


CAMBODIA/VIETNAM

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7.11.85



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FM MOSCOW

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 542

OF 010645Z MARCH

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, PEKING, HANOI, ASEAN POSTS

*Summary only.*

FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MIPT (NOT TO ALL): SECRETARY OF STATE'S DINNER WITH SHEVARDNAZDE,  
 31 MARCH: CAMBODIA

## SUMMARY

1. SECRETARY OF STATE PRESSES SOVIET UNION TO EXERT INFLUENCE  
 IN VIETNAM TO WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM CAMBODIA. SHEVARDNAZDE MAINTAINS  
 SOVIET UNION COULD NOT DO THIS EFFECTIVELY EVEN IF IT WANTED TO,  
 BUT CLAIMS TO SEE SIGNS OF A POTENTIAL SETTLEMENT EMERGING.

## DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THE CHINESE HAD MADE IT  
 CLEAR THAT THE VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION OF CAMBODIA WAS THE MAIN  
 OBSTACLE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS. HE COULD NOT  
 UNDERSTAND WHAT THE RUSSIANS GAINED FROM IT. THEIR SUPPORT FOR  
 VIETNAM WAS COSTING THEM ENORMOUS SUMS: IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO  
 SEE A MORE SETTLED FUTURE FOR CAMBODIA WITHOUT A VIETNAMESE  
 WITHDRAWAL. WHY COULD THE RUSSIANS NOT EXERT MORE INFLUENCE  
 ON VIETNAM?

3. SHEVARDNAZDE SAID THAT HE HAD HAD EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS  
 DURING HIS RECENT TOUR TO AUSTRALIA, ASEAN COUNTRIES AND  
 INDONESIA. HE ADDED A LITTLE ACIDLY THAT THE AUSTRALIANS HAD  
 BEEN MORE INTERESTED IN PERESTROIKA THAN CAMBODIA. (HE ALSO  
 ADDED IN PARENTHESES THAT HE HAD BEEN VERY IMPRESSED WITH  
 AUSTRALIA).

4. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THERE WAS LITTLE THE SOVIET UNION  
 COULD DO TO INFLUENCE VIETNAM. IT WAS NOT AS SIMPLE AS WE AND THE  
 CHINESE MAINTAINED. THE VIETNAMESE HAD COMMITMENTS TO CAMBODIA.  
 THE SOVIET UNION HAD FOR HISTORICAL REASONS A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP  
 WITH VIETNAM, BUT THEY CERTAINLY COULD NOT AFFORD THE LUXURY OF  
 PRESSURING THEM, AND EVEN IF THEY DID IT WOULD BE UNEFFECTIVE.  
 THE VIETNAMESE MADE UP THEIR OWN MINDS, AS THE AMERICANS HAD  
 FOUND OUT. THE VIETNAMESE DID NOT WANT TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS.

THE SOVIET UNION HAD FOR HISTORICAL REASONS A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH VIETNAM, BUT THEY CERTAINLY COULD NOT AFFORD THE LUXURY OF PRESSURING THEM, AND EVEN IF THEY DID IT WOULD BE INEFFECTIVE. THE VIETNAMESE MADE UP THEIR OWN MINDS, AS THE AMERICANS HAD FOUND OUT. THE VIETNAMESE DID NOT WANT TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS. THE CAMBODIAN LEADERSHIP WERE READY TO MAKE A SERIOUS EFFORT TO ACHIEVE NATIONAL ACCORD AND WERE READY TO COOPERATE WITH THE OPPOSITION GROUPS, INCLUDING Sihanouk, BUT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF POL POT. THE LATTER POINT WAS UNDERSTANDABLE: THE MUSEUM OF POL POT CRIMES WHICH HE HAD SEEN IN CAMBODIA MADE ANYTHING THE NAZIS HAD DONE IN EUROPE LOOK LIKE CHILD'S PLAY.

5. HE MIGHT BE OVER-OPTIMISTIC, BUT HE HAD DERIVED AN IMPRESSION IN INDONESIA, THAILAND AND HINDO-CHINA THAT THERE WERE SOME OUTLINES EMERGING OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WHICH BOTH ASEAN AND THE HINDO-CHINESE COULD SUPPORT. NOT EVERYONE HAD AN INTEREST IN SUPPORTING THIS, AND IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE WITH THE PROCESS. THE PROCESS OF ACHIEVING A NATIONAL CONSENSUS WOULD HAVE TO START BEFORE VIETNAMESE TROOPS LEFT, AND CONTINUE AFTER THEY HAD GONE.

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID WE WERE ENGAGED IN SEVERAL WAYS. THE CONTINUING ECONOMIC FAILURE OF VIETNAM LED TO REFUGEES ARRIVING IN HONG KONG. WE ALSO BECAME INVOLVED IN THE REFUGEE PROBLEM ON THE THAI BORDER. AND AS PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WE HAD A STRONG INTEREST IN REMOVING THE CAUSE OF THIS FESTERING SORE. WE HAD NO BRIEF FOR POL POT. CAMBODIA NEEDED TO FIND ITS OWN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT, WHICH THE PRESENCE OF VIETNAMESE FORCES MADE MORE DIFFICULT. HE COULD SEE THE SOVIET INTEREST IN VIETNAM, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE CAM RANH BASE, WHICH HE COULD UNDERSTAND THAT THE RUSSIANS WISHED TO KEEP. BUT THE COST TO THE SOVIET UNION OF SUPPORTING THE VIETNAMESE ECONOMY, AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH CHINA LOOKED TO US DISPROPORTIONATE.

7. SHEVARDNAZDE ROSE STRONGLY TO THE MENTION OF CAM RANH, SAYING THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS SURROUNDED BY FOREIGN BASES AND COULD SURELY HAVE JUST ONE OF ITS OWN. HE CONTINUED THAT THE CAMBODIAN SITUATION COULD NOT BE SOLVED OVERNIGHT. THE REASONS FOR THE IMPOVERISHED VIETNAMESE ECONOMY WERE WELL KNOWN TO EVERYONE. WE SHOULD ESTABLISH A BETTER DIALOGUE WITH HANOI. BUT IN THE END THE CAMBODIAN PROBLEM COULD ONLY BE RESOLVED BY THE COUNTRIES IN THE REGION.

8. IN A RATHER REPETITIVE DISCUSSION THE SECRETARY OF STATE REFERRED TO THE LONG HISTORY OF THE VIETNAMESE CONFLICT, AND REPEATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WITH ITS CLOSE INVOLVEMENT IN THE AREA OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO BRING SOME INFLUENCE TO BEAR. SHEVARDNAZDE CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN THAT THIS WAS NOT PRACTICAL POLITICS: THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO MORE INFLUENCE VIETNAM THAT WE COULD INFLUENCE SOUTH AFRICA, IN SPITE OF OUR CLOSE TIES WITH THAT COUNTRY. OUTSIDE POWERS COULD ONLY HELP THE COUNTRIES IN THE REGION TO REACH AGREEMENT AMONG THEMSELVES. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HAD NOT RAISED THIS ISSUE PURELY IN ORDER TO BE CRITICAL OF THE SOVIET UNION, BUT IN AN EFFORT TO FIND SOME COMMON PERCEPTION OF A HUMANITARIAN PROBLEM WHICH HAD GONE ON FAR TOO LONG. HE WOULD LIKE TO COME BACK TO IT ON ANOTHER OCCASION, AND MEANWHILE LOOKED FORWARD TO HIS OWN VISIT TO THE REGION.

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FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

## SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALKS WITH SHEVARDNADZE

1. SHEVARDNADZE GAVE SMALL WORKING DINNER FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN PARALLEL WITH GORBACHEV'S RESTRICTED DINNER FOR THE PRIME MINISTER. REGIONAL AGENDA COMPLETED, WITH DISCUSSION OF SINO/SOVIET, THE TWO KOREAS, VIETNAM/CAMBODIA, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ON THE SUBCONTINENT, AND AFGHANISTAN (FOR WHICH SEE MY 5 LIFTS, COPIED TO VARIOUS POSTS). LITTLE GAVE ON SUBSTANCE BUT CANDID AND SERIOUS EXCHANGES. SHEVARDNADZE'S INVITATION TO SECRETARY OF STATE TO VISIT THE SOVIET UNION CONFIRMED AND ACCEPTED. NO DATES DISCUSSED.
2. SHEVARDNADZE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT DISCUSSIONS OVER TWO DAYS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD BEEN INTENSIVE AND INTERESTING. THERE WERE WIDE DIVERGENCES BUT COMMON INTERESTS HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED. THE SERIES OF FOREIGN MINISTER MEETINGS MUST CONTINUE. A CALM AND PRODUCTIVE ATMOSPHERE HAD BEEN CREATED IN WHICH DIFFICULT ISSUES COULD BE ADDRESSED.
3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AGREED WHEN HE BECAME FOREIGN SECRETARY THE PRIME MINISTER AND HE HAD SET AS THEIR MOST IMPORTANT TASK THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. THERE WERE STILL LARGE DIFFERENCES, SOME DUE TO FAILURE TO SEE THE TRUTH ABOUT THE OTHER SIDE, OTHERS MORE SERIOUS THAN THAT. BUT THEY HAD MADE A START IN LOOKING FOR COMMON GROUND.
4. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TOOK ADVANTAGE OF CONCLUDING COURTESIES TO ASK FOR SOVIET HELP IN ARRANGING THE STUDY VISIT TO SIBERIA OF AN EXPERT IN THE MIGRATORY HABITS OF BEWICK SWANS. HE ASKED ALSO / THAT

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THAT FAVOURABLE CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO A REQUEST BY THE  
BRITISH NATIONAL RAILWAY MUSEUM FOR AN ANTIQUE SOVIET LOCOMOTIVE.  
SHEVARDNADZE AGREED TO LOOK INTO THESE REQUESTS, WHICH THE EMBASSY  
WILL FOLLOW UP.

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TELNO 541

OF 010630Z APRIL 87

INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, UKDEL NATO, SEOUL, TOKYO, PEKING

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

MIPT (NOT TO ALL): SECRETARY OF STATE'S DINNER WITH SHEVARDNADZE,  
31 MARCH: KOREA

## SUMMARY

1. SECRETARY OF STATE DELIVERS PRESIDENT CHUN'S MESSAGE. SHEVARDNADZE UNRECEPTIVE ON JOINT ENTRY TO UN, SUGGESTS PROGRESS ON DIALOGUE AND JOINT STAGING OF OLYMPIC GAMES. SHEVARDNADZE APPARENTLY SEEKING TO PERSUADE HIMSELF THAT NORTH KOREA WHOLY TO FOLLOW SOUTH KOREA ECONOMICALLY.

## DETAIL

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ENCOURAGING THE TWO KOREAS TO DEVELOP BETTER RELATIONS. THE SOUTH KOREAN FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO HAD RECENTLY BEEN IN LONDON, HAD ASKED US TO CONVEY A MESSAGE FROM THE SOUTH KOREAN PRESIDENT THAT SOUTH KOREA WISHED TO HAVE BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE NORTH, AND A SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF PROBLEMS ON THE OLYMPIC GAMES. THE PRESIDENT THOUGHT THAT THE BEST PROSPECT WOULD BE TO FIND A WAY FOR BOTH SOUTH AND NORTH TO ENTER THE UN AT THE SAME TIME. HE WISHED US TO CONVEY HIS WISH FOR CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE NORTH. FOR OUR PART, ALTHOUGH WE WERE FAR DISTANT, WE HAD A CLOSE INTEREST IN RESOLVING THIS POSSIBLE SOURCE OF TENSION.

3. SHEVARDNADZE REPLIED THAT SOVIET CONTACTS WITH NORTH KOREA WERE FAIRLY CLOSE, THOUGH THEY HAD FEW WITH THE SOUTH. THE NORTH KOREAN OBJECTIVE REMAINED REUNIFICATION. THEY WERE PREPARED FOR DIALOGUE, AND HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT A MEETING BETWEEN THE TWO PRIME MINISTERS WAS IMMINENT TO DISCUSS THE RAFT OF PROBLEMS WHICH HAD ACCUMULATED. THE NORTH KOREANS THOUGHT THAT FOR BOTH COUNTRIES TO ENTER THE UN WOULD PERPETUATE THE PRESENT DIVISION. THE RUSSIANS HAD SOME SYMPATHY WITH THIS POINT OF VIEW. HE THOUGHT THAT AN ARRANGEMENT FOR JOINT STAGING OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES BY THE TWO COUNTRIES WITH SOME EVENTS TAKING PLACE IN PYONGYANG MIGHT BE HELPFUL. IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF THE UK COULD SUPPORT THIS IDEA, AS MANY OTHERS ALREADY DID. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF THIS GOING ON. IT WOULD BE A NICE CHANGE IF SPORT FOR ONCE DIMINISHED INTERNATIONAL TENSION RATHER THAN INCREASING IT.

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4. SHEVARDNADZE MAINTAINED THAT THE PRESENCE OF US TROOPS WAS A SERIOUS OBSTACLE IN THE WAY OF RECONCILIATION. SOUTH KOREA HAD A LARGER POPULATION THAN THE NORTH AND MUCH LARGER ARMED FORCES, AS WELL AS A STRONG ECONOMY. THE NORTH WAS WEAKER IN POPULATION, TROOP NUMBERS AND EQUIPMENT. THERE WAS NO REASON FOR A CONTINUING US PRESENCE OF 40,000 MEN AND BASES. IF THEY WENT THE TWO KOREAS MIGHT FIND COMMON GROUND. IN PRACTICE HE THOUGHT THERE WAS LITTLE PROSPECT OF THIS. THE BEST WAY FORWARD IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE MIGHT BE A JOINT EFFORT ON THE OLYMPIC GAMES AND THE PROMOTION OF HIGH LEVEL DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT THINGS LOOKED VERY DIFFERENT FROM THE OTHER SIDE OF THE BORDER. WHEN HE HAD VISITED PAN JUM JOM, HE HAD FELT THE COLD WAR AS NEVER BEFORE. THE SOUTH KOREANS WANTED US TROOPS TO STAY BECAUSE OF THEIR VIVID MEMORIES OF INVASION FROM THE NORTH, WHICH HAD LED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE TO THE INTRODUCTION OF UN TROOPS. BUT HE WOULD CONVEY THE SOVIET REACTION TO THE SOUTH KOREANS.

6. THE SECRETARY OF STATE COMMENTED ON THE PROSPERITY OF SOUTH KOREA. SHEVARDNADZE AGREED THAT IT WAS IMPRESSIVE. HOWEVER HE HAD RECENTLY VISITED NORTH KOREA AFTER A 15 YEAR GAP AND SAW SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS THERE AS WELL. IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THAT THEY HAD TO SPEND SO MUCH ON ARMS WHICH COULD BE BETTER SPENT ELSEWHERE. NORTH KOREA DID NOT HAVE THE BENEFIT OF US TAXPAYERS MONEY, OR EXPENDITURE BY FOREIGN TROOPS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE COMMENTED ON SOVIET ARMS SUPPLIES TO NORTH KOREA, TO WHICH SHEVARDNADZE RESPONDED THAT THE NORTH KOREANS HAD TO PAY IN FULL FOR THEM.

7. SUMMING UP, SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT A STEP BY STEP APPROACH SEEMED RIGHT. THERE WAS UNLIKELY TO BE SWEEPING CHANGE OVERNIGHT. JUST HAVING A HIGH LEVEL DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO WAS ALREADY SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS. THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD DENG XIAOPING SPECULATE ABOUT THE USE OF HIS ONE COUNTRY TWO SYSTEMS IN RELATION TO KOREA. THIS MIGHT BE EASIER TO STATE THAN ACHIEVE. SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT HE DID NOT RULE IT OUT. BUT ONLY THE KOREANS THEMSELVES COULD REACH AGREEMENT. HE ADVISED THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO VISIT NORTH KOREA. THE SECRETARY OF

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STATE SAID HURRIEDLY THAT HE THOUGHT THERE WAS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF THIS.

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