

SUBJECT: LUNCH WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR ZAMYATIN

2. SUMMARY: SOVIET AMBASSADOR ZAMYATIN WARNED OF THE DANGERS OF ESCALATION POSED BY THE U.S. NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE GULF, BUT REITERATED MOSCOW'S RELUCTANCE TO PURSUE AN ENFORCEMENT RESOLUTION AT THE UN UNTIL THE IRANIANS HAVE RECEIVED THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN TEHRAN. ON AFGHANISTAN, ZAMYATIN CLAIMED THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO INCLUDE FORMER MINISTERS OF THE DAUD GOVERNMENT, NOW IN EXILE, IN A "COALITION GOVERNMENT," BUT WOULD NOT PULL OUT UNCONDITIONALLY. ZAMYATIN EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD SELL MIG-29'S TO JORDAN, SINCE THE AIRCRAFT WERE "TOO SOPHISTICATED FOR THE ARABS." THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR STUCK TO THE OFFICIAL LINE ON ARMS CONTROL, BUT EXPRESSED ENTHUSIASM ABOUT GORBACHEV'S ECONOMIC REFORMS AND MOSCOW'S PLANS TO PUBLISH MORE HISTORICAL MATERIAL ABOUT THE STALIN ERA.
END SUMMARY

3. SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO THE UK LEONID M. ZAMYATIN, AT SHORT NOTICE, INVITED AMBASSADOR PRICE TO LUNCH ON AUGUST 26, RECIPROCATING OUR EARLIER GET-TOGETHER IN MARCH (REF A). ZAMYATIN WILL BE RETURNING TO MOSCOW ON SEPTEMBER 2 FOR A MONTH OF VACATION AND CONSULTATIONS, AND SEEMED MORE INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING U.S. POLICY THAN IN PROBING FOR ANY INSIGHTS INTO THE US-UK DIALOGUE. ZAMYATIN LAID ON A HUGE SPREAD, WITH CAVIAR AND LOBSTER IN ABUNDANCE, AND VODKA (AND SCOTCH) DISCREETLY ON OFFER AMIDST AN ARRAY OF SOVIET WINES. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY EMBASSY FIRST SECRETARY AND ARMS CONTROL UNIT CHIEF NIKOLAY KOSOV. THE AMBASSADOR WAS ACCOMPANIED BY

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GLASNOST AND PERESTROYKA: ZAMYATIN'S A CONVERT

4. BEFORE TURNING TO INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, ZAMYATIN WAXED ON ENTHUSIASTICALLY ABOUT INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION. HE EXCITEDLY EXPLAINED THAT THE COMMUNIST PARTY WAS PLANNING TO PUBLISH DOCUMENTS ABOUT THE STALIN ERA, INCLUDING THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE PARTY CONGRESSES IN THE 1920'S AND 1930'S, AS WELL AS KHRUSHCHEV'S "SECRET SPEECH" TO THE 20TH PARTY CONGRESS IN 1956. HE SAID THERE WERE VIRTUALLY NO LIMITS TO WHAT COULD BE PUBLISHED IN THE SOVIET UNION TODAY.

5. AMBASSADOR PRICE ASKED WHY, IF THIS WERE THE CASE, THE SOVIET PRESS HAD THUS FAR FAILED TO PUBLISH AN ARTICLE ON THE GENEVA TALKS BY AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN, TO RECIPROCATE THE PIECE BY SOVIET CHIEF NEGOTIATOR VORONTSOV IN THE NEW YORK TIMES. ZAMYATIN PROFESSED NOT TO KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THIS, BUT SAID THERE COULD BE NO POSSIBLE OBJECTION TO AN ARTICLE BY KAMPELMAN AFTER THE SOVIETS HAD GIVEN PRIME MINISTER THATCHER AIRTIME BEFORE 20 MILLION SOVIET TELEVISION VIEWERS AND HAD AFFORDED SIMILAR ACCESS TO SECRETARY SHULTZ DURING HIS APRIL VISIT. AMBASSADOR PRICE NOTED THAT THERE STILL SEEMED TO BE SOME LIMITS TO GLASNOST, GIVEN THAT THE SOVIETS WERE STILL JAMMING RADIO LIBERTY. ZAMYATIN READILY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT RADIO LIBERTY WAS BEING JAMMED, BUT ARGUED THAT IT WAS A SUBVERSIVE STATION, BROADCASTING THE VIEWS NOT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, BUT OF DEFECTORS AND ANTI-SOVIET DISSIDENTS.

6. ZAMYATIN WAS EQUALLY UPBEAT ON THE ECONOMIC REFORMS BEING UNDERTAKEN IN THE WAKE OF THE JUNE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM. HE SAID THE SELF-FINANCING OF FACTORIES WOULD HAVE A TREMENDOUS IMPACT: FOR THE FIRST TIME FACTORY MANAGERS AND WORKERS WOULD HAVE A DIRECT STAKE IN THE QUALITY OF PRODUCTION AND IN WHETHER THE GOODS COULD BE SOLD. ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT OPPOSITION TO GORBACHEV'S REFORMS, ZAMYATIN SAID THERE WAS, OF COURSE, SOME OPPOSITION, BUT THIS WAS LARGELY ON THE PART OF WORKERS WHO WERE COMFORTABLE WITH THE OLD SYSTEM AND WHO WERE NOT EAGER TO WORK HARDER. ZAMYATIN SAID THAT THERE WAS NOW A POSSIBILITY OF FACTORIES LAYING OFF REDUNDANT WORKERS TO INCREASE EFFICIENCY. THOSE LAID OFF, HE SAID, WOULD BE GIVEN NEW JOBS IN SIBERIA, WHERE THERE WAS A LABOR SHORTAGE (COMMENT: ZAMYATIN HAS NOT YET SHED ALL "OLD THINKING," IT WOULD APPEAR. END COMMENT).

PERSIAN GULF

7. A GOOD DEAL OF THE DISCUSSION OF FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES FOCUSED ON THE GULF. ZAMYATIN, WITH SOME EMOTION, ARGUED THAT THE U.S. NAVAL PRESENCE WAS LIKELY TO PROVOKE AN ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT. CITING THE SOVIETS' DIFFICULTIES IN AFGHANISTAN IN DEALING WITH THE MUJAHEDIN, ZAMYATIN SAID THAT THERE WAS NO PREDICTING HOW THE FANATICS IN TEHRAN WOULD BEHAVE. HE ARGUED THAT PRIORITY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS AT THE UNITED NATIONS.

8. ASKED BY AMBASSADOR PRICE ABOUT THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD A FOLLOW-ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ENCOMPASSING AN ARMS EMBARGO, ZAMYATIN SAID SUCH A RESOLUTION SHOULD NOT BE PURSUED UNTIL THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS BEEN RECEIVED IN TEHRAN. AMBASSADOR PRICE STRESSED THAT TIME WAS RUNNING OUT: WE NEEDED TO PUT MORE PRESSURE ON THE IRANIANS TO ACCEPT RESOLUTION 598, AND ADOPT ENFORCEMENT MEASURES IF THEY REFUSE TO DO SO. HE DISPUTED ZAMYATIN'S CLAIMS ABOUT THE U.S. NAVAL PRESENCE, NOTING OUR SHARED INTEREST IN DEFENDING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND THE NEED TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE IRANIANS TO TAKE THE UN PROCESS SERIOUSLY. ZAMYATIN QUESTIONED WHETHER AN ARMS EMBARGO WOULD HAVE ANY EFFECT, GIVEN THE AMOUNT OF ARMS AVAILABLE ON THE WORLD MARKET, AND REPEATED HIS WARNINGS ABOUT THE DANGERS OF THE SITUATION GIVEN THE FANATICISM OF THE AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND HIS FOLLOWERS.

AFGHANISTAN

9. AMBASSADOR PRICE ASKED ZAMYATIN WHEN THE SOVIETS WERE PLANNING TO PULL OUT OF AFGHANISTAN. ZAMYATIN THEN LAUNCHED INTO A LENGTHY PRESENTATION WHICH HE SEEMED TO HAVE THOUGHT THROUGH IN ADVANCE. HE CLAIMED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD OVER THE PAST YEAR MADE A CONSCIOUS DECISION TO ALLOW THE MUJAHEDIN TO ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER SOME PROVINCES IN AFGHANISTAN IN ORDER TO TEST WHETHER THEY WOULD ACT RESPONSIBLY (SIC). THE RESULT, HOWEVER, WAS A BLOODBATH: ALL SUPPORTERS OF THE KABUL REGIME WERE BRUTALLY KILLED OR DESTROYED. THIS ILLUSTRATED, ZAMYATIN EXPLAINED, THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SOVIETS TO PULL OUT OF AFGHANISTAN UNCONDITIONALLY. THERE HAD TO BE GUARANTEES THAT A HOSTILE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE ESTABLISHED ON THE SOVIET UNION'S BORDERS.

10. REFERRING TO THE PROGRAM OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION BEING PURSUED BY THE KABUL GOVERNMENT, ZAMYATIN SAID THE SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE PARTICIPATION OF TWO FORMER MINISTERS OF THE DAUD GOVERNMENT, NOW IN EXILE, IN A "COALITION GOVERNMENT." ZAMYATIN SAID HE DID NOT RECALL THE NAMES OF THESE TWO MINISTERS, BUT COULD PROVIDE THEM IF DESIRED. ASKED BY THE AMBASSADOR WHETHER THIS WAS THE SAME IDEA AS PREVIOUS SUGGESTIONS TO INCLUDE KING ZAHER SHAH, ZAMYATIN SAID HE WAS

REFERRING TO DIFFERENT INDIVIDUALS, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS CONTINUED TO SEE A POSSIBLE ROLE FOR THE FORMER KING AS WELL. ZAMYATIN THEN WENT ON TO STRESS THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE GUARANTEES FROM OUTSIDE POWERS, INCLUDING THE U.S. HE COMPLAINED THAT THE U.S. WAS PREVENTING PAKISTAN FROM NEGOTIATING SERIOUSLY IN THE UN-SPONSORED TALKS, A CHARGE WHICH WE DISPUTED.

MIGS TO JORDAN?

11. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED ZAMYATIN WHETHER THE SOVIETS WERE PLANNING TO SELL MIGS TO JORDAN. ZAMYATIN SAID HE WAS NOT FULLY INFORMED, BUT THAT HE THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD SELL MIG-29'S. THE PLANES WERE "TOO SOPHISTICATED FOR THE ARABS," HE EXPLAINED.

ARMS CONTROL

12. DISCUSSIONS OF ARMS CONTROL YIELDED NO SURPRISES. ZAMYATIN HAD JUST RECEIVED INITIAL PRESS REPORTS OF CHANCELLOR KOHL'S AUGUST 26 STATEMENT ON PERSHING 1A'S. HE AND KOSOV HESITATED TO SAY WHETHER THIS WOULD BE VIEWED IN MOSCOW AS RESOLVING THE P-1A ISSUE. THEY

REPETATED FAMILIAR SOVIET ARGUMENTS THAT THE U.S. WARHEADS FOR THE GERMAN PERSHING'S HAD TO BE ELIMINATED AND THAT THIS WAS AN ISSUE OF PRINCIPLE FOR MOSCOW. WE REPLIED THAT PROTECTING ESTABLISHED PATTERNS OF ALLIANCE COOPERATION WAS AN ISSUE OF PRINCIPLE FOR THE U.S. AND THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WOULD RATHER HAVE NO AGREEMENT THAN ACCEPT A BAD AGREEMENT.

13. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED ZAMYATIN WHY THE SOVIETS WERE HOLDING UP PROGRESS IN START. ZAMYATIN AND KOSSOV REHEARSED STANDARD SOVIET POSITIONS ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS WITHOUT AGREEMENT ON STEPS TO "STRENGTHEN" THE ABM TREATY.

US-UK RELATIONS

14. ZAMYATIN OFFERED LITTLE COMMENT IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION BY AMBASSADOR PRICE ABOUT THE CURRENT STATE OF UK-SOVIET RELATIONS. HE SAID HE HAD NO IDEA WHEN GORBACHEV WOULD PAY A RETURN VISIT TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER BUT CLAIMED THAT IN GORBACHEV'S MOST RECENT LETTER TO THATCHER (REF B), HE HAD EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH A PURPORTED SUGGESTION BY HER THAT THE TWO MEET INFORMALLY WHEN, FOR EXAMPLE, ONE OR THE OTHER WAS PASSING THROUGH ENROUTE TO ANOTHER DESTINATION. (COMMENT: WE ASKED THE FCO ABOUT THIS; THEY EXPRESSED SOME SURPRISE, SINCE THATCHER HAD NOT MADE ANY SUCH OFFER, AND SINCE GORBACHEV'S LAST LETTER HAD SPOKEN SIMPLY OF HIS DESIRE TO TAKE UP THATCHER'S INVITATION FOR A RETURN VISIT AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME. THEY SAID IT WAS NOT INCONCEIVABLE, HOWEVER, THAT GORBACHEV WOULD "DROP IN FOR A CHAT" ON HIS WAY TO OR FROM A US-SOVIET SUMMIT IN WASHINGTON. END COMMENT.)

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