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
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SHULTZ VISIT TO SOVIET UNION, 13-15 APRIL: MEETING WITH GORBACHEV

SUMMARY

1. IN TALKS WITH SHULTZ ON 14 APRIL GORBACHEV SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD INCLUDE A LRINF AGREEMENT SOVIET OBLIGATION TO ELIMINATE ITS OPERATIONAL/TACTICAL MISSILES IN EUROPE. SHULTZ HAD CONTINUED TO ARGUE FOR THE RIGHT TO MATCH. THE SOVIET UNION WERE ALSO PREPARED TO ELIMINATE BATTLE FIELD TACTICAL MISSILES. ALL THIS WITH THE STRICTEST VERIFICATION REGIME INCLUDING ONSITE INSPECTION 'EVERYWHERE'. THE US TIMESCALE FOR STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS AND ADHERENCE TO THE ABMT CRITICISED. ON SDI THE SOVIET UNION WANT RESEARCH TO BE RESTRICTED TO LABORATORIES ON THE GROUND, BUT EXPERTS SHOULD CONSIDER A LIST OF DEVICES BANNED FOR LAUNCHING INTO SPACE IN THE COURSE OF SUCH RESEARCH. GORBACHEV READY TO MEET REAGAN BUT NOT JUST TO SIGN AN INF AGREEMENT: 'KEY PROVISIONS' ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS, ABM SYSTEMS AND NUCLEAR TESTS SHOULD BE WORKED OUT IN ADVANCE. ASSURANCES FROM GORBACHEV ON A LEGAL AND HUMANITARIAN APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS, AND AN APPEAL AGAINST US/SOVIET CONFRONTATION ON REGIONAL ISSUES.

DETAIL

2. AFTER TALKS WITH SHEYARDNADZE AND WITH RYZHKOV, SHULTZ SAW GORBACHEV FOR A 1/2 HOURS ON 14 APRIL. ALSO PRESENT WERE SHEYARDNADZE, DOBRYNIN, AKHROMEYEV, DUBNIN, MATLOCK, WITZE AND RIDGEWAY. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN POINTS FROM THE APPARENTLY VERY FULL TASS ACCOUNT IN PRAVA ON 15 APRIL.

GENERAL

3. SHULTZ HAD BEEN RECEIVED IN THE SOVIET UNION 'IN THE SPIRIT OF NEW THINKING'. HE HANDED OVER TO GORBACHEV A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN. THE DISCUSSION WITH GORBACHEV WAS 'FRANK AND PRINCIPLED, MARKED BY A DESIRE TO LOOK SERIOUSLY FOR SOLUTIONS TO THE KEY QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF EACH OTHER'S POSITIONS APPEARED DURING A THOROUGH EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS'. GORBACHEV SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD TAKEN MANY STEPS OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS TO CREATE A NEW ATMOSPHERE IN US/SOVIET RELATIONS, GIVING NEW CHANCES FOR MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND AGREEMENTS. 'NO PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION HAD SUCH CHANCES'. BUT THIS HAD NOT BEEN RECIPROCATED BY THE US. EACH SOVIET MOVE HAD BEEN MET WITH ATTEMPTS TO COMPLICATE OR FRUSTRATE THE EFFORT OR, AT BEST, WITH DELAYS IN THE EXPECTATION OF NEW SOVIET MOVES. IT WAS A MISTAKE TO THINK THAT THE SOVIET UNION NEEDED DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT MORE THAN THE WEST. TO JUDGE BY ITS ACTIONS RATHER THAN ITS STATEMENTS IT APPEARED THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION BEHAVED AS IF NOTHING HAD HAPPENED IN THE SOVIET UNION OVER THESE TWO YEARS AND THAT THE LATTER HAD DONE NOTHING TO IMPROVE THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. SHULTZ HAD NOT AGREED WITH THAT ASSESSMENT. BUT THE NATURE OF THEIR DISCUSSION, WHICH CENTERED ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES UNDERLINED THE UNWILLINGNESS OF THE US TO ACT ENERGETICALLY.

INF

4. GORBACHEV ASKED WHETHER THE US ADMINISTRATION WOULD REALLY DO ANYTHING IN THE 'TIME REMAINING'. SHULTZ HAD AGREED WITH THE 'REYKJAVIK FORMULA' ON INF BUT HAD ADDUCED A NUMBER OF RESERVATIONS OVER THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON OPERATIONAL/TACTICAL MISSILES (500-1000 KMS RANGE).

5. 'GORBACHEV EXPRESSED READINESS TO RECORD IN AN INF AGREEMENT A SOVIET OBLIGATION COMPLETELY TO ELIMINATE WITHIN A RELATIVELY SHORT AND CLEARLY DEFINED TIME FRAME ITS OPERATIONAL/TACTICAL MISSILES IN EUROPE. NONETHELESS SHULTZ INSISTED ON THE US RIGHT TO CREATE SUCH WEAPONS AND DEPLOY THEM IN NUMBERS ROUGHLY EQUALLING THOSE LEFT TO THE SOVIET UNION FOLLOWING THE ELIMINATION OF THOSE MISSILES REMOVED FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE GDR. THIS WAS PUZZLING. IT TURNS OUT THAT WHILE THE SOVIET UNION WILL BE ELIMINATING UNILATERALLY THEIR MISSILES OF THIS TYPE AND WHEN IT FIRMLY DETERMINES ITS OBLIGATIONS BEFORE THE WHOLE WORLD TO DO SO, FOR EXAMPLE WITHIN A YEAR, THE US WILL BE ARMING ITSELF WITH SUCH MISSILES. THIS WOULD CONTRADICT THE WHOLE SENSE OF THE PROCESS OF DISARMAMENT'.

6. 'IT WAS CLEAR FROM SHULTZ'S EXPRESSIONS THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION TOGETHER WITH ITS NATO ALLIES IS NOT PREPARED TO REACH ZERO FOR OPERATIONAL/TACTICAL MISSILES AND THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE A FINAL POSITION ON THIS QUESTION'

REACH ZERO FOR OPERATIONAL/TACTICAL MISSILES AND THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE A FINAL POSITION ON THIS QUESTION'.

7. GORBACHEV HAD STRESSED: 'WE HAVE TOLD YOU EVERYTHING, EVEN MORE THAN YOU EXPECTED PROBABLY. WE ARE GOING FURTHER THAN WAS STATED IN PRAGUE - WE ARE PREPARED TO ELIMINATE ALSO BATTLE-FIELD TACTICAL MISSILES. WHAT ARE YOU AFRAID OF. WE ARE IN FAVOUR OF A RELIABLE AGREEMENT WITH THE MOST STRINGENT AND COMPREHENSIVE CONTROL. IF THE PROCESS OF ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS REALLY BEGINS WE WILL ADOPT THE STRICTEST POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF CONTROL, AND DEMAND VERIFICATION AND INSPECTION EVERYWHERE - AT THE SITES WHERE MISSILES ARE DISMANTLED AND DESTROYED, AT RANGES AND AT MILITARY BASES, INCLUDING THOSE IN THIRD COUNTRIES, AND AT DEPOTS AND FACTORIES REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THESE ARE PRIVATELY OR STATE-OWNED.

8. GORBACHEV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE US AND ITS ALLIES NEEDED TO CONSIDER ALL THIS. 'BUT IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS ABSURD TO DEMAND A BUILD-UP WHEN THE SOVIET UNION WILL BE UNILATERALLY ELIMINATING THEIR OPERATIONAL/TACTICAL WEAPONS'.

STRATEGIC WEAPONS

9. DISCUSSED IN DETAIL. THE US WERE RESILING FROM THE AGREEMENT AT REYKJAVIK TO REDUCE THE WHOLE TRIAD OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS BY 50%. SDI HAD THEN BEEN THE STUMBLING BLOCK BUT NOW 'COMPLICATING ELEMENTS' SUCH AS LEVELS, SUB-LEVELS AND OTHER EXCUSES, APPARENTLY DISCARDED AT REYKJAVIK, WERE AGAIN APPEARING.

10. 'DEVIATIONS FROM THE RYKJAVIK POSITIONS ARE ALSO EVIDENT IN THE FACT THAT THE US IN CONSIDERING A STRATEGIC AGREEMENT NOT OVER FIVE YEARS BUT OVER SEVEN, AND THE COMMITMENT NOT TO BREAK OUT OF THE ABM TREATY FOR A PERIOD OF SEVEN INSTEAD OF TEN YEARS'.

SDI

11. ASSURANCES THAT WORK ON THE SDI DID NOT THREATEN A VIOLATION OF THE ABM TREATY WERE UNACCEPTABLE. 'WE WILL NEVER ACCEPT AS NATURAL A TRANSFER OF THE ARMS RACE TO SPACE. THE VERY IDEA OF SDI IS DEEPLY DAMAGING AND IF THE US ARE TO DEPLOY ABM SYSTEMS IN SPACE THERE WILL BE NO AGREEMENT OF ANY KIND ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. IF YOU FORCE US, OUR ANSWER TO SDI WILL BE ASYMETRICAL, IT WILL NOT NECESSARILY BE FROM SPACE AND WILL BE CONSIDERABLY CHEAPER. BUT A MOST DANGEROUS SITUATION WILL RESULT. AND THERE WILL BE NO MUTUAL TRUST OF ANY KIND'. COULD RESPONSIBLE POLITICIANS ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH SUCH A PROSPECT - THE DESTABILISATION OF THE WHOLE SYSTEM OF SECURITY - AT THE VERY MOMENT WHEN THERE WAS A REALISTIC POSSIBILITY OF SOLVING THE ISSUES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ?

12. THE SOVIET UNION WERE PREPARED TO LOOK FOR A WAY OUT, GIVEN THE ADMINISTRATION'S COMMITMENT TO SDI. 'WE AGREE TO ABM RESEARCH BUT LIMITED TO THE LABORATORY. IT WAS EXPLAINED FOR THE FIRST TIME TO OUR INTERLOCUTOR WHAT THE SOVIET UNION UNDERSTANDS BY THIS, NAMELY: SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH WORK ON THE GROUND - IN INSTITUTES, ON TESTING RANGES AND IN FACTORIES. AND LET THE SPECIALISTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES SIT DOWN, CONTEMPLATE AND AGREE ON THE LIST OF DEVICES WHICH IN THE COURSE OF THIS RESEARCH WOULD BE BANNED FROM BEING PUT INTO SPACE. A SOLUTION LIES ALONG THIS PATH... WE ARE SEEKING

INTO SPACE. A SOLUTION LIES ALONG THIS PATH.... WE ARE SEEKING COMPROMISE SOLUTIONS AND, IN A MANNER OF SPEAKING, MAKING THE FINAL EFFORTS'.

NUCLEAR TESTING

13. THE SOVIET UNION REMAINED DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE A CTB THROUGH FULL SCALE NEGOTIATIONS. TO MAKE PROGRESS THEY WERE READY JOINTLY TO WORK OUT A FORMULA WHICH WOULD ALLOW RATIFICATION OF THE 1974 AND 1976 AGREEMENTS AND TO AGREE ON A CONSIDERABLE REDUCTION IN THE YIELD AND NUMBER OF EXPLOSIONS.

SUMMIT

14. GORBACHEV SUGGESTED THE WORKING OUT OF 'KEY PROVISIONS' ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, ABM SYSTEMS AND NUCLEAR TESTS. 'TOGETHER WITH THE SIGNING OF AN INF TREATY THEY COULD BECOME THE SUBJECT OF AGREEMENT AT THE SUMMIT LEVEL AND THE BASIS ON WHICH LEGALLY BINDING US/SOVIET AGREEMENTS COULD BE PREPARED. IN ORDER TO AGREE ON THESE KEY PROVISIONS AND TO CONCLUDE AN INF TREATY I AM READY TO MEET THE US PRESIDENT'.

15. GORBACHEV URGED THE US ADMINISTRATION TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY ALL ASPECTS OF DISARMAMENT COVERED IN THE TALKS. 'EVEN IF THERE IS NOT ENOUGH TIME TO CONCLUDE TREATIES WE COULD LAY THE GROUND FOR THEM'. THE POLITICAL WORK SO FAR SHOULD BE NOT WASTED.

SPYING

16. GORBACHEV REJECTED SHULTZ'S COMPLAINTS ABOUT 'UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES' CONCERNING THE US EMBASSY IN MOSCOW AND REFERRED TO CIA ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE SOVIET REPRESENTATION IN THE US. EVERY TIME WHEN PROGRESS APPEARED IN RELATIONS THERE WAS ANOTHER OUTBREAK OF SPY MANIA AND ANTI-SOVIETISM.

HUMAN RIGHTS

17. HUMAN RIGHTS, 'ESPECIALLY THE RIGHT TO EMIGRATE' WERE COVERED. GORBACHEV SAID THAT EVERYTHING THAT WAS 'LEGAL AND HUMANITARIAN' WOULD BE CONSIDERED AND SETTLED POSITIVELY. 'GENERALLY SPEAKING WE WILL ACT SO THAT THOSE OF US WHO ARE DISSATISFIED WITH THEIR COUNTRY WILL BECOME SATISFIED WITH IT. I HOPE THAT YOU ALSO IN THE US WILL DO SOMETHING SO THAT THE MILLIONS OF YOUR CITIZENS WILL BE BETTER OFF'. GORBACHEV REJECTED ACCUSATIONS 'BORDERING ON INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER STATES'.

REGIONAL ISSUES

18. THE US SEEMED TO VIEW REGIONAL CONFLICTS AS OFFERING CONSTANT SCOPE FOR CONFRONTATIONAL MANOEUVERINGS, POWER POLITICS AND ANTI-SOVIET PROPAGANDA. 'IF THAT IS REALLY SO, OUR RELATIONS ARE DOOMED TO VERY SERIOUS TRIALS'. REGIONAL CONFLICTS SHOULD NOT BE TURNED INTO A POLICY OF CONFRONTATION ESPECIALLY BETWEEN THE US AND SOVIET UNION. 'WE IN NO WAY WISH TO IGNORE THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE US BUT WE DO NOT AGREE THAT THE WORLD OR SOME OF ITS REGIONS SHOULD BE LOOKED ON AS ONE'S PATRIMONY. CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS COULD NOT BE SOLVED BY METHODS BASED ON CHURCHILL'S FULTON SPEECH AND THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE. GORBACHEV WAS CONVINCED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE AND NECESSARY FOR A RESTRUCTURING IN US/SOVIET RELATIONS FOR THE SAKE OF AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

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MY TELNO 613 SHULTZ'S MEETING WITH GORBACHEV: COMMENT

1. THE PUBLISHED SOVIET ACCOUNT OF SHULTZ'S MEETING WITH GORBACHEV IS REMARKABLE NOT ONLY FOR THE AMOUNT OF DETAIL APPARENTLY DIVULGED, BUT ALSO IN REVEALING THE SPEED WITH WHICH GORBACHEV HAS DEVELOPED THE SOVIET POSITION ON INF/SRINF.
2. THESE TWO ASPECTS ARE CONNECTED. UNTIL NOW THE SOVIET PRESS, AND SHULTZ'S SPOKESMAN REDMAN, HAD GIVEN VIRTUALLY NOTHING AWAY ON THE CONTENT OF SHULTZ' TALKS WHILE IN MOSCOW, AND ONLY YESTERDAY THE MFA SPOKESMAN, GERASIMOV, TOLD JOURNALISTS THAT IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT THE TALKS WOULD BE CONFIDENTIAL. IT IS THUS MORE THAN DEDICATION TO "GLASNOST" THAT HAS PROMPTED GORBACHEV TO HAVE THE SUBSTANCE OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH SHULTZ PUBLICISED TO THIS UNPRECEDENTED DEGREE: IT IS, RATHER, A CONCERN TO MAINTAIN THE INITIATIVE AND PRESSURE ON THE WEST OVER THE WHOLE INF SPECTRUM, AND IN PARTICULAR TO PRE-EMPT WESTERN EFFORTS TO DIG IN OVER SRINF.
3. GORBACHEV HAS REACTED WITH AGILITY AND WITH FORESIGHT SINCE THE ALLIANCE BEGAN TO RECONSOLIDATE THE GROUND NEARLY LOST AT REYKJAVIK. IDENTIFYING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR EAST/WEST CONSENSUS ON AN LRINF ZERO OPTION IN EUROPE, HE EFFECTIVELY STITCHED THIS UP WITH HIS "DELINKAGE" STATEMENT OF 23 FEBRUARY. BUT SOVIET PREPONDERANCE IN BOTH SRINF AND IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES REMAINED VULNERABLE POINTS IN HIS CASE. HOLDING HIS GROUND ON THE LATTER THROUGH HIS NEGOTIATORS IN VIENNA HIS PRIME REQUIREMENT WAS THEN TO SMOTHER WESTERN CONCERNS (EXPRESSED TO HIM WITH GREAT CLARITY BY THE PRIME MINISTER ON 30 MARCH) OVER SRINF. THIS HE HAS NOW

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ATTEMPTED TO DO BY MAKING A SERIES OF OFFERS WHICH GIVE THE WEST THE UNCOMFORTABLE CHOICE BETWEEN A EUROPE FREE OF LAND-BASED NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE TASK OF TAKING ON PUBLIC OPINION, AS IN 1983, OVER NEW NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENTS.

4. THE RANGE OF OFFERS NOW IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN ARE: IMMEDIATE TALKS ON SRINF, BY IMPLICATION FOLLOWING LRINF AGREEMENT (23 FEBRUARY STATEMENT): IMMEDIATE SRINF TALKS IN PARALLEL WITH THOSE ON LRINF (PRAGUE SPEECH): AND A TIME-LIMITED ZERO SRINF COMMITMENT BUILT INTO THE LRINF AGREEMENT, COMBINED WITH READINESS TO ELIMINATE BATTLEFIELD TACTICAL NUCLEAR SYSTEMS (SHULTZ MEETING). THE COMMON FACTOR IS ZERO FOR BOTH SIDES IN EUROPE, AND A STEADFAST REFUSAL TO CONTEMPLATE THE WESTERN RIGHT TO MATCH. GORBACHEV HAS THUS PRE-EMPTED A COHERENT AND DEVELOPED WESTERN CASE FOR REMEDIAL ACTION AGAINST SOVIET SRINF SUPERIORITY BY APPEARING TO ADDRESS WESTERN CONCERNS (NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF A LRINF AGREEMENT) WITH A FORMULA WHICH, SUPERFICIALLY, REMOVES THEIR JUSTIFICATION.

5. OUR RESPONSE TO THIS, BOTH PUBLICLY AND IN NEGOTIATION, MUST PRESUMABLY BE TO CONTINUE TO UNDERLINE THE INSTABILITY OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPONS FREE EUROPE IN THE ABSENCE OF CONVENTIONAL AND CW BALANCE. SEEN FROM HERE, ONE POSSIBLE OPTION MIGHT BE TO AGREE WITH THE RUSSIANS ON ZERO LRINF, ZERO SRINF DOWN TO 500 KILOMETRES, WITH REMAINING SRINF/BATTLEFIELD SYSTEMS TO BE MAINTAINED (WITH NO SOVIET INCREASE) UNTIL SATISFACTORY BALANCE AT LOWER LEVELS OF COVENTIONAL FORCES AND A CW CONVENTION ARE ACHIEVED. IN THIS, GORBACHEV'S FAR-REACHING PROPOSALS ON VERIFICATION SHOULD BE TAKEN UP: IF THEY CONTAIN AN ELEMENT OF BLUFF, IT SHOULD BE CALLED.

6. TWO OTHER SIGNIFICANT POINTS EMERGE FROM THE SOVIET ACCOUNT OF THE TALKS, ON SDI AND A FUTURE SUMMIT. ON THE FORMER, GORBACHEV IS APPARENTLY ATTEMPTING TO CLARIFY THE PREVIOUSLY DECLARED SOVIET POSITION, NAMELY RESEARCH AD LIB ON THE GROUND, BUT NOT IN SPACE. BUT THERE IS A HINT OF FLEXIBILITY: IF SPECIALISTS ARE TO WORK OUT WHAT MAY NOT BE PERMITTED TO BE LAUNCHED INTO SPACE IN THE COURSE OF ABM RESEARCH, THE UNSPOKEN COROLLARY IS THAT SOME RESEARCH IN SPACE MAY NONETHELESS BE PERMITTED.

7. GORBACHEV'S REMARKS ON A SUMMIT CONFIRM WHAT WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY SUSPECTED, NAMELY THAT SIGNATURE OF AN INF AGREEMENT IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT A TRIP TO THE US. THE THREE 'KEY PROVISIONS' SINGLE² OUT, (EVEN IF SOME FLEXIBILITY CAN BE READ INTO GORBACHEV'S BRIEF REMARKS ON NUCLEAR TESTING ISSUES) NOW COMPRISE AN AMBITIOUS AGENDA. UNLESS THE LRINF/SRINF NEXUS CAN BE RAPIDLY SORTED OUT AND THEREBY GIVE POLITICAL MOMENTUM TO THE

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OTHER OUTSTANDING MAJOR ISSUES, THE ODDS FOR A REAGAN/GORBACHEV SUMMIT, AT LEAST IN THE US, SEEM TO HAVE LENGTHENED: AND REAGAN IS PUT IN THE POSITION (ASSUMING THAT GORBACHEV'S PRE-CONDITIONS CANNOT BE NEGOTIATED DOWN TO AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL) OF BEING THE ONE TO CLOSE THE DOOR.

8. I SHALL REPORT FURTHER FOLLOWING A BRIEFING BY MY US COLLEAGUE TOMORROW, 16 APRIL.

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EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS
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PRESS RELEASE

13 KENSINGTON PALACE GARDENS LONDON W8 4QX

15th April 1987

PR52587

MIKHAIL GORBACHYOV RECEIVES GEORGE SHULTZ

MOSCOW APRIL 14 TASS - MIKHAIL GORBACHYOV RECEIVED IN THE KREMLIN TODAY GEORGE SHULTZ WHO IS HAVING THESE DAYS SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS WITH NIKOLAI RYZHKOV AND EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE. THE VISIT OF THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE USSR IS TAKING PLACE AT A CRUCIAL JUNCTURE IN THE LIFE OF BOTH STATES AND IS OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEW FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP.

GEORGE SHULTZ HAS BEEN RECEIVED IN THE SOVIET UNION IN THE SPIRIT OF NEW THINKING, CONSIDERING THE ROLE AMERICA IS PLAYING AND CAN PLAY IN WORLD POLITICS, AND ALSO THE ACCUMULATED EXPERIENCE OF MUTUAL RELATIONS, CONTACTS, DIALOGUE WITH THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION, INCLUDING THE SUMMIT LEVEL.

GEORGE SHULTZ HANDED OVER TO MIKHAIL GORBACHYOV A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN.

A FRANK, PRINCIPLED CONVERSATION WAS HELD, MARKED BY THE DESIRE TO LOOK SERIOUSLY FOR DECISIONS ON KEY QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF EACH OTHER'S POSITIONS SHOWED UP IN THE COURSE OF A THOROUGH EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS.

OVER TWO YEARS WE TOOK MANY STEPS TO CREATE A NEW ATMOSPHERE IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, GAVE NEW CHANCES FOR MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND ACCORDS, SAID MIKHAIL GORBACHYOV.

NO PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION HAD SUCH CHANCES. YET WE HAVE NOT SEEN ON THE PART OF THE USA THE WISH TO USE THEM FOR IMPROVING BILATERAL RELATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. EACH OF OUR STEPS MET WITH ATTEMPTS AT COMPLICATING OR EVEN SIMPLY FOILING THE EFFORT, OR, AT THE VERY BEST, THEY WERE DRAGGING FEET ON THE MATTER, PENDING OUR NEW STEPS. THE ERRONEOUS CALCULATION PERSISTS UNTIL NOW THAT THE SOVIET UNION NEEDS DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT MORE THAN THE WEST. JUDGING BY THE DEEDS RATHER THAN BY SEPARATE STATEMENTS, THERE IS AN IMPRESSION THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION BEHAVES AS IF NOTHING HAS HAPPENED IN THE SOVIET UNION OVER THESE TWO YEARS AND THAT IT HAS DONE NOTHING ON ITS PART TO IMPROVE THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

GEORGE SHULTZ HAS NOT AGREED WITH THAT APPRAISAL. YET THE VERY COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION, WHICH CENTRED ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES, HAS BORNE OUT THAT THE U.S. LEADERSHIP IS PRACTICALLY UNPREPARED TO ACT VIGOROUSLY, TO GO ITS PART OF WAY.

MIKHAIL GORBACHYOV ASKED THE CANDID QUESTION: WHAT HAS GEORGE SHULTZ BROUGHT ALONG? IS THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION PREPARED TO REALLY DO SOMETHING IN THE REMAINING TIME? OUR PROPOSAL ON THE MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IS AN ATTEMPT AT CREATING BOTH FOR THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION AND FOR OUR OWNSSELVES BETTER CONDITIONS FOR MAKING A BIG STEP, PERHAPS, THE MOST DIFFICULT ONE, BUT A STEP THAT WOULD START THE REAL PROCESS OF PUTTING AN END TO THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND A CUT IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

GEORGE SHULTZ EXPRESSED CONSENT WITH THE REYKJAVIK FORMULA FOR A SETTLEMENT ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, WHILE MAKING A NUMBER OF RESERVATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH OUR PROPOSAL ON SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES (WITH A RANGE OF FROM 500 TO 1,000 KILOMETRES), WHICH WE HAVE PUT FORWARD PRECISELY IN ORDER TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT WESTERN EUROPE'S CONCERN AND FACILITATE A SETTLEMENT ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES.

MIKHAIL GORBACHYOV EXPRESSED THE READINESS TO RECORD IN AN AGREEMENT ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES THE SOVIET UNION'S OBLIGATION TO ELIMINATE ITS SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE WITHIN A RELATIVELY SHORT AND CLEARLY DEFINED TIME FRAME. NEVERTHELESS, GEORGE SHULTZ INSISTED ON THE UNITED STATES' RIGHT TO CREATE SUCH WEAPONS AND DEPLOY THEM IN THE AMOUNTS APPROXIMATELY EQUAL TO THOSE THAT THE USSR WILL HAVE AFTER THE ELIMINATION OF SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES REMOVED FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE GDR.

THIS HAS CAUSED PUZZLEMENT: IT TURNS OUT THAT WHILE THE USSR WILL BE UNILATERALLY ELIMINATING ITS MISSILES OF THIS TYPE, WHEN IT FIRMLY PROCLAIMS TO THE WORLD ITS OBLIGATION TO DO SO, FOR INSTANCE, WITHIN A YEAR, THE USA WILL BE ARMING ITSELF WITH SUCH MISSILES. THIS WOULD CONTRADICT THE VERY ESSENCE OF THE PROCESS OF DISARMAMENT.

IT FOLLOWED FROM GEORGE SHULTZ'S EXPLANATIONS THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION, TOGETHER WITH ITS ALLIES IN NATO, IS NOT PREPARED TO REACH ZERO IN THE QUESTION OF SHORTER RANGE MISSILES, THAT THEY HAVE NO FINAL STAND ON THE MATTER.

WE HAVE TOLD YOU EVERYTHING, WE HAVE TOLD YOU EVEN MORE THAN YOU HAVE, PROBABLY, EXPECTED, MIKHAIL GORBACHYOV SAID. WE GO FURTHER THAN THIS WAS STATED IN PRAGUE: WE ARE PREPARED TO ELIMINATE ALSO BATTLEFIELD TACTICAL MISSILES. WHAT ARE YOU AFRAID OF? WE ARE FOR A RELIABLE AGREEMENT WITH THE MOST STRINGENT AND ALL-EMBRACING CONTROL. IF THE PROCESS OF THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS IS REALLY STARTED, WE SHALL BE HOLDING THE MOST STRINGENT STAND IN THE QUESTION OF CONTROL, WE SHALL BE DEMANDING VERIFICATION AND INSPECTION EVERYWHERE: ON THE SITES OF MISSILES' DISMANTLING, ON THE SITES OF THEIR ELIMINATION, AT RANGES AND MILITARY BASES, INCLUDING THOSE IN THIRD COUNTRIES, AT DEPOTS AND PLANTS, WHETHER PRIVATE OR STATE-OWNED.

TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE NEW IDEAS EXPRESSED DURING THE CONVERSATION, MIKHAIL GORBACHYOV AGREED THAT THERE EXISTED A NEED FOR THE AMERICANS AND THEIR ALLIES TO THINK ALL THAT OVER. HOWEVER, IT IS IMPORTANT TO REALIZE THAT IT IS ABSURD TO DEMAND A BUILDUP WHEN THE SOVIET UNION STARTS UNILATERALLY THE ELIMINATION OF ITS SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES -- AN ENTIRE CLASS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

THE ISSUE OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS WAS DISCUSSED IN DETAIL. THE EXAMINATION OF THAT PROBLEM REVEALED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE DEPARTING FROM WHAT THEY AGREED TO IN REYKJAVIK, NAMELY -- FROM THE READINESS TO REDUCE THE ENTIRE TRIAD OF STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS BY 50 PER CENT. BACK THEN THE STUMBLING BLOCK WAS SDI. AND NOW IT TURNS OUT THAT, APART FROM SDI, THERE ONCE AGAIN APPEARED AS COMPLICATING ELEMENTS +LEVELS+, +SUB-LEVELS+ AND OTHER PRETEXTS WHICH, IT SEEMS, WERE DISCARDED IN REYKJAVIK.

DEVIATIONS FROM THE REYKJAVIK POSITIONS ARE ALSO EVIDENT CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT AT PRESENT THE UNITED STATES IS PLANNING THE REALIZATION OF AN AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMAMENTS OVER A PERIOD OF SEVEN, NOT FIVE YEARS, JUST AS IS THE CASE WITH THE COMMITMENT NOT TO BREAK OUT OF THE ABM TREATY OVER A PERIOD OF SEVEN YEARS, NOT TEN YEARS.

MIKHAIL GORBACHYOV BROUGHT INTO THE FORE THE QUESTION OF OBSERVANCE OF THAT TREATY. ASSURANCES THAT WORK UNDER SDI ALLEGEDLY IS NOT FRAUGHT WITH THE THREAT OF BREACH OF THAT TREATY ARE UNACCEPTABLE.

WE, MIKHAIL GORBACHYOV STATED, WILL NEVER RECOGNIZE A TRANSFER OF THE ARMS RACE TO SPACE AS SOMETHING NATURAL. THE VERY IDEA OF SDI IS VERY HARMFUL. AND IF THE U.S. BEGINS TO DEPLOY ABM SYSTEMS IN SPACE THERE WILL BE NO AGREEMENT OF ANY KIND ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMAMENTS. IF YOU FORCE US, THE RESPONSE TO SDI ON OUR PART WILL BE ASYMMETRICAL, IT WILL NOT NECESSARILY COME FROM SPACE AND WILL BE FAR LESS EXPENSIVE. HOWEVER, A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION WILL EMERGE AS A RESULT. AND THERE WILL BE NO TRUST OF ANY KIND TO EACH OTHER -- NEITHER ON OUR NOR ON YOUR PART. IS IT POSSIBLE THAT POLITICIANS SHOULDERING VERY HEAVY RESPONSIBILITIES CAN ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH SUCH A PROSPECT -- DESTABILIZING THE ENTIRE SYSTEM OF SECURITY AND DOING SO PRECISELY AT THE TIME WHEN THERE EXISTS A REALISTIC POSSIBILITY FOR TACKLING THE ISSUE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

WE TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE FACT THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION ASSOCIATED ITSELF WITH SDI. AND, SEEKING SOLUTION, AND NOT WISHING TO FRUSTRATE THE PROCESS OF THE TALKS ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, WE ARE PREPARED TO LOOK FOR THE WAY OUT IN THIS AREA, TOO. WE AGREE TO RESEARCH IN THE ABM SYSTEMS AREA, BUT TO RESEARCH RESTRICTED TO THE LABORATORY. IT WAS EXPLAINED TO THE INTERLOCUTOR FOR THE FIRST TIME WHAT IS MEANT IN THE SOVIET UNION BY THIS, NAMELY, RESEARCH WORK ON THE GROUND -- IN INSTITUTES, AT PROVING GROUNDS, AT PLANTS. LET EXPERTS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES TAKE THEIR TIME, PONDER ON THE SUBJECT AND AGREE ON THE LIST OF DEVICES WHICH WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO BE PUT INTO SPACE IN THE COURSE OF THIS RESEARCH. THIS IS THE ROAD TO THE SOLUTION. AS YOU SEE, WE LOOK FOR COMPROMISE DECISIONS, WE ARE MAKING +THE LAST EFFORTS+, SO TO SAY, MIKHAIL GORBACHYOV CONTINUED.

AS TO NUCLEAR TESTS, THE SOVIET UNION'S FIRM RESOLVE TO PRESS FOR THEIR COMPLETE BAN IN THE CAUSE OF THE FULLSCALE NEGOTIATIONS HAS BEEN CONFIRMED. TO GET THE MATTERS OFF THE GROUND, THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED FOR WORKING OUT JOINTLY A FORMULA THAT WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO RATIFY THE 1974 AND 1976 AGREEMENTS, TO COME TO TERMS ON A CONSIDERABLE LESSENING OF THE YIELD AND NUMBER OF EXPLOSIONS.

CONCLUDING THE DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEMS OF DISARMAMENT, MIKHAIL GORBACHYOV PROPOSED TO WORK OUT +KEY PROVISIONS+ ABOUT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, ABM SYSTEMS AND NUCLEAR TESTS. ALONGSIDE THE SIGNING OF AN AGREEMENT ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, THEY COULD BECOME THE SUBJECT OF ARRANGEMENT AT THE SUMMIT LEVEL AND THE BASIS ON WHICH LEGALLY BINDING AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE USA COULD BE DRAFTED. I AM READY TO MEET THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN ORDER TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THESE +KEY PROVISIONS+ AND CONCLUDE A TREATY ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, MIKHAIL GORBACHYOV SAID.

MIKHAIL GORBACHYOV HAS URGED THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION TO THINK OVER CAREFULLY ALL ASPECTS OF DISARMAMENT, WHICH WERE TOUCHED UPON AT THE TALKS IN MOSCOW, AND HAVE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE WHOLE OF THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS. EVEN IF THERE IS NOT ENOUGH TIME TO CONCLUDE TREATIES, YET WE COULD LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR THEM. MUCH WORK HAS BEEN PUT IN FOR PREPARING THEM, HENCE THE POLITICAL WORK WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN DONE SHOULD NOT BE WASTED.

OTHER QUESTIONS WERE TOUCHED UPON IN BRIEF, PROCEEDING FROM THE PREMISE THAT THEY ARE BEING CAREFULLY DISCUSSED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS. MIKHAIL GORBACHYOV HAS REJECTED THE ATTEMPTS OF GEORGE SHULTZ AT MAKING GRUDGES AS REGARDS +UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES+ VIS-A-VIS THE U.S. EMBASSY IN MOSCOW, AND POINTED TO THE MATERIAL EVIDENCE PRODUCED TO THE AMERICANS OF THE CIA'S TRULY CRYING ACTIONS VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES AND THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN THE USA. THE OUTBREAK OF SPY-SCARE IS PART OF THE PRACTICES WHICH HAVE ALREADY BECOME A ROUTINE: EACH TIME WHEN SOME PROGRESS TOWARDS AN IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS BECOMES EVIDENT, A FRESH MALICIOUS ANTI-SOVIET CAMPAIGN IS INVENTED. AS

FAR AS INFORMATION ABOUT EACH OTHER IS CONCERNED, THAT IS PRECISELY WHY THERE ARE EMBASSIES AND OTHER LEGITIMATE MISSIONS IN THE COUNTRIES TO HAVE A GOOD AND FULL KNOWLEDGE OF EACH OTHER. THIS INTRODUCES AN ELEMENT OF STABILITY, PREDICTABILITY AND REDUCING THE RISK OF ILL-CONSIDERED ACTIONS. DIVERSE AND FULL INFORMATION MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO OUTLINE A TRULY REALISTIC POLICY WITHOUT DOING DAMAGE TO THE OTHER SIDE.

THE SUBJECT OF +HUMAN RIGHTS+, ESPECIALLY THE RIGHT TO EMIGRATE HAS BEEN TOUCHED UPON. EVERYTHING THAT IS LAWFUL AND HUMANITARIAN, MIKHAIL GORBACHYOV SAID, WILL BE EXAMINED AND SETTLED POSITIVELY. GENERALLY SPEAKING, WE WILL DO SO THAT THOSE WHO ARE DISSATISFIED WITH THEIR COUNTRY BECOME SATISFIED WITH IT. I HOPE THAT YOU IN THE UNITED STATES WILL ALSO DO SOMETHING THAT MILLIONS OF YOUR CITIZENS BE BETTER OFF.

AS TO ACTIONS WHICH BORDER ON INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER STATES, ESPECIALLY WHEN UNDERTAKEN AT THE LEVEL OF HIGH-RANKING PEOPLE, THEY ARE REJECTED BY US. THEY ARE DOING NOTHING TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS.

AS TO THE REGIONAL CONFLICTS, MIKHAIL GORBACHYOV EMPHASIZED, WE GET THE IMPRESSION THAT THE U.S. IS VIEWING THEM AS A PERMANENT ROOM FOR MANEUVERING THE LEVEL OF CONFRONTATION, POWER POLITICS AND ANTI-SOVIET PROPAGANDA. AND IF THAT IS REALLY SO OUR RELATIONS ARE DOOMED TO VERY SEVERE TRIALS. WE BELIEVE THAT REGIONAL CONFLICTS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO ESCALATE INTO THE POLICY OF CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE TWO SYSTEMS, ESPECIALLY THE USSR AND THE U.S. WE ARE NOT OVERSIMPLIFYING THE SITUATION IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD. A LOT OF SERIOUS PROBLEMS HAS ACCUMULATED THERE. WE ARE OPPOSED TO THE BREACH AND EROSION OF THE TIES BETWEEN VARIOUS REGIONS OF THE WORLD -- TIES THAT HAVE TAKEN SHAPE HISTORICALLY. WE ARE PREPARED TO BUILD RELATIONS ON A REALISTIC BASIS WITH ACCOUNT OF NATIONAL INTERESTS. AND NOT ONLY THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE NATIONAL INTERESTS. A BALANCE OF INTERESTS SHOULD BE SOUGHT, THEREFORE, AND THIS BALANCE IS CHANGING IN MUCH THE SAME WAY AS THE INTERESTS THEMSELVES ARE CHANGING IN THE COURSE OF HISTORY.

WE BY NO MEANS FAVOUR DISREGARDING THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES, BUT WE DO NOT AGREE WHEN THE WORLD OR SOME OF ITS REGIONS ARE LOOKED UPON AS ONE'S PARENTAL ESTATE.

WE ARE NOT INCLINED TO PURSUE A PUGNACIOUS POLICY VIS-A-VIS THE UNITED STATES. WE REJECT THE VICIOUS PRINCIPLE ACCORDING TO WHICH, THE WORSE IT IS FOR THE SOVIET UNION THE BETTER IT IS FOR THE USA, AND VICE VERSA. IT IS NECESSARY TO OVERCOME THE OLD STEREOTYPES. OUR TWO COUNTRIES' RESPONSIBILITY TO THE WORLD IS IMMENSE. THE PRESENT-DAY PROBLEMS CANNOT BE SETTLED ALONG THE LINES SET IN THE FULTON SPEECH BY CHURCHILL AND THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE. WE INVITE THE UNITED STATES TO THINK OVER A RESTRUCTURING OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, TO THINK HOW WE SHOULD LIVE FURTHER ON, HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO AN IMPROVEMENT OF THE WHOLE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. I AM CONVINCED THAT THIS IS POSSIBLE AND NECESSARY.

IT IS BETTER TO DISCUSS THINGS, TO ARGUE AND ENGAGE IN POLEMICS THAN MAKE PERFIDIOUS PLANS OF MUTUAL DESTRUCTION. IT IS EVEN BETTER TO HAVE A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE DESIGNED FOR AN OUTCOME ACCEPTABLE TO ALL.

TAKING PART IN THE MEETING WERE EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE, ANATOLY DOBRYNIN, SERGEI ARKHROMEYEV, YURI DUBININ, JACK MATLOCK, PAUL NITZE, ROZANNE RIDGWAY.

ITEM ENDS+++++