

US/SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS/ EAST WEST & US/SOVIET RELATIONS

PS/nes Chalker
PS/LADY YOUNG

MR POWELL No.10 DOWNING STREET

PS/MR RENTON

PS/PUS

MR THOMAS

MR BOYD

MR D NICHOLLS DUS(P)

NPS

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MR RATFORD

MR FALL


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SHULTZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW : NAC BRIEFING

SUMMARY

1. SHULTZ REPORTS TO NAC ON HIS MOSCOW DISCUSSIONS: CONSIDERABLE HEADWAY ACHIEVED WITH IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS IN INF. SOVIET OFFER TO ELIMINATE SRINF MISSILES (SS12/22 AND SS23) WITH IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A SEPARATE SRINF TREATY. US EMPHASISED THAT BEFORE RESPONDING TO SOVIET PROPOSAL ALLIANCE CONSULTATION WOULD BE NECESSARY. NAC VIEWS INVITED WITHIN 2 WEEKS USING HLG/SCG MEETINGS TO PREPARE GROUND. BURDEN OF SHULTZ'S ARGUMENTS IS THAT US FAVOURS ZERO-ZERO SRINF INCLUDING SS23 AND NO FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS ON SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS. IN THE ABSENCE OF ALLIANCE SUPPORT FOR THIS, THE US WOULD PROPOSE CONCURRENT CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF AND FOLLOW-UP NEGOTIATIONS FOR EQUAL GLOBAL CEILINGS AT A LEVEL BELOW THE SOVIET LEVEL BUT ABOVE ZERO.

DETAIL

2. IN BRIEF OPENING REMARKS THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND SHULTZ STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE TO BE ATTACHED TO ALLIANCE CONSULTATION, AND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF THE NAC ON THE HEELS OF THE MOSCOW VISIT. SHULTZ DESCRIBED THE ALLIANCE AS NOW BEING IN BASICALLY A VERY GOOD POSITION TO SEIZE REAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE SORT OF ARMS CONTROL THE ALLIANCE HAD ALWAYS WANTED. BUT IT WAS ALSO IN A POSITION WHERE A DECISION HAD TO BE MADE. THIS SHOULD BE DONE CAREFULLY AND SYSTEMATICALLY, WITH AN EXHIBITED CONSULTATIVE PROCESS, BUT THE DECISION NEEDED TO BE TAKEN PROMPTLY. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS INDECISIVE FOR AN EXCESSIVE LENGTH OF TIME.

3. SHULTZ STRESSED THE NEED TO SEE HIS TALKS IN MOSCOW IN A WIDER CONTEXT THAN ARMS CONTROL. HE RECALLED HIS NAC DISCUSSIONS IN DECEMBER 85 BEFORE HIS MEETING WITH GROMYKO, WHEN IT HAD BEEN AGREED

3. SHULTZ STRESSED THE NEED TO SEE HIS TALKS IN MOSCOW IN A WIDER CONTEXT THAN ARMS CONTROL. HE RECALLED HIS NAC DISCUSSIONS IN DECEMBER 85 BEFORE HIS MEETING WITH GROMYKO, WHEN IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT ARMS CONTROL HAD TO BE TAKEN TOGETHER WITH HUMAN RIGHTS AND REGIONAL ISSUES, AND HE HAD BEEN URGED BY THE ALLIES TO BE PATIENT WITH THE RUSSIANS. HE CONTINUED TO TAKE THAT ADVICE. MUCH OF HIS TALKS IN MOSCOW HAD BEEN SPENT IN OBTAINING A FEEL FOR WHAT WAS GOING ON IN THE SOVIET UNION. THE CHANGES THAT WERE TAKING PLACE HAD TO BE EXPLOITED, NOT LEAST ON BEHALF OF THE SOVIET PEOPLES. PRESSURE HAD TO BE KEPT UPON SOVIET BEHAVIOUR, FOR EXAMPLE IN AFGHANISTAN AND CAMBODIA. HE HAD HAD VERY STIFF DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW ON THESE SUBJECTS BUT THE OUTCOME WAS NOT VERY COMFORTING AT ALL. HE HAD ALSO HAD WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS STIFF DISCUSSIONS ON ESPIONAGE AND SURVEILLANCE, BUT THESE ASPECTS HAD TO BE KEPT IN PERSPECTIVE.

START

4. SHULTZ CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THE BASIC SHAPE OF THE 50 PERCENT PROPOSAL FOR REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, ALONG THE LINES OF REYKJAVIK, INCLUDING FURTHER EXPLORATION OF THE COUNTING RULES FOR HEAVY MISSILES AND BOMBERS. NO FURTHER AGREEMENTS HAD BEEN REACHED ON THE DETAILS, BUT HE VOLUNTEERED THAT THE 10 YEAR PROPOSAL FOR THE COMPLETE ABOLITION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES WAS QUOTE NOT REALLY BEING ADDRESSED AT THIS POINT UNQUOTE. THE US EXPECTED TO TABLE A FULL START TREATY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEXT ROUND IN GENEVA.

SPACE AND DEFENCE

5. IN MOSCOW SHULTZ HAD EXPLAINED THE RE-ARRANGED US POSTURE, AS BRIEFED TO THE NAC BY WITZE - OUR TELNO 171 - INCLUDING THE 7 YEAR NON-WITHDRAWAL ABMT PROPOSAL WITH SUBSEQUENT RIGHT OF SDI DEPLOYMENT. ACKNOWLEDGING ITS AUTHORSHIP, SHULTZ SAID THAT HE HAD PUT FORWARD THE PRIME MINISTER'S IDEA FOR YEARLY EXCHANGES ON PLANS AND DATA ON STRATEGIC RESEARCH PROGRAMMES. THE US OPEN LABORATORY PROPOSAL WAS ON THE TABLE. HE HAD ALSO PROPOSED AS A FURTHER CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE THE PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT SDI TESTS SO THAT THESE COULD BE OBSERVED. HIS OBJECTIVE HAD BEEN TO ENCOURAGE THE SOVIET UNION TO BUILD A STABLE ENVIRONMENT, BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO AGREEMENTS.

TESTING

6. THERE HAD BEEN INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS BY THE EXPERT GROUPS OF THE US CORTEX METHOD AGAINST THE SOVIET SO-CALLED SEISMIC PROCEDURE WHICH THEY STILL CONSIDERED PROVIDED BETTER VERIFICATION. THE EXPERTS HAD DIFFERED BUT SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE HAD AGREED THAT FURTHER MEETINGS OF EXPERTS SHOULD EXPLORE THE TECHNICAL DIFFERENCES AND SHOULD CONDUCT EXPERIMENTS TO TEST THEIR THEORIES. SHULTZ DESCRIBED THIS AS A POSITIVE STEP TOWARDS IMPROVING VERIFICATION.

CW

7. ANOTHER SPECIAL WORKING GROUP ON CW IN MOSCOW HAD EXPLORED THE US/SOVIET DIFFERENCES ON VERIFICATION. THE US STILL FOUND IT HARD TO SEE HOW CONFIDENCE IN A VERIFICATION REGIME COULD BE MAINTAINED WITHOUT MANDATORY INSPECTION. THE ONLY PROGRESS HAD BEEN IN PICKING UP THE REFERENCE IN MR GORBACHEV'S PRAGUE SPEECH IN THE CONSTRUCTION BUILDING OF A SOVIET CW DESTRUCTION PLANT. NOTING THAT THE USSR HAD ONLY VERY RECENTLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEY HAD ANY CW TO DESTROY, SHULTZ HAD INVITED SOVIET EXPERTS TO VISIT THE US DESTRUCTION PLANT AND SUGGESTED RECIPROCAL VISITS. THIS HAD BEEN ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE BY THE SOVIET SIDE, BUT QUESTIONS OF TIMING AND STATUS STILL HAD TO BE RESOLVED. THIS REPRESENTED QUOTE A LITTLE HEADWAY UNQUOTE.

RISK REDUCTION CENTRES

8. THIS WORK HAD BEEN TAKEN FORWARD BY PERLE AND WAS NOW FAIRLY CLOSE TO FINAL AGREEMENT. ONE MORE SESSION MIGHT BRING MATTERS TO

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LRINF

9. SHULTZ REPORTED IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS IN INF. LRINF DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN ON THE BASIS OF THE REYKJAVIK FORMULA, BUT SHULTZ HAD MADE A STRONG CASE FOR A TRULY GLOBAL LRINF OUTCOME. THIS WOULD HAVE SOLVED ONE OF THE REMAINING SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS, SOVIET REFUSAL TO ALLOW US LRINF BASING IN ALASKA SINCE THE RUSSIANS WERE STILL ARGUING FOR THEIR DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS (ANYTHING WHICH WOULD REACH THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SUPER POWER) BUT THE US QUOTE WOULD NEVER SHIFT UNQUOTE ON THIS. A GLOBAL ZERO WOULD ALSO GREATLY EASE VERIFICATION PROBLEMS. THE SOVIETS HAD NOT LISTED VERIFICATION AS A PROBLEM AREA, AND PROMISED TO DISCUSS VERIFICATION IDEAS CONSTRUCTIVELY DURING THE NEXT INF ROUND BEGINNING 23 APRIL WHEN THEY WOULD TABLE A FULL DRAFT TREATY. IT DID LOOK AS THOUGH, AT LEAST IN PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS, THE SOVIETS HAD MOVED A LONG WAY ON VERIFICATION. THIS WOULD BE A GREAT IMPORTANT.

10. ON SRINF, THE SOVIETS HAD PROPOSED ZERO AND HAD GONE PUBLIC. AN EARLY AND UNITED ALLIANCE RESPONSE WAS NOW NEEDED.

11. THE SOVIET OFFER WAS FOR CONSTRAINTS ON SS12/22 AND, SHULTZ IMPLIED, SS23 WITH A MAXIMUM NUMBER AT CURRENT SOVIET LEVELS MINUS THOSE MISSILES IN GDR/CZECHOSLOVAKIA WHICH WOULD BE REMOVED AND DESTROYED IN ONE YEAR. THEIR PREFERENCE WAS FOR ZERO LRINF IN EUROPE BUT, FOLLOWING SHULTZ'S REJECTION OF THIS, GORBACHEV INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO APPROACH THE ISSUE ON A GLOBAL BASIS. GORBACHEV HAD PROPOSED IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS TO INCORPORATE ALL THESE IN A SEPARATE SRINF TREATY, THUS DE-LINKING LRINF FROM SRINF. SHULTZ HAD NEITHER ACCEPTED NOR REJECTED GLOBAL ZERO SRINF BUT HAD PRESSED FOR SRINF TO BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE INF AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF ALLIANCE POLICY. SHULTZ EMPHASISED THAT HE HAD BEEN TALKING ABOUT SRINF AND THAT NATO SMF WERE NOT PART OF THE EXERCISE AND QUOTE SHOULD NOT BE ON THE TABLE UNQUOTE. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION FROM GENSCHER, SHULTZ SAID THAT THE GERMAN PERSHINGS HAD NOT BEEN MENTIONED. HE ADVISED THAT QUOTE WE SHOULD NOT BRING THEM UP UNQUOTE.

12. SHULTZ OUTLINED 3 POSSIBLE BROAD APPROACHES BY THE ALLIANCE:

(A) ACCEPT A SOVIET ZERO SRINF PROPOSAL PROVIDING IT MET ALL OUR NEGOTIATING CRITERIA. THE P11/GLCM DEPLOYMENT WOULD THUS HAVE LEVERED OUT SS20, SS4, SS12/22 AND SS23 SYSTEMS FOR WHICH THERE ARE NO US DEPLOYED COUNTERPARTS. NEW US SRINF DEPLOYMENT PROBLEMS WOULD BE AVOIDED. SOME PEOPLE WOULD SAY IT WAS QUOTE A HELL OF A DEAL UNQUOTE AND PUBLIC OPINION WOULD BE SUPPORTIVE. BUT HE ACKNOWLEDGED A DANGER OF BUILDING MOMENTUM FOR SOVIET GOAL OF DENUCLEARISING EUROPE LEAVING THEIR CW AND CONVENTIONAL ADVANTAGE. IT WOULD BEGIN THE PROCESS OF UNDERMINING FLEXIBLE RESPONSE IF NATO DID NOT COME FORWARD WITH SUITABLE ADDITIONAL MEASURES.

(B) REJECT A SOVIET ZERO-ZERO SRINF PROPOSAL, EVEN IF IT MET OUR BASIC NEGOTIATING REQUIREMENTS. SOVIET PROPAGANDA WOULD ENCOURAGE PUBLIC CRITICISM BUT IMPORTANT SEGMENTS OF PUBLIC OPINION WOULD WELCOME SUCH A REJECTION. SHULTZ STRESSED THAT THIS OUTCOME IMPLIES DEPLOYMENT OF US SRINF SYSTEMS SINCE THE ALLIANCE COULD NOT FAVOUR LEAVING SOME SOVIET SRINF BUT CONTINUE WITH ZERO US SRINF. FROM THE US POINT OF VIEW SHULTZ NOTED THAT THEY WERE NOT LIKELY TO LOOK FAVOURABLY ON A PROPOSAL TO DEVOTE SCARCE RESOURCES TO DEVELOP AN ALTERNATIVE SRINF MISSILE, WHEN THE US PIB WOULD BE AVAILABLE. THE LATTER WAS EASY TO PRODUCE BY TAKING A STAGE OUT OF P2.

(C) TABLE A COUNTER-PROPOSAL WITH AS A MINIMUM SOME EQUAL GLOBAL CEILING AT A LEVEL BELOW THE CURRENT SOVIET LEVEL BUT ABOVE ZERO, AND THAT HAS SOME REALISTIC POSSIBILITY OF BEING IMPLEMENTED. THERE

(C) TABLE A COUNTER-PROPOSAL WITH AS A MINIMUM SOME EQUAL GLOBAL CEILING AT A LEVEL BELOW THE CURRENT SOVIET LEVEL BUT ABOVE ZERO, AND THAT HAS SOME REALISTIC POSSIBILITY OF BEING IMPLEMENTED. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF SUB-OPTIONS. IN SHULTZ'S VIEW CURRENT ALLIANCE POLICY OF CONCURRENT SRINF CONSTRAINTS WITH US RIGHT TO MATCH FELL UNDER THIS HEADING. IN ANY CASE THE SOVIETS WOULD DESTROY THEIR 42 SRINF LAUNCHERS IN GDR/CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND RESULTING LEVEL COULD BECOME LOWER GLOBAL CEILING FOR BOTH SIDES. SHULTZ EMPHASISED THAT IF THE ALLIANCE REJECTED ZERO IT HAD TO PROPOSE AN ALTERNATIVE LEVEL AND BE PREPARED TO REACH IT. THIS APPROACH WOULD MAINTAIN THE BASIC ALLIANCE VIEW THAT CONCURRENT CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF ARE A SINE QU NON AND AVOID THE PROBLEMS OF ZERO-ZERO SRINF, AND SUPPORT NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. IN THE ABSENCE OF AN ALTERNATIVE NATO POSITION THIS SUB-OPTION WOULD REMAIN THE US APPROACH.

13. SHULTZ STRESSED THAT NO MATTER WHAT THE OUTCOME VOCAL AND IMPORTANT SEGMENTS OF THE COMMUNITY THAT ARE CONCERNED ABOUT NATO DEFENCE WOULD BE DISSATISFIED. GIVEN THIS THE ALLIANCE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON THE BEST REALISTICALLY ACHIEVABLE OUTCOME FOR NATO SECURITY. BEFORE MOSCOW HE HAD BELIEVED THE NAC TO BE APPROACHING CONSENSUS ON AVOIDING ZERO-ZERO OUTCOME IN SRINF BECAUSE OF THE DANGERS OF A MOVE TO DENUCLEARISATION, AN OUTCOME WHICH COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED IN CURRENT OR PROSPECTIVE SECURITY CONDITIONS. NO MATTER WHAT THE SOLUTION OF SRINF, THE ALLIANCE NEEDED TO AGREE TO DRAW A LINE BELOW THE RANGE OF LRINF BEYOND WHICH WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO GO TO ZERO OR FURTHER ELIMINATE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. THE ALLIANCE MUST STICK TO THAT LINE AND ACT ACCORDINGLY. WE MUST MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THERE ARE SOME THINGS WE ARE NOT INTERESTED IN NEGOTIATING ABOUT.

14. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL DREW THAT LINE JUST BELOW THE SS23. IF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WAS REJECTED THE LINE WOULD IN EFFECT BE DRAWN AT THE RANGE OF SCALEBOARD (925 KM).

15. SHULTZ EMPHASISED HIS BELIEF THAT AS LONG AS NATO IS FACED WITH A CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL IMBALANCE, AND UNLESS AND UNTIL A BETTER STRATEGY FOR DETERRENCE IS FOUND AND IMPLEMENTED, WE MUST STICK TO THE STRATEGY OF FORWARD DEFENCE AND FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. US WOULD CONTINUE TO PLAY ITS FULL PART AND TO DEPLOY NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN ALL RANGE BRACKETS. HE MENTIONED SLBMS COMMITTED TO SACEUR, F1-11 AND OTHER DCA, (ALL CAPABLE OF HOLDING TARGETS ON SOVIET TERRITORY AT RISK.) MODERNISATION OF US NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN EUROPE WAS IMPORTANT UNFINISHED BUSINESS; QUOTE WE WILL STICK WITH IT UNQUOTE. THE HLG WOULD MEET TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS NEXT WEEK, AND THE US PROPOSED A SCG MEETING THE FOLLOWING WEEK. HE INVITED HLG/SCG REPRESENTATIVES TO PROVIDE NATIONAL VIEWS SO THAT EARLY DECISIONS COULD BE TAKEN; QUOTE WE HAVE STUDIED THE ISSUES LONG ENOUGH UNQUOTE.

16. A NEW NEGOTIATION CONCERNING THE MONTEBELLO SYSTEMS WOULD POSE THE ALLIANCE VERY SERIOUS PROBLEMS AND MIGHT LEAD TO A NEW DE FACTO DUAL TRACK IN WHICH ESSENTIAL PROGRAMMES COULD BECOME HOPELESSLY Mired. THE ALLIANCE COULD BE PROPELLED INTO A NEGOTIATION IN WHICH THERE IS NO PROSPECT OF AN AGREEMENT THAT COULD BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIED, AND PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF THE DENUCLEARISERS. ALTHOUGH THE CURRENT ALLIANCE POSITION CALLS FOR FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, A ZERO SRINF AGREEMENT WOULD CHANGE THE SITUATION AND OBIVIATE THE PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF SUCH NEGOTIATIONS.

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MY TELNO 617: SHULTZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW 13-15 APRIL

SUMMARY

1. SUFFICIENT GLIMMERS OF PROGRESS ON INF/SRINF TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO ENVISAGE AN AGREEMENT THIS YEAR; AND A SURPRISING MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR TEST NEGOTIATIONS. BUT NONE ON START/SDI. NOTHING NEW ON CW, CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS OR REGIONAL ISSUES. DESPITE CURRENT BILATERAL PROBLEMS, A BUSINESS-LIKE VISIT.

DETAIL

2. MY US COLLEAGUE GAVE TO ME (AND TO THE FRG AND FRENCH CHARGES) TODAY, 16 APRIL, THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF SHULTZ'S TALKS IN MOSCOW. THIS WILL INEVITABLY DUPLICATE UK PERM REP'S REPORT OF SHULTZ'S OWN BRIEFING TO THE NAC IN MANY RESPECTS BUT, IN CASE THERE ARE NUANCES OR GAPS IN ONE ACCOUNT OR THE OTHER I AM REPORTING MATLOCK'S IN FULL.

3. SHULTZ HAD TALKS LASTING 4 1/2 HOURS WITH GORBACHEV, 3 HOURS

IN FULL.

3. SHULTZ HAD TALKS LASTING 4 1/2 HOURS WITH GORBACHEV, 3 HOURS WITH RYZHKOV AND 11 HOURS WITH SHEVARDNADZE.

ARMS CONTROL

INF/SRINF

4. SHEVARDNADZE, IN HIS FIRST MEETING WITH SHULTZ ON 13 APRIL, CONFIRMED THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS WILLING TO CONCLUDE A LRINF AGREEMENT BASED ON THE REYKJAVIK FORMULA (ZERO IN EUROPE, 100 IN ASIA/USA) PROVIDING FOR THE SIMULTANEOUS REMOVAL OF SHORTER-RANGE (500-1000KM) INF FROM THE GDR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND FOR THEIR DESTRUCTION. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD THEN NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT FOR THE FURTHER REDUCTION OF SHORTER-RANGE INF OR, ALTERNATIVELY, COULD AGREE TO EMBARK ON THESE NEGOTIATIONS STRAIGHT AWAY, IN ADVANCE OF A LRINF AGREEMENT. THE SOVIET OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO ACHIEVE A ZERO SOLUTION ON SRINF WITHIN A SPECIFIC TIME-FRAME, TO BE NEGOTIATED, WHICH COULD (GORBACHEV SUBSEQUENTLY ADDED) BE AS SHORT AS ONE YEAR. SHULTZ STATED THE US PREFERENCE FOR A GLOBAL ZERO ON LRINF, WHILE INDICATING WILLINGNESS TO ADHERE TO THE REYKJAVIK FORMULA AS A (NEXT TWO WORDS UNDERLINED) PIS ALLER AND STRESSING THAT LIMITS ON SRINF WOULD HAVE TO BE GLOBAL RATHER THAN REGIONAL IN VIEW OF THE EASE OF TRANSFER OF SHORTER-RANGE WEAPONS. SHULTZ ALSO TOOK A FIRM STAND FOR A US LEGAL RIGHT TO MATCH SRINF DEPLOYMENTS FOR SO LONG AS ANY SOVIET SRINF REMAINED DEPLOYED. BEYOND THIS, SHULTZ SIMPLY TOOK NOTE OF THE SOVIET PROPOSALS AND SAID THAT HE COULD NOT RESPOND TO THEM IN ADVANCE OF CONSULTATIONS WITH US ALLIES.

5. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION BETWEEN SHULTZ AND GORBACHEV, THE LATTER APPEARED TO INDICATE ACCEPTANCE OF A GLOBAL BASIS FOR SRINF REDUCTIONS BUT WITHOUT GIVING A CLEAR COMMITMENT. GORBACHEV ARGUED THAT, IF THE TIMESCALE FOR THE REDUCTION OF ELIMINATION OF SRINF WAS TO BE AS SHORT AS ONE YEAR, THE U S DEMAND FOR A RIGHT TO MATCH WAS UNREALISTIC AND UNNECESSARY. SHULTZ REPLIED THAT THIS WAS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE FOR THE US: IT DID NOT FOLLOW THAT A LEGAL RIGHT TO MATCH WOULD NECESSARILY BE IMPLEMENTED. HE REMINDED GORBACHEV THAT, IN ADVANCE OF CONSULTATION WITH THE ALLIES, THE US HAD NOT, IN ANY CASE, ACCEPTED A GLOBAL BASIS FOR SRINF REDUCTIONS.

6. SHULTZ'S IMPRESSION, AT THE END OF HIS DISCUSSIONS, WAS THAT BOTH GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE WERE PROBABLY THINKING IN TERMS OF CONCLUDING AN INF AGREEMENT IN 1987, WHILE REMAINING FUZZY ON FURTHER SOVIET CONCESSIONS: AND THAT, ON SRINF, THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD PROBABLY ACCEPT A US LEGAL RIGHT TO MATCH BUT WITHOUT COMMITMENT AT THIS STAGE. THE RUSSIANS REMAINED ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO THE CONVERSION OF PERSHING IIS TO PERSHING IS DESPITE THE US OFFER OF VERIFIED DESTRUCTION OF THE PERSHING II ADDITIONAL BOOST STAGE. THE SOVIET SIDE UNDERTOOK TO PRODUCE A NEW DRAFT INF AGREEMENT WHEN NEGOTIATIONS RESUME IN GENEVA ON 23 APRIL.

START

7. ON STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS, SHULTZ'S TALKS PRODUCED NO PROGRESS. THE RUSSIANS HAD APPEARED TO RETREAT FROM THE AGREEMENT WHICH THE

7. ON STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS, SHULTZ'S TALKS PRODUCED NO PROGRESS. THE RUSSIANS HAD APPEARED TO RETREAT FROM THE AGREEMENT WHICH THE AMERICANS THOUGHT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED AT REYKJAVIK ON COUNTING RULES, I.E. THAT BOMBERS WITHOUT ALCM'S WOULD BE COUNTED AS ONE LAUNCHER PLUS ONE WARHEAD, INSTEAD OF EACH GRAVITY BOMB COUNTING AS A WARHEAD. ON THIS POINT GORBACHEV, HAVING CALLED IN AKHROMEYEV FOR ADVICE, HAD SAID THAT THIS CONCESSION WAS DEPENDENT ON US AGREEMENT TO ABANDON SUB-LIMITS FOR EACH SYSTEM. APPARENT PROGRESS AT REYKJAVIK ON THIS ISSUE HAD, THEREFORE EVAPORATED. MOREOVER, GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE HAD REMAINED ADAMANT ON THE LINKAGE BETWEEN STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS AND SDI CONSTRAINTS.

8. SHULTZ HAD LEFT ON THE TABLE THE NEW US PROPOSAL THAT THE FIVE PLUS FIVE YEAR TIME-FRAME FOR STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS AND ABM COMPLIANCE SHOULD BE REPLACED BY A 7-YEAR PERIOD DURING WHICH STRATEGIC WEAPONS WOULD BE REDUCED BY 50% AND BOTH SIDES WOULD BE BOUND NOT TO DEPLOY SDI SYSTEMS. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL ON ABM COMPLIANCE REMAINED THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD COMMIT THEMSELVES NOT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ABMT FOR 10 YEARS, WHILE AGREEING TO NEGOTIATIONS, WITHIN THE LAST 2-3 YEARS OF THAT PERIOD, ON WHAT WOULD IN FUTURE BE PERMISSIBLE. IF THESE NEGOTIATIONS DID NOT SUCCEED AND IF ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER DENOUNCED THE ABM TREATY, THE OTHER PARTY WOULD BE FREED OF ITS OBLIGATION TO CONTINUE WITH STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS.

9. THE SOVIET INSISTENCE ON STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE ABMT WAS NOW SUPPLEMENTED BY THE SUGGESTION THAT NEGOTIATIONS COULD TAKE PLACE IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY THOSE SDI SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS WHICH WOULD BE BANNED FROM BEING PUT INTO SPACE FOR TESTING OR DEPLOYMENT (PARAGRAPH 12 OF MY TELNO 613).

10. SHULTZ UNDERTOOK THAT THE US WOULD TABLE A DRAFT START TREATY WHEN THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS (DELAYED BECAUSE OF KAMPELMANN'S ILLNESS) RESUME.

NUCLEAR TESTS

11. SHULTZ'S TALKS SHOWED THAT THERE IS NOW VIRTUAL AGREEMENT ON A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH, TACKLING VERIFICATION ISSUES FIRST AND THEN GOING ON TO RATIFICATION BY THE US OF THE 1974 (THRESHOLD) AND 1976 (PNE) TREATIES. ON THE REITERATED US PROPOSAL FOR ADOPTION OF THE CORTEX VERIFICATION SYSTEM, THE RUSSIANS AGREED TO CONDUCT A SCIENTIFIC COMPARISON OF CORTEX WITH SEISMIC METHODS, INCLUDING THE MONITORED EXPLOSION OF A US NUCLEAR DEVICE IN THE SOVIET UNION AND OF A SOVIET NUCLEAR DEVICE IN THE US. ACCEPTING THIS, SHULTZ INDICATED THAT THE US WOULD THEN BE PREPARED TO GO ON TO NEGOTIATE ON AGREED REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR TESTS BY EACH SIDE IN PROPORTION TO THE REDUCTIONS ACHIEVED IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE RUSSIANS AGREED TO THIS. FULL AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR TESTS NEGOTIATIONS IS THUS NOW DEPENDENT ONLY ON FINDING A DESIGNATION OF THOSE NEGOTIATIONS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES: WHEREAS THE RUSSIANS WISH TO DESCRIBE THEM AS BEING DIRECTED 'TOWARDS A CTB', THE AMERICANS CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN THAT THIS WOULD BE MISLEADING.

12. IT WAS AGREED THAT EXPERT TALKS SHOULD BE CONTINUED: MATLOCK COMMENTED THAT THE CURRENT SOVIET POSITION IS CLOSER TO THAT OF THE UK THAN TO THAT OF THE US AND THAT US RESERVATIONS ON OUR CHALLENGE INSPECTION PROPOSALS REMAIN A SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLE.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES

13. THIS ISSUE RECEIVED ONLY CURSORY ATTENTION. SHULTZ REGRETTED THE ABSENCE OF AN EASTERN RESPONSE TO THE WESTERN INITIATIVE IN MBFR. SHEVARDNADZE MADE SOVIET LACK OF INTEREST IN CONTINUING NEGOTIATIONS IN THAT FORUM VERY CLEAR, WHILE INDICATING THAT THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD BE WILLING TO SUBSUME NEGOTIATIONS ON THE REDUCTION OF TACTICAL (LESS THAN 500KM) NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL REDUCTIONS, PREFERABLY WITHIN THE CSCE FRAMEWORK (IN ORDER NOT TO "OFFEND" THE NNA'S).

NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTRES

14. SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE AGREED THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON NRRC'S WERE CLOSE TO SUCCESS: THE ONLY UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS WERE TECHNICAL E.G. WHAT KIND OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE USED.

MISSILE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

15. SHULTZ TOLD GORBACHEV THAT THE US AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS, INDEPENDENTLY, WOULD SOON BE ANNOUNCING A REGIME TO CONTROL THE TRANSFER OF MISSILE TECHNOLOGY TO THIRD PARTIES. GORBACHEV DID NOT REACT.

HUMAN RIGHTS

16. SHULTZ RAISED HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES WITH BOTH GORBACHEV AND SHEVARDNADZE. GORBACHEV REACTED WITH CONSIDERABLE HEAT ("POPPED HIS CORK", ACCORDING TO ROZ RIDGEWAY) AND COUNTER-ATTACKED VIGOROUSLY, IN FAMILIAR TERMS. THE RUSSIANS NEVERTHELESS GAVE SHULTZ A SPECIFIC RESPONSE TO THE MOST RECENT US LIST OF HUMAN RIGHTS/FAMILY REUNIFICATION CASES, INCLUDING SOME NEGATIVE DECISIONS BUT MANY MORE POSITIVE ONES, AFFECTING ABOUT 20 FAMILIES WHO WOULD BE GIVEN EXIT VISAS TO EMIGRATE TO ISRAEL (ONE OF THE BENEFICIARIES IS THE PIANIST FELTSMAN IN WHOSE CASE REAGAN HAS TAKEN A PERSONAL INTEREST. GORBACHEV TOOK MATLOCK TO TASK IN CAUSTIC TERMS FOR ARRANGING, AT HIS RESIDENCE, A PASSOVER CEREMONY FOR REFUSENIKS WHICH SHULTZ HAD ATTENDED.

REGIONAL PROBLEMS

17. ALTHOUGH DISCUSSION OF REGIONAL ISSUES OCCUPIED SOME TIME, PARTICULARLY WITH SHEVARDNADZE, SOVIET POSITIONS REMAIN UNCHANGED FROM THOSE EXPOUNDED TO ARMACOST A MONTH AGO. SHEVARDNADZE MADE (AS HE MADE TO YOU) A STRONG PITCH FOR THE PROGRESS BEING MADE BY THE PUPPET REGIME IN AFGHANISTAN TOWARDS RECONCILIATION, DEMOCRATISATION ETC: HE CLAIMED THAT 12,000 MUJAHEDDIN HAD TURNED IN THEIR ARMS AND THAT LARGE NUMBERS OF REFUGEES ARE RETURNING FROM PAKISTAN. ON ANGOLA, SHULTZ URGED THAT THE MPLA SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO CONSIDER SAVIMBI'S PROPOSAL FOR THE BENGUELA

ENCOURAGED TO CONSIDER SAVIMBI'S PROPOSAL FOR THE BENGUELA RAILROAD SERIOUSLY (SHEVARDNADZE REPLIED THAT THIS WAS AN INTERNAL ANGOLAN MATTER). ON CHAD, SHEVARDNADZE SAID, (IN RESPONSE TO SHULTZ'S URGING THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT SHOULD ENCOURAGE QADAFFI TO STAY OUT OF CHAD) THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO QADAFFI THAT IT WISHED TO SEE CHAD FREE OF BOTH FRENCH AND LIBYAN INFLUENCE. SHULTZ TOLD GORBACHEV THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT SHOULD DO MORE TO PERSUADE INDIA TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING WITH PAKISTAN ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION; THERE WAS NO CLEAR SOVIET RESPONSE.

PERESTROIKA

19. SHULTZ'S TALKS WITH RYZHKOV WERE DEVOTED LARGELY TO ECONOMIC ISSUES. RYZHKOV EXPLAINED THAT THE EXISTING ECONOMIC STRUCTURE WAS TOO CENTRALISED AND THAT, WHILE BASIC ECONOMIC INDICATORS WOULD CONTINUE TO BE CENTRALLY DETERMINED, THE DETAILS WOULD HENCEFORTH BE WORKED OUT AT ENTERPRISE LEVEL. "PERESTROIKA" WAS NOT PROGRESSING AS QUICKLY AS THE LEADERSHIP WOULD WISH BUT THERE WAS PROGRESS; WESTERN REPORTS OF "OPPOSITION" OR "RESISTANCE" TO "PERESTROIKA" WERE GREATLY EXAGGERATED - THE PROBLEM WAS SIMPLY ONE OF BUREAUCRATIC INERTIA.

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20. SHULTZ LEFT MOSCOW REASONABLY SATISFIED. HE HAD EXPECTED NO BREAKTHROUGHS. THERE HAD, HE THOUGHT, BEEN PERCEPTIBLE IF GLACIAL PROGRESS ON SOME ISSUES, NOTABLY INF/SRINF AND NUCLEAR TESTING.

CARTLEDGE

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