

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No. T62/87



Filed on: SOVIET UNION
SPM's Visit 28 March -
1 April Pt. 2.

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

THE PRIME MINISTER

6 April 1987

SUBJECT: a OPS
MASTER.

Dear Prime Minister,

When we met in London last month, I promised to raise the problem of Cambodia during my visit to Moscow.

I did indeed make clear to Mr Gorbachev our deep concern about Soviet support for the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. Sir Geoffrey Howe also discussed the matter at greater length with Mr Shevardnadze, and will be happy to give you and your colleagues a personal account when he comes to Bangkok later this month.

We both pointed out to the Russians that their support for Vietnam only reinforced international apprehensions about Soviet policies worldwide. The Russians said that they were reluctant to exert any pressure on the Vietnamese to withdraw because such pressure would be ineffective. They argued that a solution to the Cambodian problem could not be achieved overnight, that responsibility for a solution ultimately rested with the countries in the region and that the process progress of achieving a national consensus in Cambodia would have to start before Vietnamese troops left and continue after they had gone. The Russians claimed to have gained the impression that some outlines of a peaceful settlement acceptable to ASEAN and the countries of Indo-China were emerging.

I fear that the Soviet attitude was entirely predictable. There was no movement, but at least they were prepared to discuss the subject. We can only keep up the pressure on them and on the Vietnamese to take the steps necessary for a solution.

I should be happy for you to share this information with your ASEAN colleagues but I should be grateful if, beyond that, you could treat it in strict confidence.

Yours sincerely

Rajendra Prasad

His Excellency General Prem Tinsulanonda



File SKW

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

6 April 1987

I enclose a message from the Prime Minister to the Prime Minister of Thailand about her recent visit to Moscow. I should be grateful if the text could be telegraphed to Bangkok for delivery.

(C. D. POWELL)

Robert Culshaw, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

RM



CCP

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

3 April 1987

Dear Charles,

Proposed Message to the Thai Prime Minister on Cambodia

When General Prem, the Thai Prime Minister, called on the Prime Minister on 12 March he stressed the importance of concentrating international attention on the Cambodian problem and the need to work for a solution. The Prime Minister indicated that she would raise Cambodia with Mr Gorbachev when she visited Moscow. General Prem was clearly pleased with this undertaking.

The Prime Minister did raise Cambodia with Mr Gorbachev and the Foreign Secretary also discussed Cambodia at length with Mr Shevardnadze. It would help our relations with the Thais if the Prime Minister were now to send a short personal message to General Prem to confirm that she had fulfilled her undertaking to him.

/ I enclose a draft, the last sentence of which is intended to discourage the Thais from revealing publicly the details of what the Soviet leaders said to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary.

(R N Culshaw)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

DRAFT: minute/letter/teleletter/despatch/note

TYPE: Draft/Final 1 +

FROM: Prime Minister

Reference

DEPARTMENT:

TEL. NO:

Your Reference

BUILDING:

ROOM NO:

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

CAVEAT

TO: HE General Prem Tinsulanonda
Prime Minister of the Kingdom
of Thailand

Copies to:

TG *(initials)*
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SUBJECT:

When we met in London last month, I ~~said that~~
^{to} ~~I would~~ raise the problem of Cambodia during
my visit to Moscow.

promised

I did indeed make clear to Mr Gorbachev our
deep concern about Soviet support for the Vietnamese
occupation of Cambodia. ^{Sir} Geoffrey Howe also
discussed ~~Cambodia~~ ^{the matter} at greater length with
Mr Shevardnadze, ^{and} ~~Sir Geoffrey~~ will be happy
to give you and your colleagues a personal account
when he comes to Bangkok later this month.

DRAFT

We ^{pointed} ~~pointed~~ out to the Russians that their support
for Vietnam ^{only} ~~served to~~ reinforced international
apprehensions about Soviet policies worldwide.

The Russians said that they were reluctant to
exert any pressure on the Vietnamese to withdraw
because such pressure would be ineffective.

They argued that a solution to the Cambodian
problem could not be achieved overnight, that
responsibility for a solution ultimately rested
with the countries in the region and that the
progress of achieving a national consensus in

/Cambodia

Enclosures flag(s)

Cambodia would have to start before Vietnamese troops left and continue after they had gone. The Russians claimed to have gained the impression that some outlines of a peaceful settlement acceptable to ASEAN and the countries of Indo-China were emerging.

I think you ^{few} will agree that the Soviet attitude was entirely predictable. There was no movement, but at least they were prepared to discuss the subject. ~~I am sure that it is right to keep up the pressure on them and on the Vietnamese to take concrete steps towards a solution.~~ ^{We can only} ^{the necessary for}

I should be happy for you to share this information with your ASEAN colleagues but I should be grateful if, beyond that, you could treat it in ^{strict} confidence.

CU

