

SECRET

17

file DTS

SIR PERCY CRADOCK

US/SOVIET SUMMIT

Thank you for your note covering Mr Mallaby's minute and draft. I find the latter otiose because:

- it is already agreed that we should send a message to the President (and possibly to Gorbachev) before the December Summit and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have been instructed orally to draft.
- we are constantly getting reports from Washington on United States intentions for the Summit. The latest came from Mrs Ridgway in the Quadrapartite Political Directors meeting;
- instructions have issued to Washington to take action to ensure that any non-circumvention clause in the INF agreement does not affect existing patterns of co-operation;
- the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have discussed the possibility of a visit to Washington ahead of a second Summit next year. The Prime Minister accepts the need in principle but the timing requires careful consideration.

I am not quite sure why Mr Mallaby has suddenly decided to enter this field; nor, in particular, why he has chosen to send a draft to you instead of using normal channels.

C D POWELL

12 November 1987

DASADQ

SECRET

SECRET

16

COPY NO 1 OF 2

MR POWELL ^{o/r.}

11 November 1987

US/SOVIET SUMMIT

1. You should see Christopher Mallaby's minute and draft
--- attached.

2. We need to give some thought to our pre- and post-Summit strategy.


3. I agree that we should quiz the Americans thoroughly on their Summit plans and that the Prime Minister should send a pre-Summit message. The main danger, as we have been recently reminded, is for a resurrection of the nuclear-free world idea in some general language emanating from Reagan/Gorbachev conversations. A reference to the Camp David II communique in the Prime Minister's message should be a good way of reminding the President of our concerns, without a direct mention of 'surprises'. The second requirement, and here again Camp David II would be useful, is the need to ensure that an INF agreement does not affect existing patterns of defence cooperation with allies or preclude modernisation.

4. Equally important, we should plan for a visit by the Prime Minister to Washington early next year in advance of next year's Summit, which being less tightly scripted, could be more dangerous. This would provide the opportunity to give the President a steer and also the chance to talk about other major issues, eg the world financial situation. If the President travels to Europe for a NATO meeting before the Moscow Summit he could see the Prime Minister in London; but this may be less reliable, since, as the Americans may see it, it could be invidious to pick one NATO ally out for special attention.

SECRET

SECRET

5. Another aspect of Summit arrangements is a possible visit here by Gorbachev en route for Washington. I gather we have already sown the seed.



PERCY CRADOCK

SECRET



SECRET AND PERSONAL

B.0311

SIR PERCY CRADOCK

United States/Soviet Summit

I understand from the FCO that the exact intentions of the United States regarding consultations with allies before the forthcoming Summit meeting are not yet clear. But it is expected that Mr Nitze and others, but almost certainly not Mr Shultz, will participate in a meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

2. There is no longer any idea of a NATO Summit meeting before or after the US/Soviet Summit. Mr Shultz is likely to brief the regular meeting of Foreign Ministers in the North Atlantic Council on 10/11 December about the outcome of the Washington Summit.

3. For various reasons, there should be no great risk that the Washington Summit will produce for us the shocks that came out of the US/Soviet meeting in Reykjavik. It is probable that people in Washington are now conscious of the dangers of putting forward new ideas on the spur of the moment. The views of important European countries about "denuclearisation" are well known and widely shared in Washington.

4. Nevertheless, further shocks would be a very serious matter and the question of how to minimise their likelihood is important. There is a case for considering a message from the Prime Minister to the President some days before the Washington Summit, to remind him tactfully that surprises would be far from welcome.

5. I attach a draft letter from Mr Powell to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office which requests that the ground be prepared for a possible message from the Prime Minister.

C L G Mallaby

10 November 1987

SECRET AND PERSONAL

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Draft letter from Mr Powell to

A C Galsworthy Esq CMG

United States/Soviet Summit

The Prime Minister has in mind the possibility of sending a message to President Reagan some days before he meets Mr Gorbachev ^{on 7 December}. This might summarise our understanding, following consultations with the Americans bilaterally and in the Alliance, of American intentions for the Summit, at least as regards arms control. It might recall the points that were agreed at the Prime Minister's last meeting with the President at Camp David and conclude by making clear the Prime Minister's hope that there would be no unexpected developments at the Summit. The way to put this last point would require careful consideration; one possibility would be to express appreciation of consultations undertaken by the United States before the Summit and to say that these should clearly ensure that the friends of the United States would not be surprised by any part of the results.

2. Before deciding whether to send a message or further considering its possible contents, the Prime Minister would be grateful to have a full and clear statement of United States intentions for the Summit. Any meeting of the North Atlantic Council before the Summit, even if attended by Mr Nitze and others, might not provide as full and frank a statement as we could obtain bilaterally from the Americans. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary may wish to instruct Sir Antony Acland to call on General Powell at the White House - and possibly on Mr Shultz - to obtain a full account of United States intentions at the Summit regarding arms control and more generally. Sir Antony's report should be received by 20 November, to enable the Prime Minister to consider the question of a message to the President.

3. I am sending copies of this letter only to John Howe (Ministry of Defence) and Trevor Woolley (Cabinet Office).