


SECRET ENCLOSURE



EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
LONDON

March 23, 1987

*Prime Minister  
Some helpful  
points*

*OOO  
23/7.*

Charles Powell, Esq.  
Private Secretary to the Prime Minister  
10 Downing Street  
London

Dear Charles:

The enclosed is self-explanatory, and I hope that the Prime Minister will find it of interest. As Mike suggests, I hope she will pursue a parallel line of argument.

Regards.

Sincerely,

*Charles H. Price II*

Charles H. Price II  
Ambassador

*mt*

Enclosure:  
Copy of letter to  
Mr. Derek Thomas from  
Mr. Pendleton March 21.

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AMB

Embassy of the United States of America

London  
March 21, 1987



Mr. Derek Thomas, CMG  
Political Director  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
Downing Street West  
London, SW1A 2AL

Dear Derek:

Mike Armacost has asked me to pass along to you the enclosed portion of our reporting cable on his Middle East discussion with Vorontsov and Polyakov in Moscow on March 16 and 17. Mike hopes it will be of use to those helping to prepare the Prime Minister for her Moscow visit. If she could pursue a parallel line of argument with the Soviets, it would be most helpful.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Miles".

Miles S. Pendleton, Jr.  
Counselor for Political Affairs

Enclosure: SECRET

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ARMACOST BEGAN THE FIRST DAY'S MIDEAST DISCUSSION MARCH 16 BY CITING THE COMMON SOVIET-U.S. INTEREST IN THE AVOIDANCE OF CONFLICT AND CONFRONTATION AND IN A SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE BASED ON RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AND RECOGNITION OF THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL. WHILE VARIOUS FACTORS IN THE REGION (ISRAELI DISUNITY, PLO DISARRAY, SYRIAN OPPOSITION) LEAD SOME TO BELIEVE THAT CONDITIONS FOR PROGRESS ARE NOT PROPITIOUS AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE USG BELIEVES THERE ARE SOME POSSIBILITIES AND WILL CONTINUE WORKING TO IMPROVE THE ENVIRONMENT. THERE HAVE BEEN SOME ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS: RESOLUTION OF THE TABA DISPUTE; THE PERES VISIT TO EGYPT; THE RESTORATION OF AMBASSADORIAL REPRESENTATION IN BOTH COUNTRIES; EGYPT'S ENTRY INTO THE ARAB MAINSTREAM WITHOUT BACKSLIDING ON THE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS; ISRAELI-JORDANIAN COOPERATION ON THE WEST BANK; AND THE HASSAN-PERES MEETING LAST YEAR.

RODMAN CONTINUED THE DISCUSSION FOR THE U.S. SIDE, FOCUSING ON OUR RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE EFFICACY OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AND ABOUT SOVIET POLICIES IN THE REGION. HOWEVER, HE SAID, HE WANTED TO STATE THE U.S. POSITION POSITIVELY AND DESCRIBE POSITIVELY OUR ANALYSIS OF WHAT PROGRESS REQUIRES. WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE DIPLOMATIC MOVEMENT AND A CHANGE IN THE STATUS QUO BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THE PRESENT SITUATION IS UNSTABLE. A DETERIORATION COULD ALSO COMPLICATE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. PRESIDENT REAGAN, IN HIS SEPTEMBER 1, 1982, STATEMENT HAS SKETCHED OUR VIEW OF AN EQUITABLE OUTCOME TO THE PEACE PROCESS. WHILE THE SOVIET SIDE SAYS THAT THE ERA OF SO-CALLED SEPARATE DEALS IS PAST, THE U.S. BELIEVES THE SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS OF THE 1970'S SHOWED THAT SUCH STEPS CAN PRODUCE USEFUL AND POSITIVE AGREEMENTS. THESE ACCORDS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED AND WOULD NOT HAVE LASTED IF THEY HAD NOT SERVED THE MUTUAL INTERESTS OF THE PARTIES -- INCLUDING THE INTERESTS OF THE USSR'S SYRIAN FRIENDS, WHO HAD TAKEN PART IN THIS U.S. DIPLOMACY. THIS DIPLOMACY IS THE ONLY APPROACH THAT HAS PRODUCED ANY RESULT. DECLARATIONS, ARMED STRUGGLE, THE SYRIAN MILITARY BUILDUP, TALK OF MULTILATERAL APPROACHES -- NONE OF THESE HAS GOTTEN THE ARABS ANYWHERE. NO OTHER APPROACH HAS PRODUCED MOVEMENT OR HAS LED TO "ONE CENTIMETER" OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT YET SUCCEEDED IN SOLVING THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM OR THE PROBLEM OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, RODMAN SAID, WE HAVE OUR OWN ANALYSIS OF WHY WE ARE NOW AT AN IMPASSE. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES ARE THE ONLY WAY TO GET THINGS GOING. IT IS IN THE ARABS' INTEREST MOST OF ALL TO GET A REAL NEGOTIATION STARTED. THIS WILL REQUIRE RESOLUTION OF THE KEY QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION. THE ONLY WAY TO ENGAGE THE ISRAELIS WILL BE TO GET JORDAN TO PLAY A KEY ROLE; THE JORDANIANS OBVIOUSLY NEED TO HAVE A PALESTINIAN PARTNER. AS LONG AS THE PLO SEEMS UNABLE TO ACCEPT RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, IT MAY BE BEST FOR IT TO WORK

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OUT AN INDIRECT ROLE WITH HUSSEIN. NO OTHER ARRANGEMENT WILL WORK. THE FEBRUARY 11, 1985, AMMAN ACCORD WAS A PROMISING DEVELOPMENT IN THIS REGARD; WE THOUGHT IT MIGHT LEAD TO SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT.

THE U.S., RODMAN CONTINUED, DOES NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. A CONFERENCE THAT LEADS TO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE HELPFUL, BUT SUCH A CONFERENCE WOULD REQUIRE PREPARATION -- MEANING PREPARATION OF THE POLITICAL CONDITIONS, NOT JUST PROCEDURAL PREPARATION. WE NEED A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION AS WELL AS SOME SENSE OF HOW THE REAL (DIRECT) NEGOTIATIONS WILL UNFOLD. WHILE A "COMPREHENSIVE" SOLUTION IS NEEDED, IN THE SENSE OF COVERING ALL FRONTS, THE NEGOTIATION ITSELF PROBABLY CANNOT BE COMPREHENSIVE. IT SEEMS IMPRACTICAL, PARTICULARLY CONSIDERING THE REALITIES OF ISRAELI POLITICS, TO EXPECT TO NEGOTIATE ALL THE MAJOR ISSUES AT THE SAME TIME; IT IS A FORMULA FOR INSTANT DEADLOCK; THE ISRAELI POLITICAL SYSTEM SIMPLY COULD NOT ABSORB MAJOR CONCESSIONS ON ALL FRONTS SIMULTANEOUSLY. AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, IF INADEQUATELY PREPARED, COULD OVERLOAD THE PROCESS, WHEREAS OUR EXPERIENCE WITH MORE DIGESTIBLE STEPS HAS SHOWN THAT SUCH AN APPROACH CAN GENERATE MOMENTUM AS IT EVOLVES: EACH SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION COULD EVEN IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE FOR RESOLVING THE NEXT ISSUE IN DISPUTE. TRYING TO DO EVERYTHING AT ONCE WOULD MEAN DELAYING THE ATTAINABLE WHILE WAITING FOR THE UNATTAINABLE. IF WE HAD FOLLOWED THIS APPROACH IN THE 1970'S, THE ISRAELIS WOULD STILL BE SITTING ON THE SUEZ CANAL AND ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF DAMASCUS.

RODMAN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE SYRIANS FEAR THIS APPROACH WOULD LEAVE THEM OUT AND LEAVE THE GOLAN HEIGHTS QUESTION UNRESOLVED. WE DISAGREE WITH THAT ANALYSIS. A SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION ON THE WEST BANK COULD PERHAPS EVEN FACILITATE A RESOLUTION ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. IN ANY EVENT, SETTLEMENT OF THIS ISSUE DEPENDS LESS ON PROCEDURE AND MORE ON THE OBJECTIVE STATE OF SYRIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS. REAL PROGRESS COULD COME WHEN THE SYRIANS REALIZE THEIR AIMS CANNOT BE ACHIEVED THROUGH ARMED STRUGGLE OR A MILITARY BUILD-UP.

BEYOND THESE PROCEDURAL ISSUES, RODMAN OUTLINED A NUMBER OF U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT SOVIET POLICY IN THE SOVIET MIDDLE EAST. HE NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE CONSISTENTLY JOINED IN THE ASSAULT ON DEVELOPMENTS WE CONSIDER TO BE POSITIVE, SUCH AS THE HASSAN-PERES MEETING AND THE FEBRUARY 11 ACCORD. SOVIET POLICY SEEMS CONSISTENTLY TO SUPPORT THE MORE INTRANSIGENT ARAB DEMANDS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE MODERATES. IT SUPPORTS THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES SUCH AS LIBYA AND SYRIA, AND ITS EFFORTS TO REUNIFY THE PLO SEEM TO BE ON THE BASIS OF A REJECTIONIST POSITION. THUS OUR PROBLEM WITH SOVIET POLICY GOES FAR DEEPER THAN JUST THE ABSENCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. THE

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SOVIETS SEEM TO BLOCK PROMISING EFFORTS. THIS MAY PLEASE THE ARABS IN THE SHORT TERM, BUT IT IS REALLY A DISSERVICE TO THEM. THE U.S. IS ALWAYS CALLED UPON TO PUT PRESSURE ON ITS FRIENDS TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE; WE WOULD BE IMPRESSED IF THE SOVIETS USED THEIR INFLUENCE TO GET FRIENDS LIKE SYRIA AND THE PLO TO ADOPT MORE MODERATE POSITIONS THAT WOULD HELP GET A REAL NEGOTIATION STARTED.

DESPITE OUR RESERVATIONS ABOUT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, RODMAN SAID, THE U.S. IS WILLING TO CONSIDER IT. THIS WAS SHOWN DURING THE RECENT VISIT TO THE U.S. BY ISRAELI PM SHAMIR. CONDITIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE RIPE, HOWEVER. PRESENTLY SUCH CONDITIONS DO NOT EXIST, BUT, IF THERE WERE A REAL PROSPECT THAT A CONFERENCE COULD GET DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS GOING, WE WOULD NOT RULE IT OUT. RODMAN CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION HAD WORKED TOGETHER IN THE PAST, PARTICULARLY IN TIMES OF CONFLICT. THERE WAS A PRECEDENT, AND WE WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO SEE IT HAPPEN AGAIN.

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