



CDP on

10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

Prime Minister

Push too cautious
There are only 4 powers
involved from
W. Europe in
Push

Quadrilateral

Coordination

This looks a shade too
cautious to me. There are excellent
reasons for a Weeks of Government
Quadrilateral this year (750th Anniversary
of Berlin), although it is probably
better not to hold it in the
margins of the Venice Summit.
Agree to ask the FCO to pursue
the prospects of a separate Quadrilateral

summit while President Reagan
is over in Europe, firmly linked
to Berlin?

I am a bit reluctant to
see tripartite breakfasts at
European Councils ruled out. Agree
to reflect further on this?

The Foreign Secretary sees no
objection to tripartite meetings
of officials. I will discuss this
in Paris today. Agree to
welcome?

CDF

Summit while President Reagan is
over in Europe, firmly linked
to Berlin? Yes or

I do not think that you should

abandon the idea of tripartite

Heads of Government breakfasts at

European Comcils. Agreed to discuss

further with Foreign Secretary? Yes or

The Foreign Secretary gives the
green light to tripartite meetings

of officials. I shall be discussing
this in Paris today.

or

CD?

10/4.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

9 April 1987

Dear Charles,

Quadripartite and Tripartite Western Coordination

You wrote to me on 24 March and on 6 April about the Prime Minister's interest in greater coordination with our closest allies, including at Head of Government level. The Foreign Secretary had a word with the Prime Minister about this on 6 April and promised this note.

The Foreign Secretary entirely shares the Prime Minister's conviction that we, the Americans, the French and the Germans together hold the key to an effective response to the challenges facing the Alliance, and that the same is true within Europe of ourselves, the French and the Germans. Close bilateral contacts between each of us will remain the most rapid and secure channel for concerting policy, but coordination among the Four, and sometimes among the Three, can also on occasion be indispensable to meet specific needs. The trick must be so to organise this coordination as to avoid provoking the kind of outcry from those excluded that would be damagingly divisive.

Such coordination does of course already take place below the level of Heads of Government, and has proved its worth. The enclosed Annex summarises what is already going on. The Foreign Secretary concludes from our experience so far of meetings of this sort that they are crucial to the pursuit of British and Western interests; that a considerable amount is already being done; but that closer coordination at a more senior level would also be highly desirable. There are however pitfalls.

4. First, security. It is usually possible for senior officials to meet in secret, but very much more difficult for Foreign Ministers given the publicity that surrounds their movements. Meetings of Heads of Government would be impossible to hold in secret. Even if such a meeting were to be held in the margins of a publicly acknowledged meeting in the UK, FRG, France or USA (in practice, an Economic Summit), there would be a near certainty of it becoming /public



public knowledge. (The Germans and Americans have a particularly bad record for leaks). The same is true of meetings of the European Three in the margins of European Councils.

We could expect the Italians, and perhaps the Dutch and other European governments, to react vigorously if they were to learn of such a meeting in future. Their resentment would be real, but the real damage to our interests would vary depending on the circumstances at the time. Each instance would have to be considered on its merits, and weighed against the specific advantages to be gained from coordination between Heads of Government at that time. We should also have to be aware that the United Kingdom is, generally, the country the most prepared to face down protests of the sort which the Italians would inevitably mount. Neither the Germans nor the Americans can be trusted to hold out, as the G5/G7 experience demonstrates. And the French, while willing to engage in secret coordination, have a long-standing dislike of being seen to do so if the Americans are involved.

Turning to the three suggestions in your letter of 24 March, the Foreign Secretary thinks that the Italians would consider a Quadripartite breakfast at the Venice Economic Summit a major provocation. As the Prime Minister has observed a canal-based meeting could certainly not be kept secret from the Italians. They might even go as far as to call off the Summit itself, as they threatened to do when they learned of the G5 meeting which preceded the most recent G7 meeting in Paris. He advises strongly against aiming for such a meeting in Venice. If the Prime Minister however wishes to pursue the idea of a Quadripartite meeting of heads of government on some other occasion, he suggests that we explore further with President Reagan's, President Mitterrand's and Chancellor Kohl's advisers the circumstances under which such a meeting might be held. One obvious possibility would be the 750th Anniversary of Berlin, which offers the most plausible cover imaginable. Chancellor Kohl earlier expressed interest in a Four Power visit to Berlin after the Venice Economic Summit. This did not gel and now President Reagan has planned a bilateral visit to Berlin on 11/12 June. President Mitterrand has announced he will do the same on 11 May (with Chirac going separately in July to start the Tour de France which, incidentally, exemplifies a possible cohabitation difficulty - who should represent France at any such meeting?) It would be possible to see whether the idea of a Four Power visit could be resuscitated.

/At



At European Council meetings other member states are accustomed, since the days of Schmidt and Giscard, to bilateral Franco-German breakfast meetings, and in recent years to similar bilateral meetings involving the Prime Minister. European Council meetings also are preceded by meetings between the three Benelux Prime Ministers. But no other member state feels threatened by them. Regular meetings of the three leaders who constitute the natural "directoriate" of the Community, whether before or during European Council meetings, would cause great problems with the others led by Italy and The Netherlands. Mitterand noted that "while there were difficulties in the three meeting together, consecutive bilaterals were more manageable" (your letter of 23 March). The Foreign Secretary suggests that we should explore this further with the French and Germans, but expect that they will want to stick to the format of "consecutive bilaterals".

Consultations among officials cause less of a problem as regards secrecy. At the transatlantic level, we should maintain the rhythm of meetings of the four Political Directors and supplement these with occasional meetings of senior arms control experts of the four (US, UK, FRG, France) countries concerned. These meetings would be additional to the other consultative arrangements, for example on conventional arms control, in which the Italians as well are involved. At the European level there should be no problem in organising consultations between British, German and French officials of the kind which Chancellor Kohl has proposed. It might be convenient to arrange such meetings in the margins of other, wider consultative gatherings of which there are many. But if such an opportunity does not present itself before the end of April a special meeting in one of the three capitals could be organised. It might however be undesirable vis-a-vis the Italians to decline ever to hold such European consultations on a quadri - rather than a tri - lateral basis. The Foreign Secretary sees advantage therefore in a judicious mix in this area.

Perhaps you would let me know whether the Prime Minister would be content to proceed on this basis.

Yours ever, *A C Galsworthy*

(A C Galsworthy)
Private Secretary

C D Powell Esq
PS/10 Downing Street

ANNEXConsultations with the Americans

1. There is first the established Quadripartite forum (US, UK, France and FRG). This was set up in the early 1970s as a forum for handling the Berlin problem among the four countries concerned. It has continued in secret as a place where private discussions of wider issues can be pursued. It has in the past been particularly useful as the only group in which the French have been willing to concert closely and frankly with their major allies. On the very few occasions when its secret meetings have leaked, the Italians have created such a fuss that the continuation of this group has risked being prejudiced. At the level of Heads of Government Quadripartite meetings involving Presidents of the United States and France, the Prime Minister of the UK and the Chancellor of the FRG were held in 1975 (at Helsinki) and in 1979 (at Guadeloupe). The latter meeting was the occasion for a discussion of the implications for the West of the introduction by the Soviet Union of the SS20 and provided the political impetus for the eventual twin track decision taken by NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers in December of that year. Both these meetings were of course in the public domain and provoked predictably bitter Italian protests. The Prime Minister has also recalled that such a meeting took place at the Tokyo Summit in 1979 as well. We have established that such a meeting did indeed take place over breakfast on 29 June. This was to have been a bilateral meeting between the Prime Minister and President Carter; we believe that following the confusion of the meetings on 28 June it was expanded at the last moment to include Chancellor Schmidt and President Giscard. It also apparently led to protests from those not involved.

! I told them - I was there.

Not to us.

2. Meetings of Foreign Ministers of the Four take place openly twice a year under the "Berlin" rubric on the eve of the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meetings, and this is reluctantly accepted by the other allies. In practice, however, these meetings are used primarily for non-Berlin issues. We held a particularly useful meeting at Chevening before the NAC last December, at which we discussed arms control and East/West relations in the aftermath of Reykjavik. In addition Foreign Ministers meet secretly once a year over dinner in New York in the margins of the UN General Assembly. It has so far proven possible to preserve the secrecy of the New York meetings: under cover of the frenetic programme of activity affecting all Foreign Ministers in the margins of the UN opening debate.

/3.



3. At official level, Political Directors of the Four foreign ministries meet in secret approximately once a month in alternate capitals for a day of talks covering all urgent foreign policy questions, with a particular emphasis on East/West relations and arms control. At the lowest, this group constitutes a clearing house for /private private exchanges of view. At its best, it can be a steering group for Western policy. The last such meeting took place in London on 25 March: I sent you a copy of a summary record. Given the low profile of Political Directors, it has been possible, as it would not be for regular meetings of Ministers, for this group's existence to remain secret: knowledge of it is confined to a few Ministers and senior officials of the countries involved. Although other allies, such as the Italians, may suspect that such exchanges take place, they are not aware of the scope or frequency.

4. Arms control officials of the same four countries also meet occasionally to discuss chemical weapons negotiations. There are in addition other limited US/European groupings of officials in the arms control field. Policy on MBFR has traditionally been co-ordinated through confidential meetings of British, German and American officials, both in Vienna and in capitals. Other MBFR participants on the NATO side certainly suspect that such co-ordination takes place but have not seriously jibbed at it. More recently a somewhat wider grouping, involving officials from the US, the UK, the FRG, France and Italy has been instituted to constitute a steering group for the work of NATO's High Level Task Force on conventional arms control. It meets in Brussels on the evening before meetings of the Task Force. A meeting in Washington may also take place within the next couple of months. In addition, there /have have been regular meetings between US officials and those of the five European INF basing countries (UK, FRG, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands) before meetings of the NATO SCG to help co-ordinate the allied position on this aspect of the Geneva negotiations. These meetings are not publicly acknowledged; but we did volunteer publicity for a meeting held in Washington in February this year specifically to discuss the verification aspects of an INF Treaty, as they affect the basing countries.

/Consultations



Consultations among European Countries

5. There is no similar arrangement for tripartite meetings at Ministerial level between the United Kingdom, France and Germany, although the then Foreign Secretary held one such meeting at Chevening in 1981, primarily to discuss Afghanistan. The Italian, Dutch and Belgian governments protested when news of this meeting was leaked. There have been however frequent tripartite meetings between senior officials to discuss Community business, particularly the Budget, and, recently, the Commission's research proposals; and very close bilateral consultations with the French and the Germans. (Dutch officials have from time to time been included in such meetings, when their policy interest has been close to that of the big three northern member states.) Enlargement, and the increasing volume and variety of Community business since the conclusion of the Single European Act have made it essential that we, the French and the Germans work together in the Community. The French and Germans want to do this, though our interests do not always coincide, eg with the French over protectionism and the Germans over agriculture. There would be strong resistance to any formal "directoriate" but others generally bow to the reality of the situation if we, the French and the Germans are seen to pursue a similar line.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London SW1A 2AH

6 April 1987

Prime Minister

You may like
to see this example
of the record of a Quadripartite
meeting of Political Directors.
Sean Charles,

CDP
6/4.

Quadripartite Meetings

When we were discussing this subject the other day, you mentioned that it might be helpful for you to see more of what is happening on a Quadripartite basis than you have received hitherto. The meeting of Quadripartite Political Directors takes place monthly: they are normally summarised by Derek Thomas in a minute to the Foreign Secretary. I enclose the latest example. If it would be helpful to you, I should be happy to copy these to you on a regular basis.

Yours ever,

(Signature)

(A C Galsworthy)
Private Secretary

*John shows why
we need a meeting at
head of government level*

C D Powell Esq
10 Downing Street



From: Derek Thomas

Date: 25 March 1987

SECRET

BURNING BUSH

- cc PS/Mr Renton
- PS/PUS
- Mr Boyd
- Mr Ratford
- Mr Fall
- Mr Slater
- Mr Gore-Booth
- Mr Lever
- Mr Pakenham
- Mr Dain
- Mr Fowler
- Mr Richardson
- Mr Figgis
- Mr Llewellyn-Smith

Private Secretary

- cc HM Ambassador at
Washington
- Paris
- Bonn
- HM Representative,
UKDEL NATO

QUADRIPARTITE MEETING OF POLITICAL DIRECTORS: LONDON, 25 MARCH

1. The monthly meeting of Quadripartite Political Directors took place in London today under UK chairmanship. It was a productive meeting, without any of the hiccups which characterised meetings earlier this year.

2. The main subjects on the agenda were LRNIF and the problem of follow-on negotiations; SDI/ABMT; conventional arms control; next steps in CSCE; East/West relations generally, and the Prime Minister's visit to Moscow in particular; problems of handling Polish and Yugoslav economic problems; shipping in the Persian Gulf; and the latest escalation of tension in the Aegean. Records covering the major issues will be submitted. Other records will be circulated to those concerned.

3. The Secretary of State may like to have a brief account of the principle points which emerged.

LRNIF AND FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS

4. There was no daylight between us on the need to have constraints on SRNIF and a US right to match included within an INF agreement, with a clear commitment to follow-on negotiations. The difficulties would arise on what should be covered in the follow-on negotiations. The French wanted to be explicit from the start that third country forces and forward-based systems should be excluded, and that there should be no question of a zero option on SRINF. The rest of us agreed that these were highly desirable objectives for NATO, but doubted whether the Russians would accept them as conditions at the outset of negotiations. Mrs Ridgway pointed out the difficulties which would arise, in follow-on negotiations, on such questions as the right of conversion of P2 missiles and the implications for the shorter end of the range if we insisted strongly on all limits being global. She said that the US had examined all the options they could think of for follow-on negotiations without finding any which would be entirely acceptable. Her conclusion (and possibly Shultz's) was that we might have to be prepared to live with some degree of imbalance in SRNIF if we wanted to avoid complete de-nuclearisation in Europe.

5. We agreed that it was urgent to clarify thinking within NATO on these issues.

Why?

SECRET BURNING BUSH



SECRET BURNING BUSH

SDI/ABMT

6. Mrs Ridgway repeated twice that the consultative process would be resumed once the Administration had completed its work on the legal and technical aspects of the ABMT. She also confirmed as clearly as she could that the concept of eliminating ballistic missiles in the context of a ten-year nonwithdrawal agreement had been included because the President continued to attach importance to it, not as a serious negotiating objective (my words, not hers which were more careful).
7. Mrs Ridgway also made it clear that the US side was prepared to discuss predictability with the Russians provided they were convinced that Gorbachev was not simply aiming to cripple SDI. So far the interpretation they were seeking to impose on the ABMT appeared to be designed to do just that.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

8. Mrs Ridgway floated the idea of a Quadripartite group at Mr Fall's level to try to sort out some of the problems which had arisen in this field. The disadvantages (security of the forum, risk of proliferating Quads, need to avoid duplication) all emerged in discussion. Nevertheless, I suggested that a one-off, ad hoc meeting of this kind with a specific mandate to tackle the key problems of substance and procedure which were blocking progress could be useful. My colleagues have taken this idea away to consider urgently.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

9. We had a somewhat hand-wringing discussion about the dilemmas we faced in the negotiations on a global ban on chemical weapons. The prospect of a Congressional decision to fund the deployment of binary chemical weapons was the primary Western leverage on the Russians to negotiate. If they played their cards skilfully, they could hold up and possibly prevent a Congressional decision. That would take the pressure off. If we then reached an agreement on SRINF involving a Soviet freeze and a US right to match, we risked leaving ourselves in a doubly exposed position: Soviet preponderance in both chemical and SRINF weapons.

10. We saw no easy solutions.

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

11. I briefed my colleagues in general terms. They were supportive.

12. We looked at a French paper on the need to be more ready to take the initiative in our dealings with the USSR, not simply respond to Soviet initiatives. A number of useful ideas were explored and will be followed up.

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
QUADRIPARTITE FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING AT REYKJAVIK

13. I raised the practical problems of the present schedule. All my colleagues thought their Ministers would rule out the possibility of either holding the Quadripartite meeting in Venice or leaving the Venice Summit early. They also thought that while they would recognise the practical problems we had posed, they would attach very considerable importance to finding a way of holding the meeting somehow.

14. In the course of discussion, it emerged that Shultz and Genscher had now decided against trying to return to Berlin from Reykjavik for President Reagan's visit to Berlin. There may therefore be a possibility of shifting the Quadripartite breakfast from 11 to 12 June. Both Mrs Ridgway and Noiville thought their Ministers would accept this option. Von Richthofen was less sure about Genscher but has undertaken to consult.

NEXT MEETING

15. The next meeting of the Quadripartite Political Directors will be held in Paris on 5 May. The French problem thus seems to have been solved.


Derek Thomas

SECRET BURNING BUSH



10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SW1A 2AA

From the Private Secretary

24 March 1987

THE BERLIN FOUR

SUBJECT "made ops"

As you will see from my records of the Prime Minister's talks with President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl yesterday, there was a strong inclination to see the three countries work together more closely, initially on arms control issues. The Prime Minister welcomed this. She also suggested privately to both the President and the Chancellor that there should be more use of Berlin Four meetings at Head of Government level.

The Prime Minister is anxious to see these ideas followed up, although well aware of the risks of being seen to take any sort of initiative publicly. Her interest focuses on three points:-

- the possibility of re-establishing a Berlin Four breakfast at Head of Government level at the next Economic Summit. She recalls that the last one was in 1972 or 1980.
- instituting a Berlin Three breakfast, again at Head of Government level, as a feature of European Council meetings.
- following up Chancellor Kohl's proposal for close Anglo/German/French consultations on current arms control issues. She would like to see a first meeting held by the end of April.

BA/11
The Prime Minister would welcome the Foreign Secretary's view on how best to take these ideas forward. On the third, the initiative lies with Teltschik, but we may need to stir the Germans into action if we hear nothing from him by early April. Subject to your views, I would propose to telephone him then.

Charles Powell

A C Galsworthy, Esq, CMG,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

6 May 1600 hrs session

cc Mr Gore-Booth
Mr Cavellyn Smith
Mr Honstan
Mr Meyer
Mr Farwell.
PS/MS Denton
PS (3)

Committee set
CDP 7/5.

SECRETARY OF STATE'S CHATHAM HOUSE SPEECH,

7 MAY

"EAST/WEST RELATIONS: THE BRITISH ROLE".

- Introductory courtesies

- I vividly remember a conversation with the Hungarian General Secretary, Mr Janos Kadar, when he visited Britain in 1985.

I suggested that relations between East and West were not unlike those that have to exist between husband and wife in a world where divorce is not permitted. Mr Kadar replied that it was even more difficult than that, for in this case the marriage was not only one that could not be brought

/to

to an end, but one that had initially been arranged without either partner having the opportunity of choosing the other.

- East-West relations are a problem that we cannot avoid tackling. All the more reason, therefore, to be clear about the answers to some central questions:

- what has been the basic problem?

- what if anything has changed recently?

- how should the West react?

- The basic problem is the historic failure of the Soviet Union to sustain a reasonable, open, normal relationship with the rest of the world.

- This phenomenon has deep roots. The history of imperial Russia and the Soviet Union has generated, rightly or wrongly, a fear and suspicion of the outside world, which has encouraged it to build up its military machine to an extent which could only be seen as threatening by Western European and other countries; and as far as possible to seal its people off from infectious outside influences.

- I have referred briefly to Soviet and Russian history because that in part provides the key to understanding the problem. But understanding is not the same thing as forgiveness. There is in truth no justification for quarantining the Soviet people from a large part of their European cultural heritage. And there can be no justification for such an intense preoccupation with security and the survival of the system that the steps taken to safeguard both actually generate concern and insecurity for others beyond the Soviet Union's borders.

- The problem has been compounded by the role of ideology. The fear must always be present that harnessing foreign policy to a determinist dogma must, to put it mildly, dispose the Soviet Union to expansionist policies, particularly in the third world. We are told by the more sophisticated Soviet commentators today that this is all old hat. But so long as Marxism-Leninism remains the official creed of the Soviet Union, and so long as it is claimed to have universal validity, then the West cannot set aside the ideological component in its analysis of Soviet interests and ambitions. And it has to be said, if we are talking of history, that since 1945 there have been

/many

many instances where it would appear that the expansion of Soviet interests has ridden on the backs of Marx and Lenin.

- Is it surprising therefore, that we ask ourselves whether the Soviet Union is a state whose interests and ambitions are to be judged like any other, by power, geography and history; a state with whom the West would have similar problems of co-existence, whether communist, Tzarist or something else? Or is it different in kind from other governments, driven by an ideological vision of its State interests, of which realpolitik provides only a partial - and inadequate - interpretation?

- So this is the legacy with which not only we, but also the new Soviet leadership, have to live. What has changed in the way in which they address it?

- The Soviet Union now seems to have, in Mr Gorbachev and his colleagues, a leadership which recognises that this history has left the Soviet Union a poor advertisement for the Socialist cause they espouse: a military giant with political and social feet of clay.

- Their "new political thinking" does now acknowledge that there is more to security than military might and that one's own security cannot be maintained on terms that inevitably mean insecurity for others. It brushes aside fears of Soviet claims to world domination as outdated. Theories of the triumph of Socialism worldwide, we are told, were just that - bookish theories, not guides to action. The "new political thinking" lays stress on interdependence and the joint search for solutions to problems of global importance. It recognises that the Soviet Union cannot play a part on the world stage commensurate with its intrinsic power until it has put

/its

its own house in order, and that to do this
it needs a stable international
environment.

- This spirit of change in dealing with
the outside world is a reflection of change
at home. Mr Gorbachev may prove to be the
latest in a long line of Russian leaders
who have aimed at bold reform but come up
against the intractable limits of the
Tsarist, and now Leninist, system.
Certainly he is setting about his task with
vigour and imagination.

- Whatever we may think about his system, he believes in it. However unconvincing it sounds to us, he believes that there are inner laws of socialism capable of producing prosperity. He certainly does not intend to abandon the system. But he does intend to try to cut away the inefficiency, the sloth and corruption that has clogged it up for years.

- This task, to try to restructure the Soviet Union so that it can enter the next century as a modern, flexible economy, is colossal.

- Some Western analysts say it can't be done, that we have seen it all before.

- Others warn that to the extent it actually works, reform in the Soviet Union will make the Russians not an easier partner for the West, but more of a danger; that the immobility and stagnation of the Soviet system under Mr Gorbachev's predecessors in fact suited the West pretty well.

- We have to decide whether or not we welcome this spirit of change. The Prime Minister and I made quite plain in Moscow that we do.

- More open internal policies, that bring the Soviet people more information about their own country and the world outside, are self-evidently desirable. And more pragmatic, less aggressive, external policies ought to make the Soviet Union a less uncomfortable international partner all round.

- Of course, it is early days. We must wait and see how far these changes go. Perhaps they will work. Perhaps they won't. This is not the first time we have heard a Soviet leadership proclaim its readiness to try cooperation rather than confrontation.

- But there are some welcome signs that the present leadership may really mean to put East-West relations on a more stable footing. If this policy is sustained, it will be a new phenomenon in East-West relations.

- We welcome the fact that on arms control the Soviet Union has finally accepted the strength of long-standing NATO proposals in many different areas.

- Thanks to this belated shift in Soviet thinking, we are getting for the first time reasonably close not to freezing nuclear armaments at existing levels, but to cutting them sharply, or even eliminating certain categories altogether.

X

- No sane person could fail to see that this represents a great step forward.

- And we welcome signs of a more pragmatic and reasonable Soviet attitude on some other international issues, such as the Middle East, terrorism and drugs.

- These new features in Soviet foreign policy help extend the areas of potential cooperation between East and West.

- Why and how have these changes come about? A fresh look at a foreign policy crippled with burdens and problems was long overdue. But it was left to Mr Gorbachev to reach that conclusion. From my own regular discussions with Mr Shevardnadze, my Soviet opposite number, it is clear that just such a review has been and indeed still is taking place. [As I said in Bangkok a few weeks ago]. But certainly "New Thinking" is taking place. The steadiness and conviction of the West has surely helped to bring the new Soviet leadership to this point.

- Where do we go from here?

- The economic and political gap between the Soviet Union and the West is not going to narrow suddenly. As far as one can see into the future, two fundamentally different systems will face each other, whose views of the world and of themselves are largely incompatible. Even if we can set aside fears of the messianic expansionist drive of the Soviet system - and that remains a subject of debate - the fundamental imbalance of power in Europe will remain for the foreseeable future. So we need, now as before, a long term policy for managing this relationship, and the wider relationship between the West and the countries of Eastern Europe.

- Faced with a powerful ideological adversary which has refused to acknowledge, let alone join, the great trends of political cooperation and economic integration in the West, the United States and Western Europe have had no choice but to hold their ground. But we have also made plain over and over again our willingness to see tensions reduced in different areas, on fair and realistic terms which both sides can stick to.

- What we need to consider now is whether, when Mr Gorbachev offers us "global detente", he is offering us hope or delusion.

- History does not provide a particularly hopeful prognosis. The two main periods of East-West cooperation - the Second World War and the detente of the late 60s and 70s - both evaporated in mutual recrimination and renewed hostility.

Today we may be standing yet again on the edge of a more hopeful era in relations with the Soviet Union. In gauging whether hope is likely to be realised, we should ask ourselves, for example, why Brezhnev's detente collapsed.

- We must not forget that the portents in the early 70s were good. Those were the days of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, SALT I, the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin and the Helsinki Final Act.

- And yet by the second half of the 70s, this substantial body of achievements had been eclipsed by mutual suspicion - fed by disillusionment at Soviet activity in the Third World, Soviet human rights failures and doubts about Soviet compliance with the SALT agreements.

- The 70s showed only too clearly how there is a constant tension in East/West relations between cooperation and confrontation.

- Is Gorbachev going to change all this by a new approach to foreign affairs? I hope so; but it is too early to be sure.

- In face of that uncertainty, I offer three cornerstones for British policy - indeed for Western policy: realism, vigilance, and ^{an} ~~openness~~ ^{open mind}.

- Realism in setting expectations: not so high as to breed excessive optimism which precipitates disappointment; not so low that we miss any real chance to make progress.

- We must be prepared for setbacks. There are many past examples: from the invasion of Czechoslovakia to the shooting down of the KAL airliner. We have always carefully measured our response to these brutal episodes. We must continue to do so.

- Yet despite these disappointments and setbacks, progress has proved possible in creating a more secure, or preventing a less stable, world.

- The Partial Test Ban Treaty and the Non Proliferation Treaty showed that major arms control agreements could be achieved where there was political will.

- The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin defused a periodic crisis in relations between East and West.

- We are entering a period in which, if we hold steady on course, we may be able to match some of those achievements.

- But a policy of realism is credible only if it is backed by vigilance in defence of our national interests.

- This goes without saying for our external security. It goes for our domestic security as well. We in the United Kingdom will not tolerate espionage on our territory. We showed this in 1971 and 1985. Some accused us of a disproportionate response to Soviet espionage. But the disproportion was on the other side - in the massive deployment abroad of the resources of the KGB. Consistency and firmness in this field have been proved right. Over the long term they have not prejudiced the development of good working relations with the Soviet Union.

- Vigilance is especially needed now in sorting the wheat from the chaff of Mr Gorbachev's initiatives. We must not only look out for dangers ahead: our vigilance must extend no less to the opportunities which may be opening up.

-The third element of our policy must, therefore, be ^{an} ~~openness~~ ^{mind,} especially to the possibilities of change. It is particularly important now, at a time when Mr Gorbachev's advent has shaken the kaleidoscope of East-West contacts and discussions, to distinguish in the new patterns the genuinely promising from the falsely glittering.

- We apply these three principles first and foremost collectively in NATO. For both the facts of the East/West military confrontation and the imbalance of power in Europe ensure that firm collective defence remains the cornerstone of a successful working relationship with the Soviet Union.

- At any one time some issues are clearly more important than others. The fact that US/Soviet arms control talks have proceeded despite the latest spy scandals in Moscow makes this point.

-Yet it is not sensible - not even politically feasible - to push for progress in one area to the exclusion of all others.

- Issues are related, and must be treated as related. This is not 'linkage' for its own sake, or an attempt to be obstructive. It is common sense.

- Both sides have their different priorities. It is no coincidence that Mr Gorbachev concentrates his negotiating skills and propaganda effort on reducing nuclear weapons - they are the pivot of the Western deterrent. But we see that any reductions in nuclear weapons serve to highlight the Soviet Union's clear superiority in other important areas. So the West insists on real progress on the conventional and CW fronts too.

- Likewise with human rights. At Helsinki the Soviet Union subscribed to a whole range of undertakings related to human rights and human contacts to ease restrictions on travel and so on. These undertakings were painstakingly negotiated by all the CSCE countries as part of a comprehensive package designed to improve security and cooperation in Europe. We see these issues as central. If the Soviet Union conspicuously fails to abide by these freely undertaken commitments our willingness to trust its word in other key areas will be reduced. Again, simply common sense.

- Against this general background the contribution the United Kingdom can make is a product of our political will and judgement, our resources, and others' perceptions of Britain's weight in the international balance.

- As to will, Margaret Thatcher and I decided at the beginning of this Government's present term of office that our most important task in foreign policy was to work for an improvement in East-West relations. We are now seeing, in the results of our visit to Moscow, the outcome of a steady sustained course of action over a period of years.

- As to resources, our ability to influence events is connected with the strength of our economy and the vigour of our role in Western councils. These factors go together with our uniquely close and productive relationship with the United States, our role as a nuclear weapon state and our position as a Permanent Member of the Security Council. Together these give us a distinctive voice in the East/West dialogue. They are perceived by the Soviet Union and by the countries of Eastern Europe as strengths.

- I was struck, for example, by a remark that General Jaruzelski made when I saw him in Warsaw. Talking about Britain's role in East-West relations, he said that "yours is a nation that has trodden the path of greatness". We cannot trade on past glories in confronting today's problems. But there is no doubt that our history plays an important part in how others now perceive us and the role we can and should play.

- We have used all these assets to develop gradually a more productive set of relations with the Soviet Union. One of the keys to shifting the relationship forward away from sterile confrontation to a more productive content is information. A freer flow, enabling a more accurate assessment of each other's intentions. My six meetings to date with Mr Shevardnadze have shown that we have started to build a bridge which will bear a fair weight.

- We also want to extend the network of unofficial contacts too. Our cultural and scientific exchange programmes play an important part. For it is only through the patient dissemination of truth and information at every level that the misapprehensions and misperceptions which bedevil East-West relations will begin to be dissipated.

- I was struck, for example, during the Prime Minister's recent visit to Moscow, by the extent to which the Soviet leadership seemed to be prisoners of their own propaganda. Not only do they believe things that we know to be untrue (for

/example

example that the Korean airliner incident was a deliberate provocation on the Western part); they often seem unable to unwilling to grasp that their policies and activities cause us in the West legitimate anxiety. Truth can never be the enemy of good relations.

- Nor can getting the truth through be a one sided enterprise. It is increasingly difficult in the modern world to keep their citizens isolated from outside reality; but the Soviet leaders still have formidable instruments for doing so. If we are to propagate a true and fair picture of British values to the Soviet people, it can only be done with the Soviet Union.

- This is where Mr Gorbachev's glasnost is so important. Its effect is to expose the Soviet people to new currents of thinking. That they may now see a film about the purges of the 1930s, or read a poem about Stalin, may seem remote from present day needs. Nothing could be further from the truth. As the poet Yevtushenko has said, it is only through facing their past that the Soviet people will come to face the present frankly and honestly. It is the very novelty of glasnost which underlines our hope that the closed nature of the Soviet past is changing.

- Glasnost is in essence an internal instrument of the leadership. But thankfully it has repercussions in dealing with the West. We saw this when the Prime Minister went to Moscow. Her 50 minute TV interview, devastating in its frankness, told the Soviet people things they had never heard before.

- We deliberately tried to build further links in the area of information when we went to Moscow. I signed with Mr Shevardnadze a Memorandum of Understanding opening up new prospects of exchanges: an annual lecture by a distinguished public figure; more contacts between journalists and makers of radio and TV programmes; an understanding that BBC radio broadcasts will not be jammed. I should like to see more joint discussion programmes, telebridges and phone-in programmes. More seminars and round tables devoted to particular professional themes, on top of the successful Anglo-Soviet Round Table which Chatham House has steered so ably since 1975.

- In all this, our aim is patiently to influence by spreading knowledge and building contacts - not to subvert. We are not asking that the Soviet leaders dismantle their system. Our premise must be that the Soviet Union and its European neighbours contain within themselves the potentiality for conducting a more normal relationship with the outside world, and with their own people. That is the premise on which the CSCE process is founded. We welcome any changes - in the direction of greater tolerance, freer information, greater respect for legality - which make this more possible.

- This applies with particular force to human rights. Of all the Soviet practices which are abhorrent to Western observers, the inhumanity and intolerance with which dissent is treated stands out: the imprisonment of dissidents, the denial of Jewish and Christian practices and beliefs, the use of psychiatry for repressive ends. But it would be a counsel of despair to conclude that in the Soviet Union they are not only endemic but ineradicable. We say that the Soviet Constitution and the Helsinki Final Act alike prohibit such practices. We press the Soviet leaders to live up to the commitments they freely shouldered at Helsinki. We argue,

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persuade, criticise. And, of course, we are pleased when dissidents are released from prison and Soviet citizens are allowed to emigrate.

- The crucial point is this. People should not be treated as pawns in an East/West chess game, suddenly to be released or imprisoned as the authorities see fit. The changes which we are still waiting to see - and the only changes which will take root - are those which the Soviet people and leaders choose for themselves.

- We are not naive. We shall not convert the Soviet leadership. Irreducible differences will remain. But investment in the infrastructure of knowledge and contact can pay a dividend in the easing of tension, the management of differences.

Conclusions

- What conclusions, then, can we draw from all this? First, something new is happening in the Soviet Union. For the reasons I have explained, we in the UK are well placed to assess what is going on - both there and in Eastern Europe. We are also well placed to help ensure that the West grasps the new opportunities that may be opening up for movement on arms control and human rights. The Prime Minister's visit to Moscow was an eloquent demonstration of the right way to go about this.

- But we must not jump to final conclusions on the preliminary evidence now before us. Nor should we expect dramatic and rapid results [- overnight]. Building a better relationship between East and West will be a long haul.

- There are three key areas of Soviet policy, three litmus tests if you like, which would do more than anything else at present to show the world just how serious the Soviet leadership's intentions are.

- First, Afghanistan. Will Mr Gorbachev take his troops out, and restore to the Afghan people their freedom and dignity?

- Second, arms control. Will Mr Gorbachev accept the serious and effective measures of verification that are needed to make arms control agreements work?

- And third, human rights. Will Mr Gorbachev live up to the commitments of the Helsinki Declaration and give his people the right to emigrate and join their families overseas?

- Positive answers to all these questions would not in themselves dispel all the reasons for apprehension. Our system will still be fundamentally different. There will still be a massive imbalance in the size and strength of our armed forces. Significant changes in these facts of life can only take a long time.

- But we have no quarrel with the Russian people. If Mr Gorbachev can better their standard of living, improve their domestic political system, and introduce a more civilised style into Soviet diplomacy which enables East/West relations to be conducted on a more open and rational basis, that will be all to the good.

- We have to begin by building confidence: not just confidence in present behaviour, but confidence in a durable commitment to developing a more stable and productive East/West relationship. Only then will we be able to tackle some of the fundamental causes of East/West tension in ways that preserve both sides' legitimate interests.

- We must be prepared to face rough patches. But Mr Gorbachev has given us reason to hope that a more stable, productive relationship may not be not just a starry-eyed vision, but a realistic possibility. We shall certainly do what we can to build on that - with realism, vigilance and openness. Our earnest hope is that the Soviet Union will do the same.