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FM ISLAMABAD
TO ROUTINE FCO
TELNO 682
OF 140517Z AUGUST 87
INFO ROUTINE WASHINGTON, KABUL, MOSCOW, NEW DELHI
INFO SAVING KARACHI

CALL ON PAKISTAN FOREIGN MINISTER

1. I PAID MY INITIAL CALL ON THE PAKISTAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON 12 AUGUST HAVING ASKED FOR AN APPOINTMENT TO DELIVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO MR JUNEJO.
 2. YAQUB STARTED WITH SOME KIND WORDS ABOUT MY OWN EARLIER INVOLVEMENT WITH PAKISTAN AND ABOUT PAKISTAN'S RESPECT AND FIRENDRSHIP FOR BRITAIN. HE SAID THAT HE HOPED PAKISTAN COULD SOON REJOIN THE COMMONWEALTH WHICH IT HAD BEEN A MISTAKE FOR THEM TO LEAVE. FORTUNATELY, HOWEVER, THEIR LEAVING HAD NOT AFFECTED THEIR CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH BRITAIN, WHICH WAS A CREDIT TO BOTH SIDES (THE POINT ABOUT THE COMMONWEALTH WAS MADE IN SUCH A WAY THAT I DID NOT HAVE TO REPLY).
 3. HAVING SAID THAT IT WAS AN HONOUR TO SERVE AS BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO PAKISTAN WHERE THERE WAS SUCH A HISTORY OF GOOD RELATIONS AND PERSONAL FRIENDSHIPS STRETCHING INTO THE PAST AND HAPPILY MAINTAINED NOW, I REFERRED TO THE IMPENDING PROGRAMME OF VISITS. YAQUB DID NOT SEEM TO BE AWARE OF THE VISIT BY PRINCESS ALEXANDRA WHICH HE ASKED ABOUT AND WELCOMED. HE ALSO WELCOMED THE PROSPECT OF THE VISIT BY LORD GLENARTHUR.
- AFGHANISTAN
4. I THEN HANDED OVER THE PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE WHICH YAQUB SAID WOULD BE MUCH APPRECIATED BY MR JUNEJO. THIS LED INTO A DISCUSSION ON AFGHANISTAN. I STARTED BY EXPRESSING CONDOLENCE ON MY BEHALF AND THAT OF THE GOVERNMENT AT THE RECENT SAD LOSS OF LIFE FROM TERRORIST BOMBS IN MARDAN. YAQUB SAID THAT IT WAS NOT ONLY THE SUFFERING OF THOSE DIRECTLY INVOLVED BUT THE ANXIETY THAT HAD BEEN CREATED AMONG THE GENERAL POPULACE THAT WAS A PROBLEM, WHICH WAS NO DOUBT THE OBJECT OF THE INSTIGATORS. I EXPLAINED OUR READINESS TO HELP THE VARIOUS PAKISTAN AGENCIES CONCERNED IN COMBATTING TERRORISM. YAQUB WELCOMED THIS AND AGREED THAT SUCH HELP SHOULD NOT BE PUBLICISED.
 5. WHEN ASKED ABOUT RENEWAL OF THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT'S CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION OVER AFGHANISTAN, YAQUB SAID THAT HE EXPECTED AN APPROACH FROM THE RUSSIANS IN THE NEAR FUTURE (SEMICOLON) IMPLYING THAT A VISIT BY VOR IMPLYING THAT A VISIT BY VORONTSOV WOULD THEN BE ON THE CARDS. HE SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN A HIATUS BECAUSE THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN STICKING TO THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION POLICY AND THEY KNEW THAT

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PAKISTAN'S OWN POLICY HAD NOT CHANGED. NOW, HOWEVER, IT LOOKED AS THOUGH THE RUSSIANS MIGHT HAVE SOMETHING NEW UP THEIR SLEEVE. PERHAPS PROPOSALS FOR A NON-PARTY GOVERNMENT IN KABUL. HE BELIEVED THAT NAJIBULLAH HAD BEEN PRESSING THE RUSSIANS TO GIVE HIM MORE TIME TO MAKE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION WORK. THE RUSSIANS WERE WELL AWARE, HOWEVER, THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT BACK OF REFUGEES, NOR OF PROMINENT PERSONALITIES. HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THE RUSSIANS WANTED TO PULL OUT IF THEY COULD SAVE FACE BUT AGREED THAT THEY HAD NOT YET DECIDED WHAT TO DO WITH THEIR MEN IN KABUL: THEY MIGHT HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO TAKE THEM TO THE USSR.

6. AS FAR AS THE RESISTANCE WERE CONCERNED, PAKISTAN'S OBJECTIVE WAS TO MAKE SURE THAT THEY STUCK TOGETHER AND THAT THEIR ACTIONS WERE DESIGNED NOT TO FIGHT FOR FIGHTINGS SAKE BUT TO PERSUADE THE RUSSIANS TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN. WHEN I MENTIONED THE VIEWS OF GAELANI, WHOM I HAD KNOWN PREVIOUSLY IN AFGHANISTAN, THAT THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT WERE SUPPORTING THE WRONG RESISTANCE GROUPS, YAQUB AGREED THAT THERE WAS A PROBLEM. THE PAKISTANIS SUPPORTED THE GROUPS WHICH WERE MOST ACTIVE IN THE RESISTANCE THOUGH HE WAS AWARE THAT ONE COULD ARGUE THESE GROUPS WERE ACTIVE PRECISELY BECAUSE THEY GOT MORE ARMS. HE EXPRESSED HIGH REGARD FOR RABBANI. AS FAR AS THE KING WAS CONCERNED, HE WISELY DID NOT WISH TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH ANY RUSSIAN PROPOSALS (LIKE WE HE DISMISSED A ROGUE STORY IN THE URDU PRESS HERE THAT NAJIB HAD BEEN AWAY FOR SO LONG BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN TAKEN TO SEE THE KING IN ROME). IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT ANY MOVEMENT TO GIVE THE KING A ROLE SHOULD COME FROM THE AFGHANS THEMSELVES. YAQUB APPEARED TO KNOW NOTHING OF ANY IDEA OF A UN SPONSORED ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE WITHOUT THE RUSSIANS AND PAKISTANIS PRESENT, AND EXPRESSED SOME SURPRISE AT THE IDEA. HE SAID THAT THE MFA WOULD KEEP THIS EMBASSY FULLY INFORMED OF PAKISTAN'S CONTACTS ON AFGHANISTAN WITH THE RUSSIANS AND AFGHANS.

7. WHEN I REFERRED TO THE AMERICAN SUGGESTION ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF SOME INITIATIVE IN THE FORM OF A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON AFGHANISTAN, YAQUB SAID THIS WAS PART OF THE ATTEMPT TO COUNTER KABUL'S PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE. THE PAKISTAN MFA HAD PLANS TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE THROUGH DIPLOMATIC ACTION, THOUGH SOME VOTES AT THE UN WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE LOST. THEY VALUED HELP FROM US, AS IN THE PAST. WHEN I ASKED WHETHER THEY INTENDED TO CONSULT US ON THE CONTENT OF ANY PRINCIPLES DECLARATION HE SAID THIS WAS A GOOD IDEA AND INSTRUCTED THE NOTETAKER TO PURSUE IT.

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FRIGATE

FRIGATES

8. IN MENTIONING THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR COMMERCIAL LINKS WITH PAKISTAN I REFERRED TO THE FRIGATE CONTRACT, ON WHICH YAQUB HAD NOTHING TO SAY EXCEPT TO SUGGEST IT WAS OUT OF HIS HANDS.

9. MIFTS (NOT TO ALL) COVER FURTHER BRIEF DISCUSSIONS ON THE GULF AND SRI LANKA/INDIA.

BARRINGTON

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PS

PS | LORD GLENARTHUR

PS | MR EGGAR

PS | PUS

MR. GILLMORE

MR. MCLAREN

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