cc B/EP

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH MR. ORLOV

You are to see Mr. Orlov tomorrow. He will be accompanied by Nicholas Bethell. There will be an interpreter. There will also be photographers at the beginning.

You have already read Mr. Orlov's account of his experiences. The attached papers deal with some of his current ideas. He sees a direct link between security and human rights, and argues that disarmament can only proceed safely when the Soviet Union allows its citizens to lead normal lives. He feels that the West tends to appease the Soviet Union on these issues, has not been firm enough in attacking their human rights record at the CSCE and ought to make a stronger link between progress on human rights and progress in other areas of relations with the Soviet Union. He sees the Soviet proposal for a conference in Moscow on humanitarian questions as a propaganda ploy (I think this is right: it would cheapen the whole human rights campaign to have a meeting in Moscow. But the FCO think it could be turned against the Russians).

You might like first to ask Mr. Orlov to tell you something about his experiences; and then get on to his ideas for handling human rights problems.

CDP

C D POWELL

27 November 1986

SLHACG

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cc B1/UP
CCSC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

26 November 1986

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's Meeting with Yuri Orlov,
10.30 am Friday 28 November

/ I enclose a brief. Mr Orlov can be expected to develop the themes he has expressed in The Times of 26 November / (copy enclosed) and elsewhere.

These are, in brief, that

- international security and human rights in the USSR are connected. True security will only be achieved when confidence increases, and this will only happen when human rights are protected.

- the Soviet proposal for a conference on humanitarian questions in Moscow was a propaganda ploy. The West should not consider agreeing to it without absolute assurances of access for interested Soviet citizens.

- Western countries (except the US) are not making sufficiently detailed or specific attacks on the Soviet human rights record at the CSCE meeting in Vienna.

We do not think the last charge can be sustained. It is true that the US has often been readier than the European countries to name names in the CSCE, and that George Shultz's speech at the Vienna opening session was sharper in tone and contained more specific cases than that made by the Foreign Secretary on behalf of the Twelve. But Sir Geoffrey did insist, in the face of opposition from some EC member states, on including a reference to Sakharov, and his speech was firm and categorical on the need for human rights improvements. Our delegation have followed up with a series of interventions in which they have listed quite specifically instances of human rights abuses. As we had expected, this has touched a raw nerve; the Soviet Union have tried to hit back by reference to Northern Ireland, unemployment and so on, which we are firmly rebutting.

/I enclose

/ I enclose an account of Orlov's views and experiences, given in discussion with Lord Bethell. It is rather long, but fascinating and well worth reading if the Prime Minister has time.

Tony Bishop will be available to interpret.

Yours ever,

Colin Budd

(C R Budd)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

PM'S MEETING WITH YURI ORLOV, 28 NOVEMBER 1986

Your Objective

(Apart from expressing pleasure at meeting Orlov)

- To emphasise HMG's concern over Soviet human rights abuses.

- To welcome Orlov's constructive suggestions on how HMG could be more effective in representations to the Soviet Union.

- To invite his views on current state of CSCE process and on latest Soviet proposal for conference on humanitarian issues in Moscow.

His Objective

- Emphasise connection between international security and human rights in USSR.

- Urge co-ordinated Western support, irrespective of politics, for Soviet dissidents, and more specific and detailed attacks on Soviet record.

Your Argument

1. Welcome. Pleased your wife allowed to accompany you. Hope you can soon be reunited with your sons.

2. Will continue to press Soviet Union for better human rights in every way we can: in bilateral contracts and at Vienna CSCE meeting.

3. [If he argues West not hitting Soviet Union hard enough in CSCE]
Our delegation in Vienna making specific criticisms of Soviet abuses such as repression of religious and cultural freedoms; refusal of right of emigration; etc. Not always right to mention names. Place also for quite diplomacy.

[If he suggests linkage; no arms control, trade deals unless improvements in human rights]
CSCE contains its own linkage or balance between the Baskets. Progress necessary in human rights if West are to agree to progress in other areas.
But rigid linkage unrealisable and would be counterproductive, since we as well as Soviet Union want trade and arms control.

4. [If he argues against attending proposed Moscow Conference on humanitarian issues].
Studying this proposal now with partners and allies. Agree Soviet authorities will seek to make propaganda capital. But could be opportunity for Western expressions of concern/publicity in capital of Soviet Union if we insist on right conditions eg full press reporting, access by interested parties etc. In no hurry to take public position.

5. [If he raises Baltic States, suggesting they be represented at CSCE] Fear unrealistic, since Baltic States not signatories to Helsinki Final Act or subsequent CSCE documents. HMG support right of all peoples to self-determination and deplore acquisition of territory by force. Successive British governments have not recognised incorporation of Baltic States into Soviet Union _de jure_, although they have recognised incorporation _de facto_. Soviet authorities well aware of our views.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

Yuri Orlov

1. Born 1924. Physicist. Prominent human rights activist, founder member of Helsinki monitoring group. Arrested February 1977, sentenced May 1978 to 7 years labour camp and 5 internal exile on charge of 'anti Soviet agitation and propaganda'. Released 5 October 1986 as part of exchange involving Nicholas Daniloff. Did not want to leave Soviet Union. Stripped of his Soviet citizenship, deported with his wife to USA. Two sons remain in USSR. Received by president Reagan 7 October. Has said he will continue struggle for human rights, also wants to return to science.

2. Additional background in attached record of Orlov's discussion with Lord Bethell, and Times article of 26 November.

Vienna CSCE Follow Up Meeting

3. Main meeting opened 4 November. Foreign Secretary attended and spoke for Twelve: also met Orlov on 27 November in margins. Participants in meeting will aim to finish business by 31 July 1987. Current phase of meeting devoted to reviewing implementation of existing CSCE commitments.

Baltic States

4. Speaking in Bonn, Orlov said that the West should demand that the Baltic States should be represented at security conferences (rather as Ukraine and Byelonissia have seats at the UN).

Yuri Orlov on western misunderstandings over Soviet human rights

Peace through pressure

International security cannot be guaranteed by agreement between governments alone. Ribbentrop and Molotov embraced and shook hands immediately before the war between Germany and the USSR. One could object that in negotiating for peace and friendship they did not have mutual disarmament in mind. Today however, even mutual disarmament by the USA and the USSR would not, of itself, guarantee peace.

Of course disarmament is essential. It would help to reduce the danger of war breaking out accidentally. On the other hand, complete nuclear disarmament would reduce the mutual fear of retaliation, and this would make it easier for a war to start with conventional weapons; and no matter how another world war might start, it would end with nuclear strikes. The nuclear end of the Second World War and the fierceness with which small wars are waged today leave no doubt of that.

True, security would not be guaranteed by agreement about mutual disarmament. Something else is required: the relationship between the *peoples* of the West and the Soviet bloc must be approximately the same as that between France and Great Britain. Both are nuclear powers, but a nuclear war between them is inconceivable.

Jeffrey Morgan

Is such a relationship possible between western nations and the USSR? Would not the USSR have to be capitalized, and the West Sovietized? I do not think so. The ordinary people on both sides do not want a nuclear war, so to ensure that one never happens it is essential that they have complete control over all foreign and military policies of their governments.

Further democratization is necessary for this to be achieved even in the West; in the Soviet Union, the present system is totally at odds with this essential requirement for mutual security. Soviet citizens are not only denied the opportunity to protest against the military actions of their government but cannot even take an interest in them. If our Helsinki monitoring groups had become involved in these issues we would all have been sentenced as "spies" or "traitors".

The degree of secrecy in the USSR is such that passing information about political prisoners can be viewed as "treason", so it is not hard to imagine the reaction to publishing information about military policy. In considering international security we cannot ignore the direct link to the overall question of human rights in the USSR, including the citizen's right to criticize government actions.

The defence of Soviet citizens who are persecuted for expressing such criticism is therefore not only a universal moral duty but a self-interested insurance against dangerous recklessness by the Soviet leaders. The West, unfortunately, seems almost unaware of this fact.

To ensure that the people of both sides get to know and understand each other, and so demonstrate that they want peace, there must be no barrier to free and open communication. No one in the USSR should be persecuted for their desire to leave and return to the country whenever they wish and to talk freely to foreigners.

At present, Soviet society still remains a kind of "underground organization" with respect to foreigners. When an "underground organization" possesses the might of a superpower, this is dangerous.

Faced with the might of the Soviet state, many people in the West display cowardice, selfishness and a feeling of hopelessness. It seems to them that it is better not to irritate the Soviet government. Some will help to save individual victims of persecution but they do not relate this to world security, and they do not believe in the possibility of change within the USSR.

In fact change can be brought about, given greater collective efforts. Soviet society is incomparably better today than in the 1950s before the death of Stalin. By the end of the century a sufficient degree of openness should have been achieved to make it relatively safe for citizens to criticize military and foreign policy. But this must be fought for

Such reforms would not necessitate the collapse of the Soviet system. They require only the rejection of the Kremlin's dream of communism dominating the entire world. Dissidents in the USSR well understand the direct connection between the dream that communism will prevail and the closed and repressive nature of the regime. But their thinking is still insufficiently understood in the West.

It was with great difficulty that the West realized the possibility – indeed the necessity – of using the Helsinki Final Act to improve human rights in the Soviet Union. But before we can speak about the possibility of change, we have to make the effort for these changes to occur. At the Belgrade review conference, for example, not one western delegation made such an effort. Now, at the Vienna review conference, everyone is speaking about human rights, but the majority do not name the country guilty of the violation. Most of the western delegation have failed to mention the names of individuals who should be released immediately from prison, labour camps, exile or psychiatric detention, or of the refuseniks who have waited many exhausting years to leave the country.

It is essential to demand, openly and persistently, a universal political amnesty in the USSR. This would lead to the release of at least 800 political prisoners, first and foremost the 40 or so who monitored the observation of human rights agreements. At the very top of the least should be Dr Andrei Sakharov, Anatoly Koryagin – nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize – writer Anatoly Marchenko, the Jewish leader Iosif Begun and Professor Naum Meiman and his wife, who has cancer. It is crucial to lay down in the text of the next concluding document the unassailable rights of citizens to monitor human rights.

At Helsinki the Soviet Union promised to the world that its citizens would enjoy basic freedoms. The West must demand that that promise be kept. Some progress can be observed, but as yet it is a far cry from the right to fundamental criticism which is so important for the security of us all.

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Dr Orlov, a physicist, spent nine years in Soviet prison camps and internal exile because of his work for human rights. He was allowed to leave the Soviet Union for the

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Prime Minister
You may like to look at least at the bits which I have underlined.

CCPC
(2)

FROM
NICHOLAS BETHELL

TELEPHONE
01-402-6877

73 SUSSEX SQUARE
LONDON W2 2SS

Charles Powell Esq
10 Downing Street
LONDON SW1

30th October 1986

CDP
31/X

Dear Charles,

I am sending you herewith a full transcript of my meeting with Dr Yuri Orlov last month. I think that you will find it interesting reading, and, if you think fit, you may like to show it to the Prime Minister before Dr Orlov comes to see her on Friday, November 27th.

I am giving a small reception here at 7pm on Thursday, November 26th, for MPs, writers on Russia and others who may want to meet Dr Orlov and his wife. I would be very pleased if you could come.

Yours ever,

Nicholas

D R Y U R I O R L O V

Leader of the Helsinki Monitoring Group in Moscow

Talks to Nicholas Bethell

PART ONE: Yuri Orlov's Ideas for Russia's Future

The world's main guarantee of peace, I believe, is not disarmament but the building-up of trust and confidence between peoples. For instance, Britain and France both have nuclear weapons, but you're not going to use them against each other. Your links are too close for that. The same sort of links must be built up between the Soviet Union and the West, and this can only be done by making the Soviet Union a far more open society, allowing a free press, non-violent dissent, different political ideas and foreign travel.

Disarmament is not the main thing. Nuclear weapons can never be entirely done away with. Even if they are all destroyed, factories remain, the technology remains, they can always be rebuilt if a country feels threatened by conventional forces. So the only way to prevent it is by confidence building measures, as envisaged in the Agreement.

Millions must be allowed to travel - and freely, without being guarded all the time as they are now. And this is why the human rights movement is so important. People must not be arrested for providing information. If they are, it is not only a violation of human rights, it also makes nuclear war more likely. And if western countries raise the question of human rights in the Soviet Union, it is not interference in their internal affairs. It is essential if nuclear war is to be avoided.

Gorbachov says that he wants greater openness, but for the moment he is not doing much to bring it about. My hope, though, lies in the fact that a more open society is now necessary to him. His country is becoming technologically backward and he must allow more Soviet people to travel, even if only specialists. Our task is now to convince him to allow the masses to travel also. It would not be a threat to the Soviet Union. On the contrary, I think that the USSR would become a lot more powerful if it were to adapt itself to democracy. It would develop more quickly, if there was freedom to criticise and to manoeuvre economically. With its enormous resources, the Soviet Union could really prosper in such conditions.

This cannot be done overnight. It must take a little time. But it need not take so long a time as Gorbachov seems to envisage. The great barrier, I think, is not Gorbachov himself or the top leadership, but the middle ranks of Soviet bureaucracy who have become so firmly dug in to the system as it exists today. The KGB, for instance, is a very strong negative force. They want to preserve their power and role in society. Implementation of my ideas would reduce this power.

I still have some hopes in Gorbachov. It's too early to say, though. We'll have to see. He has improved things over criticism of the authorities. Regional Party secretaries, for instance, can now be criticised in the press. So can ministers, but not the Central Committee or the Politburo. One can criticise the police, but not the army and certainly not the KGB. So there are some small steps.

On the other hand, the situation over Jewish emigration has got worse. Even fewer are being allowed to leave than before Gorbachov came to power. I think though that this is a card that Gorbachov and the leadership will play if and when it comes to the point that they need better relations with the West and a more liberal policy at home. All these concessions over human rights, myself included, are cards in Mr Gorbachov's hand. And he plays them when it suits him. For the moment Jewish emigration is not necessary for him, so they stay in the Soviet Union as hostages, for the moment, ready to be used in the future.

I explained most of this to Mr Reagan, though not in such detail, because there wasn't time, and I told him that this was why he really should defend and try to free the Soviet Union's political prisoners, who are as it were the pioneers of this openness that we want.

It would be no threat to the Soviet Union to release these people. There are not so

many of them. The number of actual political dissidents in prison, those sentenced under Articles 64 (treason) and 70 (anti-Soviet agitation), I would put at something between 200 and 300, not counting collaborators with Nazi Germany or those genuinely guilty of spying for the West. This was the figure, I think 276, in a list recently compiled by Tatyana Sergeyevna Khodorovich.

The number of those convicted on other less serious political charges, under Article 190 which carries a maximum of three years imprisonment, is harder to calculate. There are many convicted of offences connected with religion. There are people who refuse to serve in the army, the Pentecostalists for instance, or Jews who wish to emigrate, or others who simply object to serving as a matter of conscience.

The figure of 10,000, I think, is too high, but it may be in the range of 2,000 to 3,000. One can work this out roughly, as I did, by asking prisoners or former prisoners, either in transit prisons as well as before I was arrested, what camp they were in and where the camps are situated. One comes out with a figure of 1,000 to 1,500 camps with an average of 2,000 prisoners in each, making a total of two to three million prisoners actually in labour camps. And in each camp, we calculate, there are a small number, say two people, one in each thousand, convicted under Article 190. This is, of course, very approximate. And it does not include those who have finished their terms and are at forced labour in exile, the so-called "khimiki". There are more of these than there are in the camps, maybe four or five million.

The prison population in the Soviet Union will decline, I believe, because people are drinking less. So many crimes are drink-related. I certainly agree with this part of Mr Gorbachov's programme. And I think it has a chance of success, except that soon there is bound to be a big problem over home-made alcohol (samogon), especially in country districts. Drink is one of the Soviet Union's greatest problems. There is no other country in the world, I believe, where alcoholism is so widespread.

Less drinking will mean less fighting and less hooliganism generally. And these are the main offences for which young Soviet men are sentenced. This can only benefit the Soviet state. It is no longer the case that a huge labour-camp population helps the Soviet economy. Maybe it was the case in the 1920s, when dams and canals were built by forced labour. Now all they do is feed the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB. The ministry wants to keep a large number of prisoners, so as to maintain its manning levels and influence generally.

Forced labour is not conducive to high productivity. You cannot have top-quality equipment or an efficient production line in a labour camp. Prisoners do not have the skills for it. And there is no point in training them, because they are here today and gone or moved to another camp tomorrow. There is no stability. It was different 50 years ago. The Soviet Union then did not claim to have a technologically up-to-date economy. Now it claims exactly that. And Gorbachov talks about our backwardness in certain areas. This is one of them. The camps are a relic of the past.

The changes I propose would be equivalent in degree to the Khrushchev reforms of the 1950s. Under Stalin the "curtain" was impenetrable. Khrushchev lifted it a bit. I now want Gorbachov to lift it a lot more.

If such reforms were implemented, I do not think that millions would take the opportunity of leaving the country. Some would in the beginning, but then it would settle down. I certainly would not want to leave in such a situation. Many would want to leave for a few years, to study or to earn money, but most would return. People prefer to live in their own country. People are not hungry in the Soviet Union and one's country is one's country. Many Jews wish to leave because there is another country where things are generally better for them and to which they feel

attached. The vast majority of the rest would stay.

I asked President Reagan to tell Mr Gorbachov that, if these reforms are not implemented, peace cannot be guaranteed. This is what the West should do, keep repeating this to the Soviet leadership, that these reforms are the best guarantee of peace, that without them, without a more open Soviet society, there can be no real detente.

I would not support a move from a socialist to a capitalist society. Each country has its history and this creates limits for any programme of reform. In our case we had a revolution which destroyed a capitalism that was just beginning. We never had the sort of capitalism that you did in Britain. If we were now to renounce this, it would be a national humiliation, leading to a terrible cynicism and disintegration of morale. This is bad for any nation in any circumstance.

So let us keep socialism, but a democratic socialism, with an opposition, free trade unions and so-called bourgeois freedom, but without private industry on a very great scale. I would not be against private craftsmen or a certain private enterprise in service industries, for instance, or in agriculture, where there might also be a return to the cooperative system.

I do not want to label myself as a socialist generally. I just think that for the Soviet Union there must be socialism, but with freedom. I am not talking about England or Germany. I don't know enough about the history or political background. I am just a socialist for Russia. In general, the only principle I support is that of a free pluralist political system. And as for future generations, no one can tell.

I spoke to Mr Reagan about openness in Soviet society and about the need to defend those individuals in the Soviet Union who defend that openness. I mentioned several individuals, such as Andrey Sakharov and Anatoli Marchenko, just a few, because to mention many is as pointless as to mention none. Marchenko was one of the first to join my group and now he is living in very difficult conditions in Chistopol prison. He has declared a hunger stike in the run-up to the Vienna CSCE review conference. He is very stubborn and he may well continue his hunger strike a long time.

There are some who compare him to the IRA hunger strikers in your country, but this is not fair, because the IRA have taken up arms, whereas Marchenko and other Russian dissidents have never done this. There is no problem with terrorism in the Soviet Union. The KGB say, "We imprison dissidents for what they do, not for what they think." But in fact there is very little that we actually do. We merely express our thoughts.

Gorbachov said, "We do not imprison people for their convictions." What he means is that you must keep your ideas in your head and never open your mouth. And that is absolutely pointless. The expression of a conviction, in his view, is an act, for which people can be puhished. However, such behaviour by the Soviet government is a clear violation of the Helsinki Agreement.

PART TWO: Yuri Orlov's Experiences 1977-86

I was arrested in Moscow on February 10th, 1977, for organising the "Helsinki Group", which monitored the Soviet Union's observance of the human rights provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed by Leonid Brezhnev in 1975. I was charged with anti-Soviet agitation under Article 70 of the penal code and, after 15 months in Lefortovo Prison in Moscow, sentenced to seven years at forced labour, to be followed by five years of internal exile. In the spring of 1978 I began my sentence in camp No. 37 in the Perm labour-camp complex in the northern Urals.

In the beginning I was treated quite carefully in the camp. The authorities there clearly did not quite know how they ought to treat me. But then in February 1979 I was deprived of my associate membership of the Armenian Academy of Sciences. This was a signal for them to tighten up.

I was put to work on a lathe cutting threading into the inside of metal tubes. I had done this type of work 45 years ago, during the war, and this was a help to me, except that most of those working with me were between 20 and 30 years old, while I was coming up to 60. It was an eight-hour-a-day shift six days a week, physically exhausting, so that I never fulfilled the norm.

In a labour camp you can be punished by being sent to the camp prison. This happened to me six times, for half a year each, making up half my actual term. In the prison I worked at a bench weaving wire into metal grilles. Anatoli Koryagin, a doctor imprisoned for speaking out against the abuse of psychiatry, was working at a nearby bench on a different shift. He was one of those who helped me to approach the norm. But the authorities increased the norm twice, so as to tighten discipline by making it easier to punish the prisoners, and after that I never got near it.

The camp prison was not too bad, though, because they gave you proper boots and a jacket against the cold. Most important of all, at night we had a mattress, a pillow and a blanket each. So we could sleep.

The really awful punishment was the SHIZO, the "shtrafnoy isolyator" or "punishment isolation cell". After I was expelled from the Armenian academy, they confiscated the scientific papers I had been working on in the camp. This confiscation was quite illegal, so I said that in that case I would refuse to work. And for that I was sent to the SHIZO for five days. It was five days of complete isolation with no books, nothing to read and nothing to write on. As a political prisoner I could not even have pieces of newspaper to use as toilet paper. They said I might read it.

Every time they put me in the cell they took away my clothes and gave me just a light shirt, a pair of socks and some linen trousers. It meant that I got very cold, especially at night. The temperature was supposed to be 18 degrees Centigrade according to the rules, but they only heat it up to that level when it is being officially measured for the record. In fact it gets down to ten degrees, which is very bad if you only have light clothing.

The great problem then was lack of sleep. The bunks were wooden planks held together with metal strips. They fold into the cell wall. Every night at about ten o'clock the guard opens your bunk with a key from the outside and closes it again at six in the morning. You have no blanket or bedding of any sort whatever.

Every night I used to rub the planks with my hands to warm them up. Then I would lie down, fall asleep, wake up again ten minutes later because of the cold, start

rubbing the planks again with my hands, and so on hour after hour getting just a few minutes sleep at a time.

Our food consisted of 450 grammes of black bread a day and hot food, if you can call it that, every second day.- 300 grammes of cabbage soup and half a cup of porridge. Also there was hot water, except that by the time they brought it from the kitchen it was no longer hot. I did eight terms of solitary confinement, two terms of five days, four of fifteen days, one of 30 days and one of 55 days - a total of 155 days. All that time I was dizzy through cold and lack of sleep. The purpose of the SHIZO is to break the prisoner's spirit.

A political prisoner is under particular pressure, because the authorities are under instructions to change his attitude and ideas. Ordinary criminals can just obey the rules, work hard and they will be all right. Political prisoners have to be cracked. This is why the KGB surrounded me with a tight circle of prisoners whom they had broken previously and who did what they told them.

In my zone there were a lot of prisoners convicted of collaboration with Germany during the war. The authorities like to remind the Soviet people about the war, so every year they arrest a few men for collaboration, even though it was decades ago. Usually they get 15 years. They were under orders to keep an eye on me and to try and trap me in any way possible.

They tried to get me charged with theft. For instance, they would take the soap from the washroom and put it by my bunk. "Orlov stole it," they would say. Why had he done it? Orlov is not a thief. "So as to create disorder in the camp." There had to be a political reason for all my offences. I was never charged with theft, but the idea was to keep the threat of such a charge always hanging over my head. It could have meant a new trial and another two or three years in the camp. So the pressure was psychological as well as physical.

The most serious incident was in September 1982 when a friend of mine, a dissident from Georgia, Mirab Chitava, was beaten up by violent criminals. The guards just watched it happening and did not interfere, except that when it was over they accused me of starting a fight, my aim being to start a mutiny or sabotage the camps work. It was a very serious matter indeed, it could have meant another seven years. There were bruises all over my back and I had a fever, but the doctor said it was nothing and I could go to work as usual.

The doctors were quite unqualified. One was the wife of a senior camp officer, the other the wife of the KGB chief. So they treated me on a political basis. They said I was cheating, that I must have done something to make the thermometer go above normal. So off I went to work.

They did have some medicines, because it was important to keep the men at work, but as for dentists there were none at all and all of us now have rotten teeth. The only thing that made it all just bearable was the help I got from the other political prisoners. We helped each other out and the authorities did not like it. They put in my annual report that I was a bad influence on the other prisoners. And it really was not true. Especially during the last two years I was genuinely frightened of being charged and sentenced to another term, so I did not break any of the rules, not once. It did not stop them trying to pretend otherwise. I even got close to fulfilling my norm, but still I got a bad annual report.

The only thing I did occasionally was to try and communicate with the other prisoners. We used to leave notes for each other at the work bench. We had to hide these notes

very carefully, because the guards always searched them between shifts, but it really kept us going to find a kind word from a friend. When I was ill - I was coughing blood for a month - one of the prisoners even got some medicine for me and hid it for me at the bench.

Many of Russia's best known prisoners of conscience were at camps in the Perm region. Anatoly Shcharansky was at camp No. 35. There was also Gleb Yakunin, the Orthodox Christian activist, and Alexander Goretoy, a Pentecostalist. I also remember a man called Kaparov, who was sentenced for Marxism-Leninism! It happens quite often that men who are beginning to think and challenge the Soviet authorities take Lenin as their heero, believing that the Soviet government has betrayed Lenin's ideals, that the Party is not behaving as Lenin would have wished or that the working class do not live as Lenin would have wanted. This is quite natural, since books about Marx and Lenin are the basis of all Soviet education. There is very little reading matter available about non-communist political thinkers. And of course one has to admit that Lenin was a more flexible Soviet leader, for instance over his New Economic Policy, that his successors have been.

My seven year term expired on February 10th, 1984. Four days before that I was put on a prisoner transport to be taken to a small village called Kobyay, which is 220 miles north of Yakutsk in northern Siberia. These transports are the worst aspect of prison life in the Soviet Union. It took them a whole month, until March 6th, to get me from Perm in the Urals to Kobyay in Siberia. They took me from the camp to Perm city, them to Sverdlovsk, to Krasnoyarsk, to Irkustsk, to Yakutsk and then by 'plane north along the River Lena to Sangar and then to Kobyay itself, 40 miles to the southwest.

As far as Irkutsk they took me by train in those famous "Stolipyn" prison wagons, with 20-25 men crammed into a cell the size of an ordinary compartment, about 120 prisoners in each wagon. It was all chaos and confusion, but we were the ones who sufferred. Salted herring was part of our diet, but it made us thirsty. The guards did not have time to give us water and, when eventually we got the water, they did not have time to take us to the lavatory. Also the windows of the compartments were usually broken, so it was very cold, although we did have warm clothes. The bunks were made of metal.

At stops along the way they would take us from the train to a transit prison, forcing us to march at the double with all our things and "encouraging" anyone who could not make it. Once, after marching me to a transit prison, all the cells were full, so they put me in a punishment cell. The next morning the guards had changed and the new shift started feeding me a bread-and-water diet, thinking I had been sentenced to solitary confinement. I shouted to the guard to give me proper food and he said, "Shut your face or I'll put my fist down it." I told him that my term of imprisonment was finished, that I should not be in prison, let alone in solitary confinement, that I was on my way to exile, but he would not believe me. How was he to know? By the time I got to Yakutsk I had pneumonia and I didn't fully recover until after two or three weeks in Kobyay.

North of Yakutsk there is permafrost. The ground is frozen to a depth of six or seven feet. In the summer the top layer melts, turning the whole area into lakes and bogs. There is no way that anyone can build a permanent road in such conditions, so every year around mid-October when it freezes they build a "winter road" on the frozen surface that lasts until mid-April. After that and all through the summer the only way of travelling the 40 miles from Sangar to Kobyay is by 'plane.

It was only when I got to Sangar that they took the handcuffs off me and I was taken by car to Kobyay by the people I was going to work for as a janitor. I lived at first in a caravan, a mobile home for building workers, about 25 of us in bunk beds. Teams of workers used it on a shift basis. There were about 3000 people in the village, almost all of them Yakutian, which is a Mongolian tribe, with just a dozen or so

Russians. So it was no wonder that they were suspicious of me, that children threw stones at the caravan and that a gang of men beat me up, because the local authorities keep telling everyone that I was an "enemy of the people".

I wanted to rent a small house and I had the money, because my scientist friends clubbed together and had collections for me. They were very loyal and good friends. Several of them travelled to Kobyay to see me. Only I couldn't rent anywhere, because the police said it was illegal to sell me anything. It was a lie, of course, and Irina wrote complaints to everyone in Moscow about it, saying that I was being treated illegally. Eventually it worked and I was allowed to buy a lease on a house for 3000 roubles. It was a three-year lease, enough to last me till the end of my exile.

Exile is the most lenient type of punishment according to Soviet law. I could subscribe to newspapers and magazines. I could not leave the area, which in the case of Kobyay was very small, just a couple of miles in any direction, but after a few months I was allowed to walk in the woods and I could receive visitors. My scientist friends helped me build a greenhouse. (Nothing will grow in Kobyay without one.) And I grew potatoes, cucumbers and tomatoes.

Irina came as often as she could and so did my sons, as well as my scientist friends. In other words, they ended up by treating me in exile according to the law, which is what they try to do if possible. Irina also made them give me an identity document. And she sufferred for it. She was searched once in Yakutsk when she was on her way to see me and she could only take private work in Moscow, as a secretary or child minder, so as to have time to come to Kobyay as often as possible. She couldn't live with me, although legally she had the right to, because there was no work for her. In Moscow she worked on a week-by-week basis, so as to be able to get away easily.

She first had to fly to Yakutsk, which is 6½ hours in a big 'plane, an Ilyushin 62, then from Yakutsk to Sangar in another 'plane, much smaller, and from Sangar to Kobyay just 40 miles in a third 'plane. It can be a journey of several days and a round trip from Moscow cost 350 roubles.

I worked as a janitor just for six months, because on August 13th, 1984, it was my 60th birthday and, by law, I could retire and claim my pension. So I got my pension, which was 67 roubles a month. It was so small because a Soviet pension is calculated according to your highest-earning five years in the last ten of your working life. I had been on a high salary in my 40s, but as for the years from 50 to 60 the last seven years were spent in prison and for the first three I was unemployed. I was dismissed at the beginning of 1974. So that's why I only got 67 roubles a month. It was enough to live on, since I had the food I grew. I bought cabbage from a farm and in the summer I caught carp and picked mushrooms.

The first I knew that something was happening was on Sunday, September 28th, when one of the local KGB bosses, a big man in civilian dress, probably a captain, came to my little house and gave me one hour to pack my things. Then me took me to the airport on the back of his motor-bike, with my suitcase in my hand and another KGB officer in the sidecar. We got to Kobyay airport, with its earth runway, and flew to Sangar where there was a special military aircraft waiting. We flew to Yakutsk, where the local KGB handed me over to a Moscow KGB group. We flew north and spent the night in a hotel.

They were very polite to me. We ate together in the hotel and they guarded me discreetly. They gave me no information about where we were going or what was going to happen to me. The next day we flew on to Norilsk and Pechora, across northern Siberia, and I thought they might be going to settle me in some place even further north, where no one could visit me at all. It is true, I also thought it possible that there was a political development that would lead to my release, because I had

followed the row over Daniloff and Zakharov in the Soviet press. I had no idea, though, that the decision had already been taken.

The worst moment was when finally we reached Moscow. They took me to Lefortovo prison, on September 29th, to the office of a criminal investigator, who told me that I was a suspect in an investigation into the Solzhenitsyn fund for the aid of political prisoners. He said that there was a suspected link between the fund and my Helsinki monitoring group. This was just a device to hold me in prison. By law they had the right to keep me for three days of preliminary investigation. It was another example of how they prefer to keep their own laws, if possible, even if it means inventing absurd pretexts.

So I stayed in Lefortova for three days, not knowing if I was going to be set free or sent back to prison for a second term, until October 2nd, when the investigator informed me that, by decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, I was deprived of my Soviet citizenship and sentenced to be sent into exile abroad. We then had a discussion in which I said that I ought to be pardoned, not sentenced to exile, since there were legal irregularities in my trial in 1978. Anyway, of course he wouldn't accept that and I stayed in Lefortovo. Again they were acting legally, because they were entitled to detain me as a man sentenced to exile by decree. And so I stayed until they put me on the 'plane to New York last Sunday morning, October 5th.

As soon as this first hectic period is over, I shall look for a university where I can resume my scientific work.