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31 MAR 1987	
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FM FCOLN TO BREMB
261200Z MAR
GRS 727

**PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T 558/87**

CONFIDENTIAL
FM FCO
TO DESKBY 261500Z BRUSSELS
TELNO 79
OF 261200Z MARCH 87
AND TO DESKBY 261500Z THE HAGUE, ROME
INFO IMMEDIATE BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO
MARTENS/LUBBERS/CRAXI:

BEGINS

DEAR PRIME MINISTER

I WANT TO LET YOU KNOW HOW I AM APPROACHING MY VISIT TO THE
SOVIET UNION WHICH STARTS ON SATURDAY.

I WANT FIRST TO MAKE MY OWN ASSESSMENT OF HOW SERIOUS
GORBACHEV IS ABOUT INTERNAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING,
AND WHAT IMPACT THIS WILL HAVE ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY.

I SHALL MAKE CLEAR THAT THE WEST DOES NOT WANT TO MAKE
CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION MORE DIFFICULT. FAR FROM IT: IT IS
ONLY WHEN THEY START TO TREAT THEIR OWN PEOPLE DECENTLY AND
IMPLEMENT THE FREEDOMS CONFIRMED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT THAT
WE SHALL BE ABLE TO DEVELOP THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE WHICH ARE
NECESSARY FOR A MORE PEACEFUL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION.
BUT WE SHALL NOT JUDGE THEM ON THE BASIS OF WHAT THEY SAY THEY

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44383 - 1

WILL DO: WE SHALL WANT TO SEE ACTUAL RESULTS.

I SHALL REMIND HIM THAT ALTHOUGH DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES ARE SLOW TO DO BATTLE, HE SHOULD NOT DOUBT OUR DETERMINATION TO RETAIN STRONG DEFENCES BASED ON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. NOR SHOULD HE BE UNDER ANY ILLUSION THAT HE CAN SEPARATE EUROPE FROM THE UNITED STATES.

I SHALL BE HAVING SEVERAL HOURS OF TALKS WITH GORBACHEV IN A VERY RESTRICTED CIRCLE. IN THESE MEETINGS, I PROPOSE TO PRESS HIM ON HUMAN RIGHTS - IN PARTICULAR THE RELEASE OF DISSIDENTS, AN END TO THE ABUSE OF PSYCHIATRY, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, AND JEWISH EMIGRATION. THE TWELVE HAVE BEEN MAKING USEFUL HEADWAY ON THESE ISSUES AT VIENNA UNDER THE BELGIAN PRESIDENCY.

ON REGIONAL ISSUES, I INTEND TO FOCUS ON AFGHANISTAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST. ON AFGHANISTAN, I SHALL TRY TO CONVINCE HIM THAT THE ONLY CHANCE FOR A SOLUTION LIES IN THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND GENUINE SELF-DETERMINATION, POSSIBLY WITH SOME SORT OF NEUTRAL STATUS FOR AFGHANISTAN, WHICH COULD BE ON THE MODEL OF THE AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY. I SHALL MAKE CLEAR THAT WE WOULD NOT EXPLOIT A SETTLEMENT AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION, BUT THAT WITHDRAWAL WILL BE A TEST OF THEIR WIDER INTENTIONS. IT IS HELPFUL THAT THE BELGIAN PRESIDENCY HAS KEPT UP THE PRESSURE FROM THE TWELVE ON AFGHANISTAN, AND HAS ARRANGED A PROTEST AFTER THE RECENT BOMBING OF CIVILIAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN.

WE ARE BOUND TO SPEND MOST TIME ON ARMS CONTROL. MY AIM WILL BE TO GET GORBACHEV TO ACCEPT IN PRACTICE, IF NOT FORMALLY, THE CAMP DAVID PRIORITIES WHICH NATO COLLEAGUES ENDORSED IN DECEMBER. I WILL PRESS HIM HARD TO ACCEPT THE HALVING OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, AND TO REACH AGREEMENT ON LONGER-RANGE INF. I SHALL MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO ENDORSE AN INF AGREEMENT PROVIDED OUR CONDITIONS ON VERIFICATION AND SHORTER-RANGE SYSTEMS ARE SATISFIED. AN

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44383 - 1

AGREEMENT MUST NOT DIMINISH OUR SECURITY. BUT I SHALL STRESS THAT WE DO NOT SEE AN INF AGREEMENT AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS A DE-NUCLEARISED EUROPE, AND SHALL UNDERLINE THE NEED FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO DEAL WITH SOVIET CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY.

THERE WILL PROBABLY BE DISCUSSION OF A CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN. I WILL MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE TO CONVINCING US THAT THEY ARE TRULY INTERESTED IN A COMPREHENSIVE BAN WITH AN EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION REGIME.

I HAVE NO EXAGGERATED EXPECTATIONS AND AM NOT LOOKING FOR ANY AGREEMENTS (OTHER THAN SOME MINOR BILATERAL ACCORDS WHICH WILL BE SIGNED WHILE I AM THERE). BUT WE HAVE A MAJOR INTEREST IN GETTING THE RUSSIANS TO BEHAVE LESS AGGRESSIVELY. I SHALL BE DOING MY BEST TO GET GORBACHEV TO SEE THAT HE HAS AN INTEREST IN THIS TOO.

I AM CONSCIOUS OF THE WIDE INTEREST IN THIS VISIT, WHICH COMES AT AN INTERESTING MOMENT IN SOVIET AFFAIRS. GEOFFREY HOWE WILL HAVE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF HIS EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES AT CORSENDONK.

I AM SENDING SIMILAR MESSAGES TO RUUD LUBBERS/BETTINO CRAXI/WILFRED MARTENS.

YOURS SINCERELY,
MARGARET THATCHER
ENDS

2. IN HANDING OVER THE MESSAGE, YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT IT IS DIRECTED TO MARTENS/LUBBERS/CRAXI AS PRIME MINISTERS OF INF BASING COUNTRIES (IE NOT (NOT) IN MARTENS' CASE IN HIS FORMAL PRESIDENCY CAPACITY).

3. THERE WILL BE NO (NO) SIGNED ORIGINAL

HOWE

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LIMITED
ECO (E)
SOVIET O
DEFENCE O
WEO
PLANNING STAFF
ACOD

NEWS O
SAO
PS
PS/MR BENTON
PS/MRS CHALKER
PS/LADY YOUNG

3
CONFIDENTIAL
MR THOMAS
MR BOYD
MR RATFORD
MR RENWICK
MR FALL

CONFIDENTIAL



file DAS.

cc pc

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

26 March 1987

**PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW:
MESSAGES TO EUROPEAN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT**

BT
Thank you for your letter of 25 March enclosing a draft message from the Prime Minister to the Belgian, Netherlands and Italian Prime Ministers about her forthcoming visit to Moscow. The Prime Minister is perfectly content to send a message but would prefer something slightly closer to the message which she sent to President Reagan, omitting the more sensitive passages. I enclose a revised version which, subject to any comments you might have, may be despatched. You will no doubt arrange for it to be topped and tailed in the appropriate way.

C D POWELL

Lyn Parker, Esq.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

DASAFN

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO MR MARTENS/SIGNOR CRAXI/
MR LUBBERS

I want to let you know how I am approaching my visit to the Soviet Union which starts on Saturday.

I want first to make my own assessment of how serious Gorbachev is about internal political and economic restructuring, and what impact this will have on Soviet Foreign Policy.

I shall make clear that the West does not want to make change in the Soviet Union more difficult. Far from it: it is only when they start to treat their own people decently and implement the freedoms confirmed in the Helsinki Final Act that we shall be able to develop the trust and confidence which are necessary for a more peaceful relationship with the Soviet Union. But we shall not judge them on the basis of what they say they will do: we shall want to see actual results.

I shall remind him that although democratic countries are slow to do battle, he should not doubt our determination to retain strong defences based on nuclear deterrence. Nor should he be under any illusion that he can separate Europe from the United States.

I shall be having several hours of talks with Gorbachev in a very restricted circle. In these meetings, I propose to press him on human rights - in particular the release of dissidents, and end to the abuse of psychiatry, religious freedom, and Jewish emigration. The twelve have been making useful headway on these issues at Vienna under the Belgian Presidency.

On regional issues, I intend to focus on Afghanistan and the Middle East. On Afghanistan, I shall try to convince him that the only chance for a solution lies in the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops in the near future and genuine self-determination, possibly with some sort of neutral status for

Afghanistan, which could be on the model of the Austrian State Treaty. I shall make clear that we would not exploit a settlement against the Soviet Union, but that withdrawal will be a test of their wider intentions. It is helpful that the Belgian Presidency has kept up the pressure from the Twelve on Afghanistan, and has arranged a protest after the recent bombing of civilian refugees in Pakistan.

We are bound to spend most time on arms control. My aim will be to get Gorbachev to accept in practice, if not formally, the Camp David priorities which NATO colleagues endorsed in December. I will press him hard to accept the halving of strategic weapons over the next five years, and to reach agreement on longer-range INF. I shall make it clear that we are prepared to endorse an INF agreement provided our conditions on verification and shorter-range systems are satisfied. But I shall stress that we do not see an INF agreement as a first step towards a de-nuclearised Europe, and shall underline the need for negotiations to deal with Soviet conventional superiority. An agreement must not diminish our security.

There will probably be discussion of a chemical weapons ban. I will make it clear that the Russians have to convince us that they are truly interested in a comprehensive ban with an effective verification regime.

I have no exaggerated expectations and am not looking for any agreements (other than some minor bilateral accords which will be signed while I am there). But we have a major interest in getting the Russians to behave less aggressively. I shall be doing my best to get Gorbachev to see that he has an interest in this too.

I am conscious of the wide interest in this visit, which comes at an interesting moment in Soviet affairs. Geoffrey Howe will have an early opportunity to brief his European Community colleagues at Corsendonk.

I am writing in similar terms to Rund Lubbers/Bettino Craxi.

~~leaf~~ ①



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

Prime Minister

25 March 1987

(A)

Agree to send this message? It is not awfully good.

Your message please as you have received it

(B)

The alternative would be to send a version of the message to Dear Charles, Reagan, omitting the more sensitive passages. I have prepared a text (attached)

Prime Minister's Visit to Moscow

The Foreign Secretary thinks that, as part of the preparations for the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow, there would be advantage in her sending a message to the Belgian Prime Minister, Mr Martens, in his current Presidency role and to Lubbers and Craxi because the Netherlands and Italy, like Belgium, have accepted INF deployment. The Prime Minister's consultations have naturally centred on France and Germany. But several other European partners have a direct interest in the arms control issues the Prime Minister will be discussing with Mr Gorbachev. A message to the Belgian Presidency, Italy and the Netherlands at this stage would be an economical way to look after the requirement to keep the smaller partners in the picture.

CDP 25/3
prefer A or B?
CDP

The Foreign Secretary proposes to brief EC Ambassadors in Moscow, and to give his EC colleagues an account of the Moscow visit at their informal weekend meeting in Belgium on 4-5 April.

I enclose a self-explanatory draft which Sir Geoffrey Howe has approved.

Yours ever,
L Parker

(L Parker)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

OUT TELEGRAM

A

	Classification CONFIDENTIAL	Caveat	Precedence IMMEDIATE
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ZCZC TC CAVEAT FM TO TELNO OF AND TO	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29	<p>ZCZC</p> <p>CONFIDENTIAL</p> <p>FM FCO</p> <p>TO IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS</p> <p>TELNO</p> <p>OF 251400Z MARCH 1987</p> <p>AND TO IMMEDIATE THE HAGUE, ROME</p> <p>INFO IMMEDIATE BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW</p> <p>PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW</p> <p>1. Please pass following message from the Prime Minister to Martens/Lubbers/Craxi:</p> <p>Begins</p> <p>Dear Prime Minister</p> <p>As you know, I am in the final stages of preparing for my visit to Moscow. Before I go, I want to let you know my general approach to the visit, in view of your direct interest in the INF issue (for Martens: and of your current Presidency role). I am also sending this message ^{similar} to Ruud Lubbers/Bettino Craxi/Wilfred Martens. Geoffrey Howe ^{my} will accompany me and has already had some discussion about the visit with his Community colleagues.</p> <p><u>to range widely</u> I expect to have substantial ^{my} talks with Gorbachev. I shall ^{to cover the whole spectrum of international issues.} seek to gain ^{want} a personal impression of his objectives, both internal and external, ^{make} and in particular to see ^{establish} how far he is really committed to change.</p>
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YYYY	Catchword: Security		
MAIN	File number	Dept Private Office	Drafted by (Block capitals) A C Galsworthy
ADDITIONAL			Telephone no 2059
NNNN	Authorised for despatch by: Initials Date/time		
	For COD use only	Comcen reference	Telegram number
			Processed by

OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

	Classification CONFIDENTIAL	Caveat	Precedence IMMEDIATE
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1 <<<<

2 Security and arms control issues will occupy most time in the

3 talks. I shall not of course be going to Moscow to negotiate,

4 but I shall make clear to Gorbachev that our security depends on

5 maintaining an overall balance in armaments, and that we shall

6 only agree to propositions ^{do not diminish our security} which help that objective. I shall

7 ^{base myself on} promote ^{the} Camp David arms control priorities, which were endorsed

8 at the North Atlantic Council in December. I will urge

9 Gorbachev to accept the wisdom of a step-by-step approach,

10 based on realistic objectives. I shall support the completion

11 of an INF agreement, provided that there is effective

12 verification and constraints on shorter-range systems; but I

13 shall leave Gorbachev in no doubt that negotiations on one

14 category of armaments will ~~inevitably~~ ^{be above all conventional forces} have consequences for the

15 balance in other areas which must be addressed.

16

17 ^{intend to make clear} I shall ~~also tell~~ Gorbachev that prospects for arms control

18 will also depend on increased confidence in East/West relations.

19 ~~semi colon~~ This in turn will require changes in the Soviet

20 Union's internal policies as well as in its behaviour

21 internationally. Speeches are not enough: we shall ^{want to see} require

22 ~~actions~~ ^{leads}.

23

24 I shall ^{raise} ~~press him~~ on human rights issues (on which the Twelve

25 have been making useful headway at Vienna under the Belgian

26 Presidency).

27

28 I shall put to Gorbachev ~~very strongly~~ ^{with demand} our view that Soviet

29 ~~departure~~ ^{will be a test of his intentions} from Afghanistan is a key issue and I shall try to

30 ~~establish how serious he is about achieving this.~~ It is helpful

31 that the Belgian Presidency has kept up the pressure from the

32 Twelve on Afghanistan, and has arranged a protest after the

33 recent bombing of civilian refugees in Pakistan.

34

base myself on

do not diminish our security

be above all conventional forces

intend to make clear

want to see

leads

raise

with demand

will be a test of his intentions

For distribution order see Page	Catchword: I
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OUT TELEGRAM (CONT)

Classification
CONFIDENTIAL

Caveat

Precedence
IMMEDIATE

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1 <<<<

2 I expect to give an interview on Soviet television and to
3 have a speech published in the Soviet press. Apart from Moscow,
4 I hope to visit Zagorsk and Tbilisi.

5
6 I am conscious of ^{the wide} ~~partners~~ interest in this visit, which
7 comes at a very interesting moment in Soviet affairs. ~~I am glad~~
8 ~~that~~ Geoffrey Howe will have an early opportunity to brief
9 his European Community colleagues at Corsendonk.

11 Yours sincerely
12 Margaret Thatcher

13 Ends

15 HOWE

18 YYYY

19 MAIN

20 MR RATFORD

21 MR RENWICK

22 MR FALL

23 ECD(E)

24 SOVIET D

25 DEFENCE D

26 WED

27 PLANNING STAFF

28 ACDD

29 NEWS D


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
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Catchword:



I WANT TO LET YOU KNOW HOW I AM APPROACHING MY VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION WHICH STARTS ON SATURDAY. ~~T WIFE~~ B

I WANT FIRST TO MAKE MY OWN ASSESSMENT OF HOW SERIOUS GORBACHEV IS ABOUT INTERNAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING; AND WHAT IMPACT THIS WILL HAVE ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. ~~THE SOVIET UNION'S WEAK ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE MUST BE PUSHING HIM TOWARDS CHANGE. BUT I AM SCEPTICAL WHETHER HE IS REALLY ABLE TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS, OR FULLY UNDERSTANDS WHAT IS NEEDED. PEOPLE WHO HAVE ONLY LIVED UNDER COMMUNISM FIND IT DIFFICULT TO COMPREHEND THE WORKINGS OF THE FREE MARKET ECONOMY.~~

I SHALL MAKE CLEAR THAT THE WEST DOES NOT WANT TO MAKE CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION MORE DIFFICULT. FAR FROM IT: IT IS ONLY WHEN THEY START TO TREAT THEIR OWN PEOPLE DECENTLY AND IMPLEMENT THE FREEDOMS CONFIRMED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT THAT WE SHALL BE ABLE TO DEVELOP THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE WHICH ARE NECESSARY FOR A MORE PEACEFUL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION. BUT WE SHALL NOT JUDGE THEM ON THE BASIS OF WHAT THEY SAY THEY WILL DO; WE SHALL WANT TO SEE ACTUAL RESULTS.

I SHALL REMIND HIM THAT ALTHOUGH DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES ARE SLOW TO DO BATTLE, HE SHOULD NOT DOUBT OUR DETERMINATION TO RETAIN STRONG DEFENCES BASED ON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. NOR SHOULD HE BE UNDER ANY ILLUSION THAT HE CAN SEPARATE EUROPE FROM THE UNITED STATES. ~~I MADE A POINT OF VISITING PRESIDENT MITTERRAND AND CHANCELLOR KOHL EARLIER THIS WEEK TO UNDERLINE WESTERN SOLIDARITY.~~

I SHALL BE HAVING SEVERAL HOURS OF TALKS WITH GORBACHEV IN A VERY RESTRICTED CIRCLE. IN THESE MEETINGS I PROPOSE TO PRESS HIM ON HUMAN RIGHTS - IN PARTICULAR THE RELEASE OF DISSIDENTS, AND END TO THE ABUSE OF PSYCHIATRY, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, AND JEWISH EMIGRATION. **THE TWELVE HAVE BEEN MAKING USEFUL HEADWAY ON THESE ISSUES AT VIENNA UNDER THE BELGIAN PRESIDENCY.**

ON REGIONAL ISSUES I INTEND TO FOCUS ON AFGHANISTAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST. ON AFGHANISTAN I SHALL TRY TO CONVINCE HIM THAT THE ONLY CHANCE FOR A SOLUTION LIES IN THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND GENUINE SELF-DETERMINATION, POSSIBLY WITH SOME SORT OF NEUTRAL STATUS FOR AFGHANISTAN, WHICH COULD BE ON THE MODEL OF THE AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY. I SHALL MAKE CLEAR THAT WE WOULD NOT EXPLOIT A SETTLEMENT AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION, **BUT THAT WITHDRAWAL WILL BE A TEST**

OF THEIR WIDER INTENTIONS. }

WE ARE BOUND TO SPEND MOST TIME ON ARMS CONTROL. MY AIM WILL BE TO GET GORBACHEV TO ACCEPT IN PRACTICE, IF NOT FORMALLY, **(PRIORITIES** ~~THE PRIORITIES WHICH YOU AND I IDENTIFIED AT CAMP DAVID LAST NOVEMBER AND WHICH OUR NATO COLLEAGUES ENDORSED A FEW WEEKS LATER.~~ **IN DECEMBER** ~~I WILL PRESS HIM HARD TO ACCEPT YOUR PROPOSAL FOR THE~~ **THE** HALVING STRATEGIC WEAPONS OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, AND TO REACH AGREEMENT ON LONGER-RANGE INF. I SHALL MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO ENDORSE **AN** ~~AN~~ INF AGREEMENT ON WHICH YOU AND THE RUSSIANS ARE NOW WORKING, PROVIDED OUR CONDITIONS ON VERIFICATION AND SHORTER-RANGE SYSTEMS ARE SATISFIED. BUT I SHALL STRESS THAT WE DO NOT SEE AN INF AGREEMENT AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS A DE-NUCLEARISED EUROPE, AND SHALL UNDERLINE THE NEED FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO DEAL WITH SOVIET CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY. **AN AGREEMENT**

MUST NOT DIMINISH OUR SECURITY.

THERE WILL PROBABLY BE DISCUSSION OF A CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN.
I WILL MAKE IT CLEAR THAT ~~NO AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED WITHOUT~~
~~YOUR ENDORSEMENT - AND THAT~~ THE RUSSIANS HAVE TO CONVINCE US THAT
THEY ARE TRULY INTERESTED IN A COMPREHENSIVE BAN WITH AN
EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION REGIME.

I HAVE NO EXAGGERATED EXPECTATIONS AND AM NOT LOOKING FOR ANY
AGREEMENTS. (OTHER THAN SOME MINOR BILATERAL ACCORDS WHICH WILL
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GETTING THE RUSSIANS TO BEHAVE LESS AGGRESSIVELY. I SHALL BE
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I AM CONSCIOUS OF THE WIDE
INTEREST ~~IN~~ THIS VISIT, WHICH
COMES AT AN INTERESTING MOMENT IN
SOVIET AFFAIRS. GEOFFREY HOWE WILL
HAVE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF
HIS EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES
AT CORSENDONK.

I am writing in similar
terms to Rued Lubbers / Bettino Craxi.