establishing whether there was scope for some degree of harmonisation of SSBN operations (CDS and General Saulmier, to pursue).


5. On other subjects: AEW was discussed more fully in the formal session (recorded separately) but M. Giraud made it clear privately that he would probably follow us in our choice of system. Mr Younger promised to keep him in touch, at least with the timing of our decision. M. Giraud warned (again) against our having anything at all to do with the Treaty of Raratonga. He knew we tested in the US now, but could we rely upon this for ever, post Reykjavik? (the recurring theme again). He spoke darkly about Libyan influence in Malaysia and the Pacific.

6. On the nuclear issue, there is clearly much to be done to refine the proposals and define the next steps. My distribution of responsibility reflects the Ministers' first thoughts only. Your first reaction was that a senior official should have discussions with M. Giraud's staff. The Secretary of State would welcome this. The Ministers might consider a report by officials at their next meeting, probably in February.


 f. (J F HOWE)
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External distribution:

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MO 14/4E

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NOTE FOR THE RECORD OF A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND M. GIRAUD, IN MARGIN OF ANGLO/FRENCH SUMMIT IN PARIS, FRIDAY 21ST NOVEMBER AT 1200

Present:

The Rt Hon George Younger MP
 Secretary of State for Defence

M. Giraud
 French Defence Minister

Sir Clive Whitmore
 PUS

M. Chevallier

Air Commodore Burton

M. de la Fortelle

Mr Giles

Vice Admiral Goupil

Mr J F Howe
 PS/Secretary of State

M. Scheller

Capt Delaunay

Bilateral Security Co-operation

After an initial exchange of courtesies, and agreement on the agenda for the meeting, the Ministers agreed the joint report on bilateral security matters and endorsed its recommendations, viz, to continue to develop bilateral relations and armaments co-operation; to reaffirm the role, in this connection, of politico/military talks, staff discussions and discussions between armaments directors; and to commission a report from the high level politico/military group for the next Franco/British summit.

Nuclear Powered Warship Visits

2. M. Giraud said that although there was a legal problem over NPW visits, which the Foreign Ministries were trying to resolve, from a general political point of view the French were keen to continue such visits. They wanted the Royal Navy to continue to visit France and he was ready to help as much as he could to resolve the difficulties. The Secretary of State said that his view was the same. The UK would much welcome visits by French vessels in return for the successful RN visit to Brest earlier in the year. The legal problems over liabilities were really on the French side and he felt it doubtful whether we could help much but if there was any way in which he could help, he would.



Equipment Matters: General

3. The Secretary of State noted and welcomed the fact that relations between Britain and France on equipment matters were close, and getting closer. We were the only two European countries with across the board capabilities in armaments and there were many promising areas for further development, notably, for example, medium SAMs. He acknowledged that bilateral co-operation had practical attractions but it was useful to achieve multilateral co-operation where practicable. He was glad to note the reciprocal - but not formally linked - purchases of RMCDS Mark II by the UK and Racal-Decca navigation radars by France. He felt that the reports by National Armaments Directors to summits were a useful innovation. They showed that good progress was being made on a number of fronts, including towards the long term goal of torpedo collaboration.

4. M. Giraud generally agreed but raised the following three specific issues.

AEW

X | 5. M. Chevallier said that the French had participated in the UK evaluation exercise and this arrangement worked well. The problem for the French was that they had not been able to complete their evaluation of the Nimrod in the latest configuration, and were not yet clear whether its performance met the French requirement. They were awaiting a Nimrod demonstration flight over French territory on 10th December.

6. The Secretary of State said that he hoped that the British Government would be able to make a decision before Christmas on whether to buy AWACS or Nimrod, although he could not exclude the possibility that a decision would spill over into the new year. He would let M. Giraud know when his mind was made up. On the one hand, AWACS was a working system, but it was expensive; in the case of Nimrod, on the other hand, there were some technical problems which had yet to be demonstrably resolved. Once our decision was taken, we would welcome co-operation with the French in placing contracts if this was feasible. M. Chevallier said that if we both opted for AWACS, we would need to agree upon the order of deliveries; there could be price advantages in taking later aircraft. The Secretary of State said that our own requirement was for an in-service date of 1989. M. Giraud said that the French requirement was for Chad, for which aircraft were required soon, and the Western Mediterranean, which was not so urgent. The French, in short, were not in a terrible hurry but they wanted to move reasonably quickly.



7. The Secretary of State said that our own requirement would probably be for eight AWACS, or ten Nimrod. M. Giraud confirmed that his own requirement was for three AWACS; M. Chevallier said that if Nimrod was chosen, the requirement would be for four aircraft.

8. M. Giraud suggested that the delivery arrangements should be made flexible so that in the case of an urgent need arising deliveries could be switched from one country to the other. The arrangement for changing flags in this way would have to be such as to avoid implicating one country politically in the crisis for which the other country required the aircraft. The Secretary of State said that this sounded a good idea and he agreed that it should be looked at.

9. M. Chevallier said that if both countries chose the Nimrod, the problem would arise that the number of aircraft available was insufficient to cover both requirements. M. Giraud said that his potential interest in the GEC option was in the context of a long term plan for a European AEW system that would have overseas markets as well, such as Spain or the Middle East. He was not sure whether the GEC radar would fit into a French aircraft, although GEC had assured him that it would. If this was feasible and the price was right, it could well have attractions. He felt that the Nimrod solution; (by which I take him to have meant either the Nimrod itself, or the GEC equipment in a French aircraft) would make sense for the short term requirement only, in the absence of longer term sales prospects.

Medium SAMs

10. M. Giraud said that we needed to consider together further our concepts of air defence. He disagreed with the US concept of zonal defence and favoured concentrating on the point defence of ships or bases. The Secretary of State and PUS said that the British concept was of a mixture of area and point defence, for example (in the maritime area) Sea Dart and Sea Wolf. M. Chevallier suggested that the first requirement was for a point defence against sea skimming missiles. Ministers agreed that our requirements for future medium SAMs were sufficiently similar for us to encourage co-operation between the British and the French industries. M. Giraud said that for his part he would not seek other partners until he had taken our bilateral exploration further forward and "decided the backbone of the system". PUS added that medium SAM requirements were meanwhile under discussion in the IEPG.

TRIGAT

11. M. Giraud said that he was concerned at the delays in this project, for which he believed the UK held some responsibility. M. Chevallier said that there were two main problems: the British had sought a negotiated price before inter-governmental agreement



was reached, whereas the French were seeking agreement first before the price was finally settled. The second problem was that the UK were insisting on participants - even indirect participants - having a right of veto on export sales. Mr Giles said that agreement had recently been reached that associated nations should have no right of veto. M. Chevallier said that there was still a difficulty outstanding. The Secretary of State expressed a general sympathy for what the French were trying to achieve here; we had experienced difficulties, in other contexts, with collaborative partners who were slow to give approval to export sales. It was agreed that officials should look into the details. For his part he considered it essential that a contract for full development was achieved by mid 1987.

Post-Reyjavik

12. The Secretary of State said that the immediate British concern after Reyjavik was that the proposal to abolish ballistic nuclear missiles was unrealistic and damaging to the Alliance's defence posture. He had talked to Mr Weinberger at Gleneagles and though Weinberger's reactions there had been guarded there were now signs that our reservations were widely shared, at least in the Pentagon. The declaration after the Prime Minister's meeting with the President at Camp David had been very satisfactory to us. It was also welcome that the Russians were not insisting on bringing the French and British systems into the negotiations as a pre-condition. The way ahead was to pursue the aim of an INF agreement, preferably at a level above zero in Europe if this was practicable; and with the most stringent limits possible on SRINF. M. Chevallier interjected that SRINF were, to the Europeans, strategic weapons. M. Giraud said that he had detected at the WEU meeting in Luxembourg the previous week that "even the Dutch" were nervous about the outcome of Reykjavik; they made an implicit distinction between shorter range systems which could not strike the Netherlands, and those which could.

13. M. Giraud asked how we understood the US attitude towards CW arms control. The Secretary of State recapitulated the position, which was that the United States was committed to resume CW production if a comprehensive ban was not achieved. M. Giraud drew attention to the reference in the French five year programme law to the possession by France of a deterrent CW capability. The threat obliged France to take precautions. At present the only response to this threat was nuclear. Moreover the CW threat placed considerable constraints on conventional forces by virtue of the NBC precautions they were obliged to take. He doubted whether a CW ban would in fact be achieved. The French had not however set themselves a definite target date, unlike the Americans, for reintroducing a chemical capability; and the programme law spoke of "going towards" a CW capability. The Secretary of State said that the US position on CW production had proved difficult



for some NATO members and so far as the United Kingdom was concerned there was no practical likelihood that we would again possess a CW of our own.

(J F HOWE)
PS/S of S

24th November 1986

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