

CCPC



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

23 March 1987

CM 28/3

Sea Charles,

Prime Minister's Visit to the Soviet Union
Speech

~~withheld~~
Thank you for sending me with your letter of 23 March a revised version of the speech.

We think that the structure and overall balance of the speech are good. The passage on page 11 about the "two very important questions" is a good introduction to the remaining material.

We have one comment on the "tone" of the speech. In the passage on pages 20 to 21 on ideology, Brezhnev is quoted to support the point about the widespread belief in the West that the Soviet Union is committed to the worldwide domination of communism. But the Brezhnev quotation is an example of the "old thinking" which we believe Gorbachev himself would repudiate. A more accurate reflection of Gorbachev's own approach would be what Dobrynin said in June 1986 : "We have our own ideas about the historical fate of the capitalist system but we as a State do not have the objective of overthrowing capitalism in other countries. This follows from our readiness for peaceful coexistence with them." He goes on to say that the other side must recognise the right of socialism to exist. (Kommunist No 9, June 1986.)

/There

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There is still, of course, an underlying question about how far the new language genuinely reflects new thinking and diminished commitment to the worldwide domination of communism. But we think that the shift in language is important and should not be ignored. / We have suggested in the annex to this letter a possible redraft.

We have a number of comments on the arms control content of the speech, and a few on other aspects of it which are also set out in the annex.

Yours ever,
Tony Galsworthy

(A C Galsworthy)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
No 10 Downing St

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ANNEX

Page 6

Yevgeny Onegin does not need "explaining" as the hero of Pushkin's novels: all Russians are wholly familiar with it and him. We suggest, "You will recall that Alexander Pushkin's Yevgeny Onegin learned all his knowledge . . .".

Pages 10 and 13

The two references to Chernobyl, each alright in itself, sound rather laboured. It might be better to move the bulk of the passage on page 10, about heroism, to the end of the passage on page 13.

Page 16

"Our internal affairs do not stop at our borders" has a nasty ring of Brezhnev doctrine to it. Delete ?

Pages 20 to 21

Suggest: "It is still widely believed in the West that the Soviet Union is committed to the worldwide domination of communism. Some people remember statements such as that by one of your leaders a few years ago: [Brezhnev quotation].

"This concept is bound . . . elsewhere in the world.

"I know that more recent, authoritative statements give a different view. And I welcome this.

"We in the West have the system . . .".

Page 23

In the sentence "The more you respond . . ." it would be better to find wording which avoided the implication that such action only takes place in response to Western pressure - which much annoys the Soviet Union. We suggest language on these lines: "The greater your readiness to release prisoners of conscience and to allow those who wish to do so freely to leave their country - and we welcome the steps which you have already taken - the greater the readiness . . .".

Page 24

Delete, "as the Helsinki Final Act says", since this is not a quotation from the Final Act.



Page 28

Insert [1982].

Page 29

Delete "indeed . . . and attack". The statement as drafted raises a host of questions, not all of which we would find it easy to answer.

Pages 30-31

Replace "But our response . . . inseparable" with "But on the fundamentals and in our determination to defend our democratic values we are inseparable. We will stand firm against any attempt to divide us." The present formula sounds unduly defensive.

Page 36

Redraft second paragraph and continuation on page 37 as follows: "We cannot swap one threat for another. It is right to remove the intermediate range missiles. It is essential to have appropriate constraints on shorter-range missiles. But we cannot stop there. The nations of Western Europe must not be left increasingly vulnerable to another Warsaw Pact superiority in shorter-range nuclear weapons. We therefore need negotiations to deal with this." The present text implicitly casts doubt on our commitment to the present US negotiations position.

Page 41

Redraft last paragraph (continued on page 42) as follows: "But we cannot foreclose on the chance that defences could make a valuable contribution to a more stable relationship." As drafted, the present text begs a number of questions, especially with the reference to first-strike capability. It also raises difficult problems for our own approach to arms control, and notably our prime condition for our own participation: that there should be no significant increase in Soviet defences.

Page 42

Redraft first paragraph to read: "That is why I think we should be trying not to prevent research to the point of feasibility, but to manage the results, etc".



Page 43

Redraft first paragraph to read: ". . . spells out the planned research programmes of both parties etc".

Page 44/45

Redraft passage on CW as follows: ". . . to ban chemical weapons. The use of such munitions is regrettably becoming more widespread. And we in Europe face the undoubted threat of a huge imbalance in these weapons in the Soviet Union's favour. To this we must have an adequate response. But surely the best answer is to bend every effort to agree the complete elimination of these weapons, thus removing the need for modernisation on the Western side." The present ext would give much offence to the Americans, particularly the reference to agreeing a ban "before" Western modernisation.

Page 50

Suggest add emphasis to the final line by saying, "they may be - indeed they are - very small . . .".

Page 52

The Memorandum of Understanding on Information and Culture is not yet agreed. We expect that it will be. But "ambitious programme of exchanges" is not the right description. We suggest "One of them sets out ambitious new ideas designed to improve communication between our peoples".

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

25 March 1987

CDP26/3

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's Visit to Moscow: Speeches and Toasts

Apart from the Prime Minister's main speech at the Kremlin Banquet, she will need texts for three other occasions:

- the lunch offered by the Patriarch at Zagorsk;
- the opening of the British/Soviet Chamber of Commerce Offices;
- the dinner at Tbilisi.

/ I enclose three short drafts.

Zagorsk

It may be of interest to know that when Mr Rifkind visited the Soviet Union in July 1985 the lunch offered at Zagorsk was the only occasion at which vodka was served. It was a delicious meal. The "raise my glass" at the end of the text will, we believe, therefore be needed.

Chamber of Commerce

The final version will need to take account of the latest state of play over the signature of contracts for major projects. The Prime Minister's brief on trade includes a request for an assurance that larger premises will be made available for the new British/Soviet Chamber of Commerce Office. We recommend that this point should be made to Mr Ryzhkov. It is alluded to in the draft speech.

Dinner at Tbilisi

The current draft programme says toasts not speeches. However, the Georgians are a very hospitable people, where toasts tend to go on a long time. We think it wise for the Prime Minister to have a mini-speech up her sleeve.

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The paragraph referring to Mtskheta on the first page is square bracketed because at present the draft programme does not include a visit there. The phrase underlined ("the road does indeed lead to the church") is a quotation from the last scene of the well-known Georgian film Repentance, which is now being shown widely in the Soviet Union and which deals with attitudes to Stalinism. It will be clearly recognised as such.

All these drafts are based on drafts sent by our Embassy in Moscow.

Yours ever,

L. Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

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