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 TELNO 968
 OF 071350Z JULY 87
 INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
 INFO PRIORITY PARIS, BONN, UKDEL NATO

MY TELNO 928, PARA 2: **US/SOVIET RELATIONS**

1. MY US COLLEAGUE (PLEASE PROTECT) TOLD MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE AND ME ON 7 JULY THAT THERE HAS STILL BEEN NO SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSAL THAT SHEVARDNADZE SHOULD TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON IN MID-JULY FOR TALKS WITH SHULTZ (NOR TO THE RELATED SUGGESTION THAT HE SHOULD ATTEND THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO CAST THE SOVIET VOTE ON IRAN/IRAQ). SOVIET OFFICIALS ARE TALKING VAGUELY ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH A VISIT IN, PERHAPS, LATE JULY OR MAYBE IN EARLY AUGUST. THIS LACK OF ENTHUSIASM IS EXPLAINED BY VAGUE REFERENCES TO LACK OF PROGRESS AT GENEVA AND US RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS.

2. THE AMERICANS ARE PERPLEXED BY THE PUBLIC SOVIET DISAVOWAL OF CHERVOV'S 'NON-INITIATIVE' IN GENEVA (MY TELNO 945). ALTHOUGH IT IS TRUE THAT CHERVOV'S PROPOSAL TO GILTMAN, IN A DISCUSSION OF WHICH THEY HAVE AN AGREED MINUTE, WAS ADVANCED AS 'A PERSONAL IDEA NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENTING OFFICIAL POLICY', CHERVOV HAD QUITE CLEARLY BEEN AUTHORISED TO SPEAK AS HE DID. HE HAD TOLD GLITMAN THAT THE DIFFICULTY POSED FOR THE SOVIET SIDE BY THE PERSHING WAS RELATED SOLELY TO THE POSSIBILITY OF MODERNISATION. CHERVOV HAD INDICATED THAT THE RUSSIANS COULD ACCEPT THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE IN THE FRG OF 72 P1AS, WITH THEIR US WARHEADS, FOR SO LONG AS THEY COULD BE CERTAIN THAT THE US WOULD NOT UPGRADE THESE, AT FRG REQUEST, TO P1BS. THE LEAKAGE OF THIS CONVERSATION BY THE AMERICANS HAD CLEARLY AGGRAVATED THE RUSSIANS BUT THIS WAS NOT (IN MATLOCK'S VIEW) AN ADEQUATE EXPLANATION FOR PYADISHEV'S DISCLAIMER. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THE P1A ISSUE WAS CONTROVERSIAL WITHIN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND THAT THE LEAK HAD EXACERBATED AN INTERNAL DISPUTE.

3. AT THE SAME TIME, A SOVIET MFA OFFICIAL HAS TOLD THE AMERICANS THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES ARE WORKING 'ON THE PRESUMPTION' THAT GORBACHEV WOULD ATTEND THE UNGA IN SEPTEMBER. IF THIS IS INDEED ON THE CARDS, THE SOVIET GAME-PLAN MIGHT BE TO WORK TOWARDS AN EARLIER WASHINGTON SUMMIT THAN HAD BEEN EXPECTED COMBINING IT, AS KHRUSHCHEV HAD DONE, WITH UNGA ATTENDANCE AND A MAJOR SPEECH: THIS MIGHT HAVE ATTRACTIONS FOR GORBACHEV IN TERMS OF THE POLITICAL PRESENTATION OF A WASHINGTON SUMMIT BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND IN THE THIRD WORLD. IF THE RUSSIANS ARE THINKING ALONG THESE LINES, SHEVARDNADZE'S TALKS WITH SHULTZ WOULD PROBABLY

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BE AIMED AT FINALISING AN INF AGREEMENT AND PRODUCING A DOCUMENT VIRTUALLY READY FOR SIGNATURE AT THE SUMMIT - HENCE THE SLIPPAGE, AT WHICH THE RUSSIANS APPEAR TO BE HINTING, IN THE TIMING FOR A VISIT TO WASHINGTON BY SHEVARDNADZE. P1A AND OTHER OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS WOULD HAVE TO BE RESOLVED FIRST, IN GENEVA. THE LEAKAGE OF THE CHERVOV/GLITMAN CONVERSATION MAY, HOWEVER, HAVE UPSET THIS SCENARIO.

4. A TRADE-OFF WHEREBY THE RUSSIANS WOULD ACCEPT GLOBAL ZERO FOR LRINF IN EXCHANGE FOR US FORFEITURE OF THE RIGHT TO MODERNISE P1AS, EVEN IF SO REQUESTED BY THE FRG, STILL SEEMS A THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE OUTCOME WHICH COULD UNBLOCK THE PATH TO AN EARLY INF AGREEMENT - ALTHOUGH IF GORBACHEV IS NOW THINKING IN TERMS OF AN OCTOBER SUMMIT THE AMOUNT OF WORK REMAINING TO BE DONE IN SO SHORT A PERIOD IS FORMIDABLE.

CARTLEDGE

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MXHPAN 1852

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