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CCB/UP

PRIME MINISTER

MEETING WITH MR. ARMACOST

You are to see Mr. Armacost tomorrow afternoon. He is Permanent Secretary equivalent in the State Department and on his way back from a visit to Moscow. The intention is that he should brief you on what he heard there. Since we have only half an hour, you will want to let him do most of the talking.

The main purpose of his visit was to discuss regional issues. But he will almost certainly have dealt with arms control as well, and prepared the way for Shultz' visit in mid-April. He may also have discussed the prospects for a US/Soviet Summit.

Points which you will want to try to cover are:

- his assessment of Gorbachev's position;
- the main obstacles on the Soviet side to an INF agreement;
- any signs of softening of the Soviet position on SDI (particularly in the light of Gorbachev's reference to it in his INF statement);
- his assessment of Soviet intentions on Afghanistan and points which you can usefully make to Gorbachev;
- indications of Soviet interest in playing a constructive role in the Middle East (and restoring relations with Israel);
- indications of Soviet readiness to restrain the Vietnamese in Cambodia;
- how he expects the Shultz visit to be handled;
- whether the Russians wanted to discuss a possible Summit later this year.

C.D.P.

Charles Powell
17 March 1987

CONFIDENTIAL

cc: PG/ BLUP

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

17 March 1987

Dear Charles,

Call on the Prime Minister by Mr Michael Armacost:

1700 Hours, 18 March

The Prime Minister asked Mr Armacost, Under Secretary for Political Affairs at the State Department to call on her on his way back from his talks in Moscow on 16-17 March. I enclose Mr Armacost's curriculum vitae.

The talks in Moscow focus on regional issues and form part of the now established pattern of US-Soviet exchanges on this subject. But the US will also have wanted to use the visit to take the temperature of the Soviet political climate, in advance of the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow from 28 March and of the visit by Mr Shultz on 13-16 April.

The Prime Minister will no doubt wish to ask Mr Armacost for his impressions. Questions of particular interest include :

- the Soviet attitude to the US, after Gorbachev's statement on INF;

- prospects for Mr Shultz's visit. Solely about arms control? Any progress likely on INF?

- do the Russians seem to want another Summit with the President this year?

- assessment of Gorbachev's internal position.

/As

As regards the regional issues, we have already had an opportunity to have some initial discussion with Armacost at a meeting with Sir Patrick Wright on 13 March before Armacost went to Moscow. Meetings are also planned for 19 March with Mr Renton and with FCO officials. Armacost expects his talks in Moscow to include discussion on Afghanistan, the Middle East, Southern Africa, Cambodia, Korea and on terrorism. In case the Prime Minister wishes to raise these issues / also with Mr Armacost, I attach a list of the kind of questions which we intend to pursue with him.

The Embassy at Moscow have been asked to arrange an early debrief from the Americans on Mr Armacost's visit and to report by 1000Z on 18 March, copied to No 10. If this report or other developments raise any new points we shall get in touch with you before the meeting at 1700 hours.

Yours ever,

Lyn Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing St

MICHAEL ARMACOST

Under-Secretary of State, Department of State, since May 1984

Born April 15 1937.

Educated Carleton College, Minnesota. (BA 1958). Columbia University, New York (MA 1961, PhD 1965). Instructor (later Assistant Professor) in Pomona College, California 1962-68. Visiting Professor of International Relations, International Christian University, Tokyo 1968-69. Lecturer, Johns Hopkins University 1970-71 and Georgetown University 1971-72.

Entered Government service in 1969 in the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department. Special Assistant to the Ambassador in Tokyo 1972-74, and Policy Planning Staff 1974-77. Senior Staff member for East Asia, National Security Council 1977-78, and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defence for International Security Affairs 1978-80. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 1980-82. Ambassador to the Philippines 1982-84.

An academic by training and nature (and from an academic family) his experience until his present job has been almost exclusively related to East Asia. Despite a few initial misgivings that he did not have the breadth for such a job, he is highly regarded for his quick grasp. He has the academic's capacity for thinking beyond immediate problems and is a good listener. He has been described as sensible, measured and relaxed, but is also reported to be capable of speaking his mind.

Married to a pianist. They have three sons.

REGIONAL ISSUES

(a) Afghanistan - How do the Russians see Western intentions - do they believe the US and West are sincere in not seeking a Soviet humiliation? Are the Russians engaged in a genuine search for a settlement now that the UN talks have adjourned? What is the prospect of encouraging them to consider dropping their bottom-line insistence on continued predominance of PDPA and Najib? Can they do this without some reassurance about the readiness of the West/resistance to avoid a bloodbath when they leave? What advice have you on how I should put this question to Gorbachev?

(b) Middle East - any greater confidence that the Soviet Union might be ready/able to play a constructive role in the peace process, including an international conference? Any signs of Soviet flexibility on relations with Israel?

(c) Southern Africa - any comments from the Russians on Southern Africa?

(d) Cambodia - discussed Cambodian problems with Thai Prime Minister Prem when he was here last week. Thais obviously confirmed by the problem. Any sign of Soviet flexibility/willingness to put pressure on Vietnam following Shevardnadze's visit to the region?

(e) Korea - did the Russians show any signs of new thinking? How did they respond to the American relaxation of rules on official contacts with the North Koreans?


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PM 8

MJ2AFTP

a PC

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

9 March 1987

VISIT OF MR ARMACOST

I have seen Washington telegram no. 497 reporting that Mr Armacost will visit London on his way back from Moscow. The Prime Minister thinks that, in the light of her visit to Moscow which by then will be imminent, it would be useful for her to see Mr Armacost. She could do so at 12 noon on Wednesday 18 March. I should be grateful if you could arrange for Mr Armacost to call at No.10 then.

Bf

Charles Powell

A.C. Galsworthy, Esq., CMG.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

10 DOWNING STREET

Charles

Have put Mr. Armacost in the diary at 12. noon on Wed. 18 March. Is this OK?

Tessa
6/3

GRS 300

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CONFIDENTIAL
FM WASHINGTON
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 497
OF 052300Z MARCH 87
INFO PRIORITY MOSCOW

Prime Minister
I assume that you would like to see Armacost in London?
CDP 6/3

Yes

MOSCOW TELNO 304: SHULTZ'S MOSCOW VISIT

SUMMARY

1. SHULTZ NOW LIKELY TO FOLLOW, NOT PRECEDE, THE PRIME MINISTER.

DETAIL

2. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE US PREFERENCE, LIKE THE SOVIET PREFERENCE, NOW IS FOR APRIL DATES FOR SHULTZ'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO MOSCOW. THE MARCH DATES FIRST PROPOSED WILL NOW COINCIDE WITH A MEETING HERE (ON 23/24 MARCH) OF THE US/SOVIET BILATERAL REVIEW COMMISSION, COVERING BILATERAL ISSUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS. IT ALSO MAKES SENSE TO ALLOW A LONGER GAP BETWEEN ARMACOST'S ACROSS-THE-BOARD TALKS, PRIMARILY ON REGIONAL ISSUES, IN MOSCOW ON 16/17 MARCH, AND SHULTZ'S SUBSEQUENT VISIT. WE UNDERSTAND THAT, THOUGH NOTHING HAS YET BEEN FINALISED (SINCE SHULTZ IS IN CHINA), THE PRESENT PLAN IS FOR HIS VISIT TO START ON 13 APRIL.

3. WE HAVE MADE ARRANGEMENTS TO ENSURE THAT WE GET EARLY WARNING OF ANY SWING BACK TO THE MARCH PLAN.

4. IF 13 APRIL STICKS, THE SEQUENCE OF US AND UK VISITS COULD HARDLY BE BETTERED, FOR MUTUAL BRIEFING. ARMACOST WILL VISIT LONDON ON 18/19 MARCH (SEE SEPARATE TELEGRAM) EN ROUTE HOME FROM MOSCOW. AND YOUR VISIT HERE ON 9 APRIL WILL ENABLE YOU TO GIVE SHULTZ, JUST BEFORE HE SETS OFF, A SIMILAR DE-BRIEFING ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT.

ACLAND

ORWBAN 0088

EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS
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Kissinger: How to Deal With Gorbachev

Taking stock after a meeting with the Soviet leader

BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

It had been a decade since I last visited the Soviet Union. So it was a bittersweet experience to find that Moscow has not lost its capacity to inspire ambivalence. The seediness of the accommodations had not changed, nor the backwardness of what in the West are considered life's amenities. One remains amazed that a country subsisting at so marginal a standard of living should conduct so assertive a global policy.

Yet the surface impression of stagnation was misleading. There is clearly an unprecedented ferment underneath the gloomy surface of wintry Moscow. The new leadership is different. It displays a vigor, dynamism and flexibility inconceivable 10 years ago. Brezhnev was ebullient but slightly insecure in dealing with American visitors. Reflecting a combination of vulnerability and inward doubt, he insisted on proclaiming the equal status of the Soviet Union. He came to meetings with a prepared statement and plowed through it, come what may. He seemed heavily reliant on his associates..

Mikhail Gorbachev and his colleagues are far more urbane. They take Soviet equal status with America for granted; reaffirming it would surely have evoked an indignant outburst. When I and a group of former senior officials from four administrations called on him on a private visit, Gorbachev had also brought a prepared statement. But he did not start reading from it until near the end of a three-hour conversation. In the event he did not finish the reading, and we only saw the full text in the newspapers the next day. Alternately bantering and caustic, threatening and conciliatory, Gorbachev addressed various members of our delegation individually, displaying an impressive knowledge of his subject and a subtle intuition for each interlocutor.

That the Soviet Union is now led by so forceful a personality is not an unalloyed blessing. The Brezhnev group seemed exhausted by its experiences in Stalin's purges and in the war. It was—until tempted by American domestic divisions—extremely cautious. Gorbachev and his associates seem less constrained by the past and more assertive with respect to Soviet power. They have the intellectual equipment for a far more dynamic foreign policy than their predecessors. These qualities also make them far more formidable adversaries.

YURCHENKO—AP

Alternately bantering and caustic, threatening and conciliatory, Mikhail Gorbachev is the most urbane Soviet leader I have encountered

I emerged from the sojourn in Moscow with six fundamental conclusions:

- "Reform" is in the air. I do not doubt the sincerity of the effort to overcome the stagnation, technological backwardness and corruption of traditional Soviet-style central planning.
- The purpose of that reform is not to spur democracy or freedom; it is to encourage efficiency and industrial progress, hence to make the Soviet Union more powerful.
- So far we are dealing with a program that has just been announced—with a theory and not yet a practice.
- Even if the program succeeds it does not automatically guarantee a more benign foreign policy. On the contrary, it may provide additional resources for expansionism and ideological challenges.
- The American scope to influence—or even to evaluate correctly—Soviet internal development is limited. American concessions should therefore be geared to Soviet foreign-policy conduct and not to its domestic economic program.
- All this imposes on the democracies the necessity of developing a purposeful, long-range and subtle strategy on East-West relations. This is all the more important to prevent the Soviet leaders from using their newfound skill in public relations to manipulate the desire in the democracies for peace.

Domestic Reform

The criticism of the inefficiency of central planning heard from high Soviet officials in Moscow today could be mistaken for that of a conservative American think tank. One is told horror stories about the impact of subsidized prices. For example, one senior official told us that subsidized children's clothing is so cheap that eligible buyers use it to polish their cars because rags, being unsubsidized, are more expensive.

High Soviet officials are vigorous in their insistence that such evils will be overcome. They assert that soon enterprises will be able to deal with each other on the basis of consumer demand rather than deal only with ministries by means of quotas imposed from the top. They advance vague concepts of worker and peasant participation in economic decision making. They speak of elections with multiple candidacies, heretofore a heresy in Soviet thinking. They condemn aspects of the existing censorship, such as bureaucrats defending their turf or taking care of personal friends.

What makes these propositions more impressive is that they are not put forward in the traditional Soviet manner as revealed truth. Rather they are advanced with a disarming admission of ignorance about the means to achieve them. Andrei Sakharov, whom we met in a moving encounter, stressed his belief in the seriousness of the reform program. He argued almost plaintively that there was no choice; any alternative would be worse.

All this is music to the ears of Westerners who believe that the Soviet vocabulary mimics that of the West. It is easy to overlook the fact that reform so far consists essentially of a major speech by Gorbachev to the Central Committee—and that several of his recommendations, such as retirement at the age of 70, were not reflected in the Central Committee statement ending

the plenum. When I asked about the discrepancy, a member of the Central Committee explained that the best talent in the Central Committee staff had worked on the speech, not the resolution.

Gorbachev's program clearly faces major obstacles. Not the least significant is the historical Russian tendency to bend pronouncements from on high to the elemental rhythm of a long-suffering people. Then there are major contradictions—to use a Marxist phrase—in Gorbachev's program. It seeks to rely on markets while emphasizing central planning. Those two objectives are likely to prove as incompatible in the Soviet Union as elsewhere. So is the attempt to base production on real costs while subsidizing the prices of major items. The theory of *glasnost*—or openness—may well be based on the misconception, which comes naturally to a Leninist, that there is only one truth.

But left to their own devices, men and women tend to reach contradictory conclusions from the same body of facts. Eventually that tendency toward pluralism is likely to oblige the new Soviet leadership to choose between Western-style democracy and repression. When confronting this choice in the past, Communist leaders have always opted for repression.

Similarly, economic decentralization is likely to spawn demands for political decentralization. This was a serious problem even in China, which is culturally homogeneous. The implications are much graver for an empire like the Soviet Union composed of many nationalities that may well see in decentralization a first step toward national autonomy.

In the euphoria engendered by the new style of Soviet leadership, there has been a deafness to explicit Soviet statements emphatically rejecting any intention of moving toward a market economy or any kind of Western democracy. True, our Soviet hosts expressed grave doubts about the efficacy of central planning, but they were equally emphatic on the need to retain its key features.

This reflects the realities of the Soviet system. What would be the function of the Communist Party if there were no central planning? And what leader who owes his eminence to the communist system—as is the case with Gorbachev and all his colleagues—can imagine a communist state without a dominant Communist Party? In short, the Soviet Union is a totalitarian state today and it will be a totalitarian state even after the reforms are completed, albeit a somewhat more benign one.

The new Soviet reform program has unleashed the perennial nostalgia of the democracies for seeking salvation in a conversion of the Soviet system to Western values. The West German foreign minister has already announced that we must not let this opportunity pass. In other words, some concessions not justified on foreign-policy grounds should be made to encourage a reform program which the Soviet Union needs for its own purposes.

But the sophisticated, tough-minded, able and urbane Soviet leaders we met are not reforming their society as a favor to us. They seek efficiency, productivity, technology—not democracy. They need a respite in the international field to accomplish these objectives; they have not been converted to Western pacifist notions. If they succeed in the objective of making their country stronger—without changing the foreign policy that produced current tensions—the democracies will in the long run be less secure.

SHONE—SIPA PRESS

In a moving encounter, Sakharov stressed his belief in the seriousness of the reform program, arguing that there was no better alternative

I am not suggesting that the West has an interest in the failure of Gorbachev's experiment. Rather it cannot gear its foreign policy to a Soviet domestic program, however attractive. The only Soviet leader who did not die in office was also the principal reformer; Khrushchev was overthrown by the Central Committee. He also carried out the most adventurous foreign policy, witness the Berlin crisis and the Cuban missile crisis.

It cannot be in the interest of the democracies to gamble on an international structure dependent on Soviet self-restraint. The test of Gorbachev's statement that his top priority is domestic reform must be whether it can be translated into specific conditions that make a difference for international security.

Foreign-Policy Issues

For visiting delegations in a communist capital, discussing foreign policy can be treacherous. While diplomatic solutions usually result from an accumulation of nuances, a brief visit tends to focus on general propositions. One must resist the temptation of cooperating in the myth that diplomacy is like a detective story in which one side throws out vague hints and the other must guess at the answers. Serious proposals should be made through established channels, not to visiting delegations.

To some extent, a visiting delegation is always used for the purposes of the host country. For example, at one reception a Soviet space scientist took me aside to tell me with great earnestness about a laser experiment he wished to conduct with one of the moons of Mars. It was extremely flattering to be the recipient of such information, especially as no Western space scientist ever thought me worthy of his confidence (on the correct premise that I would not understand it). In this case the purpose was clearly to convey a hint of Soviet flexibility with respect to testing in space—though people more knowledgeable than I soon enlightened me that it was not much of a concession.

Of the foreign-policy topics we discussed, the Soviets proved most interesting on the subject of Afghanistan. I had arrived in Moscow persuaded that the Soviet Union would never permit the overthrow of a regime established by Soviet power; that is certainly the essence of the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine. I am no longer so sure. Our Soviet hosts emphasized their desire for total withdrawal. They also affirmed the goal of a government of national reconciliation that would include representatives of the guerrilla groups. They hinted at a short period for withdrawal; they seemed prepared to discuss—though not to be specific about—the evolution of the Kabul government after a withdrawal. I asked a senior Communist whether it was possible for the Soviets to stand by while a communist government collapsed. He replied that the Kabul government was not communist and technically not even socialist.

It would be rash to draw dramatic conclusions from these statements. It is possible that this apparent flexibility was designed to soften us up for the major onslaught on

arms control. Perhaps these hints are designed to tempt Pakistan to stop the supply of arms to the Afghan guerrillas. But it should be relatively easy to test Soviet intentions. If the Soviets are serious about an Afghan settlement, they will have to meet two conditions: (1) to set a short deadline for withdrawal—say six months or less; (2) to leave the future of the so-called government of reconciliation to Afghan domestic evolution without the threat of a new Soviet intervention.

In return, the United States can agree to end the supply of arms to the Afghan freedom fighters as Soviet forces withdraw and to respect Afghan neutrality. Such an agreement, were it attainable, would represent the most significant Soviet foreign-policy move since the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria 30 years ago.

But Afghanistan seemed a secondary problem for our hosts. Their overwhelming preoccupation was with ending President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

Our hosts, including Gorbachev, seemed determined to enshrine the Reykjavik framework as sacrosanct—and to interpret it as eviscerating SDI. The Reykjavik framework has three components: (1) a reduction of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces by 50 percent, (2) the removal and destruction of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles from Europe, the so-called "zero option," (3) limitations on the Strategic Defense Initiative not yet finally negotiated.

After agreement on the first two points, Reykjavik broke down over SDI. Reagan and Gorbachev had already agreed on a 10-year moratorium on deployment of SDI. But President Reagan refused to accept Gorbachev's proposition that during the moratorium testing on strategic defense should be restricted to "laboratories"—that is to say, no field testing would be permitted.

Since then Soviet negotiators have thrown out tantalizing hints—like those of the space scientist I talked with—that "laboratory testing" could be defined liberally and that some SDI components might even be tested in space. The Soviets were very careful to avoid precision, probably because they want to elicit an American offer. For after an American proposal, Soviet negotiators could then whittle away at it until the combination of test limitations and deployment moratorium effectively kills SDI.

I consider the Reykjavik framework extremely disadvantageous. Moreover, it may be squandering the historic opportunity represented by a new and more dynamic Soviet leadership. For one thing, the Reykjavik framework is not balanced. The 50 percent reduction of strategic forces should stand by itself. It is not Nirvana, since it still leaves each side with close to twice as many warheads as President Kennedy had at the time of the Cuban missile crisis (when he thought he was facing Armageddon). But it would be a significant symbolic achievement. Whatever its ultimate merits, the balance of benefits and risks in such an agreement would be the same for both sides. Thus, no additional price should be paid to obtain them.

But the two additional components of the Reykjavik framework—the zero option on medium-range missiles and the restrictions on SDI—are in effect unilateral concessions on our part. The removal of American and Soviet medium-range missiles from Europe leaves unimpaired the Soviet ability to devastate Europe with short-range missiles and ICBM's. It eliminates the American ability to retaliate from Europe. It thus magnifies European fears that America might not respond to a nuclear attack confined to Europe, much less to a conventional one. With such an agreement, the Soviet strategy to decouple the defense of Europe from that of the United States will gain momentum.

The Reykjavik treatment of Asian-based missiles compounds the problem. It "balances" 100 Soviet warheads on medium-range missiles aimed at the Far East (and transportable to Europe) by 100 warheads located in the continental United States, where they can retaliate against Mexico or Canada but not against the Soviet Union. The Soviets even object to basing these missiles in Alaska, though no realistic base for them would be within range of any significant Soviet target.



ROGER RESSMEYER—STARLIGHT

Within the Reykjavik framework, no genuine compromise is possible: the Soviets want to destroy SDI, the Reagan administration to preserve it

The Reykjavik framework culminates in the relentless Soviet pressure to do away with SDI. I consider SDI a major contribution to Western strategy. In its absence, the West must rely on the mutual assured destruction theory, which seeks deterrence through the devastation of civilian populations and industrial targets.

This strategy has two huge handicaps: it leaves the democracies with no choice between surrender and suicide. And it imposes an unbearable psychological burden. For how long can democractic leaders tell their public that their security is based on leaving them naked to extermination? Faced with such prospects, pacifism and unilateral disarmament will sooner or later sap the will to defend the West.

In Moscow, responsible military figures told us that major conventional disarmament can take place only in a global context—in other words, only if China and other countries bordering the Soviet Union join in. This position has the practical consequence of neatly deferring the issue into an indefinite future. The West is therefore being asked to accept an arms-control regimen that leaves it facing a massive conventional imbalance from which it could extricate itself only by the early use of nuclear weapons. Yet the very arms-control agreements now being contemplated would render such a course suicidal.

The attitude of our European allies is hard to comprehend. It is confusing enough that they do not make explicit the grave reservations they have about the zero option. In addition, most of them actively seek to dissuade the Reagan administration from pursuing SDI. It takes more than uncertainty about SDI technology to explain why democratic leaders should prefer to leave their public undefended even against small-scale attacks, third-country strikes and accidents. It is the triumph of a theory that exalts the fact of agreement over its substance. In the end it stakes everything on the escapist gamble that Gorbachev's reform program will render the Soviets benign.

This is why the quest for "compromise" is so dangerous within the Reykjavik framework—and why the Soviet leaders are so eager to declare it sacrosanct. My visit to Moscow leaves me with little doubt that a "compromise" can be had for the asking. It would permit testing sensors even in space. It would prohibit the testing in space of antiballistic missile devices or of

sy[...]ns linking sensors to killing devices. [...]ough such a solution would be presented as a Soviet retreat, it would not be a compromise but an American concession which would render SDI nearly meaningless. In the democracies various peace groups, scientific congresses, legislators and the media would vigilantly police the agreement. In the Soviet Union it would prove impossible to verify—whatever the formal arrangements. Indeed, with the passage of time the incentive for vigilance would diminish. If the democracies cannot agree that the radar near Krasnoyarsk—the size of three football fields, hundreds of miles from its permitted location under the 1972 ABM treaty—is a violation, how can they possibly agree on disputed violations in outer space?

The compromise that the Soviets so subtly hinted at to our delegation is likely to turn into a one-way street. In effect, the Soviets would be given an interval to catch up with SDI or even to surpass it while we immobilize our program. Given that prospect, I would prefer a complete ban on space testing for both sides to the qualitative restraints now being considered.

The visit to Moscow left me with little doubt that within the present framework no genuine compromise on SDI is possible. The Soviets clearly want to destroy SDI; the Reagan administration so far has sought to preserve it. The Soviets will not agree to a research program that explores practical feasibility; the United States, if it is true to itself, can do no less. Any formula that fudges the issue would lead to endless controversy and insecurity.

But a deeper issue is involved than either negotiating tactics or even military strategy. It goes to the heart of East-West relations. If at a moment of maximum Soviet preoccupation with domestic change the West feels obliged to strike such a disadvantageous bargain, what conceivable incentive exists for further Soviet concessions? What will be our negotiating stance after the contemplated agreement is consummated? When will it be possible to achieve a truly balanced agreement or a genuine improvement in global security?

With some melancholy, I am driven to wonder how the intelligent Soviet leadership group might have reacted to a philosophical approach, rather than the numbers game of standard arms-control talks, when the Reagan presidency was at its height—say, at the Geneva summit. What would have been their response to a conceptual discussion on the relationship between strategic offense and defense—or, even better, to an attempt to define the superpower relationship a decade hence? Perhaps the outcome would have been the same; but it is a pity not to have tried.

Instead the democracies are in danger of succumbing to self-induced emotional blackmail. Every Soviet proposal, however one-sided and however much a variation on the same theme, elicits pressures for some reciprocity. The practical consequence is to nudge the Western bargaining stance step by step toward the Soviet position.

What the U.S. Should Do

At this point, President Reagan finds his choices limited. He is told that his place in history depends on making an arms-control agreement. Yet the agreement being urged on him would in effect eviscerate SDI, which may be his greatest contribution to strategic theory.

The time has therefore come to return to fundamentals. The greatest public service President Reagan can perform at this stage is to advance a coherent statement of America's philosophy regarding both security and arms control. Specifically, this requires some conceptual definition of SDI. It is too late to pursue the mirage of eliminating nuclear weapons. This is simply impossible, either by agreement among statesmen or by technological expedients such as a leakproof space shield. For the foreseeable future, the best hope is to achieve such a balance between offense and defense that the attacker would be penalized under any predictable circumstance. This is not an easy matter. It will surely emphasize the growing significance of the conventional threat. But it is time for our allies to face the fact that this is inherent in the evolution of technology, not in American choices.

Specifically:

- The Reykjavik framework should be abandoned.
- The administration should propose a 50 percent cut in both strategic and medium-range forces. This would bring about a substantial reduction while avoiding the danger of decoupling the defense of Europe from that of the United States.
- The administration should offer to negotiate a *quantitative* relationship between offensive and defensive forces. It should avoid the twin traps of *qualitative* limitations on testing and a prolonged moratorium on deployment. It could accept a quantitative limit on ABM tests to a fixed number each year without limiting their type or nature. This might provide time for realistic negotiations. But it would not change the direction or thrust of SDI.
- To permit this process to proceed, the United States could offer to extend the present abrogation clause in the ABM treaty from six months to, say, two years.

In our conversation with Gorbachev, he asked rhetorically why I was turning against my accomplishments of a decade ago. Had there been an occasion to reply, I would have pointed out that the agreements of a decade and a half ago were an important achievement of which I am proud. But they were intended to be a starting point, not a final destination. Fifteen years later—in a decade of multiple warheads, of Angola and Afghanistan and Cambodia—they cannot possibly be enough.

The same willingness to transcend established patterns that has characterized Gorbachev's and Reagan's thinking on some domestic matters is also needed on both sides in foreign policy. The two superpowers have nothing to gain by eternal conflict. A war between them would leave both so gravely weakened that other countries or regions would thereafter determine the future. Attempts to achieve a unilateral advantage cannot succeed in the long run. Why not make a new attempt that starts with a concept of what the political and security relationship of the two superpowers might look like a decade hence and work back from there? This would at least be the right question. And these next two years—with a conservative American president who has nothing to lose from a bold approach and a new Soviet leadership that has everything to gain from tranquillity—may be the right occasion.



EUGENE POMEROY—VISIONS

I had arrived in Moscow persuaded that the Soviet Union would never permit the overthrow of its regime in Afghanistan; I am no longer so sure

United States Information Service

Embassy of the United States of America
24, Grosvenor Square
London W1A 2LH

Tel: (01) 499 9000

ADDRESS BY

THE HON. CHARLES H. PRICE, II

U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE COURT OF ST JAMES'S

TO

THE EUROPEAN-ATLANTIC GROUP

ON

THE OCCASION OF THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

LONDON, THURSDAY, MARCH 12, 1987

AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY

(EMBARGOED TILL 2100, MARCH 12)

Lord Layton; Lord Chalfont; distinguished members of the European-Atlantic Group; ladies and gentlemen.

I am deeply honored to speak here tonight on this, the fortieth anniversary of the Truman Doctrine. I thank you for your presence and I thank your prestigious organization for the kind invitation.

The European-Atlantic Group, for over thirty years, has promoted deeper understanding between the Western democracies and, in the process, made our alliance stronger and more vibrant. For these contributions to our welfare, we, and indeed free peoples everywhere, are in your debt.

I was in my adolescence when, a few miles away in Fulton, Missouri, Winston Churchill proclaimed in a memorable metaphor that an "Iron Curtain" had fallen across the European continent. I was a year and a week older when Harry Truman, before a joint session of Congress, enunciated the policy that bears his name and that took its inspiration, in part, from Churchill's prophetic warning.

I later went on to study at the University of Missouri, serve in the Air Force, and then pursue a career that took me into business and banking. To the extent that I thought about the Truman Doctrine at all, I thought about it in the most general terms.

But times change, and so do our professions. In 1981 I became an ambassador in Europe. In the six years since then, I have thought often about the Truman Doctrine, its origins, execution, and repercussions. Unfortunately, I was not, like Dean Acheson, "Present at the Creation." I therefore cannot claim any special insight into its genesis. But, as an ambassador in Brussels and London, I have lived with, and studied, the Truman Doctrine's current relevance.

Tonight I would first like to discuss that precise topic: the validity of the Truman Doctrine forty years after its proclamation. Then, I would like to look at a couple of factors that, if allowed to take hold, could undermine Western cohesion, the Doctrine's keystone.

As a proud native of Missouri, though, I want to begin by discussing my state's most famous son, Harry S. Truman.

If you visit Missouri, you will notice that the license plates carry the state's simple slogan: "Show me."

If ever a Missourian embodied that succinct and sassy sentiment, it was Harry Truman.

Tough and blunt, given to salty language and fits of temper, Harry Truman guided the United States and, to a lesser degree, the free world through the perilous post-war period. He came to America's highest office upon the death of his predecessor, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and a day later said with characteristic candor that he felt as if "the moon, the stars, and all the planets" had fallen on him.

Truman, however, quickly asserted himself. He declared his intentions, defined his territory, and defended his positions. He designed a domestic agenda, called the "Fair Deal," that addressed the needs of post-war America. He articulated a foreign policy that changed radically, and forever, America's approach to international affairs.

Although the only American president this century who did not attend a university, Truman had a sophisticated knowledge of politics and history. He served twelve years in the Senate and avidly read the great historians. This experience and knowledge, however, never interfered with his direct manner of speech. He liked to say, "The buck stops here," and, "If you can't stand the heat, get out of the kitchen."

Tom Pendergast, the political boss who sponsored Truman early in his career, called Harry "the contrariest cuss in Missouri." The years did nothing to temper his crustiness. When Oxford made him an "ancient fellow" in 1956, Truman came to Britain for an extensive visit. He went to Parliament, where the almost palpable sense of democracy and history profoundly moved him.

The speeches, however, did not. After listening to one, he pronounced it "as longwinded and boresome as any U.S. Senator might make in a filibuster." Then, turning to his travelling party, he commented: "So you see how and from whom we inherited that procedure."

This frankness endeared him to his British hosts. At the annual Pilgrims Dinner, Lord Halifax, the chairman, paid him a fine British compliment. "In homely language, Mr. Truman," Lord Halifax said, "we in this room feel that you are the sort of chap with whom we would be quite happy to go tiger-hunting."

Truman inspired that kind of confidence. His countrymen admired him, his allies trusted him, and his foes respected him. All knew where he stood, and why, because the principles that animated Harry Truman were obvious.

He believed implicitly in democracy and in self-determination. He had enormous regard for the

individual and for individual liberty. He knew instinctively that the people, given the opportunity, could, and would, govern wisely. All that he said contemplated these values, all that he did reflected these beliefs.

When small Marxist parties, with the connivance of the Red Army, began to usurp power throughout Eastern Europe, and when a communist insurgency imperiled Greece, Truman acted. On March 12, 1947, he appeared before Congress to ask for four-hundred million dollars to aid Greece and Turkey. At the same time, he requested that American troops be stationed in Europe.

Although he did not mention the Soviet Union by name, he attacked its system of government. He framed his speech in ideological terms, contrasting democracy with communism. He argued that the one was based on "free institutions" and "individual liberty." The other rested "upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority."

If the democratic nations were to realize their objective of a safe world, he continued, they must be "willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes." That brief statement captured the essence of what was to become known as the Truman Doctrine.

Congress approved the aid bill on May 15, 1947, and a week later the President signed it into law. The United States sent 250 million dollars to Greece and this, in part, led to the defeat of the communist rebellion.

But the Truman Doctrine had much broader ramifications. It marked the end of American isolationism during peacetime and irrevocably committed the United States to an international role, including the defense of Europe.

Within two years of Truman's seminal speech, the United States launched the Marshall Plan, participated in the Berlin airlift, and became a founding member of NATO. These actions served to blunt communist aggression in Europe and helped to rebuild the devastated economies of America's allies. We, the Europeans and Americans, came together in a democratic alliance of democratic nations. Although mindful of the dangers we then confronted, we had no idea of the long-term implications of our decision.

We are now four decades later. History has rendered its verdict, and it has found in our favor. We took the right course, made the right choice. We, the Western democracies, beginning in those confused and uncertain years, embarked upon a period of unprecedented prosperity, enduring peace, and expanding freedom. We owe these successes, and much more, to the policies of the late 1940s and to the courage of the men who articulated them.

Recently, though, some in our countries seem to have lost sight of those achievements. They tend to be young, born during or after the Second World War, and they assume peace, prosperity, and freedom to be the natural state of affairs. For them, the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe after the last war, the brutal extinction of reformist regimes in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the suppression of an independent labor movement in Poland, and the invasion of Afghanistan are merely the stuff of an academic exercise, far removed from their pleasant lives. Content and complacent, they seek no discomfitting evidence to the contrary. They see no remote threat, they hear no distant thunder.

The thunder, to be sure, is muted, less menacing than the deafening rumbles that rolled across Europe after the last war. But it still threatens. For so long as the Soviet Union remains hostile to our liberal values, we must maintain our vigilance. Until such time as the Soviets, their allies and their client states, forswear the Leninist tenet of territorial expansion, we must be on our guard.

Yes, we have taken note of Mr. Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union. We welcome them and sincerely hope they are genuine. If they are genuine, if they continue, and if the Soviets profoundly change their international behavior, we will readily reassess our relationship with them. Only time, however, can prove their real intentions, only the future can confirm our present hopes.

For today, we must deal with reality, a reality that any objective analysis must find sobering. The Soviet navy continues to expand, adding capital ships and submarines at an alarming rate. Sophisticated arms of every description pour into the Red Army, a force that bases 70% of its manpower in Europe. Military research, development, and manufacturing claim an enormous share of the Soviet gross domestic product and this, despite internal reforms, gives no sign of abating.

Even a cursory review of the balance of power in Europe reveals Warsaw Pact superiority in almost every important military category. They have twice as many tanks as NATO and two and one-half times the artillery. They have more combat aircraft, more armored personnel carriers, and at least 25 percent more troops. They maintain a large and expanding inventory of chemical weapons while NATO, in contradistinction, has not produced any in 18 years.

Finally, the Soviet Union, which does not share its nuclear weapons with allied states, has a distinct numerical advantage in strategic, intermediate-range, and short-range nuclear forces.

Only the naive, after reviewing these comparisons, could think our freedom beyond danger and our security beyond peril. Even if we were to reach an agreement on intermediate-range missiles in Europe - a desirable goal,

the Soviets would retain a great preponderance of conventional, chemical, and short-range nuclear weapons. We must also redress these imbalances through negotiations, and we must do so from a position of strength.

This strength does not derive exclusively, or even predominantly, from the military and economic might of the United States. Rather, it emanates from our alliance of prosperous democracies, it stems from the consent of our free peoples.

It depends upon consensus, not coercion; upon compromise, not conquest. It is the rule of law, and not the law of rulers, that distinguishes our systems of government and our style of alliance. It is the dignity of the individual, and not the supremacy of the state, that animates our actions, domestic and international.

Harry Truman, within a single week in the spring of 1945, defined the proper role of powerful nations and gave voice to the free world's aspirations. In his first message to Congress, on April 16 of that year, he said: "The responsibility of the great states is to serve and not to dominate the world."

On April 23, in an address to the delegates at the opening session of the United Nations conference in San Francisco, he urged all peoples to "build a new world, a far

better world -- one in which the eternal dignity of man is respected."

Our alliance of great states has not sought to dominate the world, and the world we have built for our citizens respects the eternal dignity of man. United we have achieved these goals and united we shall preserve them.

Yet we can detect occasional grumblings on both sides of the Atlantic, a kind of petty intolerance, that could threaten our unity, could undermine our cohesion. At the moment, these agents of discord operate on the periphery of our grand alliance. But left unchecked, or ignored, they could penetrate to the very sinews of our partnership and cripple it. If this came to pass, the consequences would be tragic.

I would now like to look at a couple of these threats: anti-Americanism in Europe and the often rash response to it of many in America. They are two sides of the same debased coin and, like a bad penny, they seem always to keep returning.

Anti-Americanism is an amorphous, wholly subjective, feeling. It is therefore difficult to agree on an acceptable definition. For my part, I approach it as one of our Supreme Court justices approached pornography: I can't define it, but I sure can recognize it when I see it. And nowadays, I see a lot of it, in Britain and in Europe.

This is not to say, however, that anti-Americanism equates with criticism of the United States. In fact, sensible, constructive criticism often bespeaks affection, not enmity.

The United States, as the pre-eminent power in the free world, must expect to come under scrutiny and must accept, if not always act upon, the observations this review produces. All dominant nations, from ancient Rome, through Hapsburg Spain, to imperial Britain, invited the same attention and its concomitant criticism.

Nor should the strident anti-Americanism long evident in certain circles cause undue distress. We can fairly dismiss the outbursts of those dotty demagogues who revile America's cultural and political values. When they take to the streets, trample and burn the flag, incite to riot, make venomous accusations, they bring shame on themselves, not discredit to the United States.

There is, however, another kind of anti-Americanism, far subtler and far more insidious, that ought to concern us. It is the anti-Americanism found within elements of the European establishment. Once entrenched, it spreads to every segment of society and, over time, undermines the mutual respect that our alliance requires to prosper.

How has this taken hold, how is it expressed, and what effect, if any, does it have in the United States?

Much of it, I would argue, originates, almost unconsciously, in the United States itself. Our news media, entertainment industry, book publishers, and academic institutions often tend to emphasize the failings of America and the worst features of American life. Those in Europe who, for political or philosophical reasons, dislike the United States, seize on this biased picture. They in turn give broad currency to these distortions, representing them as commonplace America.

Then there is the view, held by a minority of European elites on both ends of the political spectrum, that America's egalitarian society caters to the vulgar and rewards the mediocre. America, in their opinion, cannot discharge competently its international obligations because Americans lack the necessary perspective, training, and experience. We are political and cultural neophytes, they seem to say, and, like the sorcerer's apprentice, pose a danger to all those around us.

America the violent, America the crass, America the inept have all become everyday images in Europe. Professors at prestigious universities and writers in influential journals, creative artists and prominent politicians embellish and transmit the message.

Meanwhile, America the steadfast ally, America the generous, and America of the many Nobel laureates get short shrift or lost entirely.

Little wonder, then, that opinion polls in Western Europe often indicate a low regard for American policies and a deep suspicion of American motives. No surprise, then, that an article in a British national daily can begin, almost gleefully: "In Britain we are living through the twilight of the Atlanticist hegemony," and continue; "The enfeebled political institutions in post-imperial Britain seem incapable of realizing that the special relationship, if it ever existed, is over now."

The author errs on both counts, but no doubt many Europeans share his misguided thoughts about the alliance and his thinly veiled antagonism toward the United States. Furthermore, many Americans will hear the echo of this animosity and resent it. Thus begins anew the senseless spiral of European provocation and American reaction.

In the United States, this reaction normally takes the form of bewilderment. How is it possible, Americans ask, that the Europeans think so poorly of us? After all, we helped them defeat Hitler's tyranny, gave them aid through the Marshall Plan, committed ourselves to their defense in NATO. We maintain a third of a million troops in Europe and this costs us over 120 billion dollars a year,

about 40 percent of our defense budget. Yes, we benefit from the relationship, but so too do the Europeans, and why can't they see that?

When, however, the accusations reach a fevered pitch, when Americans see their national interests scorned -- as in the raid on terrorist centers in Libya -- bewilderment turns to anger. Then the call issues forth, from senators and from salesmen, from pundits and from plumbers: bring our boys home.

As all of you know, isolationism has been a strain in the American character from the country's earliest years. Our first president, George Washington, counselled Americans to avoid "permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world." Our third, Thomas Jefferson, in a famous phrase, warned against "entangling alliances." Throughout the nineteenth century, their successors repeated this admonition with such regularity that it became an article of American political faith. Woodrow Wilson, after the First World War, defied this tendency and conceived the League of Nations. But his countrymen repudiated the idea, preferring their splendid isolation to international commitments of any sort.

Only the devastation of the Second World War, the specter of communist aggression, and the vision of Harry Truman and his advisers altered their stubborn belief in the

wisdom of "Fortress America." The American people, with much reluctance, accepted a world role. Many Americans, however, continue to think that the assumption of these duties was a mistake. Many more have reconciled themselves to this role, but in the most begrudging fashion.

Therefore, a worsening trade deficit, ill-considered remarks on American society, or wildly irresponsible charges that impugn American intentions can, and do, elicit a visceral response in the United States.

One of these responses, oft heard at the loftiest levels of the American foreign-policy establishment, advocates a partial withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe. This, according to many, would give the United States greater latitude in addressing military crises in other parts of the world and reduce our balance of payments deficit. To others, it promises big cuts in our defense budget. To some, narrow and myopic, it provides the means to castigate our Western European allies who, they argue, do not contribute enough to their own defense.

In whatever way the various factions choose to justify the proposal, it would, if implemented, endanger both the United States and its allies. The United States would declare, as Secretary of Defense Weinberger recently said, that it "is either no longer concerned about the Soviet threat, or has lost the will to maintain an effective deterrent against that threat."

In other words, it would contradict the stated intention of our presence in Europe. The United States is here precisely to deter the Soviet Union through a tangible demonstration of its will and its power. This deterrence, moreover, reaps as many benefits for the United States as for Western Europe.

Europe is freedom's front line. America's European allies maintain under arms three and one-half million of their citizens. If hostilities were to erupt, NATO's European members would contribute about sixty percent of the ground troops and tactical air power that the Alliance would marshall against the aggressors. Although the United States spends more per capita on defense, the Europeans, during the decade of the 1970s, increased their spending in this field by 2 percent a year as the American defense budget declined by 20 percent in real terms.

Yet, the military dimension is but one part of our alliance. Together, the United States and the European Community account for half the world's wealth. Trade between the two annually exceeds 120 billion dollars. The United States has over 81 billion dollars invested in the European Community and the Community has 95 billion dollars in American assets. We rely on each other for our prosperity and without each other we could not sustain our economic growth.

Our military arrangement and our economic interdependence are not born exclusively of self-interest. They are not mere expedients. Rather, they flow from a much richer, and much more enduring, vein: our belief in freedom and democracy.

All the members of NATO and all the nations in the European Economic Community -- the partners in Western freedom -- practice democracy. This democracy may differ in structure from one country to another, it may be called presidential or parliamentary, but it is everywhere characterized by the guarantee of individual liberties, by the free exercise of the franchise, and by the rotation of parties in power.

Freedom inevitably produces ferment. In our polyglot nations, where there are philosophical, regional, racial, religious, social, and even linguistic differences, groups compete against each other in the full glare of public debate and with the full force of their arguments. It is a noisy, freewheeling, almost chaotic way to conduct a government's business, one that encourages, indeed demands, candor.

What is true of our nations is true of our alliance, writ large. It would be utter folly to expect 16 democratic nations, embracing some 630 million free people, to agree all of the time and in every particular. It would

be equally foolish, as well as dangerous, to expect them to disguise their disagreements.

It is not, however, foolish to expect them to be temperate in their criticism of each other. Nor is it unrealistic to expect the sixteen, after long discussion and proper compromise on an important issue, to speak and act as one. In fact, it is essential.

We did so upon the creation of the alliance, when we set forth NATO's doctrine of defense. We did so upon the adoption of "Flexible Response," when we reformulated NATO's strategy. We did so during the deployment of cruise and Pershing, when we answered a growing Soviet nuclear threat.

As we took these actions, we also conveyed a simple and clear message: we are committed to each other's safety. This fact transcends our intramural differences and declares unambiguously our solidarity. It also serves the cause of peace.

When, to cite a recent example, the Soviets failed to divide the alliance over deployment of cruise, they returned in 1985 to the arms talks they had abandoned in Geneva. Recent signs suggest that we may reach an agreement there that will lead to the removal of all intermediate-range missiles from the European continent. Had we not mustered the courage and consensus to proceed

with deployment, had we heeded the Cassandras of unilateralism, Russian SS-20s would have become a non-negotiable feature on the European military landscape. In addition, and ultimately more damaging, the Soviets would have had good reason to doubt our resolve, persuasive evidence to question our strength.

That they do not, I think, ratifies the current relevance of the Truman Doctrine.

President Truman promised 40 years ago to aid the free world against communist aggression. In a larger sense, though, he summoned the Western nations to common purpose. The task has not been easy. We have come under intense pressures and have had serious problems. But we have never faltered.

We have demonstrated common purpose, have come together to promote peace, freedom, and democracy. This, then, is our example. This is our triumph. This is our only assurance of future liberty.

The buck stopped with us, and we have handled it wisely. We have, as Harry Truman might have said, stayed in the kitchen and stood the heat.