

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST &amp; US/SOVIET RELATIONS

PS(4)  
PS/MRS CHALKER  
PS/LADY YOUNGMR POWELL ~~NO.10~~ DOWNING STREET

PS/MR RENTON

MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P)

PS/PUS

NPS

MR THOMAS

DACU

MR BOYD

CDI

MOD

MR RATFORD

MR FALL

MR FEARN

ADVANCE COPY  
IMMEDIATE

HD/DEFENCE DEPT

**Secret**

HD/ACDD


HD/SOVIET DEPT

PLEASE ADD HD/NAD IF EAST/WEST DIST

~~RESIDENT CLERK~~

19.11.8

GRS 1300



SECRET

FM UKDEL NATO

TO DESKBY 271530Z FCO

TELNO 146

OF 271359Z MARCH 87

INFO IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

INFO PRIORITY WASHINGTON, PARIS, BONN, BRUSSELS, UKDEL CSCE VIENNA

INFO PRIORITY ROME, MODUK

INFO SAYING TOKYO, PEKING, UKDIS GENEVA

MODUK FOR DACU

SCG, 27 MARCH

## SUMMARY

1. US BELIEVE GORBACHEV WANTS INF AGREEMENT BY AUTUMN. INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA BUT NO NEW MAJOR MOVES. SCG FOCUS ON SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS. SOVIET AIMS UNCLEAR BUT OBVIOUS RETROGRADE STEP, IN SEPARATING THEM FROM LRINF. TO BE FIRMLY RESISTED BY ALLIANCE. WEST ALSO NEEDS TO ESTABLISH RESPONSE TO ANY SOVIET OFFER OF ZERO DOWN TO 500 KM. MILITARY ADVICE SHOULD BE ACCELERATED. RISKS OF WHOLESAL DE-NUCLEARISATION NOW OR LATER FULLY RECOGNISED.
2. BLUNT GERMAN STATEMENT OF RESERVATIONS OVER US OPTION TO CONVERT PERSHING.
3. CONTENT OF FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS TO BE CONSIDERED FURTHER, UK TO PROVIDE QUINT WITH NON-PAPER ON POSSIBLE PRINCIPLES.

## DETAIL

4. GLITMAN REPORTED TO THE QUINT ON THE STATE OF PLAY IN GENEVA. THERE HAD BEEN INTENSIVE ACTIVITY IN 3 GROUPS, BUT STILL NO FULL SOVIET DRAFT TREATY, NOR SPECIFICS ON VERIFICATION OR REDUCTIONS. THE US EXPECTED, AND WOULD WELCOME, A SOVIET DRAFT TREATY DURING THE NEXT ROUND. THE RUSSIANS WERE PURSUING A TWO-TRACK APPROACH:

NEXT ROUND. THE RUSSIANS WERE PURSUING A TWO-TRACK APPROACH: SERIOUS APPLICATION WITHIN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND A SERIOUS PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN OUTSIDE.

5. ON LRINF THE REYKJAVIK DEAL REMAINED INTACT. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD PRESS THE RUSSIANS FOR GLOBAL ELIMINATION. GLITMAN EMPHASISED THAT THERE WERE A HOST OF DETAILED ISSUES STILL BE RESOLVED, WHICH WOULD TAKE TIME. ALLIED UNITY WOULD REMAIN CRUCIAL.

6. ON SRINF, THE SOVIET POSITION WAS EVIDENTLY IN FLUX, AND THEIR NEGOTIATORS UNABLE TO ELABORATE ON GORBACHEV'S 28 FEBRUARY STATEMENT. IN EFFECT, THE RUSSIANS HAD TAKEN SRINF OFF THE PRESENT TABLE AND REFUSED TO DEFINE HOW THESE SYSTEMS SHOULD BE HANDLED ELSEWHERE. THERE WERE CLEAR SIGNS THAT THEY CONTINUED TO PLAY WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF OFFERING REDUCTIONS TO ZERO IN ALL INF SYSTEMS DOWN TO THE SS23 RANGE (AROUND 500KM), (ALTHOUGH KARPOV'S ORIGINAL OFFER ON 3 MARCH HAD BEEN DISAVOWED AT THE TIME BY VORONTSOV). THEY WERE ALSO MAKING GREAT PLAY WITH THEIR OPPOSITION TO A US OPTION TO CONVERT PERSHING 41 TO PERSHING 1B. GLITMAN EMPHASISED THAT THE BASIC ISSUES WERE THE US RIGHT TO EQUALITY AND THE US OBLIGATION TO IMPLEMENT REQUIRED REDUCTIONS. HOW THE US EXERCISED THESE WAS NOT THE CONCERN OF THE RUSSIANS.

7. GLITMAN CONCLUDED THAT ON SRINF THE RUSSIANS COULD EITHER STICK TO THEIR 28 FEBRUARY POSITION, OR RETURN TO THEIR FREEZE PROPOSAL WITH SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS ON SUCH SYSTEMS. THE ALLIANCE MUST DRIVE THEM OFF EITHER POSITION. EQUALLY, THEY MIGHT RESURFACE THE OFFER TO REDUCE SS22 AND 23 TO ZERO. ANY OR ALL OF THESE POSITIONS MIGHT EMERGE DURING THE PRIME MINISTER'S AND SHULTZ'S VISITS TO MOSCOW.

8. IN DISCUSSIONS, THE QUINT REVIEWED POINTS AGREED AT THE HEADS OF DELEGATION DINNER THE PREVIOUS EVENING:

A) THAT THE SRINF PROBLEM MUST BE RESOLVED WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE PRESENT LRINF NEGOTIATIONS, IE WITH CONCURRENT CONSTRAINTS. THE DEFERRMENT OF A SOLUTION WAS UNACCEPTABLE.

B) AN OFFER OF ZERO DOWN TO 500 KM WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY LIKELY. CONCEPTUALLY IT HAD MORE RELEVANCE TO LRINF SYSTEMS THAN TO THE BALANCE BELOW 500 KM, WHICH WAS TIGHTLY LINKED TO CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

C) ELIMINATING ALL INF SYSTEMS ABOVE 500 KM WOULD CUT MUCH MORE DEEPLY INTO SOVIET THAN WESTERN FORCES. THE NLG SHOULD CONSIDER URGENTLY THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH A STEP. THE SCG WOULD ALSO NEED TO REACH A POSITION SOON.

D) WHETHER OR NOT THE RUSSIANS MADE SUCH AN OFFER, NATO SHOULD STICK TO OUR INSISTENCE ON CONCURRENT CONSTRAINTS, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO PERSHING CONVERSION AS A WAY OF ACHIEVING EQUALITY.

E) THE CLEAR RISKS INHERENT IN A PROCESS OF WHOLESALE DE-NUCLEARISATION MUST BE AVOIDED.

9. IT WAS AGREED THAT MORE MILITARY ADVICE WAS NEEDED IN THE NEAR FUTURE, TO ALLOW A US POSITION FOR THE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS TO BE ACHIEVED. EVEN PRIOR TO THAT, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO BEGIN ELABORATING SOME PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD GUIDE THE ALLIANCE IN SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS. AT THE US SUGGESTION, PAKENHAM (UK) AGREED THAT WE WOULD PREPARE A NON-PAPER ON SUCH PRINCIPLES AS A FIRST STEP IN THIS PROCESS.

10. ON PERSHING CONVERSION, HARTMANN (FRG) INDICATED GERMAN SENSITIVITIES. HE SUGGESTED THE US EMPHASISED THEIR RIGHT TO GLOBAL EQUALITY RATHER THEIR NEED FOR CONVERSION. IN REPLY GLITMAN POINTED OUT THAT WITHOUT A US DECISION TO CONVERT ON THEIR OWN BEHALF, IT MIGHT PROVE IMPOSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN THE PRACTICAL BACK-UP FOR CONTINUED (NEXT WORD UNDERLINED) GERMAN DEPLOYMENTS. AT THE SAME TIME DEMANDS FOR EQUALITY HAD TO BE HANDLED CAREFULLY, SINCE THESE COULD BE EXPLOITED BY THE RUSSIANS TO INSIST ON ZERO ACROSS THE

TIME DEMANDS FOR EQUALITY HAD TO BE HANDLED CAREFULLY, SINCE THESE COULD BE EXPLOITED BY THE RUSSIANS TO INSIST ON ZERO ACROSS THE BOARD.

11. IN FURTHER DISCUSSION, THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT A SOVIET OFFER OF ZERO DOWN TO 500 KM WOULD BE HARD TO REFUSE, SO LONG AS IT WAS GLOBAL. THE SITUATION BELOW 500 KM WAS VERY DIFFERENT. A GOOD DEAL MORE MILITARY ANALYSIS OF NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS BELOW THAT LEVEL WAS NEEDED, TO INCLUDE CONVENTIONAL FACTORS. A DIRECT LINKAGE BETWEEN THE NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL BALANCE WOULD BE NEEDED AT SOME POINT. THE ALLIANCE REQUIRED A WELL-DOCUMENTED PUBLIC CASE ON INF. THE RUSSIANS WERE MAKING A MAJOR PROPAGANDA EFFORT TO JUSTIFY THEIR BACK-SLIDING ON CONCURRENT CONSTRAINTS FOR SRINF. THE WEST MUST HIGN BACK HARD, AND CONVINCE THEM (AS WE HAD WITH THE INF/SDI LINKAGE) THAT THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE.

12. IN THE SG PLENARY, HOLMES (STATE DEPARTMENT) UNDERLINED THE SUCCESS FOR ALLIED UNITY IN SECURING THE INF DECOUPLING FROM SDI, AND WELCOMED THE COLLABORATION ON VERIFICATION. GLITMAN REPEATED HIS EARLIER REPORT. THE SCG AGREED THAT WE SHOULD STICK TO THE DEMAND FOR CONCURRENT SRINF CONSTRAINTS, AND THAT WE MUST DECIDE HOW TO HANDLE A SOVIET OFFER TO ELIMINATE ALL SYSTEMS DOWN TO SS23.

13. A NUMBER OF ALLIES EMPHASISED THE NEED FOR URGENT MILITARY ADVICE, AND PRESSED SHAPE TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY INPUT TO THE HLG. ADMIRAL HOWE (MILITARY COMMITTEE) SAID THAT ADVICE WOULD BE PROVIDED AS SOUGHT. BUT AT THE MAY WPG THIS WOULD FOCUS LARGELY ON THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF LRINF REDUCTIONS AND 50 PERCENT CUTS IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS. IT WOULD NOT PERHAPS COVER THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ELIMINATION OF ALL SYSTEMS DOWN TO THE SS23. THIS MIGHT TAKE LONGER TO PROVIDE. HOLMES REFLECTED WIDESPREAD CONCERN AT THIS TIMESCALE. HOWE NOTED THE CONSENSUS WISH THAT THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES SHOULD ACCELERATE THEIR ANALYSIS.

14. ON PERSHING CONVERSION, GLITMAN THEN REVEALED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN ASKED IN GENEVA IF THEY WOULD ACCEPT A US RIGHT TO EQUALITY PROVIDED THE US GAVE UP THE CONVERSION OPTION. THERE HAD BEEN NO SOVIET RESPONSE. GLITMAN EMPHASISED THAT THE ISSUE WAS BOGUS, AND A SOVIET SUBTERFUGE TO PREVENT THE US ACHIEVING ANY SRINF SYSTEMS IN EUROPE. IN RESPONSE (AND, WE UNDERSTAND, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM GENSCHER) HARTMANN READ OUT PART OF A 14 FEBRUARY 1986 LETTER FROM KOHL TO REAGAN, IN WHICH THE FORMER HAD STATED: QUOTE SUCH A REQUEST (TO CONVERT PERSHING II TO PERSHING IB) WOULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD BY GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION, AND WOULD RISK CASTING DOUBT ON THE ALLIED COMMITMENT TO THE DUAL TRACK INF DECISIONS UNQUOTE. (WE LEARNED PRIVATELY FROM THE AMERICANS THAT THEY INTERPRETED THIS AS REFERRING ONLY TO AN ACTUAL (UNDERLINED) REQUEST TO CONVERT, AND THEY STILL WERE ANXIOUS TO PRESERVE THE RIGHT TO DO SO AS A POTENTIAL MEANS OF ACHIEVING EQUALITY. GLITMAN WOULD DISCUSS THE ISSUE FURTHER IN BONN ON 30 MARCH.)

15. THE INTELLIGENCE UPDATE PROVIDED USEFUL DETAILS OF SOVIET SR/SNF SYSTEMS. THERE HAD BEEN NO NEW DEVELOPMENTS. HOLMES REFERRED TO THE NAC BRIEFING ON 16 APRIL ON THE SHULTZ VISIT TO MOSCOW. THE NEXT SCG WOULD BE SCHEDULED THEREAFTER.

16. SUBSEQUENTLY GLITMAN GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE ON THE BASIS OF AN AGREED SCG STATEMENT. TEXT IN MIFT.

17. ADVANCE COPIES TO PS/SOFS, FALL, ACDD, PS/NO 10.  
PIKE