

SUBJECT  
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PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T 61A/87  
CONFIDENTIAL

*Done by 304*  
*J. G. plan*  
*2. p. (Paris visit)*

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OCMIAN 6217  
CONFIDENTIAL  
ZZ BONNN  
ZZ PARIS  
ZZ BREMB  
ZZ THHAG  
DD 031430Z BRNAT  
FM FCOLN TO BONNN  
031330Z APR  
GRS 1111

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ESB 027/1	
RECEIVED	
10 APR 1987	

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FM FCO  
TO FLASH BONN  
TELNO 211  
OF 031330Z APRIL 87  
AND TO FLASH PARIS, BRUSSELS, THE HAGUE ROME  
INFO DESKBY 031430Z WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, UKDEL NATO

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW : MESSAGES TO EUROPEAN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT.

1. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO KOHL, MITTERRAND, MARTENS, LUBBERS AND CRAXI AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TODAY. NO (REPEAT NO) SIGNED ORIGINALS WILL FOLLOW.
2. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE MESSAGES TO KOHL AND MITTERRAND, WHICH SHOULD BE HEADED QUOTE DEAR HELMUT UNQUOTE AND QUOTE DEAR PRESIDENT MITTERRAND UNQUOTE, THE MESSAGES SHOULD BE HEADED QUOTE DEAR PRIME MINISTER UNQUOTE. THE ENDING SHOULD BE QUOTE WITH BEST WISHES, YOURS SINCERELY, MARGARET THATCHER UNQUOTE, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE MESSAGE TO KOHL, ON WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER'S SURNAME SHOULD BE OMITTED.

BEGINS. I WANTED TO LET YOU HAVE STRAIGHT AWAY MY IMPRESSIONS

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FROM MY VISIT TO MOSCOW. SIR GEOFFREY HOWE WILL BE ABLE TO GIVE HIS EUROPEAN COMMUNITY COLLEAGUES A MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT THIS WEEKEND AT CORSENDONK. OUR PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AT NATO BRIEFED HIS COLLEAGUES YESTERDAY.

(FOR MITTERRAND AND KOHL ONLY : IT WAS IMMENSELY USEFUL TO HAVE DISCUSSED THE VISIT WITH YOU A FEW DAYS BEFOREHAND. I WAS ABLE TO SPEAK TO GORBACHEV IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT MY MESSAGE REFLECTED THE VERY LARGE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN US ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL.)

(FOR MARTENS, LUBBERS AND CRAXI ONLY: IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO BE ABLE TO SPEAK TO GORBACHEV IN THE KNOWLEDGE THAT MY MESSAGE REFLECTED THE BROAD CONSENSUS AMONG THE WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL.)

(FOR ALL:) MY VERY EXTENSIVE TALKS WITH GORBACHEV EXTENDING OVER SOME TWELVE HOURS COVERED THE PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENTS ON REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND A BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR TWO POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND THEIR WIDE CONSEQUENCES: GORBACHEV'S PROGRAMME OF RESTRUCTURING OF SOVIET SOCIETY AND THE SOVIET ECONOMY: REGIONAL PROBLEMS: AND HUMAN RIGHTS. THEY WERE VERY FRANK. I THINK THAT WILL HAVE DONE GOOD.

I WANTED TO MAKE MY OWN ASSESSMENT OF HOW SERIOUS GORBACHEV IS ABOUT INTERNAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING. ON THE CLEAR EVIDENCE OF OUR TALKS, HE IS SERIOUS AND DETERMINED TO PRESS AHEAD WITH HIS PLANS. AND I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT IT IS IN OUR INTERESTS THAT HE SHOULD SUCCEED, WHICH WILL HELP TO MAKE POSSIBLE A MORE OPEN AND STABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

ON ARMS CONTROL, WE AGREED THAT PRIORITY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO AN AGREEMENT ON INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WITH STRICT VERIFICATION, WITH CONSTRAINTS ON SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS AND WITH IMMEDIATE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS TO DEAL MORE FULLY WITH SHORTER

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RANGE SYSTEMS. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER ACCEPT THAT THE WEST SHOULD HAVE A RIGHT TO MATCH SOVIET SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS. NOR DID WE AGREE ON THE SYSTEMS WHICH SHOULD BE COVERED IN THE FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS.. BUT I MADE CLEAR TO GORBACHEV THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM WAS NOT PREPARED TO SEE THE SOVIET UNION HAVE A MONOPOLY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE. WE ALSO AGREED THAT PRIORITY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO NEGOTIATING A BAN ON ALL CHEMICAL WEAPONS (GORBACHEV SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD BROADLY ACCEPT OUR APPROACH) AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE EARLY NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES. ON THIS LATTER POINT, I TRIED TO CONVEY CLEARLY TO HIM THE EXTENT OF THE THREAT WHICH WE IN WESTERN EUROPE PERCEIVE FROM THE SOVIET UNION'S PREPONDERANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND WEAPONS. I EXPRESSED OUR SUPPORT FOR A 50 PER CENT REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. GORBACHEV MADE CLEAR HIS VIEW THAT THIS WAS LINKED TO AGREEMENT ON SDI. I MADE A NUMBER OF PROPOSALS FOR ACHIEVING GREATER PREDICTABILITY IN THIS FIELD, INCLUDING A TIMETABLE FOR RESEARCH, WHICH GORBACHEV WILL CONSIDER.

I DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFERENCES REMAINING BETWEEN US ON THESE MATTERS, OR UPON THE FUNDAMENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF NUCLEAR DETERRANCE. BUT IT WAS CLEAR FROM OUR TALKS THAT WE DO AGREE THAT PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL REQUIRES A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH WITH CLEARLY IDENTIFIED PRIORITIES, AND THAT WE ARE LARGELY IN AGREEMENT ON WHAT THOSE PRIORITIES SHALL BE.

IN DISCUSSING REGIONAL PROBLEMS, I EXPLAINED TO MR GORBACHEV CANDIDLY THE REASONS FOR WESTERN APPREHENSION ABOUT SOVIET POLICIES AND INTENTIONS. I SAID THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM COULD SUPPORT THE CREATION OF A NEUTRAL, NON-ALLIGNED AFGHANISTAN AND HAD INDEED PRESENTED PROPOSALS FOR THIS (ON BEHALF OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY STATES) AS LONG AGO AS 1980. BUT THIS COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED UNTIL THE SOVIET OCCUPATION WAS ENDED AND ELECTIONS HELD. IN ADDITION, SIR GEOFFREY HOWE HELD EXTENSIVE AND VERY USEFUL TALKS WITH SHEVARDNADZE ON A WIDE RANGE OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS, INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR THE MIDDLE EAST

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AND IRAN/IRAQ.

ON HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS, I WELCOMED THE STEPS WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN TAKEN, WHILE EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT MORE PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE AND DISSIDENTS WOULD BE RELEASED AND JEWS ALLOWED TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY IF THEY WISH TO DO SO. GORBACHEV SAID THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED ALL HUMANITARIAN ISSUES VERY CAREFULLY AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DEAL WITH THEM ATTENTIVELY, WITH POSITIVE RESULTS WHERE POSSIBLE. I TOLD HIM OF OUR WELCOME FOR HIS POLICIES OF OPENNESS, RESTRUCTURING AND DEMOCRATISATION. AS I MADE CLEAR, WE ARE LOOKING FOR DEEDS, NOT WORDS. BUT I BELIEVE HIS ENDEAVOURS POINT THE WAY TO THE GREATER TRUST AND CONFIDENCE WHICH WILL BE NEEDED IF WE ARE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON ARMS CONTROL.

IT WAS A MOVING AND STRIKING TESTIMONY TO CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION TO BE ABLE TO MEET DR SAKHAROV FOR LUNCH AT OUR EMBASSY AND TO MEET ALSO A SMALL GROUP OF BRAVE JEWISH REFUSENIKS. I WAS ALSO ABLE TO GIVE A LONG TELEVISION INTERVIEW, WHICH SUBSEQUENTLY WENT OUT IN FULL, IN WHICH I MADE SOME EXPLICIT COMMENTS ABOUT SOVIET POLICIES. IT WAS A CHANCE TO BRING THE WESTERN POINT OF VIEW TO A MUCH WIDER AUDIENCE THAN NORMALLY HEARS IT. THE RESPONSE OF THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE ON MY WALKABOUTS IN MOSCOW, ZAGORSK AND TBILISI WAS REMARKABLE AND TESTIFIES TO THEIR YEARNING FOR CONTACT WITH THE WEST.

MY VISIT TOOK PLACE AT A MOST INTERESTING AND CRUCIAL MOMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION. I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO WELCOME AND ENCOURAGE THE COURSE ON WHICH GORBACHEV HAS EMBARKED. OUR POLITICAL SYSTEMS WILL REMAIN VERY DIFFERENT AND WE SHALL CONTINUE TO HOLD WIDELY DIVERGENT VIEWS ON MANY INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS. BUT WE WERE ABLE TO DISCUSS THESE DIFFERENCES FRANKLY IN A SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP.

I FOUND THE VISIT FASCINATING AND ON THE WHOLE ENCOURAGING.

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(FOR MITTERRAND ONLY: AS YOU KNOW, I WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO  
DISCUSS THESE ISSUES WITH M CHIRAC WHEN WE MEET ON 26 APRIL.)  
ENDS.

HOWE

OCMIAN 6217

NNNN

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LIMITED

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DEF. D

NEWS D.

SOV D

PS

PS/LADY YOUNG

PS/MR RENTON

PS/PUS

MR THOMAS

MR BOYD

MR RATFORD

MR FALL

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PS/MR YOUNGER MOD

MR MALLABY CABINET OFFICE.



10 DOWNING STREET

*From the Private Secretary*

3 April 1987

**PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION  
MESSAGES TO EUROPEAN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT**

Thank you for your letter of 2 April with which you enclosed draft messages from the Prime Minister to a number of European Heads of Government.

BF // I have slightly revised these and enclose a composite message which, with minor variations, could go to all the heads of government concerned. I should be grateful if it could be despatched as soon as possible with instructions that it be delivered in the capitals concerned in the course of today.

The appropriate headings are "Dear President Mitterrand"; "Dear Prime Minister" for the others with the exception of Chancellor Kohl which should be "Dear Helmut". The endings should be "With best wishes, Yours Sincerely, Margaret Thatcher" (except in the case of Chancellor Kohl when it should just be "Margaret").

(Charles Powell)

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND/-  
CHANCELLOR KOHL/MR MARTENS/MR LUBBERS/MR CRAXI

I wanted to let you have straight away my impressions from my visit to Moscow. Sir Geoffrey Howe will be able to give his European Community colleagues a more detailed account this weekend at Corsendonk. Our Permanent Representative at NATO briefed his colleagues yesterday.

[For Mitterrand and Kohl: It was immensely useful to have discussed the visit with you a few days beforehand. I was able to speak to Gorbachev in the knowledge that my message reflected the very large measure of agreement between us on East/West relations and arms control.]

[For Martens/Lubbers/Craxi: It was very important to be able to speak to Gorbachev in the knowledge that my message reflected the broad consensus among the West European countries on East/West relations and arms control].

My very extensive talks with Gorbachev extending over some twelve hours covered the prospects for agreements on reductions in nuclear and conventional weapons and a ban on chemical weapons; the fundamental differences between our two political systems and their wide consequences; Gorbachev's programme of restructuring of Soviet society and the Soviet economy; regional problems; and human rights. They were very frank. I think that will have done good.

I wanted to make my own assessment of how serious Gorbachev is about internal political and economic restructuring. On the clear evidence of our talks, he is serious and determined to press ahead with his plans. And I have no doubt that it is in our interests that he should succeed, which will help to make possible a more open and stable relationship between East and West.

On arms control, we agreed that priority should be given to an agreement on intermediate range nuclear weapons, with strict

verification, with constraints on shorter range systems and with immediate follow-on negotiations to deal more fully with shorter range systems. He did not, however, accept that the West should have a right to match Soviet shorter range systems. Nor did we agree on the systems which should be covered in the follow-on negotiations. But I made clear to Gorbachev that the United Kingdom was not prepared to see the Soviet Union have a monopoly of nuclear weapons in Europe. We also agreed that priority should be given to negotiating a ban on all chemical weapons (Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union could broadly accept our approach) and that there should be early negotiations on reductions in conventional forces. On this latter point, I tried to convey clearly to him the extent of the threat which we in Western Europe perceive from the Soviet Union's preponderance in conventional forces and weapons. I expressed our support for a 50% reduction in strategic nuclear weapons. Gorbachev made clear his view that this was linked to agreement on SDI. I made a number of proposals for achieving greater predictability in this field, including a timetable for research, which Gorbachev will consider.

I do not underestimate the differences remaining between us on these matters, or upon the fundamental philosophy of nuclear deterrence. But it was clear from our talks that we do agree that progress on arms control requires a step-by-step approach with clearly identified priorities, and that we are largely in agreement on what those priorities shall be.

In discussing regional problems, I explained to Mr Gorbachev candidly the reasons for Western apprehensions about Soviet policies and intentions. I said that the United Kingdom could support the creation of a neutral, non-aligned Afghanistan and had indeed presented proposals for this (on behalf of the European Community states) as long ago as 1980. But this could not be achieved until the Soviet occupation was ended and elections held. In addition, Sir Geoffrey Howe held extensive and very useful talks with Shevardnadze on a wide



range of international problems, including in particular the Middle East and Iran/Iraq.

On human rights problems, I welcomed the steps which had already been taken, while expressing the hope that more prisoners of conscience and dissidents would be released and Jews allowed to leave the country if they wish to do so. Gorbachev said that the Soviet government considered all humanitarian issues very carefully and would continue to deal with them attentively, with positive results where possible. I told him of our welcome for his policies of openness, restructuring and democratisation. As I made clear, we are looking for deeds, not words. But I believe his endeavours point the way to the greater trust and confidence which will be needed if we are to reach agreement on arms control.

It was a moving and striking testimony to change in the Soviet Union to be able to meet Dr Sakharov for lunch at our Embassy and to meet also a small group of brave Jewish refuseniks. I was also able to give a long television interview, which subsequently went out in full, in which I made some explicit comments about Soviet policies. It was a chance to bring the Western point of view to a much wider audience than normally hears it. The response of the Russian people on my walkabouts in Moscow, Zagorsk and Tbilisi was remarkable and testifies to their yearning for contact with the West.

My visit took place at a most interesting and crucial moment in the development of the Soviet Union. I firmly believe that it is in our interest to welcome and encourage the course on which Gorbachev has embarked. Our political systems will remain very different and we shall continue to hold widely divergent views on many international problems. But we were able to discuss these differences frankly in a spirit of friendship.

I found the visit fascinating and on the whole encouraging.

PRIME MINISTER

VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION  
MESSAGES TO EUROPEAN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

I attach a draft of a message which we could telegraph tomorrow to a number of European Heads of Government about your visit to the Soviet Union.

Agree to the message?

CDP


Lizceller Thankyou

CDP

2 April 1987

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CCPC

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

2 April 1987

CH

Dear Charles,

Prime Minister's Visit: Message to European Leaders

The Prime Minister may wish to send messages about her Moscow visit to President Mitterrand, Chancellor Kohl and the Belgian, Dutch and Italian Prime Ministers, following up her meetings with the first two and messages to the other three before the visit.

/ I enclose a draft message, which could be sent to each of them with the minor variations indicated.


Yours ever,

L Parker

(L Parker)  
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq  
PS/10 Downing Street

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