

SECRET

① Internal Reforms

GROUP

What Wrong

② Open, Democracy, Accountability

PRIME MINISTER

VISIT TO MOSCOW

③ ~~to~~ What is the impact of your intended

We have an hour in the diary on Tuesday, when Percy Cradock and I would like to talk through with you the objectives and main themes for your meetings with Mr. Gorbachev. We can then go ahead with spelling out the arguments for you to use (as we did for Camp David).

This note is intended to serve as a guide for our talk. The folder contains records of your earlier exchanges with Gorbachev.

Aim

Basically you will want to discuss - and be seen to discuss - all the important world issues which one would expect to see covered between the leaders of two of the major world powers.

Developments in the Soviet Union

The point of a discussion with Gorbachev of what is going on within the Soviet Union is to hear at first hand what he is trying to achieve, so that you can the better assess the sort of country and society with which we shall be dealing. You will want to let him know that you have studied his speech to the Central Committee Plenum closely. You admire the determination and vigour with which he is going about what is clearly a massive task. You will want to engage him in debate on his concepts of openness, democratisation, de-centralisation and restructuring to determine how far they represent genuine change as opposed to hijacking of the concepts of a free society in order to apply them to something very different.

Generally on your intended policies, across countries, because that is how we have to judge Peace & stability

Order - space

Time

Money

① Afghan (2)

←

The general impression you will want to convey is that we are watching developments with interest and will give credit where it is due. We will certainly do nothing to obstruct or hinder change. We are not locked into hidebound and out-dated attitudes. Nor do we subscribe to the notion that the Soviet Union can be brought to its knees by outside pressure necessitating increased military spending. We shall judge the reform process by its results and above all by how it affects Soviet behaviour towards the outside world. Here we have a legitimate and very direct interest. Our tests will be how

① far the Soviet union implements its commitments under the Helsinki Agreements, withdraws from Afghanistan to allow

② genuinely free elections, ceases pouring arms into third world

③ countries while providing virtually no aid, and ends support

④ for subversion world-wide. Above all we want to know whether they have given up the world-wide spread of Communism as an active foreign policy goal.

*In acc with the trend of each country*

⑤ *Vietnamese*

Arms Control

You will want to start the discussion by laying down some basic premises:

- each country is entitled to security;
- but we do not believe that security can be found without nuclear weapons. History shows that you cannot deter war by conventional means, while nuclear weapons have prevented war. Holding out the prospect of a world without nuclear weapons is simply to deceive;
- the United Kingdom is not prepared therefore to forego its independent nuclear deterrent.

These are irreducible points on which you will not waver. But they leave plenty of room for progress towards arms reductions. The package approach adopted at Reykjavik is not the way forward (and Gorbachev's proposals on INF suggest that he now recognises this). Progress will come by careful steps.

Just say  
ADM with  
computers

You and President Reagan identified practical priorities at Camp David.

You might then take these one at a time. On INF, we welcome the Soviet decisions not to try to constrain the British and French deterrents and to break the link with SDI. But an INF agreement must not be a means of giving one side an advantage. There must be strict verification, to give confidence; and a firm commitment to deal with the very substantial imbalance in short-range systems. These are vital points for us and the other European members of NATO.

You also see scope for progress in the START talks, with the aim of achieving 50 per cent reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. The linkage established with limitations on the SDI has been an obstacle. But we note that Gorbachev's recent INF proposal appears to modify this. Instead of limitations on SDI research, the link was made to deployment of SDI. You hope that this signals a real change in the Soviet position. The reality is that the Americans will not accept constraints on SDI research. They will pursue it up to the point of establishing whether strategic defence is feasible. We support them in this. If it appeared that feasibility could only be determined by testing within the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty, we would accept that too. But we recognise that the Soviet Union needs predictability in this area. You have therefore urged President Reagan to agree: (a) to a commitment not to deploy SDI for a fixed period of years and then only after negotiations (this latter point was of course agreed at Camp David); and (b) to set out publicly the timetable for SDI research and testing, so that it is clear and evident what the United States proposes to do and when. There would of course have to be reciprocal undertakings by the Soviet side. But on that basis, you believe that the Russians and Americans should have sufficient confidence in their respective intentions about strategic defence to allow them to move ahead with

reductions in strategic offensive weapons. You would be ready to convey any reactions to these ideas to President Reagan.

On Chemical weapons, we shall need to be careful. They were very much at the forefront of Shevardnadze's discussions with Mr. Renton. And in Australia last week, Shevardnadze hinted that the Soviet side had further proposals up its sleeve. There is a risk that they may move towards our proposals on challenge inspection. This would be embarrassing, since the Americans have not accepted them. We shall need to consider how we would handle this.

We shall also need to consider what you say on conventional arms reductions. The Camp David statement underlined that nuclear weapons could not be considered in isolation. There had to be action to eliminate conventional disparities. But we do not yet have any proposals worked out (and personally I am extremely sceptical whether any significant progress will ever be made).

*Transmits*

Under this general heading you might also tackle Gorbachev about the possibility of a further summit with President Reagan.

#### Human Rights

You will want to make clear that you are raising human rights issues because the Helsinki Agreements give us a locus to do so. You want to do so discreetly and without fuss as you did at Chequers. But the fact is that the Soviet Union's performance on such matters as Jewish emigration, family reunification and release of dissidents is a touchstone of the Soviet Union's international reputation for many people in the West. We welcome what has been done in recent months. But we would hope to see much more done in terms of allowing Jews to emigrate (or to practice their religion more freely within the Soviet Union), release of those imprisoned for their Christian beliefs, and freeing of those who are victims of psychiatric abuse.

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Regional and Bilateral Issues

We need detailed advice from the Foreign Office on these points.

C.D.P.

CHARLES POWELL

6 March 1987