

FROM: THE RT. HON. JULIAN AMERY, M.P.

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PERSONAL

26th March, 1987

*Rice Newstr*

*CDP  
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*Dear Margaret,*

I have been thinking about your expedition to Moscow and enclose a few notes which might conceivably be helpful, though I imagine most of the points in them will have been covered in such official and unofficial briefings as you will already have had.

I have tried to keep them short and please consign them to the waste paper basket if there is nothing new in them.

I have been reluctant to give unsolicited advice. But I have a feeling that your journey may prove very important, if not a turning point.

*You ever  
Julian.*

Julian Amery

The Rt. Hon. Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, MP

*I am copying these notes to  
Geoffrey Howe*

NOTE 1 - GORBACHEV WILL BE TALKING FROM WEAKNESS

Soviet members of Gorbachev's generation have known for a long time that "Central planning" and "democratic centralism" cannot deliver the goods. But until recently there was little pressure for reform and considerable personal risk in advocating it.

Under the Carter Presidency the West relaxed. The Soviets had no difficulty in securing a substantial lead in nuclear and conventional armaments and, indeed, in space. They were able to extend their empire to Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Aden, Cambodia, Nicaragua and finally Afghanistan.

Meanwhile Soviet living standards improved, only marginally for the masses but substantially for the "nomenklatura".

Afghanistan - comparable in some ways to Hitler's occupation of Prague - finally awoke the West. NATO's rearmament programme has already gone a long way to closing the strategic "window of opportunity" which had opened in favour of the Soviets. Reagan's commitment to SDI was perhaps the last straw. The Soviets have had to recognise that there ~~was~~<sup>is</sup> no way in which they could win an arms race against the West. They lacked the technology; and the collapse of oil prices has robbed them of their biggest hard currency earner.

Meanwhile, their efforts to consolidate the Soviet empire overseas have been singularly unsuccessful. Savimbi and UNITA are still in control of large areas of Angola. The Marxist Government of Mozambique is besieged by RENAMO and has had to turn to Zimbabwe and, indeed, Britain and South Africa for help. The

Eritrean and Tigre resistance movements still manage to hold their own against the Ethiopian Government with minimal external support. Cambodia is by no means pacified. The situation in Afghanistan speaks for itself.

In these circumstances Gorbachev has been looking desperately for a way of relieving the pressure on his technological, financial and human resources.

His first move was to get the Americans to abandon SDI. This would have been the greatest prize but has so far eluded him.

Next, he tried to reach agreement on a withdrawal of all intermediate missiles from Europe which would have included British and French strategic deterrents, thus decoupling Europe from the United States. This again he has, at least, temporarily abandoned.

He has now settled for trying to secure a withdrawal of American and Soviet intermediate missiles from Europe presumably in the hope of decoupling West Germany from NATO. His plan would appear to be to get West German industry and finance to work for the development of the Soviet 'bloc without Bonn having to abandon its present democratic constitution (any more than Finland) and with the hope of an eventual reunion with East Germany.

Taken together all these circumstances suggest a Government negotiating from weakness.

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*Revised*

NOTE 2. THE ZERO ZERO OPTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

From a European point of view the zero-zero option is seriously flawed, strategically and politically.

It is flawed strategically because Soviet strategic missiles which have become increasingly accurate could now threaten targets in West Germany without threatening the American mainland. The withdrawal of the SS 20's thus in no way changes the military balance on the continent.

It is flawed politically because it takes the West back to the danger foreseen by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt that, without American nuclear weapons installed in Germany, American defence of Germany would lose credibility.

This would clearly be undesirable from the European point of view. On the other hand recent talks with Nixon, Richard Perle and Jean Kirkpatrick have left me with the impression that although they personally disapprove of an agreement limited to intermediate missiles, they fear that the U.S. Administration are desperately anxious to reach that agreement not on its merits, but for purely domestic political reasons.

If this is the case and if we have to accept that negotiations on intermediate missiles will go ahead, what compensation can we procure?

The best pay off would be to persuade the Soviets that the price of the zero-zero agreement would be their withdrawal from some or all of their overseas semi-conquests e.g. a Cuban withdrawal from Angola;

the abandonment of the Marxist regimes in Mozambique and Ethiopia; and, best of all, a withdrawal from Afghanistan.

These need not be an integral part of the negotiations on intermediate missiles. They could be conducted in parallel. But progress on the missiles, which is reckoned to take some years, would depend on the progressive solution of regional problems. Could the United States and the Soviets be persuaded that the two must go hand in hand?

No - gone too far

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NOTE 3 - THE GERMAN PANDORA'S BOX

Mr. Gorbachev may hope that the withdrawal of American and Soviet intermediate missiles from Europe will lead to the de-coupling of West Germany from NATO and allow West Germany to move gradually to neutralism and German industry to work increasingly for the Soviet Union.

But this raises difficult questions. How far has he allowed for the increased German pressure for reunion between East and West Germany and what would be the implications of this for the European and, indeed, world balance of power?

The other NATO countries in Europe will not easily accept the idea of a neutralist West Germany. The French are already talking of extending the French nuclear deterrent to cover West Germany. Has Mr. Gorbachev considered the possibility that a West Germany no longer trusting an American defence would seek to acquire its own nuclear weapons? Franz Josef Strauss and others in his circle make no secret that this would be the logical conclusion.

By re-opening the German question, Mr. Gorbachev is opening a Pandora's Box. All concerned should consider the implications very carefully.

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**NOTE 4**

The broad outline of a zero-zero agreement postulates that the Soviet Union and the United States should each retain 100 intermediate missiles. One lot east of the Urals and one lot in the United States.

Is this acceptable to Iran, Pakistan, China and Japan?

Could the American missiles be deployed in Alaska to protect Western interests in the north Pacific?

While we are primarily concerned for the security of Europe, the security of Europe also depends on the balance of power in the Middle and Far East.

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NOTE 5 - BRITAIN HAS A STRONG HAND TO PLAY

The strength of the Prime Minister's hand when she goes to Moscow depends on three things.

1. The likelihood that the Conservatives will win the next election.
2. Her personal relationship with President Reagan.
3. The special relationship between the United States and Britain.

This is not a special relationship between the State Department and the Foreign Office or even between Downing Street and the White House. It is based on the close connection, largely due to language, that exists between American and British business, American and British journalists, American and British universities, i.e. between American and British opinion formers. Mr. Dobrynin, with his long years of experience in Washington, will know this better than anyone. He will know that if the Prime Minister gives an adverse report after her talks in Moscow the impact on U.S. opinion - always very volatile - could be considerable.

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
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NOTE 6 - ELECTORAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Prime Minister's visit is essentially exploratory. It is unlikely to achieve agreement on the important matters in dispute between East and West. The Soviets may, however, be persuaded that major strategic and political changes in their proposals cannot be safely accommodated on the basis of co-existence between antagonistic systems. If the Soviets really want to move from confrontation to co-operation with the Western democracies, this must be based not just on understanding between Governments but understanding between peoples. It will, therefore, be essential that the Soviet Union show greater respect for Basket 3 of the Helsinki Agreement. Some positive indication of this would naturally be popular with the British electorate. Otherwise a cautious but firm defence of Western interests is most likely to ensure respect. If it provokes criticism by Opposition Parties this will do them more harm than good.

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