

GRS 980

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

FM MOSCOW

TO DESKBY 121730Z FCO

TELNO 732

OF 121530Z MAY 87

INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, BONN, PARIS, UKDEL NATO, UKDEL CSCE VIENNA

VISIT OF MR DENIS HEALEY TO MOSCOW, 10-12 MAY *mf*

SUMMARY

1. DURING HIS VISIT MR HEALEY HAD DISCUSSION LASTING TWO AND A HALF HOURS WITH DOBRYNIN AND ZAGLADIN FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND A FURTHER TWO AND A HALF HOURS WITH SHEVARDNADZE. HE ALSO SAW BOGDANOV (USA/CANADA INSTITUTE) AND BYKOV (MEMO). AT A PRESS CONFERENCE HE CRITICISED THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT DID POINT TO THE EXISTING SOVIET CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY. I HOSTED A LUNCH ON 12 MAY AT WHICH MR HEALEY MET MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET INTELLIGENTSIA.

DETAIL

2. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE ON 12 MAY MR HEALEY SAID THAT THE FOLLOWING POINTS HAD EMERGED FROM HIS TALKS:

(1) ARMS CONTROL

(A) HE UNDERSTOOD THAT NEGOTIATIONS WERE GOING WELL ON THE DOUBLE ZERO SOLUTION FOR EUROPE, LEAVING THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION WITH 100 WAR HEADS EACH IN THE US AND ASIA RESPECTIVELY, AND THAT AN AGREEMENT WAS LIKELY TO BE REACHED FOR SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS BEFORE THE NEXT US ELECTIONS. MR HEALEY THOUGHT THAT THERE WOULD BE PROBLEMS OVER VERIFICATION ESPECIALLY WITH THE US WEAPONS AND SAID HE HAD PRESSED THE RUSSIANS HARD ON THE WISDOM OF RETAINING 100 SOVIET WARHEADS IN ASIA: WHY NOT REMOVE THEM ALL? HE AND THE RUSSIANS HAD AGREED TO DIFFER.

(B) ABOLITION OF SRINF

MR HEALEY THOUGHT THAT A REFUSAL ON THE PART OF ANY EUROPEAN COUNTRY TO ENTERTAIN THIS PARTICULAR SOVIET OFFER WOULD BE PERVERSE. HE DREW ATTENTION TO 'THE FACT THAT HMG IS APPARENTLY NOT SOLIDLY COMMITTED TO A ZERO OPTION ON INF.

RESTRICTED

(c)

(C) 50% STRATEGIC CUTS

RESTRICTED

HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS DISTURBED AT THE US PROPOSAL FOR STRATEGIC CUTS AND ABMT ADHERENCE OVER A SEVEN YEARS PERIOD. HE CLAIMED THAT KARPOV HAD EARLIER DEFINED THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SDI AND STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS IN A MORE HELPFUL WAY WHICH WOULD NOT IMPEDE NEGOTIATION ON STRATEGIC CUTS WHILE A SEPARATE ARRANGEMENT WAS BEING WORKED OUT FOR SDI.

(D) ON WESTERN ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE COMPLEX OF AGREEMENTS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS NOW IN PROSPECT MR HEALEY SAID THE ONLY RATIONAL (WESTERN) ARGUMENT AGAINST THEM WAS THAT THEY MIGHT WEAKEN THE WESTERN CAPABILITY TO DEAL WITH SOVIET CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY IN EUROPE. THIS DISPARITY WAS THE NEXT QUESTION TO BE ADDRESSED. HE HAD BEEN INTERESTED TO LEARN THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO REACTION TO EITHER THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSALS OF JUNE 1986 OR GORBACHEV'S OFFER OF REDUCTIONS DURING HIS RECENT SPEECH IN PRAGUE. MR HEALEY ADDED THAT HE HAD POINTED OUT TO THE RUSSIANS THAT ONE OF THE MAIN OBSTACLES TO AGREEMENTS SUCH AS MBFR HAD ALWAYS BEEN THE REFUSAL OF SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES TO VOUCHSAFE INFORMATION ABOUT CURRENT SOVIET FORCE LEVELS. HE SAID THAT THIS TIME HE HAD RECEIVED THE IMPRESSION FROM HIS SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS THAT WHEN NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES RESUMED THEY WOULD CORRECT THIS OMISSION.

(E) MR HEALEY CRITICISED THE 'IRRATIONAL ARGUMENT' PRESENTED BY THE PRIME MINISTER THAT EVEN IN THE CASE OF A CONVENTIONAL BALANCE OF FORCES NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE STILL REQUIRED AS A DETERRENT. THIS ARGUMENT IGNORED THE RISKS OF A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE WHICH WOULD FOLLOW AS MORE COUNTRIES WOULD WANT NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO BACK UP THEIR CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

(F) MR HEALEY WAS CONVINCED THAT THE CURRENT SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS SINCERE IN ITS DESIRE TO 'LIFT THE SHADOW OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE' AND END THE 'COLD WAR PSYCHOSIS'. ITS POLICIES WERE AIMED AT AN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM BASED ON A MORE INTERDEPENDENT AND INTEGRAL WORLD.

(G) MR HEALEY SAID THAT A HISTORIC MOMENT HAD NOW BEEN REACHED SINCE THE SOVIET UNION WERE CURRENTLY NEGOTIATING FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH AND NOT THE CONTRARY AS SOME WESTERN OBSERVERS HAD INDICATED: THE CURRENT MILITARY BALANCE IN THE WESTERN THEATRE WAS MORE FAVOURABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION THAN EVER BEFORE. ONE OF THE MAJOR REASONS FOR SOVIET ARMS CONTROL POLICIES WAS THE NEED TO DIVERT RESOURCES FROM THE MILITARY TO CIVILIAN SECTOR. THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER HAD ALSO IMPRESSED UPON THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES THE DANGERS INHERENT IN NUCLEAR POWER.

RESTRICTED

LMVMAN

RESTRICTED

HUMAN RIGHTS

3. MR HEALEY SAID THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED A LIST OF CASES HE HAD BROUGHT WITH HIM AS WELL AS THE GENERAL SITUATION. ON THE LATTER HE SAID HE HAD BEEN ASSURED THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS COMMITTED TO CHANGING SOVIET LAWS WHICH WOULD BRING THEM INTO LINE WITH BOTH THE UN CONVENTION (UNSPECIFIED) AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AS WELL AS THE NON-AGREED BERNE DOCUMENT. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT AS A RESULT OF NEW LAWS PASSED JEWISH EMIGRATION WAS EXPECTED TO REACH 12,000 BY THE END OF 1987.

4. ON SPECIFIC CASES, MR HEALEY SAID THAT IT WAS NOT CONSISTENT FOR THE SOVIET UNION ON THE ONE HAND TO BE WILLING TO GIVE UP TWO WHOLE CLASSES OF MISSILE IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS BUT ON THE OTHER TO REFUSE TO ALLOW FAMILIES TO BE REUNITED BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT ONE MEMBER MIGHT HAVE SERVED IN THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES AS MANY AS 10 YEARS AGO.

BRITISH DOMESTIC ISSUES

5. MR HEALEY WOULD NOT BE DRAWN ON HIS COMMENT TO BRITISH JOURNALISTS ON 11 MAY THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WAS 'PRAYING FOR A LABOUR VICTORY' AT THE NEXT ELECTION. HE ADMITTED A POSSIBLE EXAGGERATION, BUT STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN ASSURED THAT MR RENTON'S STATEMENT THAT THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY WAS MORE POPULAR IN MOSCOW WAS NOT TRUE. HE ASSERTED THAT MR GORBACHEV HAD NOT VETOED HIS PLANNED VISIT AT THE END OF MARCH. HE SAID THAT THE LABOUR PARTY'S CHANCES IN THE ELECTION WOULD BE ENHANCED BY THEIR SUPPORT OF A DOUBLE ZERO OPTION, AND THAT HMG'S POSITION ON THIS PARTICULAR TOPIC WAS STILL OBSCURE.

EMBASSY INVOLVEMENT

6. AS PLANNED I GAVE A LUNCH AT WHICH MR HEALEY WAS ABLE TO MEET SOME INTELLECTUALS. HE EXPRESSED HIMSELF WELL PLEASED WITH THE OCCASION AND WE HEARD NO MORE OF HIS CONTENTION MADE EARLIER TO JOURNALISTS AND CORRECTLY DENIED BY US, THAT THIS EMBASSY WAS THE ORIGIN OF AN ASSERTION BY 'WESTERN SOURCES' THAT HIS EARLIER PLANNED VISIT HAD BEEN

-3-
RESTRICTED

/THWARTED

RESTRICTED

THWARTED ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM GORBACHEV.

MARSHALL

YYYY

MXHPAN 0258

EAST WEST &
LIMITED

SOVIET D.
DEFENCE D.
RESEARCH DEPT.
PLANNING STAFF
EED
NAD
SAD
WED
ACDD
CRD
NEWS DEPT.
INFO DEPT.
ECD(E)
POD
FED
NED
PUSD
CSCE UNIT
PROTOCOL DEPT.
EGSD

PS
PS/LADY YOUNG
PS/MR RENTON
PS/MR EGGAR
PS/PUS
MR DEREK THOMAS
CHIEF CLERK
MR BOYD
MR MUNRO
MR GILLMORE
MR RATFORD
MR FALL
MR FEARN
MR LONG
MR BRAITHWAITE
MR BARRINGTON
MR WINCHESTER
MR KERR

(COPIES TO NO 40 DOWNING ST.)

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

ARMS CONTROL TALKS

- 4 -

RESTRICTED