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cc PC  
cc FCO

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

7 October 1987

**PROPOSED CALL BY MONSIEUR LEOTARD ON THE PRIME MINISTER**

Thank you for your letter about the efforts being made by Monsieur Leotard and his staff to secure a meeting with the Prime Minister.

I am at a loss to know when or how Monsieur Wajsman had a long conversation with the Prime Minister. He was one of the members of the staff of *Le Figaro* to whom she gave an interview last January. Most of the interview was in the form of written question and answer. But there was a meeting with Monsieur Wajsman and one other in your Embassy at which a few oral questions were added and photographs taken. I was present throughout and do not recall any discussion then of a possible meeting with Monsieur Leotard. I have checked with one or two possible contacts, such as Hugh Thomas, who deny any knowledge of Monsieur Wajsman. I cannot easily check with the Prime Minister herself since her mind is on other things in Blackpool, but I have to say that I take Monsieur Wajsman's claims with a large pinch of salt.

Whatever the truth of the matter, I do not see any prospect of the Prime Minister being able to see Monsieur Leotard in the near future.

C D POWELL

His Excellency Sir Ewen Fergusson, K.C.M.G.

EA

SECRET



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*cc P.C.*  
*(22)*

10 DOWNING STREET  
LONDON SW1A 2AA

*From the Private Secretary*

6 October 1987

**MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT MITTERRAND**

I enclose the text of the message which President Mitterrand has now sent to the Prime Minister to follow up their discussion on Saturday 3 October about Franco-German defence and the prospects for nuclear co-operation. I should be grateful if you could have a translation made before the weekend for the Prime Minister.

I am copying this letter and enclosure to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and to Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).

C. D. Powell

Lyn Parker, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

SECRET

SUBJECT  
CC MASTER  
OPS.

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL MESSAGE  
SERIAL No. T.181A187

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LONDRES DE PARIS  
SECRET GOUVERNEMENTAL-NR 773  
BT

FM MONSIEUR FRANCOIS MITTERRAND  
PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE  
PARIS

TO MADAME MARGARET THATCHER  
PREMIER MINISTRE DU ROYAUME UNI  
DE GRANDE-BRETAGNE ET D'IRLANDE DU NORD  
LONDRES

PARIS, LE 6 OCTOBRE 1987



MADAME LE PREMIER MINISTRE,

AINSI QUE NOUS EN ETIONS CONVENUS, JE VOUS ECRIS POUR POURSUIVRE NOTRE DIALOGUE SUR L'ETAT ACTUEL ET LES PERSPECTIVES D'AVENIR DE LA COOPERATION FRANCO-ALLEMANDE ET DE LA COOPERATION FRANCO-BRITANNIQUE EN MATIERE DE DEFENSE ET DE SECURITE.

AVEC LE CHANCELIER SCHMIDT, PUIS AVEC LE CHANCELIER KOHL, J'AI METHODIQUEMENT CHERCHE, DEPUIS MAINTENANT SIX ANS, A CONCRETISER ET A FAIRE PROGRESSER LE RAPPROCHEMENT FRANCO-ALLEMAND INITIE IL Y A VINGT-CINQ ANS. LE TRAITE SIGNE LE 22 JANVIER 1963 A L'ELYSEE PAR LE GENERAL DE GAULLE ET LE CHANCELIER ADENAUER STIPULAIT EN EFFET QU'EN MATIERE DE DEFENSE: "LES AUTORITES COMPETENTES DES DEUX PAYS S'ATTACHERONT A RAPPROCHER LEURS DOCTRINES EN VUE D'ABOUTIR A DES CONCEPTIONS COMMUNES".

MAIS CES DISPOSITIONS SONT RESTEES LETTRE MORTE JUSQU'A CE QUE NOUS DECIDIONS, LE CHANCELIER KOHL ET MOI-MEME, LE 22 OCTOBRE 1982, DE REDONNER VIE A CETTE PARTIE OUBLIEE DU TRAITE EN ORGANISANT, ENTRE MINISTRES, RESPONSABLES MILITAIRES ET HAUTS-FONCTIONNAIRES, LES CONSULTATIONS REGULIERES QUI EN DECOULENT.

TROIS POINTS ONT TOUJOURS ETE CLAIRS POUR LE CHANCELIER KOHL ET POUR MOI-MEME, COMME JE CROIS POUR NOS ALLIES ET PARTENAIRES QUE NOUS AVONS TENUS REGULIEREMENT INFORMES: CE RAPPROCHEMENT S'INSCRIT DANS LE CADRE DE NOTRE ALLIANCE., IL DONNE LIEU A DES DEVELOPPEMENTS UTILES POUR NOS DEUX PAYS ET POUR TOUS NOS ALLIES., ENFIN, NI LA FRANCE, NI LA REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNE N'ONT A MODIFIER EN QUOI QUE CE SOIT LEURS POSITIONS RESPECTIVES EN CE QUI CONCERNE L'ARME NUCLEAIRE ET L'APPARTENANCE A L'ORGANISATION MILITAIRE INTEGREE DE L'ALLIANCE.

LE RAPPROCHEMENT FRANCO-ALLEMAND A DONC PROGRESSE CES DERNIERES ANNEES. EN 1983, J'AI DECIDE LA CREATION DE LA FORCE D'ACTION RAPIDE DESTINEE, ENTRE AUTRES MISSIONS, A AGIR AUX COTES DES FORCES ALLEMANDES.



LES FORMATIONS COMMUNES D'OFFICIERS ONT ETE ENCOURAGEES. LORS DU SOMMET FRANCO-ALLEMAND DU 28 FEVRIER 1986, LE CHANCELIER KOHL ET MOI-MEME AVONS PREVU L'ORGANISATION DE GRANDES MANOEUVRES FRANCO-ALLEMANDES, CELLES-LA MEME QUI VIENNENT D'AVOIR LIEU EN BAVIERE. LORS DE CE MEME SOMMET, JE ME SUIS DECLARE DISPOSE, SI LES DELAIS LE PERMETTAIENT, ET TOUT EN RAPPELANT QU'EN LA MATIERE LA DECISION NE PEUT ETRE PARTAGEE, A CONSULTER LE CHANCELIER DE LA REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNE SUR L'EMPLOI EVENTUEL DES ARMES PRESTRATEGIQUES FRANCAISES SUR LE TERRITOIRE ALLEMAND.

PLUS RECEMMENT, EN MAI 1987, LE CHANCELIER KOHL A PROPOSE QUE LA FRANCE ET LA REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNE METTENT SUR PIED UNE UNITE COMMUNE. J'AI APPROUVE CETTE IDEE QUI EST AUJOURD'HUI A L'ETUDE ET DEVRAIT ABOUTIR DANS UN DELAI RAPPROCHE.

EN RAISON DE L'ENSEMBLE DE CES DEVELOPPEMENTS, LE CHANCELIER ET MOI-MEME AVONS RESSENTI LE BESOIN DE COURONNER CET EDIFICE ET NOUS ENVISAGEONS QUE NOS RENCONTRES SUR CES QUESTIONS POUR NOUS INFORMER, ARBITRER ET IMPULSER SOIENT MIEUX ENCORE COORDONNEES. NOTRE REFLEXION SE POURSUIT SUR LE ROLE ET LE CONTENU D'UN CONSEIL DE DEFENSE FRANCO-ALLEMAND. IL S'AGIT TOUJOURS D'ALLER DANS LA MEME DIRECTION, CELLE D'UNE PLUS GRANDE COMPLEMENTARITE FRANCO-ALLEMANDE, D'UNE PLUS GRANDE INTEROPERABILITE, POUR REPRENDRE LA TERMINOLOGIE MILITAIRE. CELA NE PEUT, A MES YEUX, GENER OU AFFAIBLIR L'ALLIANCE, BIEN AU CONTRAIRE.

C'EST PARCE QUE JE PLACE LA COOPERATION MILITAIRE FRANCO-BRITANNIQUE DANS UNE PERSPECTIVE COMPARABLE QUE J'EN SOUHAITE EGALLEMENT L'INTENSIFICATION, NOTAMMENT EN MATIERE NUCLEAIRE, PUISQUE LA FRANCE ET LA GRANDE-BRETAGNE SONT LES SEULES PUISSANCES EN EUROPE OCCIDENTALE A DETENIR CETTE ARME. NOUS AVONS EU L'OCCASION D'ABORDER CETTE QUESTION A PLUSIEURS REPRIS, EN PARTICULIER LORS DE NOTRE RENCONTRE A LONDRES APRES LE SOMMET DE REYKJAVIK. J'AI DECLARE LE 15 JANVIER 1987 A CHATHAM HOUSE, QUE J'ETAIS FAVORABLE A CETTE COORDINATION NUCLEAIRE FRANCO-BRITANNIQUE.

J'AI DONC TROUVE PROMETTEUSES ET UTILES LES CONVERSATIONS DE MM. YOUNGER ET GIRAUD QUI ONT FAIT SUITE AUX PREMIERS CONTACTS QU'AVAIENT PRIS A CE SUJET MM. HERNU ET QUILES AVEC LEURS HOMOLOGUES. COORDONNER LES PATROUILLES DE NOS SOUS-MARINS NUCLEAIRES LANCEURS D'ENGINS, REPARTIR LES TACHES DE SURVEILLANCE DES ZONES DE PATROUILLES DE CES SOUS-MARINS, ECHANGER DES INFORMATIONS SUR NOS PLANS DE FRAPPE RESPECTIFS DE FACON A POUVOIR LES COORDONNER, REALISER EN COMMUN UN MISSILE NUCLEAIRE AIR-SOL, PROCEDER A DIVERS ECHANGES TECHNOLOGIQUES, SONT, A MES YEUX, DES OBJECTIFS DU PLUS HAUT INTERET.

LES EFFORTS AINSI ENGAGES PAR NOS PAYS POUR MIEUX COOPERER ENTRE EUX REPONDENT A LA NECESSITE POUR L'EUROPE DE MIEUX ASSURER SA PROPRE SECURITE, DONC DE RENFORCER LA SECURITE COMMUNE DE L'ALLIANCE.

A DES TITRES DIVERS, L'ESPAGNE, L'ITALIE, LA BELGIQUE, LES PAYS-BAS ONT, CES DERNIERS MOIS, MARQUE DE L'INTERET POUR TELLE OU TELLE FORME DE COOPERATION EUROPEENNE EN MATIERE DE DEFENSE.

ET J'AI RAPPELE, LE JEUDI 24 SEPTEMBRE, EN REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNE QUE NOTRE REFLEXION ETAIT OUVERTE AUX PARTENAIRES EUROPEENS QUI LE DESIRAIENT.

J'AI VOULU QUE VOUS SOYEZ TENUE AU COURANT DE CES DEMANDES ET J'AI ETE HEUREUX DE VOUS ENTENDRE AU TELEPHONE LA SEMAINE DERNIERE.

JE VOUS PRIE D'AGREER, MADAME LE PREMIER MINISTRE, L'EXPRESSION DE MA TRES HAUTE CONSIDERATION.

FRANCOIS MITTERRAND

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LETTER FROM PRESIDENT MITTERRAND TO THE PRIME MINISTER,  
6 OCTOBER

As we agreed, I am writing to you to continue our dialogue on the current state and future prospects of Franco/German cooperation and Franco/British cooperation on Defence and Security.

With Chancellor Schmidt and later Chancellor Kohl I have been seeking consistently for six years now, to give body to and take forward the Franco/German rapprochement which began 25 years ago. The Elysee Treaty signed on 22 January 1963 by General De Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer laid down indeed that on Defence "the competent authorities of the two countries will make efforts to bring their doctrines together so as to reach common assessments".

But this undertaking remained unimplemented, until Chancellor Kohl and I decided on 22 October 1982 to revive this forgotten section of the Treaty by establishing the regular consultations between Ministers, military staffs and officials which flow from it.

Three points have always been clear for Chancellor Kohl and myself, and I believe for our Alliance partners, whom we have kept regularly informed. First, this rapprochement takes place within the framework of our Alliance. It permits developments which are useful for our two countries and for all our Allies. Finally neither France or the FRG is required to modify in any way its own position on nuclear weapons or on belonging to the Alliance's integrated structure.

Franco/German rapprochement has made progress in recent years. In 1983 I decided to create the Rapid Action Force which is intended, among other functions, to act alongside German forces. Common training of officers has been encouraged. At the Franco/German Summit of 28 February 1986 Chancellor Kohl and I looked forward to the organisation of large scale Franco/German manoeuvres, which indeed have just taken place in Bavaria. At that Summit I said that I was ready, if time permitted, to consult the Chancellor of the FRG about eventual use of French pre-strategic weapons on German

territory, although I made clear that the decision on this question cannot be shared.

More recently in May 1987 Chancellor Kohl proposed that France and the FRG should organise a joint military unit. I endorse this idea which is currently being studied and should come to fruition in the near future.

In the light of these developments, Chancellor Kohl and I feel the need to crown the edifice, and we plan to coordinate still better our meetings on these questions to inform each other, to take decisions and to spur us on. We are continuing to reflect on the role and content of a Franco/German Defence Council. This too would be intended to move in the same direction of a greater Franco/German complementarity, or interoperability to use a military term. In my view this cannot inconvenience or weaken the Alliance; on the contrary.

It is because I place Franco/British Military cooperation in a similar perspective that I should like to see it intensified, particularly in the nuclear field, since France and Great Britain are the only Western European powers to possess these weapons. We have discussed this question several times, in particular during our meeting in London after the Reykjavik Summit. I said at Chatham House on 15 June 1987 that I welcomed this Franco/British nuclear coordination.

I therefore found promising and useful the conversations between Mr Younger and M Giraud which have followed the first contacts on this subject which M Hernu and M Quiles had with their opposite numbers. The most worthwhile aims in my view would be coordinating the patrols of of our ballistic nuclear submarines; dividing their task of surveillance of patrol zones; exchanging information on our strike plans in such a way as to coordinate them; producing together a nuclear air to ground missile; and various technological exchanges.



The attempts begun by our two countries to cooperate better together, respond to the need for Europe to safeguard better her own security and therefore to strengthen the common security of the Alliance.

In various ways Spain, Italian, Belgian and The Netherlands have in recent months shown interest in one or another form of European cooperation on defence. I underlined on Thursday 24 September in the FRG that our thinking was open to European partners who wished to join.

I wanted you to be kept up to date with these requests, and I was pleased to talk to you on the telephone last week.

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